

# INQUIRY

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
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## THE REAL GRAIN ROBBERY

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# WHO KILLED

# JOHN PAISLEY?

The CIA calls his death a suicide, but the evidence suggests that the former intelligence analyst was another casualty in the war over the Russian "mole" inside the CIA.

By JEFF GOLDBERG

**T**WENTY-TWO-YEAR-OLD Eddie Paisley works as a waiter at a Virginia bar and grill just outside of Washington, D.C. His 55-year-old father, an important CIA analyst, was found dead, floating in the Chesapeake Bay, one year ago. The authorities ruled he had committed suicide. Eddie Paisley believes his father was murdered. "Somebody is plugging the case up and trying to befuddle it as best they can," he says. "That's what it seems like to me. Obviously something's up, but the CIA doesn't want anyone to know about it."

Eddie's father, John Arthur Paisley, left the CIA in 1974 after twenty-one years of service, for which he was decorated with the Distinguished Medal of Honor. Since 1969 he had been the deputy director of the CIA's Office of Strategic Research, the branch that deals with assessing Soviet nuclear capabilities. He was an important and respected expert on U.S. and Soviet atomic weapons and the CIA's computer and satellite systems. Since his "official" retirement five years ago, he had continued to work on top-secret agency projects as a \$200-a-day consultant—until he disappeared.

On Sunday, September 24, 1978,

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Paisley sailed off from Lusby, Maryland, on his 31-foot sloop *Brillig* for a day on the bay. He was an expert sailor who loved the time he spent on his boat. He apparently planned to work alone that day, evaluating a sensitive CIA report on Soviet nuclear strength.

Late in the afternoon Paisley radioed ashore to friends to say he would be staying out late on the *Brillig*. He asked for the dock lights to be left on for him. It was the last time anyone is known to have heard from him.

The next morning the Coast Guard discovered the abandoned *Brillig* when a crab boat reported being almost hit by it. After boarding the boat, the Coast Guard quickly identified Paisley as its owner, and they noted the CIA documents in his briefcase. The CIA's security office was immediately notified.

After a delay of some twelve hours, the CIA called Maryann Paisley at her McLean, Virginia, home. The Paisleys had separated a year earlier after twenty-five years of marriage and he had just recently moved into a new apartment in downtown Washington. Maryann Paisley had herself worked for the CIA in 1974 as a contract employee and was still bound by the agency's security oath. She understood the CIA's concern for securing his sensitive papers, so late that night she drove out to the Maryland shore, accompanied by her daughter

Diane, and CIA officials. They searched the *Brillig*, but apparently removed nothing. However, there were indications that other CIA security representatives had already been there, because Paisley's sophisticated radio gear, which included antennas and transmitters, was gone.

The next morning, Maryann Paisley sent her son Eddie to check his father's apartment. He discovered the apartment had already been entered—papers were in disarray and a camera, tape recordings, and a Rolodex were missing. Some nine-millimeter bullets were strewn on a closet floor. It was later determined that CIA representatives had already been there also. The police later complained that these searches had contaminated much of the evidence.

At this point there was no trace of Paisley. Since he was a strong swimmer, his family hoped he was still alive on one of the bay's small islands. The Coast Guard made a helicopter and boat search of the area, but there was no police investigation because a missing-person report had not been filed. For a week Paisley's disappearance went publicly unreported.

Then on October 1, a bloated, badly decomposed body was pulled from the bay several miles from where the *Brillig* had run aground. The victim, shot once behind the left ear with a nine-millime-

ter bullet, was wearing two belts containing thirty-eight pounds of diving weights. The body, made buoyant by gases trapped inside, had floated to the surface. No gun was recovered.

The next day, Maryland's chief medical examiner, Dr. Russell S. Fisher, identified the body as Paisley's and ruled the cause of death as a gunshot

tions of "moles" in the CIA, an intense debate over SALT verification, and a security breach involving a top-secret spy-satellite manual ["Poisoning SALT," May 1, 1979, p. 11].

