

BLAKEY NARRATION: CONSPIRACY THEORIES - A SECOND LOOK

Tuesday, September 26, 1978

Meagher pp 21-22

As you have noted, Mr. Chairman, the question of conspiracy has been with us since these hearings opened nearly three weeks ago, although it was addressed more specifically here yesterday. It can be argued that the theories examined yesterday seem to break down under careful inspection, but that is one of the purposes of these hearings - to weigh the validity of the evidence. Today, other, more substantial theories will be examined, if only briefly.

Nevertheless, before the Committee continues to look into conspiracy theories, it may be helpful to note that none of them wholly originated with this Committee's investigation. Most of the leads or allegations that the Committee has examined have heretofore been the subject of some public discussion, the subject of earlier investigations or of books and articles. No claim is advanced here to originality or special insight.

What the Committee has done is to apply in its own investigation more sophisticated techniques of examination than those used or available to those who have preceded us or raised questions, some of which were demonstrated yesterday. Beyond scientific analysis of the evidence, the Committee has also employed investigative tools that were disregarded in earlier investigations of the Kennedy assassination. The Committee has made extensive use of immunity grants and interrogation under oath in executive session. Files have been widely read, using only the

Narration: Second Look - 2

most tenuous relevancy theories. Another approach that has been mentioned here before is the use of a carefully thought out investigative plan that employed a detailed reconstruction of conspiracies that might have occurred, in order to determine if, in fact, they had any bearing on the actual event in Dallas. The Committee did not just run out leads in hand, the typical law enforcement approach, + THE ONE PRINCIPALLY UTILIZED BY THE FBI IN '63-'64

Over the next three days, we will be looking into a couple of conspiracy theories that the Committee felt warranted its fullest attention. This is not to say these are ^{POSSIBLE} ~~the~~ plots that are the most likely ^{ONES} to have led to the assassination, if indeed any of them did. What is being said is ^{SIMPLY} this - here are a couple of conspiracy theories that cannot be readily dismissed (as those we considered yesterday ^{MAY POSSIBLY} ~~can~~ be), and this is the way they were investigated. This is ^{THEFORE} a status report on the investigation, the full findings and conclusions of which will be detailed in the final report. Obviously, all that was done cannot be ^{ACCURATELY} portrayed here.

First, the theory that anti-Castro Cubans conspired to kill the President will be examined and summarized in this narration. Then it ^{MAY} ~~will~~ be appropriate to hear testimony on an aspect of the concern that other forces ^{POLARIS MORE SINISTER} may have been behind the assassination. ^{THE PRESSURE - PUT THIS IN RECORD}

Why anti-Castro Cubans? For several reasons. From the evidence available to them in 1964, two staff attorneys for the Warren Commission, David Slawson and William Coleman, went so far as to speculate that Lee Harvey Oswald, despite his public posture as a Castro sympathizer, was actually an agent of anti-Castro exiles. Pressing for further investigation of the possibility, they wrote a memorandum which, in part, said:

* SOME GROUPS MAY HAVE HAD MOTIVE; OPPORTUNITY, MEANS; SOME POSS. LINK TO LHO -

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(NOT READ)

The evidence here could lead to an anti-Castro involvement in the assassination on some sort of basis as this: Oswald could have become known to the Cubans as being strongly pro-Castro. He made no secret of his sympathies, and so the anti-Castro Cubans must have realized that law enforcement authorities were also aware of Oswald's feelings and that, therefore, if he got into trouble, the public would also learn of them...Second, someone in the anti-Castro organization might have been keen enough to sense that Oswald had a penchant for violence... On these facts, it is possible that some sort of deception was used to encourage Oswald to kill the President when he came to Dallas...The motive of this would, of course, be the expectation that after the President was killed Oswald would be caught or at least his identity ascertained, the law enforcement authorities and the public would then blame the assassination on the Castro government and a call for its forceful overthrow would be irresistible...

Some critics of the Warren Commission have termed the period Oswald lived in New Orleans, the summer of 1963, the "Cubanization of Oswald", implying there were sinister motives for his inserting himself into the Cuban controversy. They point out that, aside from letters he wrote to the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in New York, Oswald's known Cuban contacts in the United States were with anti-Castroites.

There are other reasons the Committee's attention has

been drawn to the anti-Castro area. The Warren Commission files reveal, for instance, that there were many reports from Dallas and Miami immediately after the assassination which linked Oswald with Cuba. Yet, when the FBI checked out the reports, in almost all cases they had come from anti-Castro sources, some militant enough to deserve suspicion themselves.

It comes down to this: in a homicide investigation, any individual or group is suspect, if it has the motive, opportunity, and means to commit the crime. There is no doubt that certain anti-Castro groups had all three.

It is difficult, these many years later, to appreciate the political and emotional impulses of the Cuban exile communities - in Miami, New Orleans and Dallas - when John F. Kennedy was President. The hopes and expectations of the exiles had been on a roller coaster ride; their relationship with the United States Government had deteriorated. They were puzzled by the often conflicting policies of various Federal agencies towards them and their objectives, the main one being to get rid of Castro. The anti-Castro groups were frustrated, bitter and angry. And the focal point of their resentment was President Kennedy.

It began with the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion in April, 1961. Since January 1959, when Castro marched triumphantly into Havana, the more than 100,000 Cubans who had fled the Revolution lived in anticipation of its overthrow. These Cuban exiles were not only encouraged in this hope by the U. S. government, they were organized, directed and

almost totally funded by its agencies. The training camps, the arms and weapons, the instructors, the ships and landing craft were all supplied by the U. S. government. The invasion plan itself was formulated by the government. The Cuban exiles came to feel that the government not only promised them success, it guaranteed it.

When what had been touted as "the glorious march on Havana" turned into a tragic rout, the Cuban exiles, unappreciative of President Kennedy's inherited role in the invasion, reacted with incredulous disbelief and anger that he would allow the operation to fail. Intensifying the exiles' reaction was the fact that Kennedy himself insisted on taking the blame. In Executive Session before this Committee, Manuel Antonio Varona, in 1961 the head of the united exile organization, the Revolutionary Democratic Front, told of a tense and emotional encounter with President Kennedy at the White House as hope for the invasion was fading. "We were not charging Mr. Kennedy with anything," Varona said. "We knew he was not in charge of the military effects directly. Nevertheless, President Kennedy told us he was the one - the only one responsible."

