

SENATE PANEL, REPORTING ON C.I.A., ASSERTS U.S. AIDES WERE INVOLVED IN PLOTS TO KILL FOREIGN LEADERS

NO VOTE BY SENATE

Democrats, Fearing a Close Tally, Said to Block Floor Ballot

By **DAVID E. ROSENBAUM**

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 20—The Senate Democratic leadership, fearing too narrow a margin of support, prevented a floor vote today on making public the report on political assassinations, according to Senate sources.

Senators attending an unusual closed session of the chamber said that Administration supporters, who opposed the release of the document, had pressed in debate for a vote because they thought that a narrow margin favoring release would reduce the report's impact. The Democrats apparently agreed with this opinion and decided to block a vote, the Senators said.

As a result, at the end of the four-hour Senate session, the matter was tossed back to the Senate intelligence committee, which drafted the report. The committee, in an action that angered many Republicans, voted to make it public.

Decision Denounced

The vote would have been close, according to informants, because a sizable number of senators would not have voted to publish a report they had not read. The document was not made available to senators until the session began this morning.

After the doors to the Senate were opened this afternoon, a dozen senators took the floor to denounce publicly the deci-



The New York Times/George James

Senator Frank Church looking over report on the C.I.A. before presenting it to closed Senate session yesterday.

sion not to vote on the issue. Most of the senators said that they would have voted to release the document.

Senator John G. Tower, the Texas Republican who is the

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DATA MADE PUBLIC

No Evidence That U.S. Actions Resulted in Deaths Is Found

By **NICHOLAS M. HORROCK**

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 20—A bipartisan, select committee of the Senate reported today that officials of the United States Government instigated assassination plots against two foreign leaders and became embroiled in plotting that led to the deaths of three others.

Fidel Castro of Cuba and Patrice Lumumba of the Congo,

The text of four sections of report, Pages 50-52.

now Zaire, were the leaders who were targets of plots said to have been initiated by officials in Washington. The three others were Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam, Rafael Leonidas Trujillo of the Dominican Republic and Gen. René Schneider of Chile.

Of the five, all except Prime Minister Castro were assassinated, but the committee—the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities—found no evidence that any foreign leader was killed as a result of assassination plots initiated by officials of the United States.

It was the first time that a formal Government investigation established that assassination had become part of United States foreign policy. Several Congressional sources said it was the only instance, except

after a military defeat, in which a modern nation had formally acknowledged such behavior.

New Details Disclosed

The plots that were cited in the document were sketched in reports attributed to intelligence and other Government sources in The New York Times and other publications over the last seven months, but there was a vast amount of new detail. The committee disclosed that a wide range of Federal officials involved themselves in plots such as hiring Mafia members and making secret arms deliveries to Chilean military officers.

The committee's 347-page report, made public today over the strong opposition of President Ford and after four hours of closed debate on the Senate floor in which the Senate refused to vote and thus permitted the committee to decide on its release, made these other points:

¶It was unable to establish that any former United States President had directly ordered the killing of a foreign leader.

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Full Senate Vote on Report Blocked

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committee's vice chairman, declared that he had disassociated himself from the report because of the Senate's failure to vote to adopt it.

President Ford argued strenuously that the report should not be made public, contending that its publication might endanger United States intelligence operations. Yesterday, William E. Colby, the Director of Central Intelligence, held a news conference at which he appealed to the committee not to publish the names of 12 individuals. The committee rejected the appeal.

Senator Robert C. Byrd of West Virginia, the assistant Democratic leader, said after the session that he objected to a vote on whether to publish the report on two grounds. First, he said, it was unfair to require senators to vote to release a document they had not read. Second, he declared, the Senate had delegated to the committee the responsibility for making a report, and a vote today would have been demeaning to the committee.

The closed session was only the second the Senate has held this year. The earlier one concerned military procurement.

Because no confidential material was discussed during the session, the Senate agreed tonight to make the transcript available tomorrow.

Senator Frank Church, the

Idaho Democrat who is chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence, defended the publication of the report at a news conference this afternoon. He declared:

"There may be temporary injury. But I believe the countries of the world will recognize that our willingness to examine our past and seek a better future openly, without flinching, is an indication of the greatness of our country. Our nation is admired in proportion to the openness of our society. Withholding this report from the public would more closely resemble the practices of totalitarian regimes."

A Republican member of the committee, Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona, disagreed. In a statement, he asserted:

"My chief concern is the diplomatic damage this document may do to our country. It is difficult to predict the reactions of our friends and enemies abroad, but I believe it will be generally unfavorable to our interests."

Other Republican committee members, however, supported publication. Senator Richard S. Schweiker of Pennsylvania said: "Our willingness to examine our past and seek a better future openly is an example of the greatness of our nation."