But from the beginning the CIA's public position was that there was "no evidence whatsoever" of foul play in Paisley's death. Agency officials claimed no

comparing them with outside evaluations (Team B). Paisley was not a member of the B team, but as its executive director he had access to the most highly classified intelligence materials on the Soviet Union.

After four months of work, in December 1976, Team B concluded the CIA had underestimated Soviet military strength. Their report was then leaked to the *New York Times* in an attempt to pressure the CIA into taking a harder line. Apparently Paisley disagreed, sticking with the Team A analysis. One of the more hawkish Team B members, Daniel Graham, former head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, has called him a "weepee liberal."

Paisley was working on his evaluation of Team B's performance during his last sailing excursion.

## "Paisley never was not involved in something big," says a source.

wound in the head. The coroner classified the manner of death as "undetermined."

The Maryland State Police now entered the case and assigned it a very high priority. But since the boat and apartment had already been "cleaned out" by the CIA, a police spokesman says, "We had to play catch-up ball during the entire investigation." Nevertheless, three weeks later the police ruled the death an "apparent suicide," although their files remain open and, like the coroner, they officially classify the manner of death as "undetermined."

Indeed this was not to be an open-and-shut case. Doubts and questions began to surface from the prodding of Paisley's family and a small group of reporters from Wilmington, Baltimore, and Washington. The uncertainties spawned a wide range of theories: It was not Paisley's body that had been found, he was alive on a secret CIA mission, he was alive in Moscow as a defector, he was the celebrated KGB mole in the CIA, or he was killed by the KGB for discovering the mole.

John Paisley's violent death is now a full-blown, year-old spy mystery becoming more puzzling and complex with each new revelation. Despite official pronouncements that nothing is amiss, the case is full of tantalizing suggestions, misdirections, and double meanings that just don't add up and won't go away. "This is the mystery story of the decade," says an unidentified police investigator to a Baltimore reporter. "You and I will probably be dead and gone long before they close the files on this one."

Besides the unusual circumstances of Paisley's death, which we will come to later, what made this case so provocative was the CIA's attitude toward Paisley and the swirl of events that coincided with his death, including fierce accusa-

jurisdiction and acceded to the police verdict of suicide. They painted a picture of a depressed, financially insecure man who had retired years ago. Initially they said Paisley had been only a "low-level analyst" who didn't work on any "sensitive" matters. They said his only remaining link to the CIA was as part-time consultant on "routine administrative matters with a very limited access to classified information." It was a flimsy cover story, and leaks from all over Washington soon completely destroyed it.

A former high-level staffer on the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, someone who had worked with Paisley on top-secret projects, called the initial CIA accounts "shocking." "In fact," this source said, "I was surprised that the agency would even try to paander that sort of information." Another source reported, "The agency is flat-out lying. Paisley never was not involved in something big." It was also reported that Paisley had several meetings—one as late as a month before his death—with CIA Director Stansfield Turner. (Admiral Turner has consistently minimized Paisley's role within the CIA.)

Senators on the Intelligence Committee were furious with the CIA's "lack of candor" and they launched their own investigation.

Paisley's biggest job in recent years was serving as liaison between the CIA and Team B, a secret task force of U.S. experts who assessed Soviet military strengths. Team B, created in 1976 by then CIA Director George Bush, consisted of national defense experts outside of the CIA who were given access to all U.S.-Soviet intelligence secrets. It was formed after White House experts on the intelligence advisory board convinced CIA officials that the agency's yearly evaluations of Soviet military capability (Team A) should be tested by

**M**ARYANN PAISLEY and her two children initially followed CIA procedures and kept silent after the body was recovered. She had sought advice from the agency and had asked a CIA-approved attorney to represent her. However, she soon began to doubt that the body was her husband's, and became upset with the unsatisfactory answers and the lack of cooperation she was receiving from the agency.

