

Dr. Marcus Raskin  
Co-Director  
Institute for Policy Studies  
1900 Florida Ave. N.W.  
Washington, D.C.

22 June 1967

Dear Dr. Raskin,

The Yale Law Review has finally sent me a copy of your Review of Rush to Judgment, which I requested last January. I think it is one of the finest and most formidable critiques of the Oswald case yet published, and a genuine contribution to the literature on the subject. That such an important review has not been reported in the press as "news" is baffling and disappointing. Many students of the case will not be aware of your article. I have in mind Representative Theodore R. Kupferman, among others, and I hope that you will find it possible to send him a reprint.

I was very interested in your comments about the Commission's predisposition to the lone-assassin hypothesis (footnote 16). Whatever Mr. Belin or his colleagues may say at this point in time, it is difficult to accept the assertion that the investigation was launched without prejudice to Oswald. One needs only to scan the chronological order of witnesses, and the kinds of questions asked (and the questions that were not asked) to arrive at a contrary impression. What is not entirely clear in your footnote is whether you have had access to the "238-page Ball-Belin memorandum." Am I correct in inferring that you have not actually seen it?

Your comment# on the rifle tests (page 586, paragraph 3) is not entirely correct. In addition to the tests for maximum speed of firing by three FBI experts, a different series of experiments were performed by three U.S. Army master riflemen (Hendrix, Staley, and Miller). The Warren Report (page 193) describes these experiments as "an effort to test the rifle under conditions which simulated those which prevailed during the assassination." But in fact these tests did not simulate the stated conditions but differed sharply, in many respects, all of which were to the advantage of the three rifle masters. Even so, they did not match Oswald's alleged feat.

There are two typographical errors, by the way. On page 586, the phrase "between 12:33 and 1:16" should read "between 12:30 and 1:16." Footnote 42 should cite Volume VI of the Hearings, not Volume II.

Finally, a comment on your discussion of Bullet 399. You suggest (in footnote 35) that "the ballistics expert stated that Bullet 399 could have passed through both the President and the Governor," citing a passage of Dr. Olivier's testimony. My reading of that testimony (V 84) is that Olivier was addressing himself to "a" bullet, not to Bullet 399 explicitly. If my recollection is correct, neither Olivier nor his two colleagues were asked at any time during their official testimony whether Bullet 399 could have performed the feats required by the Commission's single-missile hypothesis. And if information I have recently been given is correct, a document has turned up in the Archives which reveals that Dr. Olivier and/or his two colleagues, upon examining Bullet 399 during informal discussions with Commission counsel,

categorically rejected the notion that this almost pristine bullet could have wounded the President and the Governor. From this document, my colleague concluded that the Commission's counsel deliberately avoided soliciting an opinion on this point from Olivier and his two associates during their formal testimony.

Yours sincerely,

Sylvia Meagher  
302 West 12 Street  
New York, N.Y. 10014