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THE BULLETIN
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PITTSBURGH INSTITUTE OF LEGAL MEDICINE



"THE ASSASSINATION OF ROBERT F. KENNEDY: CURRENT STATUS OF THE CASE"

By Gregory Stone

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Reasonable grounds for doubt exist that Sirhan B. Sirhan acted alone in the assassination of Senator Robert Kennedy in June 1968. The balance of available evidence establishes a rebuttable presumption that at least two guns were fired in the Ambassador Hotel pantry on the night of the shooting, and a variety of other unresolved problems also exist, pointing in the direction of conspiracy. The response to these issues to date by the directors of the key Los Angeles law enforcement agencies has been persistently irresponsible or worse. Facts have been misrepresented, central items of evidence have been destroyed, and extensive and basic information has been suppressed throughout, obstructing independent appraisal of critical issues. On the basis of current information, no final judgement on the assassination is possible.

The present incoherence of this case is wholly unacceptable. Efforts to address the outstanding problems might result in either: 1.) information restoring credibility to the "lone assassin" hypothesis; 2.) inconclusive results, with a showing (presently absent) of effective pursuit of the truth; or 3.) information conclusively exploding the "lone assassin" hypothesis and suggesting conspiracy possibilities. Promising avenues of investigation remain open, providing significant prospect of resolving current problems of the evidence.

Some major aspects of the case as it presently stands are detailed in what follows.

I. Number of Guns Fired in the Shooting

Sirhan was unquestionably firing at Senator Kennedy during the assassination, but his was not the only gun present at the scene. Strong indications exist that more than eight bullets were fired during the shooting, consisting of: 1.) evidence that the bullet holes and damage acknowledged by officials could not have been caused by eight Sirhan bullets; and 2.) evidence of other bullets or bullet damage beyond what has been officially acknowledged. Authorities have repeatedly insisted that only Sirhan's gun was fired in the pantry, and no known information exists concerning the defensive or innocent firing of any other weapon. Because Sirhan's revolver had an eight shot capacity, verification that any additional bullets were fired establishes the firing of at least one other gun.

1. The gun wrested from Sirhan's hand following his apprehension was an Iver Johnson Cadet model .22 caliber revolver. All eight chambers contained expended cartridges, making the firing of up to eight Sirhan shots plausible.
2. Senator Kennedy was wounded three times, and each of five other victims once. Two bullets were recovered from the senator, and one each from the other victims. According to the official police reports (see addenda), one additional bullet (which allegedly passed through the sen-

ator's chest) made a hole in a pantry ceiling tile and was lost in the "interspace" between the tile and the ceiling. Officials have also confirmed the existence of two other bullet holes in the ceiling tiles, as well as further sets of bullet holes in the right shoulder pad of the senator's suit coat and the trousers of another shooting victim (Goldstein). Failure to reconcile this acknowledged bullet damage with a maximum of eight Sirhan shots would confirm that two or more guns were fired in the assassination.

3. Officials contend that one Sirhan bullet (mini-mag, hollow point, long rifle) traversed a ceiling tile, rebounded off the ceiling, exited a second tile, struck a victim (Evans) located nearly 20 feet away, and lodged in her forehead - all the while retaining 3/4 of its original weight. Evans testified at Sirhan's trial that she was bent over when hit. According to the police theory the bullet striking Evans travelled downward from the ceiling, but in fact it proceeded at an upward angle in her forehead. If the official theory of this shot is incorrect, separate bullets caused the Evans wound and the two ceiling tile holes, and an additional shot (beyond the eight acknowledged) was fired.
4. Police contend that the shot passing through the senator's right shoulder pad, back-to-front, struck a nearby victim (Schrade) in the forehead. Schrade, however, was travelling approximately four or five feet behind Senator Kennedy, and the steep upward angle of the shoulder pad shot makes it doubtful that this bullet could have struck even a person standing in front of the Senator. If Schrade's wound was not caused by a bullet which struck Senator Kennedy or his clothing, a further additional shot was fired.
5. In order to reconcile the angle of the shot which traversed Senator Kennedy's chest with the possibility that it also caused the third ceiling tile bullet hole, the police flight path chart and photographic crime reconstruction place the senator several feet to the west of the first pantry "steam table." This creates discrepancies, however, because Sirhan reportedly never passed the west edge of the steam table, making point blank shots from him implausible (I.I.C.), and because the senator's body on the floor extends over four feet to the east of this position. If the third ceiling tile bullet hole was caused by the same bullet which also struck a victim or his clothing, it accounts for an additional shot.
6. The direction the senator is facing in the police flight path diagram is inconsistent with the possibility that either the through-and-through or shoulder pad shot could have caused one of the three acknowledged ceiling tile holes, given the angles of these shots. Locating the senator further to the south might rescue this possibility, but it would also rule out the possibility that either shot was fired by Sirhan, who was blocked against the south edge of the steam table. Rotating the senator's body further left to solve this problem would con-

flict with eyewitness reports, and with the direction of his body as he lay on the floor, given his backward fall. Unless they can be resolved, these problems also suggest that the third ceiling tile hole was caused by an additional shot.