In January, she sent a bitter letter to CIA Director Turner, writing that "the CIA attitude toward me has been a betrayal of my husband's devotion and unquestioned loyalty to the Agency." She was so angered by what she felt was a CIA cover-up that she hired a new attorney, Bernard Fensterwald, Jr., and a private investigator, Ken Smith, and told them, "Find out what the hell happened to my husband."

Fensterwald, a longtime friend of the Paisley family, is an experienced and well-known Washington attorney. He served as a Senate committee counsel in the 1960s, and since then he has represented such noted clients as convicted assassin James Earl Ray and Watergate conspirator James McCord. For many years he has worked to uncover the JFK assassination conspiracy by directing a private, Washington-based research organization called the Committee to Investigate Assassinations.

In April, Fensterwald told reporters he was "pretty well convinced" the body found was not Paisley's. He cited discrepancies between the height, weight, and waist size of the corpse and those of Paisley. Paisley was 5 feet 11 inches tall,

weighed 170 pounds, and had a 34-inch waist. The corpse was originally measured as 5 feet 7 inches, 144 pounds, with a 30-inch waist. In November, Fisher, the state coroner, revised the height of the corpse to 5 feet 11 inches, saying it "was originally recorded in error as 5 feet 7 inches." Inexplicably, Fisher made this correction seven weeks after the body had been cremated.

In fact, it is not clear how Fisher made his identification at all; he had no fingerprints or dental records, no family member or friend on hand to examine the body, and a body so decomposed that all of the hair was gone, including the thick beard Paisley grew. There was not even any blood left to be typed. Later, in a terse but cryptic remark about the identification, the police would only say, "We were under tremendous pressures."

Fisher said the body was so grotesque it would be "out of the question" for family members to view it. After his identification, he allowed the body to be cremated in a CIA-approved funeral home. Mrs. Paisley had consented to the cremation on the advice of Fisher, CIA officials, and the CIA-approved attorney who was then counseling her. Her approval was given, however, before she learned about what she called "the multitude of physical discrepancies." Later, when she was finally allowed to see photos taken at the autopsy, she could not make an identification and was not satisfied the body was her husband's.

For nine months the identification remained in dispute as Paisley's family refused to admit the cremated body was his. Then, in June, two men who saw the body when it was first brought ashore by the Coast Guard came forward to question the suicide finding. The two said they had seen distinct markings around the throat that indicated "foul play." Dr. George Weems, the county coroner for twenty years, and Harry Lee Langley, the owner of the marina where Paisley gassed up his sloop, spoke to reporters at a press conference arranged by Fensterwald on behalf of Mrs. Paisley.

Weems, the first doctor to see the body, said he had noticed markings on the neck indicating it had "been squeezed or had a rope around it. . . . They were the type of things you see when people are strangled." He said the marks appeared to have been made before Paisley was killed, and not afterwards, when the body was in the water.

Langley said it was either "a helluva rope burn" or "the throat had been slashed, because a bad gash ran from

ear to ear." Langley said he had seen Paisley around the marina and was sure the body he saw was Paisley's. He said he was told to keep quiet about what he had witnessed, but despite repeated questioning he could not remember who had told him to remain silent.

Weems conducted only a twenty-minute preliminary observation before sending the body, and a report, on to Baltimore, where the autopsy was performed the next day. Fisher's autopsy report does not mention any markings on Paisley's throat, and when he was reached by reporters later, he denounced Weems's comments, saying that one of his subordinates should not be "spouting off about things he doesn't know about." "They had no way of observing the body adequately," said Fisher. "The marks around the neck were caused by skin slippage." Weems, recontacted after these comments, stuck to his conclusion, saying, "I know what I saw."