Varona may have sympathized with Kennedy's position, but most anti-Castro Cubans didn't. The noted attorney, Mario Lazo, in his book, Dagger in the Heart, put it very directly:

"The Bay of Pigs defeat was wholly self-inflicted in Washington. Kennedy told the truth when he publicly accepted responsibility...The heroism of the beleaguered Cuban Brigade had been rewarded by betrayal, defeat,

death for many of them, long and cruel imprisonment for the rest. The Cuban people...had always admired the United States as strong, rich, generous - but where was its sense of honor and the capacity of its leaders?

The mistake of the Cuban fighters for liberation was that they thought too highly of the United States. They believed to the end that it would not let them down. But it did..."

President Kennedy was well aware of the bitter reaction to the Bay of Pigs debacle. Far from abandoning the Cuban exiles, he set out to convince them of his loyalty to their cause. Perhaps the most ironic event of his relationship with the Cuban exiles occurred on December 29, 1962, at the Orange Bowl in Miami. He had come to welcome the survivors of Brigade 2506, the 1,200 men who had been ransomed from Cuba after almost 20 months in prison. The President was presented with the Brigade flag in a dramatic and emotional scene.

But the euphoria was false and misleading. Although the Cuban exiles cheered President Kennedy that day, there also coursed through the crowd a bitter resentment among some who felt they were witnessing a display of political hypocrisy. Later, it would be claimed that the Brigade feeling against President Kennedy was so strong that the presentation nearly

did not take place, and it would be alleged (incorrectly, as it turns out) that the Brigade flag given to Kennedy was actually a replica.

That intensity of anti-Kennedy feeling by Cuban exiles was the result of events between the time of the Bay of Pigs invasion and the ceremony in the Orange Bowl.

It is not possible to know fully how the Bay of Pigs defeat changed President Kennedy's attitude toward Cuba, but when journalists Taylor Branch and George Crile wrote in Harper's Magazine about a massive infusion of U. S. aid to clandestine anti-Castro operations in the wake of the Bay of Pigs, they titled their article, "The Kennedy Vendetta".

What is known is that the period between the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962 can be accurately characterized as the high water mark of anti-Castro activity. Miami, the center of the exile community, became a busy staging ground for armed infiltrations into Cuba. While not every raid was supported or even known about in advance by government agencies, the United States played a key role in monitoring, directing and supporting the anti-Castro Cubans. Hundreds of Cubans were set up in proprietary corporations established by the U. S. government to support the massive covert operation. And although this effort was cloaked in secrecy, there were very few Cubans in the exile community who did not know what was happening and who was supporting the operation.

That was a time of great activity and exhilaration in the Cuban exile community. American arms and weapons flowed freely through South Florida. Miami's "Little Havana" was a beehive of gossip about the latest infiltration operations or paramilitary missions. Raiding parties that left from small secret islands in the Florida Keys had the "green light" from the U. S. government.

Then came the Cuban missile crisis and negotiations that ended it. The anti-Castro groups felt as if the rug had been pulled out from under them.

The Cuban exiles were initially elated by the possibility that the crisis would provoke a showdown with Castro. But President Kennedy made a deal for the removal of the missiles. Only later did the exiles come to feel full force the impact of Kennedy's agreement with Khrushchev and Castro.

The word was soon passed. Newspapers reported a basic turn-around in the Kennedy policy. For example, the raids that were being conducted by Alpha 66, one of the most aggressive exile organizations, were abruptly condemned by Washington. The State Department asserted that it did not sanction such attacks. In December, two months after the missile accord, 13 anti-Castro guerrillas were arrested at a training camp in the Florida Keys and their arms and explosives were seized by U. S. Customs agents. In March 1963, another Alpha 66 raid brought a statement from President Kennedy himself. "The raids,"

he said, "served no useful purpose." An attack on a Soviet ship in Cuban waters led to the formal issuance of a policy pronouncement on March 31. Kennedy said, in no uncertain terms: "We intend to take every step necessary to assure that such raids are not launched, manned or equipped on United States territory." On April 5, The New York Times noted that the United States was throwing more planes, ships and men into its effort to police the straits of Florida against anti-Castro raiders.

Throughout the spring and summer of 1963, the crackdown on guerrilla activity continued, causing frustration and resentment on the part of the exiles. They could not grasp how they could be supported and aided by one U. S. agency and then be slapped down by others. In August, the FBI seized a cache of explosives at an anti-Castro training camp in Louisiana. Just weeks later, the U. S. Coast Guard cooperated with the British Navy in a raid on an exile base in the Bahamas. Then, U. S. Customs cracked down on a group of anti-Castro pilots in Miami. The Secret Service arrested a Cuban exile leader for conspiring to counterfeit Cuban currency, destined for forces inside Cuba.

The brunt of that anger fell on President Kennedy. The Cuban exiles came to think of the missile crisis deal as a "betrayal". Mario Lazo called it a "soul-shattering blow".

Jose Miro Cardona, the head of the Cuban Revolutionary Council, an exile organization put together by the U. S. government to unite fragmented exile groups, resigned in disgust.

In the major enclaves of anti-Castro Cubans - in Miami, New Orleans and Dallas - the once glittering image of President Kennedy had turned dark.

So, the motivation for anti-Castro Cuban involvement in the Kennedy assassination was based not only on a schism in political and ideological viewpoints, but also on a disposition growing out of a pragmatic realization that Castro probably would survive.

Despite the recommendations of Slawson and Coleman, the Warren Commission largely ignored the mood of the exiles in its final report. It distilled the subject down to a nine-paragraph review entitled, "Alleged association with various Mexican or Cuban individuals".

This Committee opted to approach the possibilities in a more open-minded way. It decided to examine in depth those exile groups which, besides motivation, had the capability and resources to be involved in an assassination - in other words, the "action groups".

The Committee also attempted to determine if Oswald sought to utilize or exploit resources of the exile groups or if they may have tried to use him.