7. According to the official FBI report describing the hotel area in which the shooting occurred, four "bullet holes" and two "reported" bullet holes or marks were identified following the shooting in the swinging door area at the west end of the pantry. (See addenda.) Captioned photographs to that effect were included in the FBI reports, which were not publicly available for several years after the assassination. These documents corroborate prior accounts and photographs of this area by individuals on the scene shortly after the shooting. Each of these holes is beyond the bullet damage consistent with the firing of only a single gun at the assassination scene.*
8. Following the shooting, what appeared to be a bullet was discovered lodged in a door frame in Sirhan's line of fire in the anteroom to the west of the pantry. Two police officers (Rozzi and Wright) who examined the base of this object believed that it was a bullet, and reiterated this belief explicitly when they were identified, located, and questioned seven years later. This area was photographed several times during the crime scene examination and appears in an Associated Press wirephoto captioned "BULLET FOUND NEAR KENNEDY SHOOTING SCENE." Witnesses present when the object was removed have not been identified or located. This apparent bullet is separate from, and additional to, the ones described in item I.7. above.
9. According to an Ambassador hotel maitre d' (A. DiPierro), a former army infantryman, in the period after the shooting he observed "a small caliber bullet lodged about a quarter of an inch into the wood" in the center divider of the swinging doors mentioned above (I.7.). He has stated that this bullet had not been present at that location previously.
10. A hotel waiter (Patrusky) who was present during the shooting recounted that he was told by a plain-clothes police officer at a crime scene reconstruction a few days afterwards that two bullets had been extracted by police from the center divider mentioned above. (I.7., I.9.)
11. The police criminalist (Wolfer) who directed the pantry examination stated at one point in a legal deposition that while "in charge of the crime scene" he "recovered the bullets that were recovered." However,

* Here as elsewhere the trivial possibility of a prior firearms shooting in the Ambassador Hotel pantry is excluded. No suggestion of any such shooting has ever been made.

official records clearly identify eight bullets discharged in the shooting which were not recovered at the crime scene - seven in victims and one "lost somewhere in the ceiling interspace." Any bullets "recovered" from the crime scene, as suggested in Wolfer's remark, would each be in excess of eight.

12. During a crime scene reconstruction several days after the shooting, the county coroner (Noguchi) was directed to the door frames of the swinging doors noted above (I.7., I.9., I.10.) in response to an inquiry as to where bullet holes had been found at the scene. These locations bear markings apparently made by investigators, and previous police photos had been taken of them. The coroner ordered that the areas be photographed, and one of these photos was included in the autopsy report. (The record in this case of the coroner's office may be the best of those of the Los Angeles law enforcement agencies involved.)
13. The identification of center divider bullet holes in the FBI report (I.7.) has been independently corroborated by a professor of Police Science (Bailey) who had been an FBI Special Agent assigned to the case, and who examined the pantry area closely several hours after the shooting.

II. Origin of the Bullets Which Struck Senator Kennedy or His Clothing

Three bullets struck Senator Kennedy's body and an additional bullet passed harmlessly through the right shoulder pad of his suit coat. All entered from the right rear at a leftward and steeply upward angle. Subsequent scientific tests established that these shots were fired from virtually point-blank range. Grave doubts exist, however, as to whether Sirhan's gun ever reached that near to the senator, whether it was ever positioned at a location to his rear, or whether four point blank shots could have been discharged before Sirhan's gun arm was pushed away.

1. Muzzle distance from Senator Kennedy of the gun firing shots which struck him or his clothing:
 - a.) Scientific tests involving nitrite and powder burns were conducted by the Los Angeles County coroner (Noguchi) and a police department criminalist (Wolfer) to determine the muzzle distance of the shots striking the senator and/or his clothing. Wolfer testified at the trial that the fatal bullet entered from a distance of approximately "one inch" from the senator's right ear, and that the other shots were fired at a distance of between "one to six inches" from his clothing. Noguchi testified that the fatal bullet entered from between "one to 1½ inches" from the edge of the ear, and that the other gunshot wounds were inflicted from a distance of "contact" to "one inch." These ranges of distance have been supported

by Los Angeles authorities and endorsed in subsequent outside evaluations of the distance evidence.