Why had Weems and Langley waited nine months to come forward? Langley said he finally contacted Mrs. Paisley after hearing news reports that she might not be able to collect on her husband's life insurance policies. Paisley's CIA insurance policy paid off right away, but two other insurance companies questioned the identification of the body and the cause of death. (One company, Mutual of Omaha, has a special clause in its policy: it doesn't pay off on a suicide. The other company, Mutual of New York, was not sure the body was

pects to sue them. If the company still refuses to pay, once the suit is filed, a jury trial would follow later this year. To win, Mutual of Omaha would have to prove suicide, a difficult task with no witnesses, no suicide note, and little evidence. If Mutual of Omaha were to lose, Mrs. Paisley and her attorney would have a legal verdict of murder, which they hope would prompt a new investigation. But more important, the discovery proceedings of a trial would allow Fensterwald to ask for documents and question the CIA about Paisley.

**I**F THE BODY PULLED FROM the Chesapeake Bay was indeed Paisley's, had he been murdered? "Jumping off a boat with a gun in hand, pulling the trigger while in the water, is, to be charitable about the matter, a weird way to commit suicide," says Fensterwald. "And there was no suicide note. I'm told that 95 percent of suicide cases have left a note." The attorney cites other factors that argue against suicide:

■ There were no signs of a shooting aboard the *Brillig*. No traces of blood or brain tissue were found on the sloop. Thus, a suicide verdict requires a finding that Paisley either shot himself while standing on the edge of the boat—so that the shell casing, pistol, blood, and brain fragments all fell overboard with him—or that he shot himself in the water while wearing thirty-eight pounds of diving weights.

**"Jumping off a boat with a gun is a weird way to commit suicide."**

Paisley's.) Langley told Mrs. Paisley what he had seen and then urged Weems also to come forward.

Because Langley had known Paisley previously, and because, after nine months, Paisley had not turned up alive, the family and their attorney, as a matter of convenience, now reluctantly conceded it was his body, though they still have doubts.

Soon after the June press conference, Mutual of New York (with no suicide clause) agreed to make good on its \$95,000 policy. A *MONY* spokesman said, "Our doubts have been resolved that it was Paisley's body." Mutual of Omaha (with the special clause) will not honor its policy and Fensterwald ex-

■ Ballistics experts have assured Maryann Paisley that a nine-millimeter gun held behind the ear and fired at closer than arm's length will send a bullet in one side of the skull and out the other. This did not happen to Paisley. The corpse had a lead slug lodged in the brain and no exit wound.

■ According to Mrs. Paisley, when she first boarded the boat she noticed "a table had been pulled away from the wall. Several screws had been pulled loose, and it was tilted at an angle which would have made it impossible to use." This raised the question of struggle aboard the boat, since Paisley was working on the Team B report and the table

was the only writing surface aboard.

A week after the Langley-Weems press conference, two former state prosecutors who had worked on the Paisley case said it had not been properly investigated and should be reopened. The two men, Naji P. Maloof (the county attorney when the body was found) and Lawrence Lampson (Maloof's successor and now a district court judge) said their work was hampered by the CIA's refusal to cooperate with the state police. "Some people just don't want the truth about this case out," said Maloof.

**M**ARYANN PAISLEY says her husband was not just a paper-pushing analyst, despite the CIA's insistence that he never worked for the clandestine side of the agency. She wrote to Admiral Turner that Paisley's CIA activities "over the years were, as you know, certainly not confined to the overt side." She has said privately that Paisley served as a CIA contact for Nixon's White House "Plumbers." Also, investigator Ken Smith found the code-name "NASH" scribbled among some of Paisley's papers. "'NASH' stands for North Arlington Safe House," says Smith. "Nosenko was kept there at one time."

