

New York Times, May 8, 1963, pp. 1,3

(Reporting on Penkovsky trial).... Capt. Alexis H. Davison, a United States Air Force officer, who was the embassy's doctor here, and Hugh Montgomery, an attaché, were named in the indictment as the recipients of signals from Mr. Penkovsky when he had left intelligence data in the apartment cache.

Captain Davison left Moscow yesterday upon completion of his normal tour of duty. Mr. Montgomery is still on the staff of the embassy.

The US Embassy has denied as unfounded the charges against the accused aides.

The trial indictment did not press the charges of complicity against Captain Davison or Mr. Montgomery as vigorously as was done in December in articles published in the Soviet press....

May 14, 1963, pp. 1, 14 (5 US and 5 British diplomatic personnel barred from USSR, including Davison. Photo, p. 14.) ... Captain Davison and Mr. Montgomery were accused in the indictment at the trial of having been telephone contacts for Mr. Penkovsky. Captain Davison left Moscow the day before the trial began. The Embassy said he had been transferred on normal rotation....

No other index references to Davison, 1960-1967 inclusive.

WISE + ROSS, 'INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT'

V. Penkovsky was the deputy chief of the Soviet State Committee for the Coordination of Scientific Research, and very likely was also a colonel in Soviet military intelligence. At his show trial in May, 1963, he confessed passing 5,000 frames of exposed miniature-camera film, containing classified information about Soviet rockets and other secrets, to American and British agents.

The Russians charged that Penkovsky, a "money-hungry traitor who loved to dance the Charleston and the twist," would hide his information in a matchbox behind the radiator in the hallway of a Moscow apartment house at No. 5-6 Pushkin Street. He would mark a circle with charcoal on lamppost No. 35 near a bus stop on Kutusov-sky Prospekt.

The Soviets said he would then telephone either Captain Alexis H. Davison, an assistant air attaché at the American Embassy (who was also the embassy doctor) or Hugh Montgomery, the internal security officer.

Davison would go to the lamppost, the Russians claimed. If he found the charcoal circle it meant there was something ready to be picked up at the Pushkin Street drop. According to the Moscow version, Richard C. Jacob, the twenty-six-year-old embassy "archivist" from Egg Harbor, New Jersey, would go to the radiator and retrieve the little package. When the information was picked up, the Americans would make a black smudge on the door of the fish department of a Moscow food store (presumably after a casual purchase of a pound or two of sturgeon as cover). Then Penkovsky would know the transfer had been accomplished.

The Russians also sought to link Penkovsky to Rodney W. Carlson, the thirty-one-year-old assistant agricultural attaché at the embassy, and to William C. Jones III,* the second secretary.

* All five Americans were declared *persona non grata* on May 13, 1963. The Russians claimed two other American Embassy personnel were involved in the case—Robert K. German, second secretary, and William Horbaly, agricultural attaché. They also ousted two embassy aides in October, 1962, just before the Penkovsky case surfaced publicly. They were Commander Raymond D. Smith, of Brooklyn,

Penkovsky, it was alleged, also passed information in a box of chocolates to Greville M. Wynne, a London businessman who was actually working for British Intelligence. Wynne supposedly got the chocolates out of Moscow by giving them to the children of a British diplomat.

The Russians convicted Penkovsky and later announced he had been executed. Wynne drew an eight-year prison sentence.

Considering the fact that no fewer than twelve Americans and British diplomats were linked, one way or another, to a serious charge of espionage, London and Washington were exceedingly quiet about it all.

But there are likely to be more spy cases involving diplomats. The Kennedy Administration, while Dulles was still the CIA director, made some efforts to reduce the number of agents operating under diplomatic cover in American embassies. But embassy cover is still central to the agency's operations.

There is a great danger in relying heavily on diplomatic cover. If relations are severed between countries, or war breaks out, then the CIA tends to be cut off from its sources of information. In January, 1961, for example, when Washington broke off relations with Havana, the CIA lost its embassy base in Cuba. Ironically, the Cubans retained two legations in the United States—their delegation to the Organization of American States in Washington* and their UN mission in New York.

CIA agents operating abroad under commercial cover pose, as the term implies, as legitimate businessmen, rather than as diplomats. Not long ago a CIA man in Washington told all his friends he was quitting the agency

assistant military attaché, and Kermit S. Midthun, of San Francisco, first secretary. Smith was arrested in Leningrad on October 2, carrying a tiny tape recorder, a Minox camera and high-powered binoculars. The Russians said he was photographing naval installations. The American Embassy said he was taking a walk in the park. Midthun, forty-one, was accused on October 11 of having tried to get secret data from a Soviet official. The Russians also expelled five British diplomats in the Penkovsky case.

* Until Cuba was expelled from the OAS in January, 1962.