- b.) Though disagreeing on various other matters, the eyewitnesses in a position to see the shooting have stated overwhelmingly that Sirhan's gun never came closer than $1\frac{1}{2}$ to 3 feet from the senator's body. No grand jury or trial testimony ever put it any closer. (Among distances reported by various witnesses are the following: Burns, $1\frac{1}{2}$ -2 feet; Cesar, 2 feet; V. DiPierro (grand jury), Sirhan 4-6 feet; Hamill, 2 feet; Lubic, 2-3 feet; Minasian, 3 feet, Patrusky, 3 feet; Romero, one yard; Schulte, 3 yards; Uecker, $1\frac{1}{2}$ -2 feet. (Clarification is desirable for the observations of some witnesses, such as DiPierro, Urso and Yaro.) As Sirhan was initially assumed by all to be the lone assailant, this issue was never noticed or pursued in the formal grand jury or trial proceedings.
- c.) In approaching Senator Kennedy, Sirhan was blocked by the pantry steam table on his right and by a hotel assistant maitre d' (Uecker), who was leading the senator forward, on his left. In order for a point-blank shot (II.l.a.) by Sirhan to have been possible, Senator Kennedy must have been within at least two to three feet of the steam table, which Sirhan reportedly did not pass. Official representations, however, have placed him beyond this range, in attempting to attribute to a single bullet both the wound in Senator Kennedy's chest and a ceiling tile hole more than six feet west of the steam table. (I.5.)
- d.) The pantry area was highly congested during the shooting, with at least 77 people present, and visibility was sharply limited. As Sirhan opened fire, he attracted the exclusive attention of many of those close in. People dove for cover and pandemonium ensued for some moments.
- e.) At least one other unquestioned gun was in Senator Kennedy's immediate vicinity at the time of the shooting. It was drawn by a security guard (Cesar) who had been travelling at the senator's right and whose fallen clip-on tie appears at the senator's side in the first photograph taken following his fall. The guard later denied having fired his gun. No record exists that it was either inspected or impounded by police, and the presence of other guns in or near the shooting area cannot be ruled out.

2. Direction of the shots:

- a.) According to the hotel employee (Uecker) who was leading Senator Kennedy forward just prior to the shooting, Sirhan approached from the senator's front, and he felt the senator's right arm fall out of his hand after the firing began. Uecker was the first to grab Sirhan, pushing his gun arm away, and according

to his account no Sirhan shot from behind the senator was possible. The four RFK shots entered from a right rear direction.

- b.) Other witnesses, but not all, concur that the senator was facing forward (eastward) when the shooting began and that Sirhan (approaching from the east) was to his front. According to the hotel busboy (Romero) whom he reportedly greeted last, the senator "had just turned away" when the shooting began.
 - c.) While travelling through the pantry, the senator several times stopped to shake hands with those present. Some witnesses recall that he was turned to the left (north), shaking hands, or just turning back (east) from a handshake, when the firing began.
 - d.) Even if Senator Kennedy were turned fully ninety degrees to the north of his eastward path, it remains difficult or impossible to reconcile shots from a gunman to the east with the angles of the shots striking the senator's body or traversing his shoulder pad. (I.6.) His subsequent direction on the floor following a backward fall would also be unlikely.
3. According to the witness (Uecker) who first grabbed Sirhan, only two shots were fired before Sirhan's gun arm was pushed down onto the adjacent steam table. If this is accurate, Sirhan could not have fired four point-blank shots into the senator or his clothing.

III. Firearms Examinations and Identity of Gun(s) Which Fired Specific Bullets

Subsequent scientific tests have failed to substantiate the sworn testimony at grand jury and trial that Sirhan's gun could be positively matched with the bullet reportedly recovered from Senator Kennedy's neck. (The fatal bullet was too fragmented for comparison.) Other problems and confusions cloud both specific bullet comparison questions and the general issue of official handling of evidence guns and bullets.

1. The formal documentation submitted at Sirhan's trial recorded that a bullet recovered from Senator Kennedy's neck had been matched to test bullets fired from Iver Johnson gun number H18602. Sirhan's gun (I.1.) was Iver Johnson H53725. This discrepancy (unnoticed at the time) was later attributed to "clerical error" on the part of the criminalist (Wolfer) exclusively entrusted with the police bullet comparison work.
2. No specific records whatever exist of the reported test firing of Sirhan's gun in 1968, and no personal corroboration has been provided for the Wolfer statements concerning the firing, the discrepant gun