The Nosenko controversy is at the center of a secret struggle that divides the CIA. The question is, Is there a "mole"—a KGB plant—inside the CIA's top staff who has compromised our intelligence system? Paisley was apparently a man in the middle of this "mole war," which is being fought in public by former CIA officials James Angleton and

became wary of Nosenko's bona fides. Their doubts increased with time. The timing of Nosenko's arrival was too convenient, his message too pat. Nosenko revealed he was the KGB man in charge of all of Lee Harvey Oswald's KGB records—including Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union in 1959 and his dealings with the Soviet embassy in Mexico City in 1963. With this complete knowledge, Nosenko assured both American intelligence and the Warren Commission, which was then beginning its deliberations, that Oswald was of "no interest" whatsoever to the KGB and had had no contact with the Soviet spy agency. Oswald, though, had told the U.S. embassy in Moscow that he had agreed to give the Russians U-2 spy-plane secrets. (As a marine radio operator, Oswald had been stationed at a major U-2 base in Japan.) Tennant Bagley, former deputy chief of the CIA's Soviet bloc division and an Angleton ally, now says he found Nosenko's explanation "unbelievable." Angleton went so far as to conclude Oswald was a KGB sleeper agent when he returned to the United States, and was later activated to kill Kennedy.

But to others in the CIA and to J. Edgar Hoover, Angleton was just paranoid. To Hoover's FBI, which had primary responsibility for investigating the assassination, Nosenko brought the best possible news. It was not in Hoover's interest to have the Soviets involved in the assassination. His most trusted Soviet intelligence source, a prized Russian double agent at the UN code-named "Fedora," had given Hoover the same assurances that Oswald had no KGB ties. The Soviet source also vouched for

Two years before Nosenko came, another Soviet defector, Anatoli M. Golitsin, code-named "Stone," told the United States there was a KGB mole who had penetrated the highest echelons of the CIA. When Nosenko defected, Stone at once suspected him. But both he and Nosenko-Fedora couldn't be right. (Stone is today a top CIA consultant whose word is accepted by agency counterintelligence.)

Angleton's side agreed with Stone and they tried to break Nosenko. He was placed under "hostile interrogation" at a specially constructed CIA safe house and psychologically tortured for more than three years. According to Bagley, Nosenko was the only defector to receive such treatment, which included solitary confinement, constant visual observation, and sophisticated techniques designed to disorient him. Serious contradictions and omissions developed in his story, but Nosenko refused to crack.

Still unconvinced, Angleton and Helms finally decided in 1968 that their doubts couldn't be resolved definitively. In an effort to diffuse the problem and get Nosenko out of their hair, they gave him a new identity and shipped him off to North Carolina for "rehabilitation." A 900-page report from the CIA's Soviet branch that year summed up their considerable doubts. But an 18-page rebuttal, written later in 1968 by the Office of Security, disputed each and every conclusion of the Angleton side. There the matter was to have ended.

But then came the major power shift within the CIA. In 1973 Helms was sent off to Iran and William Colby took over as director. By 1974, Angleton and his top aides were also out—forced to resign by Colby. Then came Colby's airing of twenty-five years of agency dirty laundry before the Senate—including foreign assassinations, mind-control projects, and illegal domestic operations. Helms and Angleton, the old-guard leaders, were blamed for many of these past crimes, and were chided for their anti-Soviet biases. (Colby, responsible for one of the worst CIA abuses, the "Phoenix" project of Vietnam executions, remained unscathed.) Colby also allowed the Nosenko defenders to welcome back Nosenko as a top consultant to CIA counterintelligence.

Until last year the whole Nosenko matter had smoldered in secret. However, the publication of Edward Epstein's book, *Legend*, changed that; there was a sensation in Congress, the media, and intelligence circles when it was learned that Angleton was a primary source for

**"Some people just don't want the truth about this case out."**

Richard Helms on one side, representing the "old guard," and William Colby and Stansfield Turner on the other side, representing the new wave.

Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko, now 51, was a KGB agent who began feeding information to the CIA in June 1962. In January 1964—two months after the Kennedy assassination—he defected to the United States. To that point he was the highest-ranking KGB catch ever for American intelligence.