The first step was, of course, to define the "action groups". The Committee examined public records; it instituted

requests for file reviews from every Federal agency in contact with the groups, including the CIA, the Department of Defense, the U. S. Customs Service, the FBI, the Drug Enforcement Agency, the Secret Service, and so on; it delved into the records of local law enforcement agencies in Miami, New Orleans and Dallas. The Committee also sent field investigators into Cuban exile communities on an exploratory mission, to talk to former members of the "action groups".

From these sources the Committee discovered there were a few hundred militant anti-Castro exile organizations founded between the Castro Revolution and the Kennedy assassination. Most did not stay in operation for long, but at one time 105 of them could be identified from local police files alone. The Committee finally boiled the list down to 20 key anti-Castro Cuban groups which had the motivation, capability and resources to assassinate the President.

They will be named and discussed in detail in the Committee's final report. Suffice it to say now that the Committee closely scrutinized the history of the groups and it looked very carefully at the activities and associations of their key leaders. The Committee conducted dozens of field interviews, it took depositions, and it cross-examined witnesses in executive session.

In its investigation of two of the main action groups the Committee found indications of a possible connection with figures named in the Kennedy assassination, specifically with Lee Harvey Oswald.

Narration: Second Look - 12

The two anti-Castro Cuban exile organizations of special interest to the Committee are Alpha 66 and a group named Junta Revolucionaria Cubana, or JURE.

Alpha 66 was founded in Puerto Rico in the summer of 1962 by Antonio Veciana Blanch, a soft-spoken, mild-mannered former Havana accountant, a church-going family man who had fled Cuba in 1961. Two months after he left, Cuba's government-controlled press named Veciana as the ringleader of an unsuccessful assassination attempt on Castro.

On founding Alpha 66, Veciana declared he was forming the group because the Cuban exiles needed a new, coordinated effort to topple Castro and to counteract the "do nothing" attitude of President Kennedy towards the Castro regime. Dramatic action was required, he said, announcing there would soon be a series of significant hit-and-run attacks on Cuba.

Although most of the original members of Alpha 66 were, also, former accountants, Veciana put together a tough commando unit. Veciana, as the chief spokesman, fund-raiser and coordinator, claimed no political aims other than the overthrow of Castro. Alpha 66 was uniquely independent, generally having little to do with other exile groups whose members were often at odds over the hierarchy that would follow Castro's overthrow.

When Alpha 66 acted, it did so with a flourish. One of its first assaults was the shelling and machine-gunning of a British ship and two Cuban vessels off the north coast of Cuba.

Narration: Second Look - 13

At a press conference following the raid, Veciana issued a "declaration of war" against Castro and any ships that were carrying Cuban goods. The British Government filed a strong complaint with the State Department, but Veciana promised more raids.

Throughout the rest of 1962 and into the summer and early fall of 1963, Alpha 66 struck often, quickly gaining the reputation as the most militant of the exile groups. In the middle of the missile crisis, it had the audacity to pull a raid. By March 1963, the Alpha 66's unceasing hit-and-run attacks provoked direct public criticism by President Kennedy. Veciana was not cowed. "We are going to attack again and again," he declared.

Veciana had made an old friend, former Castro Army Major, Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo the military leader of Alpha 66. But Veciana himself was the strategic organizer, the public spokesman and fundraiser of the organization. At least that's what a review of the newspaper files of the time has reflected. Yet, in September 1962, the New York Times attributed to Veciana a cryptic statement. He had called a press conference to announce five raids in 60 days. Then, in the body of the story, Veciana was quoted as saying that all the planning for the raids was done by leaders, "I don't even know".

As the years went by and the military operations of the Cuban exile groups, including those of Alpha 66, lapsed, Veciana himself remained very active in anti-Castro operations

in Latin America. From 1968 to 1972, he used La Paz, Bolivia, as his base. There he was ostensibly working as a banking consultant, though he spent most of his time planning anti-Communist subversive operations. He was, in fact, on the U. S. government payroll. Nevertheless, in 1971, he organized an attempt on Castro's li.

Then, in March 1976, a staff investigator for Senator Richard Schweiker, a member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, approached Veciana in Miami to talk about the relationship of U. S. intelligence agencies to anti-Castro activities. The Kennedy assassination was not mentioned.

Veciana told the investigator of his anti-Castro activities. Then, when asked, he said that, yes, he had been in touch with certain Americans in those activities. In fact, he said, there was one American who had directed him in all his activities, including the Castro assassination attempts in 1961 and 1971. Veciana said the man told him, when they first met in the Havana bank in which Veciana was working in 1960, that his name was Maurice Bishop. Veciana believed that to be a false name.

Veciana said Bishop never told him he was an agent of a U. S. intelligence agency and, in fact, avoided a direct answer when asked. But, Veciana recounted, Bishop was obviously a man with strategic contacts, both in the United States and Latin America.

Veciana said that Bishop had broken contact with him in 1973, that down through the years he had never initiated contact with Bishop, and he didn't know how that could be done. Bishop had always contacted him. He had met with Bishop at various locations, on the average of several times a year, between 1960 and 1973. He met him in Miami often, in Las Vegas once, in Puerto Rico many times, in Washington, D. C., in La Paz, in Caracas and in a few other cities. And, yes, said Veciana when asked, he had met Maurice Bishop a few times in Dallas. As a matter of fact, he recalled one meeting there in August 1963, when he was scheduled to rendezvous with Bishop in the lobby of a large office building. When he arrived, Bishop was there talking with a young, slightly built American. Veciana did not recall whether he was introduced to the man by name, but after the Kennedy assassination, he immediately recognized Lee Harvey Oswald as the man with Maurice Bishop that day in Dallas.

Antonio Veciana's story has been of considerable interest to this Committee, which has gone to great lengths to assess it. The Committee has spent many hours with Veciana, who has provided it with details of his relationship with Bishop. There are still leads which cannot now be revealed, but which the Committee is pursuing.

The Committee has, of course, taken sworn testimony from Veciana and other key witnesses. Its investigators have tapped

sources from as far as Venezuela and Cuba. Numerous files which have been requested from the CIA, the FBI and the Department of Defense are still being reviewed and analyzed. In addition, the Committee is probing the possibility that Bishop may not have been associated with a U. S. intelligence agency. On July 30, 1973, the Committee released a composite sketch of Bishop, produced from a detailed description provided by Veciana.