- identification (III.1.), the microscopic bullet comparisons, or certain other physical evidence tests reportedly performed at the time.
3. In contrast to Wolfer's sworn testimony that Sirhan's gun had fired the bullet reportedly recovered from Senator Kennedy's neck (exhibit 47), this match could not be verified by any of a panel of seven firearms examiners convened in 1975 to study the firearms evidence. Though the match had been represented by Wolfer as being an obvious one, it could not be duplicated by any examiner, using either old or newly-fired test bullets.
 4. None of the 1975 examiners could likewise substantiate Wolfer's testimony matching the Weisel bullet (exhibit 54) to Sirhan's gun, or his testimony matching the Goldstein bullet (exhibit 52) to Sirhan's gun. Other specifics of Wolfer's firearms testimony were likewise controverted in the conclusions of the 1975 panel.
 5. Though recommended by the county coroner (Noguchi) during the initial crime investigation, no neutron activation analysis has ever been undertaken to determine which victim bullets can be linked to each other.
 6. Some questions exist as to whether exhibit 47 is in fact the bullet which was recovered from the senator's neck. These relate to the background of the bullet's custody, to discrepancies in autopsy and subsequent observations about the bullet, and to the fact that, unlike the six other bullets recovered from victims, exhibit 47 shows no trace of human tissue.
 7. Of the seven victim bullets in evidence, three (exhibits 47, 52 and 54) were identified by several examiners as having been fired from the same (not identified) gun. Other examiners were unable to confirm this match.
 8. Though agreeing on some questions, the examiners differed on other important issues and often could not arrive at any definitive judgment. Their formal conclusions reported no evidence either to support or preclude the firing of more than one gun in the shooting.
 9. Based on the unexpected presence of lead deposits in the barrel of Sirhan's gun, the chairman of the firearms panel (Garland) testified in court that an unauthorized and unexplained firing of the gun with lead bullets had apparently taken place during the period it had been in official custody. This conclusion was absent from the written reports and was not unanimous among all examiners.
 10. The mandate of the 1975 panel extended only to bullet comparison and firearms examination issues, excluding other questions of crime scene or evidence controversy. Questioned in court, panel members agreed to the potential value of specific tests and inquiries in other areas.

IV. Other Evidence Relating to the "Lone Assassin" Hypothesis

Additional problems in the case, beyond those suggested above, have been ignored or addressed in a frivolous manner by Los Angeles authorities. Though often difficult or impossible to pursue independently, these add further major questions about the official theory of the case. Problems with the assassination evidence extend well beyond the "number of guns" issue, and many outstanding questions remain troublesome regardless of the determination of that issue. Some may be touched on briefly.

1. Sirhan was reportedly engaged in close conversation with a young woman, never subsequently located, immediately before the shooting. Some evidence exists of a previous Sirhan connection with the same or another woman, and a woman was linked to an earlier reported prediction that Senator Kennedy would be shot on election night. Police discounted these lines of evidence, and advanced a patently inaccurate identification of the woman reported as being with Sirhan prior to the shooting.
2. Substantial indications exist that Sirhan may have been in a hypnotic state at the time of the assassination. Apart from his denials of any memory of the shooting itself or of contents of his notebook, many specifics of his behavior before, during, and after the incident are consistent with this hypothesis. Important evidence concerning hypnosis possibilities has been advanced by some investigators and never seriously rebutted by Los Angeles authorities.
3. The contents of Sirhan's notebooks are consistent with the hypnosis hypothesis, as well as with the possibility of outside influence of his plans. Prolonged repetitions of particular words and phrases occur, and references to killing Senator Kennedy are coupled with "pay to the order of..." The writing is largely incoherent and dreamlike, and some unexplained or otherwise suggestive references occur. An entry dated May 18 vows that "RFK must die," but the television documentary which Sirhan later cited as the catalyst for his shooting intentions did not appear until May 20. Senator Kennedy's well-publicized campaign pledge concerning jets for Israel did not take place until May 26.
4. Similar independent reports from a witness and a Los Angeles police officer (Sharaga) concerning suspicious persons hurriedly exiting the hotel after the shooting were dismissed as investigative leads. A police radio bulletin concerning two suspects was dispatched in this connection, but was rescinded shortly thereafter for unknown reasons.
5. Although the Los Angeles chief of detectives (Houghton) proclaimed that no one with "right wing" connections was present in the pantry, at least one armed individual (Cesar, II.l.e.) in the immediate shooting vicinity fits that description. In spite of contradictions and inaccuracies in his subsequent statements, no information exists that

he was closely investigated, even after officials were made aware of his sharply anti-Kennedy views.

6. Various Sirhan contacts with reported organized crime or other suggestive individuals have been ignored or cursorily dismissed by officials. These include associations during the period of his first interest in the occult and a reported and unexplained contact with an itinerant self-styled evangelist (Owen) in the weeks prior to the shooting. A former Sirhan roommate for five months (Van Antwerp) reportedly vanished on the morning before the shooting, asserting when located 12 days later that he had never met Sirhan and had no information about him. Such lines of evidence have been forcefully pursued, if at all, by independent investigators.
7. Unresolved circumstantial issues also exist concerning various events at the crime scene or on the day of the shooting. Unsupported official assurances aside, no basis presently exists for either confirming or dismissing their conspiracy significance.