James Angleton, then chief of CIA counterintelligence, and his allies in the CIA's Soviet bloc division immediately

Nosenko's legitimacy. If Nosenko was a double agent, then Fedora must also be a mole. And if Fedora was lying, it meant Hoover's counterintelligence system was severely compromised. More important, the Nosenko message got Hoover's G-men off the hook for not having spotted Oswald as a potential assassin. Hoover reasoned that if Oswald had documentable ties to the KGB—whether or not he was their assassin—Hoover would have to explain to the Warren Commission why his men didn't know about it. So he embraced Nosenko and Fedora.

the author.

The book laid out publicly, for the first time, Angleton's opposition to Nosenko and his contention that the defector was a KGB plant sent to dupe the CIA. Masterspy Angleton, now out in the bitter cold, was saying, through Epstein, that the CIA had been turned "inside out" by the KGB. Colby was blamed for handing over the "family jewels" of past CIA illegalities to the Senate and destroying CIA counterintelligence. Angleton also hinted that maybe Colby was the "mole."

Apparently Colby's allies felt the same way about Angleton. Last May it was reported Angleton had been the subject of a 1972 CIA investigation into his loyalty. The investigation was terminated in 1974 because of lack of evidence. But now a second probe targeting Angleton is said to be underway. Ordered by Admiral Turner, this new investigation will reportedly blame Angleton for his failure to protect the CIA from Soviet penetration.

In the face of this attack, the Angleton-Helms side has been bolstered by the recently released report of the House Assassinations Committee, which substantiates their view of Nosenko. The committee interviewed everyone concerned, including Nosenko five times. The report concludes Nosenko "lied about Oswald" either "to the FBI and CIA in 1964 or the committee in 1978, or perhaps both." The committee found Oswald "quite likely" had been interviewed by the KGB and had been the subject of extensive KGB surveillance. One former committee staffer says, "We hammered away at Nosenko for six hours one day and totally broke him and his whole story shattered." Nosenko completely reversed his story and admitted to the committee that all of Oswald's mail was intercepted, his phone was tapped, his apartment bugged, and his movements watched by undercover KGB agents.

Adding weight to Nosenko's revised story, the committee's polygraph expert found that Nosenko's first two lie detector tests, which were administered by the Angleton team and showed Nosenko to be lying, were the "most valid." A later test, used by Nosenko's defenders to exonerate him, was judged by the committee's expert to be "atrocious."

Despite the committee's finding on Nosenko, the CIA officially sticks by him. The agency chose John Clement Hart, a twenty-four-year CIA veteran who wrote yet another positive CIA evaluation of Nosenko in 1976, to explain its current

position to the committee. Hart condemned the CIA interrogation of Nosenko as the shabbiest he had ever seen. Then, in a classic stonewall, he refused to testify about Nosenko and Oswald—though this was the main reason the committee had called him. He refused to even acknowledge that questions exist about Nosenko. Hart would only say, "I would ignore the testimony of Mr. Nosenko on Oswald. I would not use it." But he said this did not imply a "bad faith" act by Nosenko, only that he had

don't even remember what they tell us from one day to the next."

In April the FBI reported that the facts of the case did not warrant a counterintelligence investigation, but gave no details. The Senate committee remained "troubled" by the Nosenko angle and continued a limited investigation. (Their report should be ready this month, but is due to remain classified.) The CIA, for its part, has adamantly denied Paisley had any connection to Nosenko. Information from several

## "There isn't much we can do if the CIA lies to us," says a senator.

been misinformed or was boasting about his knowledge to get better treatment from the CIA.

Helms and Bagley were unimpressed. Since Nosenko had lied about Oswald, said Helms, "this tends to sour all other opinions he maintained. I don't know how one resolves this bone in the throat." "We cannot simply slide over this as easily as CIA does," said Bagley. "It is a serious possibility, not a sick fantasy. In fact, it is hard to avoid. It is irresponsible to expose clandestine personnel to this individual." Angleton has remained silent.