Senator Walter F. Mondale, Democrat of Minnesota, said that he believed the report illustrated two main points.

One, he said, was the "naive-

te" of American officials in believing that they could control the affairs of other sovereign nations.

The other, he said, was that the "unaccountability" of the intelligence agencies "resulted in actions being taken that would not have been taken if the principals involved had known that they would be held accountable."

The senators on the committee said that they had developed no conclusive evidence to show that orders for the attempted assassinations came from the White House.

But Senator Robert Morgan, Democrat of North Carolina, said that he was "convinced that the principals in these acts felt and believed that they were justified in that belief."

Senator Mondale acknowledged that the direct evidence that past presidents knew about the attempts to take the lives of foreign leaders was "very thin." But, Senator Mondale added, "common sense dictates that maybe they knew."

But it said that "whether or not the President in fact knew about the assassination plots, and even if their subordinates failed in their duty of full disclosure, it still follows that the President should have known about the plots."

It said the plans to kill Mr. Lumumba and Prime Minister Castro were initiated and furthered by the Central Intelligence Agency.

It found that American officials "encouraged or were privy to" coups d'état that resulted in the deaths of General Trujillo, President Diem and General Schneider, chief of Chile's general staff.

It found that in the plot to kill Mr. Lumumba "there was a reasonable inference" that President Eisenhower might have authorized the operation. This conclusion was based in part on testimony by a former official who recalled that President Eisenhower had appeared to order the death at a National Security Council meeting in 1960. The report established that Allen Dulles, former C.I.A. director, had ordered Mr. Lumumba killed.

It disclosed for the first time that on the day President Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas, Nov. 22, 1963, the C.I.A. was equipping a dissident official in the Castro Government with a ball point pen containing a hypodermic needle to poison the Cuban leader. It revealed further that this coincided with a meeting of a special envoy of President Kennedy with Mr. Castro in an effort to improve relations between Cuba and the United States.

It disclosed that ranking Government officials discussed and may have authorized, the establishment within the C.I.A. of a "generalized assassinator capability," adding that during these discussions "the concept of assassination was not affirmatively disavowed."

It said in a footnote that it had received some evidence of C.I.A. involvement in plans to assassinate President Sukarno of Indonesia and President François Duvalier of Haiti. In the Sukarno case, the report quoted a witness as saying the assassination was only contemplated. In the Duvalier case a witness was quoted as saying that assassination was "no contemplated" but that it was realized that President Duvalier might get killed in the course of an uprising for which the C.I.A. furnished arms. Both mer died of natural causes.

It sharply condemned the hiring of criminals to carry out United States Government policy and disclosed that the C.I.A. had used Mafia figure in the Castro plot and had employed two European soldiers of fortune with criminal records in the plot against Mr. Lumumba.

"The spectacle of the Government consorting with criminal elements destroys respect for government and law and undermines the viability of democratic institutions," it concluded.

Sharpest Criticism

The committee saved its harshest language for the concept that the United States should ever have utilized assassination as a tool. It said:

"We condemn the use of a

ssassination as a tool of foreign policy. Aside from pragmatic arguments against the use of assassination supplied to the committee by witnesses with extensive experience in cover operations, we find that assassination violates moral precepts fundamental to our way of life."

Not satisfied that future administrations would eschew the use of assassinations, as President Ford has done, the committee said it would submit a bill to make it unlawful for anyone "subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" to conspire, attempt to, or kill a foreign leader. The proposed legislation will specifically cover government officials acting under orders, the committee said.

Late yesterday President Ford made a final effort to his publication by sending personal letters to Senate leaders. I told them he opposed the release of information of alleged assassinations plots for the same reasons he cited in letters to committee members 15 days ago.

"Public release of these official materials and information will do grievous damage to our country," the President said in his earlier letter. "It will be exploited by foreign nations and groups hostile to the United States in a manner designed to do maximum damage to our reputation and foreign policy of the United States."

The Senate apparently spurned this argument and refused to order the alteration or suppression of the committee report. In doing so, it also rejected a last-minute appeal of William E. Colby, the Director of Central Intelligence, who asked that the names of some 12 individuals, some of them agency officials, be stricken from the report to protect them from possible acts of violence.

The 12 names were scattered among dozens of pages throughout the report's pages, and it appeared impossible for the casual reader to distinguish the names characterized by Mr. Colby as especially sensitive from any of the others.

Senator Frank Church, chairman of the select committee, later read to newsmen 10 of the names that Mr. Colby wanted deleted. [Page 54]

The report — more than 120,000 words of text, distilled from 60 days of hearings, the testimony of some 75 witnesses and 8,000 pages of transcript — was pungent in its detail and its depiction of the men involved in the plots and their moods.