V. Destruction or Withholding of Major Evidence by Authorities

A central problem in testing official claims about the assassination has been the destruction of key evidence by authorities and the withholding from public scrutiny of nearly the entire investigative record on the case. These policies are contrary to promises of public disclosure, and have rendered critical assessment of the evidence, and of official conduct, impossible in many areas. Announcement of official destruction or loss of important evidence has been unaccompanied by public expression of regret or acknowledgement of error.

1. Despite official assurances of "full disclosure" of the work product of the investigation (Younger, Murdock), the formal ten-volume report on the case has never been released, and no public access to it has been permitted. Supporting files and documents in all areas have also been withheld, except for instances of privileged access and as the basis for a commercially published book (VI.8.) which was authored by the Los Angeles chief of detectives (Houghton). Records were flatly denied by police when subpoenaed in a 1975 lawsuit relating to alleged assassination complicity by a suspect (Owen) whom police had investigated.
2. Property report records of over 90 items booked into evidence have been withheld from the public, along with time and chain of possession information.
3. The left sleeves of Senator Kennedy's suit coat and shirt are missing. Also missing is a bullet reportedly recovered from Sirhan's pocket after the shooting.

4. Hundreds of photographs and substantial film footage of the crime scene, the crime scene investigation, and the crime reconstructions are missing or withheld by officials. Captions for available photos, descriptive explanations of their content, and clarification of the notations included are either unavailable or non-existent. The materials cited here originated from both law enforcement and public sources.
5. Gun number H18602 (II.1.), which was formally linked at the Sirhan trial with a bullet reportedly recovered from the senator's neck was subsequently said to have been destroyed while in police custody. Inconsistent information has emerged as to the date and circumstances of its destruction.
6. "Two boards from door frame" which were seized as official evidence of apparent bullet holes (beyond those consistent with a one-gun shooting) have reportedly been destroyed. The circumstances of this destruction remain unclear, and documentation of the tests performed on these boards has been non-existent, withheld, or destroyed.
7. Two or three pantry ceiling tiles (both numbers have been used) which were booked as evidence in connection with apparent bullet holes were reportedly destroyed. X-rays said to have been made of them were also reportedly destroyed.
8. Specific records of the reported test-firing of Sirhan's gun in 1968 are either non-existent, withheld, or destroyed. With one exception, photos or photomicrographs supporting the bullet comparisons reportedly performed in 1968 are likewise unavailable.
9. All records or specific documentation of spectrographic tests reportedly conducted in connection with bullet evidence in the shooting are withheld or destroyed.
10. The texts of initial interviews with important eyewitnesses at the shooting scene have been withheld. False assurance (Gates) was given that all such material was included in exhibits placed on record during Sirhan's trial.
11. A police officer's report concerning possible suspects leaving the hotel hurriedly following the shooting (IV.4.) allegedly twice disappeared from official files afterwards.
12. Detailed records surrounding the official crime reconstruction in November 1968 have been publicly unavailable. Detailed records and interpretive conclusions from the belated official "raid" on the crime scene in December 1975 have also been publicly unavailable.
13. In 1975 the Los Angeles Police Commission publicly pledged that it would respond to written inquiries about the case as an attempted substitute for allowing access to case files or reports. Letters since directed to them in that connection have not, to date, resulted in known substantive response or the release of any requested information.

VI. Other Aspects of Official Conduct

The record of the direction of this case by Los Angeles chiefs of police and district attorneys for more than a decade after the assassination removes any presumption of its objectivity or effectiveness. (This is in contrast to the professionalism and care often evident in work performed by operational level law enforcement personnel.) The close journalistic oversight required in such a situation has been either sporadic or wholly absent. No corrective intervention has emerged from the other law enforcement agencies with responsibilities on these matters; consequently, the record of these agencies is also not creditable.

1. At the time of Sirhan's trial, his counsel assumed and stipulated his sole guilt in the shooting (which Sirhan did not dispute), and directed their substantive defense toward the legal issue of psychological "diminished capacity." Had the shooting evidence subsequently developed been known of at the time, his chief trial attorney later declared, the legal-investigative efforts of the defense would have been very different. Subsequent efforts by Sirhan's counsel to secure full review of the unresolved crime scene issues have been blocked by Los Angeles officials.
2. Following the trial and before the initiation of Sirhan's legal appeals, a sub rosa meeting was conducted at which the trial judge and prosecution addressed basic questions of the disposition and availability of official evidence. (The reported date of destruction of the critical door frames [V.6.], ceiling tiles [V.7.], and test weapon [V.5.] was six weeks after this meeting.) At the meeting the judge (Walker) intimated that Sirhan's pending motion for a new trial would be denied, though argument on this motion had not yet been heard in court. Defendant's counsel were neither invited to this meeting nor informed of it.
3. For years, Los Angeles law enforcement officials decried outside publicity or criticism concerning assassination issues, insisting that serious reassessment of the case could only be insured in court-supervised proceedings. Efforts to review central issues through impartial and non-adversary procedures were rebuffed. When limited court proceedings were finally achieved in 1975, through outside initiative, the district attorney (Van de Kamp) and state attorney general (Younger) moved at the first opportunity to extinguish them.
4. The police criminalist entrusted with the major physical evidence responsibilities in the case (Wolfer) is renowned for his inaccurate, incoherent and self-contradictory statements throughout. Beyond immediate specifics such as destroyed evidence, unavailable corroborating testimony, lost or non-existent records, and "clerical errors," his general professional standing has long been questioned among his peers in the forensic science community. Though his credibility is the sole basis for key official assertions in this case, he was reprimanded for improper conduct in 1974, disqualified from serving on