**W**HAT DOES ALL OF this have to do with Paisley? Apparently a lot. Paisley debriefed and befriended Nosenko; Maryann Paisley thinks her husband's death may be related to Nosenko; the Senate was so concerned it has investigated the matter for a year; and, in a remarkable coincidence, Paisley disappeared from the *Brillig* a few days after John Hart and Richard Helms testified to the Assassinations Committee about Nosenko.

In January, at the request of Senator Birch Bayh of Indiana, chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, the FBI began a counterintelligence analysis of the Paisley case. "A number of troubling questions remain," said Bayh. The Nosenko connection was high on the list, but the committee, whose function is oversight, claimed it lacked the manpower for a full investigation. "There isn't much we can do if the CIA lies to us," said a Senate spokesman. One senator anonymously added, "The CIA has lied so often about Paisley that they

sources indicates this is yet another CIA stonewall.

Reportedly, Paisley regularly interrogated and evaluated Soviet dissidents and political defectors. In particular, according to reporter Tad Szulc, who wrote about the Paisley case in January for the *New York Times Magazine*, Paisley, working closely with Angleton, interrogated Nosenko about Soviet strategic capabilities when Nosenko was held at a Virginia safe house in the mid-1960s. The two men later became friends, say Szulc's sources, and Paisley frequently visited Nosenko at his North Carolina home where he lived after 1968. The last visit was in the spring of 1978.

Admiral Turner says Nosenko "has no recollection of ever meeting Paisley." Angleton told *Look* last spring, "To my knowledge Paisley was never involved in the clandestine side. I have doubts that he saw Nosenko." But Angleton also denied ever meeting Paisley. Fensterwald, for one, doesn't trust Angleton's answer. He says, "I don't believe it's possible that in their long CIA careers, both involved in Soviet counterintelligence, that they never met." Angleton's denial could be viewed as self-serving. It is not inconceivable that Paisley, after 1974, was keeping tabs on Nosenko for the original Angleton group.

Maryann Paisley is sure her husband was part of the 1964-67 hostile interrogation team that condemned Nosenko. She says he told her he was. In her private letter to CIA Director Turner, she wrote, "You know that John Paisley was deeply involved in Nosenko's indescribable debriefing. It has crossed my mind and that of others, that my husband's fate might somehow be connected with the Nosenko case. John's death and/or

disappearance coincided with Nosenko headlines in every newspaper and news broadcast nationwide. Katherine Hart or Len McCoy will tell you that I am not a fool."

Turner, a relative newcomer to the Nosenko question, has nevertheless continued the Colby policy. In her letter, Mrs. Paisley was asking him to listen to two current senior CIA officials, Hart and McCoy, who are on the pro-Nosenko side—his side. To persuade Turner to look into the matter, Maryann Paisley was relying not on people who were anti-Nosenko and therefore prejudiced in Turner's eyes, but on people who would be credible to him.

Katherine Hart is the wife of John Hart, whose Assassinations Committee testimony came nine days before Paisley disappeared. Mrs. Hart was Maryann Paisley's immediate supervisor when Mrs. Paisley worked for a year as a CIA bookkeeper in 1974 and Mrs. Hart was a senior officer in the Requirements Division, which handles requests for funds for clandestine operations by overseas CIA stations. Apparently she had a professional relationship with Paisley, since her CIA phone number was written in his secret phone book, recovered among his effects.

Leonard McCoy, according to Epstein's book *Legend*, was an officer in the CIA's Reports Section who championed

any hard evidence or proof that he was a double agent or a mole or any of these things. There have been a lot of stories hinting this or that but they're not based on anything you can prove." Fensterwald agrees that Paisley was loyal to the CIA, but this still leaves weighty and complex questions for the Senate (and the CIA) to answer:

■ Is there a mole in the CIA and was Paisley working to uncover him? One theory is that Paisley was murdered by the Soviets because he was about to expose their mole or because the Soviets wanted to teach the CIA a lesson. According to this theory, Paisley was being offered to the Russians as a double agent, when he was actually still loyal to the CIA. Fluent in Russian, having a top clearance, separated from his wife, living in an apartment building populated with Soviet embassy employees (read KGB), Paisley appeared to be a tailor-made defector. But the Soviets figured out it was too good to be true—a setup. So, the theory goes, they killed him to intimidate the Americans.