The Committee cannot be conclusive, but it can say that Veciana's allegations remain undiscredited and that the Committee has obtained an indication of the existence of a Maurice Bishop, or someone using that name. The meaning of this story remains, as yet, indeterminate.

The other anti-Castro group of special interest to the Committee was JURE. JURE was formed in September 1962 as an outgrowth of a split in another anti-Castro group, the Revolutionary Movement of the People, or MRP. The founder of JURE was Manolo Ray Rivero. JURE was considered a relatively "leftist" Cuban exile organization, and many of its detractors accused it of "Fidelism without Fidel". Ray and his group were mistrusted by the right-wing elements of the exile Cuban community.

Although JURE was supported by the CIA, the Agency had to prod other exile organizations to accept JURE into the Cuban Revolutionary Council, their umbrella organization. Ray kept his group in the CRC for only three months, during the period of the Bay of Pigs invasion.

The largest and most active JURE chapters were in Miami and Puerto Rico, but other chapters were located throughout the U. S. and in Latin American countries. One was in Dallas, and one of the members of the Dallas chapter was Silvia Odio, a 26-year-old, recently divorced mother of four, whose husband had abandoned her in Puerto Rico. Educated in the United States and raised in an upper-class Cuban environment, Mrs. Odio was the eldest daughter of Amador Odio, once one of Cuba's top trucking executives.

In 1961, Castro's officers arrested Silvia Odio's mother and father for harboring a confederate of Antonio Veciana in the October Castro assassination attempt. The Odio children had left Cuba, and several of them lived in Dallas.

One of Silvia Odio's sisters, Serita, attended the University of Dallas and was acquainted with a socialite named Lucille Connell, who was active in civic and charitable activities. Mrs. Connell made arrangements in early 1963 for Silvia to come to Dallas, and further arranged for her to receive psychiatric treatment at Southwestern Medical School, where she became a patient of Dr. Burton C. Einspruch. According to Mrs. Connell, Silvia suffered from a condition which caused black-outs when reality became oppressive.

Silvia Odio testified to the Warren Commission that a man she identified as Lee Harvey Oswald, in the company of two

Latin men, visited her apartment in Dallas in late September 1963. The two Latin men identified themselves as members of JURE.

It should be noted that Silvia Odio was not unknown in the Cuban community of Dallas. She had attended JURE meetings, and in the summer of 1963, a large photograph of her sisters, Annie and Serita, had appeared on the front page of the Dallas Morning News, along with a "human interest" story about the Odio family. Silvia's name was mentioned.

Mrs. Odio testified before the Warren Commission in September 1964. She said that one of the men identified himself as "Leopoldo" and she assumed from his accent that he was Cuban. A second man, possibly named Angelo, was also Spanish speaking but, she said, he "looked" Mexican. The third, a white American male, was introduced to her as "Leon Oswald".

Later, Annie Odio, who was at her sister's apartment that evening, would corroborate Silvia's story to the FBI. She said she opened the door for the visitors.

Silvia Odio, who said she declined to help the men because she didn't trust their credentials, said that Leopoldo called her one or two days later. In this telephone conversation, she said, he mentioned his American friend, and said that "Leon" had remarked that the Cubans should have killed Kennedy after the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion.

When Mrs. Odio learned of Kennedy's assassination, she had one of her blackouts. She regained consciousness in a hospital room where her sister Annie soon visited her. Earlier, watching Oswald on television, Annie had independently recognized Oswald as someone she had seen before. When she mentioned it to her older sister, Silvia reminded her of the visit of the three men to her apartment.

Emotionally shaken, the women decided not to mention the incident to anyone. They did, however, tell their sister Serita, and Serita mentioned it to Lucille Connell. On December 12, 1963, the FBI interviewed Silvia Odio. She admitted the visit and positively identified Lee Harvey Oswald as the "Leon" who had come to her apartment with the two Latin-looking men. A week later, the FBI interviewed Dr. Einspruch who said that, although Silvia had had some emotional problems, she was a thoroughly credible person.

Silvia Odio's story ran contrary to other evidence which the Warren Commission had compiled. It had documentation that Oswald had traveled to Mexico City by bus and had registered at a hotel there on the morning of September 27.

The Warren Commission ordered an investigation, to be conducted principally by the FBI, of Mrs. Odio's allegation. It represented a glaring inconsistency in the movements of Oswald, as the Commission was prepared to report them.

In the summer of 1964, the Warren Commission pressed the FBI to dig more deeply into the Odio allegation. On July 24, Chief Counsel J. Lee Rankin, in a letter to FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, stated, "...the Commission already possesses firm evidence that Lee Harvey Oswald was on a bus traveling from Houston, Texas to Mexico City, Mexico, on virtually the entire day of September 26..." This so-called "firm" evidence was based on an analysis of Oswald's travel during the time period of September 24-27 by Assistant Counsel David Slawson. J. Wesley Liebeler, the Assistant Counsel who had interviewed Mrs. Odio, disagreed with this analysis and sent a memo to Rankin citing "fallacies" in the Slawson analysis.

On August 23, Rankin again wrote to Hoover and said, "It is a matter of some importance to the Commission that Mrs. Odio's allegations either be proved or disproved." Rankin requested that the FBI attempt to learn the identities of the three visitors, by contacting members of anti-Castro groups active in the Dallas area, as well as leaders of the JURE organization. He asked the FBI to check the possibility that Oswald had spent the night of September 24 in a hotel in New Orleans, after vacating his apartment. Portions of this investigation, which were inconclusive in supporting the Warren Commission's contention that Odio was mistaken, were not sent to Rankin until November 9, at which time the final report had been completed. Back on September 19, Liebeler was extorting Howard Willens, another Warren Commission attorney, to "tone down" the write-up of the Odio incident. Liebeler contended

in that memo: "There are problems. Odio may well be right. The Commission will look bad if it turns out that she is."