civil service interview boards, and temporarily suspended from his post in 1980 for other infractions. He was cited by the state Court of Appeal in another major case for testimony "bordering on perjury" and "given with reckless disregard for the truth."

5. Los Angeles officials denied when questioned that the investigating officers shown in the AP wirephoto (I.9.) had asserted, as reported, that the object they were examining was a bullet. When the officers were identified and located through outside efforts, this denial proved false. The authorities then acted in unison to prevent their requested testimony in court. The subsequent deposing of the officers was likewise blocked.
6. Key witness evidence of excess bullets (I.8., I.9., I.10.) was absent from official recountings of information in the case and was only subsequently uncovered by independent efforts. Known official attempts to pursue these lines of evidence with other crime scene witnesses or personnel were minimal.
7. Responding to public concern about problems in the crime scene evidence, the Los Angeles district attorney (Busch) proclaimed that every eyewitness to the shooting had reported that Sirhan's gun was at point-blank range from the senator. Similar assertions have been made by other officials as well, who have sometimes inaccurately invoked the statements of the prosecution witness closest to the shooting (Uecker) - which contradict them.
8. The book on the official investigation authored by the then Los Angeles chief of detectives (Houghton) presents derogatory or embarrassing narratives concerning named individuals, based on confidential information and reported results of lie-detector tests. (It preceded the stated devotion to "privacy" rights subsequently advanced as a rationale for withholding official records from the public.) Proclaimed as being "drawn from the files of the Los Angeles Police Department," the book is replete with factual errors and barely addresses the basic crime scene and other issues currently in contention.
9. Official investigators have sometimes warned witnesses not to talk with others about their information on the case, at times falsely invoking a court order which expired in 1969. Incidents also exist of efforts to "correct" or induce changes in witness testimony, as well as of factual misreporting of it.
10. The 1977 report submitted by the district attorney's "special counsel" on the case (Kranz) explicitly falsifies precise quotations from FBI reports. It bypasses central issues, misrepresents eyewitness testimony, and presents a wide assortment of factual errors. The report was subsequently rebutted in detail at a hearing before the Los Angeles Board of Supervisors and in documents submitted at their request.

11. Since the initial assassination investigation, nearly all know instances of clarification of the evidence of the case have come through outside initiatives, not from the Los Angeles police or district attorney's or the California attorney general's offices. No significant official activity on these issues has been reported in recent years, apart from responses to citizen inquiries or requests.
12. For years questions concerning official conclusions on the assassination have been countered with references to the comprehensiveness of the initial investigation, including reputed exchange of information with, and implied concurrence by, the FBI. Only with the partial release of the FBI investigative reports (I.7.) was it discovered that the FBI crime scene findings themselves contradict the one-gun hypothesis.
13. No police were reportedly assigned to the Ambassador Hotel at the time of the shooting, in spite of the fact that three major election night celebrations (Kennedy, Cranston, and Rafferty) were scheduled there that night. Some police statements subsequently quoted have blamed Senator Kennedy for his death, based on an alleged refusal by him of police protection.
14. According to the Los Angeles chief of detectives in 1968-69 (Houghton), the police officer who exercised day-to-day operational direction of the assassination investigation (Pena) "had connections with various intelligence agencies in several countries." Questions concerning this officer's 1967 "retirement" and early subsequent return to the force, his alleged CIA status, and other specific uncertainties concerning his role in this case have not been resolved.
15. False claims by official spokesmen in the past have included the assertions that the actual shooting itself was captured on film, that ceiling tile evidence was submitted at trial, that the ceiling tiles were (both) examined in 1971 and destroyed in 1969, that the RFK shoulder pad shot was not back-to-front, that the 1975 firearms panel conclusions vindicated the original firearms testimony, that no gun besides Sirhan's was present in the Ambassador Hotel pantry, that the U.S. Secret Service was guarding Senator Kennedy at the time of the shooting, and that Los Angeles Superior Court has forbidden release of police information on the case.

