

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

2 5 FEB 1970

Honorable Jacob K. Javits United States Senate Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Senator Javits:

This is in response to your letter concerning an article which appeared in the <u>Washington Monthly</u> entitled "CONUS Intelligence; The Army Watching Civilian Politics" by former Army Captain, Christopher Pyle.

The allegations made by Mr. Pyle were viewed with great concern by both the civilian and the military leadership of the Army. Both have always, over the generations, been keenly sensitive to the longstanding American tradition separating the military from involvement in domestic politics, and both are constantly alert to ensure that Army actions as well as policies are in keeping with the traditional limitations upon our armed forces. Ever since the unfortunate necessity arose, several years ago, for military forces to be prepared for civil disturbance operations when directed by the President, there has been a special sensitivity to the immediacy of this problem.

Our continuing goal has been to maintain suitable limits to Army intelligence involvement in the civilian sector, and toward this end our policies and practices have been undergoing periodic examination. The main charge of the article, and indeed its title, hold that the Army deliberately seeks the opposite, by widespread aggressive, covert collection of intelligence about people who "might make trouble for the Army." This charge is false. The Army's domestic intelligence activity has been to a small degree in the civil sector, but only to focus upon civil disorder, and the Army has long been pressing to have civilian governmental agencies meet even these intelligence needs.

The military security functions of the Army in the United States are conducted by the U.S. Army Intelligence Command, Fort Holabird, Maryland. This Command reports directly to the Chief of Staff of the Army and is closely supervised for him by the Assistant Chief

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approved. Information on the key punched cards will be placed in the computer; the purpose of this computer will be to rapidly identify and indicate the location of files needed in security investigations. The computer will contain only the information shown on the sample card, which does not reflect the existence of any personal information of any kind, derogatory or otherwise. The present system and the planned computer are not and will not be tied in with any form of computer data banks. There is no plan to use the Central Index in any other fashion.

The U.S. Army Intelligence Command also has missions relating to the collection of information that may be needed by civilian planners and Army commanders in the event Federal troops are directed to act by the President. As you know, the Army has certain obligations under the Constitution and the laws to act at the direction of the President to deal with civil disturbances beyond the capability of local and state authorities to control. Army intelligence activities in the field of civil disturbances are directed primarily at ascertaining information needed to prepare appropriate levels of alert for military forces and needed by military commanders if they are directed to act. This limited field of interest removes from legitimate concern of the Army minor forms of disturbances and lawful activities not likely to lead to mai-

Intelligence personnel obtain this limited civil disturbancerelated information primarily from the FBI and state and local police agencies. When this information is collected in the field, it is reported usually by teletype to the U.S. Army Intelligence Command. The Director of Investigations, U.S. Army Intelligence Command, is responsible for collecting the information, storing it, and forwarding it, as necessary, to appropriate officials in the Department of Defense. The teletype is not linked to any computer, nor has there ever been a plan to do this.

The collection of civil disturbance-related information by the Army increased after the disturbance in Detroit in 1967. However, the Intelligence Command was not and has never been reinforced with additional personnel to accomplish the civil disturbance missions assigned to them at that time. Since this was a new area for the Army, an appropriate level of action necessary to accomplish the Army's mission had to be evolved. This area has been a subject of constant attention and refinement in order to narrow the Army's actions to only those which are absolutely necessary. There have been some activities which have been undertaken in the civil disturbance field which, after review, have been determined to be beyond the Army's mission requirements. For example, the Intelligence Command published from 14 May 1968 to 24 February 1969,