In the Lumumba plot, for instance, one of the potential assassins, code-named W1/ROGUE, is described by a C.I.A. official this way:

"He is indeed aware of the precepts of right and wrong, but if he is given an assignment which may be morally wrong in the eyes of the world, but necessary because his case officer ordered him to carry it out, then it is right, and he will dutifully undertake appropriate action for its execution without pangs of conscience."

Almost no fantasy of spy movies was a tactical impossibility in these dark covert battles, the report confirms. The planning against Mr. Cas-

tro, for instance, contemplated poisoned cigars, poison sea shells and poison pills.

Individual officials of government in three Administrations came under criticism or question in the report.

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and his deputy in the White House in 1970, Gen. Alexander M. Haig Jr., were contradicted by C.I.A. officials on parts of their testimony on Chile.

In one instance, Mr. Kissinger had said that the Nixon Administration's policy of encouraging military coups d'état in Chile ended in the fall of 1970. Testimony by Thomas Karamessines, the C.I.A. official in charge of the Chile plotting, contradicted this. He told the committee that "as far as he knew" this effort to foment an uprising never ended.

The committee stated that although the Nixon Administration never ordered the C.I.A. to kill General Schneider, President Nixon had ordered a full-scale, unsuccessful effort to prevent Salvador Allende Gossens of Chile, a Marxist, from ever taking office as President.

Richard Helms, then the C.I.A. director, told the committee that "this was a pretty all-inclusive order. . . . If I ever carried a marshal's baton in my knapsack out of the Oval Office, it was this day."

The committee did not interview former President Nixon prior to this report, but it has said that it expects to.

More confusion about men and motives was found in the committee's investigation of the Castro plotting. It criticized the late Robert F. Kennedy, then the Attorney General, for not condemning assassination as a technique and the use of underworld elements by Government agencies when he learned some details of these matters in May, 1962.

But it also said that there was not evidence that either he or his brother, President Kennedy, had ever ordered an assassination attempt.

It criticized Mr. Helms, Richard Bissell, director of covert actions in the early 1960's, and several middle-level C.I.A. officials for either misleading their superiors or not being fully candid with them.

Helms Held Not Candid

At one point, the committee called the withholding of information from Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy "inexcusable." At another point it found "unpersuasive" Mr. Helms's explanations of why he had not been candid with then C.I.A. director John McCone.

Among those that the C.I.A. officials failed to inform about their plots against Prime Minister Castro, the report said, were the members of the Warren Commission, which was investigating President Kennedy's death. The committee said that even Mr. Dulles, who was a member of the commission and knew about early Castro plots, did not inform his fellow commission members.

The commission did not spare the policy makers from criticism. It disclosed that early in 1961, McGeorge Bundy, then President Kennedy's assistant for national security affairs, learned about development of the capability to assassinate.

"Bundy raised no objection," the report said, quoting Mr.

Bissell's sworn testimony. In a footnote the committee said:

"Bundy, as the national security adviser to the President, had an obligation to tell the President of such a grave matter, even though it was only a discussion of a capability to assassinate. His failure to do so was a serious error."

The report was strong and unrelenting in stating the reasons, both practical and moral, that it rejected assassination as a technique.

"The witnesses who testified before the committee uniformly condemned assassination," the report said. "They denounced it as immoral, described it as impractical, and reminded us that an open society, more than any other, is particularly vulnerable to the risk that its own leaders may be assassinated. As President Kennedy reportedly said, 'We can't get into that kind of thing, or we

would all be targeted.'"

The committee provided the most new information in its description of the plot to kill Mr. Lumumba. It related how deeply concerned the United States was at his emergence in the last days of the Belgian Congo. He was, the Eisenhower Administration felt, a threat of almost the same magnitude as Mr. Castro because his leadership could mean losing valuable Central African resources to Communist influences. At one point, moreover, the report quotes an official who believed that Mr. Lumumba was insane.

In August, 1960, Mr. Dulles ordered the killing of Mr. Lumumba. It was pursued later, although Mr. Lumumba was out of power, because the agency was convinced that his charismatic political qualities could spark the Congolese to support the Soviet Union.

A great deal of the plotting involved how the United States would get Mr. Lumumba away from the protection of United Nations forces and kill him. Two main methods of killing him were devised: one involved giving him a biological toxin selected from poisons stockpiled by the C.I.A. at the Army post at Fort Detrick, Md.

A substance was actually flown to Africa, but never administered, according to the report. In another plan, the C.I.A. contemplated killing Mr. Lumumba with a high-powered rifle.

The Congolese leader died early in 1961 at the hands of enemies in Katanga Province, and the report cited evidence that the C.I.A. had not had a role in his death.

Lumumba, Castro, Diem Were Among 5 Targets

Continued From Page 1, Col. 8

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