VII. Available Avenues of Inquiry

Despite the passage of time and official shortcomings, numerous options exist for addressing the ongoing problems of the evidence. Some require official cooperation, while others can be pursued independently; effective pursuit of some will obviate the need for others. In many respects this case is more open to advancement than some comparable recent assassinations,

due to past limitations on critical effort and factual information. In view of the record of the case to date, independence, professionalism, and methodical documentation are critical to constructive work in these areas. Some useful measures may be listed briefly.

1. Release the ten-volume report of Special Unit Senator, and related files. Arrange for reasonable access to any particularly sensitive material through appropriate procedures. Obtain additional information from federal sources, beyond the limited and heavily-censored material now available, through Freedom of Information Act or other channels.
2. Release all interviews and reports of hotel employees, bystanders, and law enforcement personnel concerning locations, events, and physical damage near the crime scene. Release all relevant measurements of distance, and charts showing locations of suspected bullet holes and estimated locations of known pantry eyewitnesses.
3. Locate and carefully question witnesses from the above group, particularly with respect to guns present at the scene and evidence of bullets and bullet holes or damage following the shooting.
4. Reconstruct and clarify the evidence concerning positions, distances, and locations with respect to the four known shots which struck Senator Kennedy or his clothing.
5. Perform a detailed flight path reconstruction analysis and explore possible physical simulation efforts. Determine credibility of the official version of the flight of the alleged Evans bullet. (I.3.)
6. Release all official and non-official photographs collected from the crime scene, along with the relevant context information. Release the prosecution film concerning the shooting, and the films and other records of official reconstructions of the crime.
7. Conduct neutron activation analysis on the victim bullets and any other relevant physical evidence.
8. Take steps to determine conclusively the authenticity of exhibit 47. (III.6.)
9. Conduct an impartial review of all FBI information from the crime scene examination (I.7., I.13., VI.12.), and interview all FBI personnel who examined the area with respect to evidence of bullets and bullet holes or damage.
10. Review all aspects of the security arrangements and personnel in the Ambassador Hotel on the night of the shooting. (II.1.e., IV.5., VI.13.)
11. Release the chronological logs of Sirhan's activities compiled by police and review his activities and associations in the weeks prior to the shooting. Explore in detail his movements and contacts on the

day of the shooting, including his activities at the San Gabriel Valley Gun Club.

12. Review Sirhan's movements and contacts after arriving at the hotel, and the circumstances and individuals in the pantry prior to the conclusion of Senator Kennedy's speech. Clarify the issue of the "polka dot dress girl" (IV.1.) and correct omissions in the official list of pantry eyewitnesses on the scene.
13. Review evidence questions in the case relating to certain witnesses or figures, including Bryan, Cesar, Fahey, Gindroz, Gonzales, Owen, Ramistella, Rathke, Schulman, Sharaga, Williams, and Van Antwerp. Pursue outstanding issues.
14. Explore possibilities of scientific audio analysis, based on sound information from the period of the shooting.
15. Determine if any bullet casings were recovered from the floor of the hotel pantry following the shooting. Pursue relevant issues.
16. Determine nature and origin of the wood in the bullets in trial exhibit 38. Verify the report that they were recovered from Sirhan's car.
17. Review the questions relating to Sirhan's notebooks, evidence for and against possibilities of hypnosis or self-hypnosis, and the nature of his involvement with "spiritualism" and "mind control." Correlate findings with information from MK-Ultra, Artichoke and other known intelligence-related projects or studies in this area.
18. Investigate all aspects of the handling of physical evidence taken into police custody, particularly during the 72 hours following the shooting. These should include identification markings on the scene, chains of possession, property reports, nature and times of tests performed, and identities of personnel involved or with corroborating or relevant information. Why were police unable to say whether there had been "bullets in door frames" more than four full days after the shooting?

* * *


In comparison with the John F. Kennedy assassination, relatively little information has been available concerning this case, and the independent work directed toward it has been necessarily incomplete. Even so, it is unlikely that Sirhan could be convicted of murder today in a trial based on the present evidence. This summary of the case is highly abbreviated and selective; all factual references can be documented.

An independent committee of inquiry or special prosecutor are the most promising vehicles for addressing the basic questions concerning Senator Kennedy's death. Beyond the primary issue of the assassination, however, the substantial breakdown of the institutional response to it also merits attention.

Among those who have advanced these inquiries to date are the late U.S. congressman and ambassador Allard K. Lowenstein, Paul Schrade, the Kennedy friend and campaign official wounded in the shooting, Robert J. Joling and Dr. Cyril H. Wecht, former presidents of the American Academy of Forensic Sciences, and attorney and Charles Manson prosecutor Vincent Bugliosi. Others have also made important contributions, and citizen and academic activity has recently pursued many of these problems. The case may yet remain in fundamental disarray, however, unless further responsible efforts emerge to resolve its unanswered questions.