The FBI did attempt to alleviate the "problems". In a report dated September 26, it produced the story of Loran Eugene Hall, who claimed he had been in Dallas in September 1963, accompanied by two men fitting Odio's general description, and that it was they who had visited Silvia Odio. Oswald, Hall said, was not one of the men. Within a week of Hall's statement, the other two men Hall had named, Lawrence Howard and William Seymour, had been interviewed. They denied ever having met Silvia Odio. Then, later, Hall himself retracted his statement.

Despite the fact that the Commission could not prove Oswald took a bus to Mexico City, and despite the fact that Loran Hall's story was an admitted fabrication, the Warren Report was published, with this explanation of the Odio incident: "While the FBI had not yet completed its investigation into this matter at the time the report went to press, the Commission has concluded that Lee Harvey Oswald was not at Mrs. Odio's apartment in September 1963."

The critics of the Warren Commission have been quick to pounce on this conclusion.

In her book, Accessories After the Fact, Sylvia Meagher wrote:

"The Commission's failure to get to the bottom of this affair, with its inescapable implications, is inexcusable. If the Commission could leave such business unfinished, we are entitled to ask whether its members were ever determined to uncover the truth. Indeed, the Commission did not even give an honest account of such facts as were established. Its own Exhibits expose the 'evidence' presented in the Report as a tissue of evasion and deception which discredits more than it justifies the conclusion that Oswald could not have visited Mrs. Odio."

The Committee is continuing to investigate the Odio allegation. The approach has been two-pronged. First, the Committee has endeavored to interview everyone connected with the allegation. Additionally, the Committee has made intensive efforts to identify the two Spanish-speaking men who visited Mrs. Odio.

Interviews and depositions have been conducted with the principals: Silvia Odio, Annie Odio, Amador Odio, Lucille Connell Light and Dr. Burton Einspruch. The staff also arranged a conference telephone call between Dr. Einspruch in Dallas and Silvia Odio in Miami, during which they recalled the period when Mrs. Odio was under the doctor's care and related to him the visit of the three men. Mrs. Odio and Dr. Einspruch concurred that the revelation of this event came shortly after its occurrence and prior to the President's assassination.

Loran Hall testified before this Committee in Executive Session on October 5, 1977, and Howard and Seymour were interviewed by the investigative staff.

From a review of FBI files, the Committee secured a list of persons who belonged to the Dallas Chapter of JURE, and the Committee is continuing its attempts to locate and interview these individuals. Additionally, staff investigators interviewed the leader of JURE, Manolo Ray, now residing in Puerto Rico.

Furthermore, the Committee secured photographs of scores of pro-Castro and anti-Castro activists in 1963 who might fit the descriptions of the two Latins who Mrs. Odio says visited her. The Committee also utilized the services of various government agencies to run a computerized check on all individuals who used the "war" names of Leopoldo and Angelo, or names basically similar. An extensive search produced the names and photographs of three men who might possibly have been in Dallas in September of 1963. These photographs were shown to Mrs. Odio, but she was unable to identify them as the men she had seen.

The Committee has determined, as did members of the Warren Commission staff, that Silvia Odio's story still is credible. Over the period of the past 15 years, only minor details have changed, and one important one remains consistent - Silvia and Annie Odio are adamant that "Leon" was Lee Harvey Oswald.

While this Committee has gone much beyond the Warren Commission's investigation of the Odio story, it, too, has as yet an undetermined meaning.

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The so-called "Cubanization of Lee Harvey Oswald" occurred during the time he lived in New Orleans in 1963. It is a puzzling period in a mysterious career, more so for the gaps in the record of his activities, as the Warren Commission was able to document it.

New Orleans was Oswald's home town - he was born there October 18, 1939. In April 1963 he moved back, having lived in Fort Worth and Dallas since his return from the Soviet Union the previous June.

He spent the first two weeks job hunting, staying with the Murrets, Aunt Lillian and Uncle Charles, or "Dutz", as he was called, the sister and brother-in-law of Oswald's mother, Marguerite. After being hired by the Reily Coffee Company as a maintenance man, he sent for his wife, Marina, and their baby daughter, and they moved into an apartment on Magazine Street.

In May, Oswald wrote to Vincent T. Lee, national director of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, expressing a desire to open an FPCC chapter in New Orleans and requesting literature to distribute. He also had handouts printed, some of which were stamped "L.H. Oswald, 4907 Magazine Street", others with the alias, "A. J. Hidell, P. O. Box 30016", still others listing the FPCC address as 544 Camp Street.

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The Camp Street address has been a riddle to investigators, official and otherwise, over the years, because the only Cuban activity known to have been based there was of the anti-Castro sort.

Oswald lost his job in July, and his efforts to find another were futile. It is known that through the rest of the summer he filed claims at the unemployment office.

The FPCC campaign attracted attention, since Oswald was perhaps the sole overt supporter of Castro in a city where the Cuban community was strongly opposed to Castro. It also got him into a fight with three anti-Castro Cubans, resulting in Oswald spending a night in jail, but earning him some publicity. On August 17, he was interviewed on radio, and on August 21, he appeared in a television debate.

Oswald virtually passed out of sight ^{HOWEVER} from August 21 until September 17, the day he applied for a visa to Mexico. He is known to have written letters to left-wing political organizations, and he and Marina visited the Murrets on Labor Day. Marina has claimed he spent his free time reading books and practicing with his rifle.

There is evidence, however, that Oswald was busier than Marina has admitted, or even may be aware, and that in his activities he was ^{PETTING POSSIBLY} associating with some highly improbable individuals. Six witnesses in all, each corroborating the others, have testified before this Committee ^{IN CX, 5833} that Oswald was

in Clinton and Jackson, Louisiana, in late August and early September, seeking employment at East Louisiana State Hospital.

Some of the testimony about Clinton and Jackson place Oswald there with two men, both now deceased, who have been charged by New Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrison with conspiracy in the Kennedy assassination. One of them, David W. Ferrie, died before he was brought to trial. The other, Clay L. Shaw, was acquitted.

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CHAS. GUT.

The fashion in which the Garrison investigation was conducted, and the character of the Shaw trial have served to complicate an already complex case. It may be that the full story of Oswald in New Orleans will never be told, for added to the problems of deceased witnesses and fading memories is the unfortunate fact that evidence has been tarnished by the way in which it was handled in the Shaw prosecution.