In fact, it has been reported that Paisley was approached by KGB agents during the early stages of the second round of SALT talks in Helsinki. He was asked to become a double agent on the subject of the U.S. negotiating position at the talks. Paisley immediately passed on the

(apparently the same investigation that looked into Angleton's performance). A report on this project was given to then CIA Director Colby in 1974, and soon after. Paisley was retired, Angleton was ousted, and Shadrin disappeared. One intelligence source theorized to the *Sun*, "Paisley may have gotten caught in the middle. Maybe he learned who the mole was. Or maybe he stumbled across some piece of information which might have led to the mole—and which made him an instant liability."

■ Why did Paisley retire from the CIA at 50, only to continue his top-secret work from the outside? Was his 1974 retirement voluntary or was he an anti-Nosenko loser, eased out of counterintelligence action with the rest of the Angleton side? According to the *Wilmington News Journal*, a former CIA official who was involved in Watergate recently said, "You have to examine that retirement very closely. He no more retired in 1974 than did E. Howard Hunt. The key to the Paisley case is the retirement."

■ What does it mean that the CIA embraces Nosenko?

The least horrifying possibility is that the Colby-Turner-Hart faction knows Nosenko lied, but thinks he lied to tell the truth. If this was the case, he was not a bona fide defector, but a hand-picked KGB messenger, trained in his message, and then sent to say, "We didn't kill Kennedy." But the Russians' ploy failed to convince Angleton, who is still persuaded that Oswald was a KGB-controlled agent.

It is an innocuous, but complicated explanation: The Russians didn't kill Kennedy—Angleton was wrong; Nosenko *was* a plant—Angleton was right. But there is no other mole—Nosenko, was, in effect, the mole. The CIA rupture has been caused by an internal conflict over how to interpret the data. The leaders who gained control in 1974 have decided to cover the whole thing up to save the CIA and the nation from an embarrassing misunderstanding.

The worst case would be that the CIA is totally infested with moles who have turned things inside out.

As for the Paisley case, Fensterwald now sums it up this way: "Anyone who looks at the facts is hard pressed to believe it was a suicide. And it was not a 'jealous husband' type of murder. It seems to be an intelligence murder. And if it was, the chances of solving it are very slim. Everything that happens in those kinds of cases is shrouded in mist." □

## "Everything that happens in this kind of case is shrouded in mist."

Nosenko and protested his mistreatment and the suppression of the information he had provided. After Angleton was purged in 1974, McCoy, according to Epstein, was appointed the new research head of counterintelligence, and "Nosenko himself was then appointed as a consultant to this newly constituted counterintelligence staff."

It is not known if Turner spoke to Hart or McCoy, but in February he did send Mrs. Paisley a brief reply, expressing his sympathy and concluding, "I do want you to know that our careful review of the evidence to date . . . has convinced us that it was John's body which was found and that problems or questions raised by you in your letter can be resolved." He gave no specifics.

One Senate source warns, "I would take it easy on Paisley's reputation and integrity. We have not been able to get

contact to his CIA superiors and was advised to take the offer. He fed information to the KGB with CIA approval, although it is not known whether it was accurate.

And there is also the case of Nicholas George Shadrin, a Soviet naval commander who defected to the United States in 1959 and became a consultant to the Office of Naval Intelligence. Sources confirmed to the *Baltimore Sun* that Paisley had interrogated and evaluated Shadrin. In 1966, Shadrin became a double agent working with the KGB, but under joint CIA-FBI control. In 1975, after nine years in this role, Shadrin flew to Vienna for a meeting with KGB operatives, then disappeared without a trace. His fate is still unknown and the CIA won't discuss the matter.

Five years ago, Paisley was involved in the agency-wide search for the mole