Addenda

Addendum 1: LAPD Bullet Flight Path Chart (Wolfer)



Addendum 2: LAPD Bullet Inventory Report (Wolfer)

SUBJECT Kennedy - 187 P.C.		
DATE & TIME OCCURRED 6-5-68	LOCATION OF OCCURRENCE Ambassador Hotel	DIVISION OF OCCURRENCE Rampart Division
TITLE (Rank, Name, Assignment, Division) Lt. D.W. Mann, O-I-C, Criminalistics Section, S.I.D.		DATE & TIME REPORTED 7-8-68

DETAILS:

The weapon used in this case was an Iver Johnson, Cadet Model, .22 caliber, 8 shot revolver (2½" barrel). This weapon had eight expended shell casings in the cylinder at the time of recovery from the suspect. A trajectory study was made of the physical evidence which indicated that eight shots were fired as follows:

- #1 - Bullet entered Senator Kennedy's head behind the right ear and was later recovered from the victim's head and booked as evidence.
- #2 - Bullet passed through the right shoulder pad of Senator Kennedy's suit coat (never entered his body) and traveled upward striking victim Schrade in the center of his forehead. The bullet was recovered from his head and booked as evidence.
- #3 - Bullet entered Senator Kennedy's right rear shoulder approximately seven inches below the top of the shoulder. This bullet was recovered by the Coroner from the 6th cervical vertebrae and booked as evidence.
- #4 - Bullet entered Senator Kennedy's right rear back approximately one inch to the right of bullet #3. This bullet traveled upward and forward and exited the victim's body in the right front chest. The bullet passed through the ceiling tile, striking the second plastered ceiling and was lost somewhere in the ceiling interspace.
- #5 - Bullet struck victim Goldstein in the left rear buttock. This bullet was recovered from the victim and booked as evidence.
- #6 - Bullet passed through victim Goldstein's left pants leg (never entering his body) and struck the cement floor and entered victim Stroll's left leg. The bullet was later recovered and booked as evidence.
- #7 - Bullet struck victim Weisel in the left abdomen and was recovered and booked.
- #8 - Bullet struck the plaster ceiling and then struck victim Evans in the head. This bullet was recovered from the victim's head and booked as evidence.

A Walker's H-acid test was conducted on Senator Kennedy's suit coat in the area of the entrance wounds. This test indicated that the muzzle of the weapon was held at a distance of ~~between one to two~~ inches from the coat at the time of all firings.

I HAVE EXAMINED THE ORIGINAL OF THIS DOCUMENT AND FIND THIS REPRODUCTION TO BE A TRUE COPY OF SAME MADE WITHOUT ALTERATIONS OR ERASURES.

BY *[Signature]*
RECORDS AND IDENTIFICATION DIVISION
LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT

DATE & TIME TYPED 7-8-68 10 a.m. S.I.D.	DIVN. RPTG.	CLERK	EMPLOYEE(S) REPORTING DeWayne A. Wolfer	SER. NO. #6727	DIVN. S.I.D.
SUPERVISOR APPROVING Lt. D.W. Mann <i>[Signature]</i>	TITLE S.I.D.	SERIAL NO. #245	Officer DeWayne A. Wolfer #6727 S.I.D.		

Addendum 3: Two Pages from FBI Report Entitled "Charts
and Photographs Showing Layout of Ambassador
Hotel Area Where Shooting Occurred" (marginal
bracket added)

- D-5 Anterior view of kitchen serving area looking south showing ice machines. The x marks on floor reportedly show locations in which the injured came to rest. The x shown on floor to far left reportedly is the location that Senator Kennedy had fallen after being shot.
- E-1 View taken inside kitchen serving area showing doorway area leading into kitchen from the stage area. In lower right corner the photo shows two bullet holes which are circled. The portion of the panel missing also reportedly contained a bullet.
- E-2 A close up view of the two bullet holes of area described above.
- E-3 Close up view of two bullet holes which is located in center door frame inside kitchen serving area and looking towards direction of back of stage area.
- E-4 Close up view of upper hinge on door leading into kitchen area from back of stage area. View shows reported location of another bullet mark which struck hinge.
- F-1 Interior view behind stage and speakers platform area looking in westerly direction and showing entrance to stairway which leads down to the Casino Level and the Ambassador Ballroom.
- F-2 View taken from Casino Level or Ambassador Ballroom floor level showing base of stairway which leads up to Embassy Ballroom.
- F-3 View taken from Ambassador Ballroom floor level in a northwesterly direction which shows fire doors leading up fire stairs shown in photos A-1 and A-2.
- G-1 View taken from Ambassador Ballroom floor level showing foyer arch south of entrance to the Ambassador Ballroom which leads to fire doors shown in photographs A-5 and A-7.
- G-2 Close up view of photographed area described in G-1 above.



E 2