^{WARRREN'S} The critics of the Warren Commission have argued, however, that there is more to be learned about what Oswald was up to in New Orleans and with whom he associated. There may be something to this, and the Committee will have the opportunity, in its final report, to lay out in full detail the ^{N. O.} situation in New Orleans.

The Committee can, for example, present its conclusions about Oswald's alleged association with David Ferrie. It has been suggested that the testimony that Oswald and Ferrie were together in Clinton and Jackson is, ^{DESPITE THE GARRISON PROSECUTION} ~~in a word~~, impressive.

Narration: Second Look - 27

The implications of such an association may be serious - at least on the level of association, ^{FOR}

David Ferrie worked as an investigator for Carlos Marcello, who has been identified as the organized crime boss of Louisiana and Texas. On the day of the assassination, he was with Marcello in a federal courtroom in connection with legal proceedings against the alleged Mafia leader.

Of the forces that might have conspired to assassinate the President, organized crime itself, ^{THUS} deserves great scrutiny, and the Committee has, ^{NOT} examined organized crime for its motive, opportunity and means to assassinate President Kennedy, and it has studied in depth, ^{THE} alleged Mafia associations of both Oswald and Jack Ruby.

Mr. Chairman, it would be appropriate at this time to view the greatest single justification for this effort to look ^{AT} ~~into~~ organized crime. ^{NEW}

9:00 FILM CLIP (JFK F-594) FROM NBC - VERY SHORT - RUBY SHOOTING LHM

^{THAT FILM CLIP ... FORCEFUL ... ARE ... THEY}
Mr. Chairman, understandably, the American people/might well accept one lone assassin in November in Dallas, but two surely asks for more than many have been willing to accept.

When Ruby shot Oswald in the basement of the Dallas Police Department on November 24, 1963, the nation was shocked by a nationally televised murder of the accused assassin of the President. In addition, the American people, ^{HISTORY} were deprived of the best single source of evidence in the case. When

evidence is, ^{so} put beyond reach, as it was in the assassination of Oswald, the first order of an investigation is to seek the motive for that killing.

First, what do we know about Jack Ruby? Is there anything in his background that sheds light on why he murdered Oswald?

Ruby grew up in Chicago in lower middle class surroundings. His early life was disrupted by family disputes. In 1923, after his parents had separated, he was placed in a foster home, when a court found that he, two brothers, and a sister were not receiving proper care.

He moved to California in 1933, then returned to Chicago in 1937 to become a union organizer. He moved to Dallas in 1947, where he operated a string of nightclubs. The last one he owned, the Carousel, was a burlesque house.

Ruby was known as idiosyncratic, a man of contradictions, given to occasional ~~outbursts~~ bursts of violent temper.

When President Kennedy was assassinated, Ruby was at the Dallas Morning News, arranging for an advertisement for the Carousel. In a swirl of activity that culminated in his shooting Oswald, Ruby, it has been alleged, seemed to be shadowing, or possibly stalking, the accused assassin. He was present when Oswald met the press on Friday ^{EVENING} ~~night~~, and he was at the Dallas County Jail on Saturday afternoon, waiting for Oswald to be transferred there. The transfer was postponed until Sunday.

(HOSPITAL?)

Ruby telephoned several friends to express his grief over the murder of the President. Some of them reported he would lapse into periods of sobbing. He prowled the streets at night, lamenting the decision of nightclub owners to stay open in the aftermath of tragedy. The Carousel was closed, out of respect.

On Sunday morning, Ruby went to the Western Union office on Main Street, next ^{TO THE} door ^(NOT CORRECTED) to the Dallas Municipal Building and police headquarters. At Western Union, he sent a \$25 money order to an employee, and then - four minutes after the money order was time stamped - he somehow entered the basement of police headquarters. As Oswald was being led to ^{THE} an awaiting car, ^{AS THE COM. HAS JUST SEEN} Ruby fired one fatal shot into him.

Ruby was tried and convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. An appellate court reversed the conviction on evidentiary grounds, however, and a new trial was ordered. Before it could begin, he contracted cancer and died of a blood clot in January 1967.

Our objective, ^{HERE} today is to learn more about Jack Ruby, his character, career and associations, as they might pertain to a motive for shooting Oswald. For that purpose, we have three witnesses who knew Ruby, each of whom - a close relative, a police officer, ^{PERHAPS TOMORROW} a gambler - encountered a distinct facet of the Jack Ruby character.

The first witness is Earl Ruby, Jack's younger brother. He was born in 1915, and he has spent his career as a businessman. Mr. Ruby is, at present, the proprietor of Cobo Cleaners in Detroit. He is a resident of Birmingham, Michigan.

It would be appropriate at this time, Mr. Chairman, to call Mr. Ruby.

As well as Earl Ruby might have known his brother in their early years, they spent much of their adult life apart. Earl Ruby is particularly limited when it comes to commenting on Jack's life in Dallas, since Earl was not there.

ADDS - ~~THE~~ RUBY POLYGRAPH

To learn more about Jack Ruby's life in Dallas, the Committee has turned to the Dallas Police Department. It has for two reasons: Ruby was on friendly terms with many officers of the DPD; and because there are questions still about the shooting of Oswald at Dallas Police Headquarters.

Our next witness is Captain Jack Revill of the Dallas Police Department. He has been a member of the DPD since 1951 and is currently in charge of the Internal Affairs Division of the Department.

In 1963, Captain Revill was a lieutenant assigned to the Criminal Intelligence Section of the Special Service Bureau. Later, he was a member of a special investigative unit charged with determining how Ruby, ^{IN FACT} entered the police headquarters basement on November 24, 1963.

It would be appropriate at this time, Mr. Chairman, to call Captain Revill.

The question of whether Jack Ruby acted alone in the shooting of Oswald has not been answered by his own assurances that he did. This is what he told the Warren Commission, which subjected him to a polygraph test for verification. But when this Committee asked its panel of experts on polygraphs to examine the results of Ruby's test, it declined to come to a conclusion, explaining the polygraph procedures of 1964 were of such poor quality as to preclude a judgment.

In addition, many critics of the Warren Commission insist it did not go far enough in examining Ruby's associations, to see if any of them give support to the suspicion that he was part of a conspiracy. Noting that the Warren Commission had discovered that Ruby had been in contact with an array of less than respectable characters - gamblers, ex-cons and henchmen of some underworld bigwigs, the Committee decided to investigate these connections further, to find out if they might support a conspiracy finding. There were three steps in the Committee approach:

First, the files on the individuals under investigation were reviewed, files from federal, state and local law enforcement agencies.

Second, selected individuals were interviewed, deposed or questioned at executive session hearings.

Third, Jack Ruby's 1963 long-distance phone calls to his associates were analyzed. The Warren Commission had access to long-distance telephone records, but it did not make the fullest use of them. The Committee took the records the Warren Commission had, gathered additional ones, and then analyzed all of them, using a House Information Systems computer. The objective was to categorize Ruby's phone contacts with an eye to discerning patterns.

During the Warren Commission investigation, on February 24, 1964, staff attorneys Burt Griffin and Leon Hubert recommended that immediate steps be taken to obtain and preserve the phone records of Jack Ruby and numerous associates. In a lengthy memorandum, ^{--- IN RECORD, F-448...} ~~Hubert~~ and Griffin recommended that the FBI be instructed to secure the records, and that Commission Chairman Earl Warren address a letter to telephone companies to secure preservation ^{THE} of existing records. Some records that were specified in the Griffin - Hubert request were obtained, but the extensive preservation they had envisioned was not carried out, an investigative step that Hubert and Griffin ultimately agreed to. Griffin has said that Commission General Counsel J. Lee Rankin vetoed the recommendation on ^{THE} grounds that it was too far-reaching and would create too great a burden. In another memorandum, ^{ON PRIVATE COMPANIES} ^{F-590} dated April 4, Griffin and Hubert said they needed additional assistance in evaluating the phone records that were available. Though it was suggested by Rankin that Chief Justice Warren's security guard

(WAS THIS
A JOKE?
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Narration: Second Look - 33

might be able to devote some time to the project, the project envisioned by Griffin and Hubert was never conducted. In a subsequent memorandum dated ^{APRIL} ~~May~~ 14, the adequacy of the Ruby investigation was discussed, but ultimately compromises were worked out and the Commission's work was completed.

*See MEMOS
F-591, 592, 593*

Utilizing various phone records still available, including those of Jack Ruby's phone calls in 1963, the Select Committee has developed a computer project for the purpose of detailed analysis of them.

Using the computer technology of the Legislative and Committee Systems Division of the House Information System, House ^{INFORMATION} Administration Committee, the phone records analysis took shape. An Amdahl 470 V-5 computer was utilized, backed up by two IBM 370-158 Central Processing Units. Various programs were run, using the master data base developed from the various phone records obtained by the Committee. Additional programs are still continuing.

The telephone calls of Jack Ruby in 1963 were given top priority in the project. In recent years, Ruby's alleged associations with organized crime have been raised anew. In particular, it has been said that he was in repeated contact with a number of underworld figures in the months just before the assassination of President Kennedy. A response to these charges has been, however, that any contact by Ruby with such people may well have resulted from his attempts to seek assistance in a labor dispute.

In programming a chronological consolidation of the telephone calls made by Ruby from five business and home telephones, the Committee discovered a significant upsurge in the number of calls in October and November 1963. As can be seen from the month by month plotting of these calls on the graph in Exhibit F545, the number of calls soared from an average of 25 to 35, in May through September, to 75 in October, and 96 in November. (That is, 96 calls up to November 24, the day he was imprisoned for shooting Oswald.)

To fathom the possible meaning of the upsurge in Ruby's calls in October and November, the Committee closely evaluated his activities during that period. It considered who it was Ruby was calling and being called by; why he was in contact with these people; whether or not he had contacted them previously. The Committee was also careful to examine the circumstances surrounding Ruby's labor problems in 1963.

The labor dispute involved Ruby's competition with other owners of clubs in the Dallas area. Specifically, he was involved ^{IN A} quarrel~~ing~~ with other owners over whether amateur striptease dancers - non-union girls from the local area - could perform in Dallas nightclubs. Ruby had been prohibited by the American Guild of Variety Artists from featuring non-professional local strippers in his club. The hiring of local girls in weekend shows, in what were usually billed as "amateur nights", was a source of ^{GREAT} profit for him. Ruby was further angered by

(WOMEN,
NOT
GIRLS!)

the fact that at least one of his competitors reportedly had been allowed to use non-union talent.

The exact circumstances of Ruby's labor difficulties in 1963 are too complex to be dealt with in detail, but one aspect is relevant. In analyzing the dramatic upsurge in MC calls in October and November 1963, the Committee was able to isolate a significant number from the main body of calls. It determined that these particular calls were made in conjunction with Ruby's efforts to seek acceptable mediation or settlement of his dispute with AGVA.

As can be seen from the second line of the graph in Exhibit 545, which plots the calls made by Ruby in connection with his efforts to solicit advice from AGVA, the increase in these union-related calls corresponds, to a considerable degree, with the increase in the total body of Ruby's calls during the same period. The analysis shows that Ruby's labor difficulties were in fact related to much of the increase in calls made by Ruby in October and November 1963.

But in going one step further, it became apparent that to attribute all of Ruby's increased telephone activity in October and November to his AGVA dispute might be an inaccurate oversimplification, for a closer look at the specific calls he made in 1963 raised questions that could not be readily or easily dismissed: Ruby had, in fact, placed calls to a number of individuals who have been identified as being in some way associated with organized crime. Exhibit F546 is a printout of these calls.

Although it may again be noted that these particular calls also correspond somewhat to the upsurge in the main body of Ruby calls in the weeks prior to the assassination, and even though some of the individuals in question have said that Ruby was in contact with them to seek help in his labor difficulties, the Committee felt that more detail on the backgrounds of these persons was essential. Extensive file reviews were therefore conducted, and the following picture emerged.

Between June and August of 1963, Jack Ruby placed seven long distance calls to one Lewis J. McWillie. McWillie was a close Ruby associate, as Ruby ^{HIMSELF} told the Warren Commission. In 1959, Ruby had visited Lewis McWillie in Havana, where McWillie was working in an organized crime ^{CONNECTED} ~~controlled~~ casino.

Jack Ruby's phone calls to McWillie occurred on June 27, September 2 (two calls), September 4, September 19, September 20, and September 22. The first two calls were placed to McWillie's home number, the remaining five calls were to McWillie's place of business, the Thunderbird Casino in Las Vegas.

On the afternoon of October 26, 1963, Jack Ruby placed a long distance phone call to ^{ONE} Irwin S. Weiner in Chicago, with whom he spoke for 12 minutes. Weiner was and is a prominent bondsman in Chicago, who has been closely linked with such figures as James Hoffa, Santos Trafficante, Sam Giancana, Paul

and Allen Dorfman. Weiner, according to federal and state law enforcement files, is alleged to have served as a key functionary in the longtime relationship between the Chicago Mafia and various corrupt union officials, particularly during Hoffa's reign as President of the Teamsters Union.

Additionally, Weiner has been involved in a business relationship with two men long identified as executioners for the Chicago Mafia - Felix "Phil" Alderisio and Albert "Obie" Frabotta.

In the immediate days following President Kennedy's murder, the FBI sought to question Weiner about the call he had received from Ruby on October 26. According to an FBI teletype of November 28, 1963, Weiner refused to respond to questioning by FBI Agents in Chicago with regard to his contact with Ruby, and he declined to assist the investigation in any way. Other information received by the FBI during the investigation indicated that Weiner had been acquainted years earlier in Chicago with Ruby's brother Earl.

Though the Warren Commission was aware of Ruby's phone call to Weiner, the Commission never sought to have him questioned. ^{NEVER OATH} Additionally, neither Ruby nor his brother, Earl, were ever asked by the Commission about their relationship with Weiner.

In executive session testimony before this Committee, Weiner was questioned about his contact with Ruby. He testified that he had gone to high school with Ruby's brother, Earl, and had been distantly acquainted with Jack. Weiner said he had little or no contact with Ruby in later years, and had not heard from him in at least 10 years at the time Ruby called him in late October 1963.

Weiner declared the purpose of Ruby's call was to seek assistance in the labor dispute he was having with his Dallas nightclub competitors. Ruby asked for aid in putting up a bond related to his attempt to file for an injunction against his competitors. Weiner testified that he declined to assist Ruby, and had no further contact with him.

The Committee has examined testimony and documentation relating to Ruby's labor difficulties, in particular his dispute with AGVA. Nevertheless, the Committee has not found another reference to an effort by Ruby to put up a bond in connection with seeking an injunction against his competitors.

In his appearance before the Committee, Weiner further testified that he had lied to a reporter when he said in a taped interview that Ruby's phone call to him on October 26, 1963 had had nothing to do with labor problems.

Weiner testified he had refused to submit to FBI questioning about Ruby in the weeks following the assassination because he believed Bureau agents had harrassed his daughter by implying

he might be connected to the assassination. Weiner stated he could not specifically recall where he was on the day of the assassination, or on the day Ruby shot Oswald, though he believed he was on a visit to Miami.

At 9:13 p.m., October 30, 1963, four days after his call to Irwin Weiner, Jack Ruby placed a call to the Tropical Court Tourist Park, a trailer park in New Orleans. The number Ruby called, 242-5431, was listed as the business office of the Tropical Court, and the duration of the call was one minute. In a partial compilation of numbers called by long distance by Ruby, transmitted to the Warren Commission by the FBI in early 1964, a notation was made indicating that this Ruby call to the Tropical Court went to N. J. Pecora. The Warren Commission did not, however, interview or investigate Pecora and made no reference to him in its Report.

~~No~~ J. Pecora, alias Joseph O. Pecoraro, was the owner of the Tropical Court Tourist Park. He ran the park from a one-man office located on the premises, the office Ruby had called on October 30. Pecora, a former heroin smuggler, was alleged to be a close associate of Carlos Marcello. The FBI, Justice Department, and Metropolitan Crime Commission of New Orleans have identified Pecora as one of Marcello's three most trusted aides. Law enforcement surveillance reports have indicated a particularly close Marcello-Pecora relationship during the early 1960's, with Pecora always close at hand at Marcello's

Town and Country Motel headquarters on the outskirts of New Orleans. In fact, it was noted in the Select Committee's computer phone project that Marcello himself placed a call to Pecora on June 24, 1963, at the same trailer office number that Ruby called four months later. (See earlier (sic))

Earlier this year, when Committee investigators sought to question Pecora about the October 30, 1963 telephone call from Ruby's office to his own, Pecora declined to respond. Earlier this month, however, Pecora did agree to respond to questions put to him by Committee investigators.

Pecora stated that he does not recall receiving any telephone call from Ruby. He said he did not know Ruby or have any knowledge of him. Pecora stated that he believes that he was probably the only person who had access to his Tropical Court telephone in 1963, but that he may well have taken a phone message, suggesting the call from Ruby may have been for someone else in the trailer park.

The Committee has established that Ruby did in fact have an associate who lived at the Tropical Court Tourist Park in 1963. He was a New Orleans nightclub manager named Harold Tannenbaum, now deceased, who was himself a friend and colleague of Pecora, having run several Bourbon Street clubs controlled ^{by Ruby} by the Marcello interests. In his recent interview with Committee investigators, Pecora stated he had been acquainted with Tannenbaum, that Tannenbaum was a neighbor in

the trailer court. Pecora said ^{HOWEVER} he was not aware that Tannenbaum had been a friend of Ruby.

Harold Tannenbaum met Ruby in the summer of 1963 and discussed going into business with him. The computer telephone project has established that Ruby and Tannenbaum were in frequent contact from June to October 1963.

The project has also established that an hour after the October 30 call was placed from Ruby's office to Pecora's office, Tannenbaum placed a call to Ruby.

On November 7, 1963, Ruby received a collect call from Robert G. (Barney) Baker of Chicago. The call lasted 17 minutes.

Baker is said to have been a top lieutenant and reputed "enforcer" for Teamster President James Hoffa. A former boxer and ex-convict, Baker was perhaps Hoffa's best known assistant during the McClellan Committee investigation of labor racketeering in the ~~late~~ 1950's. The Senate investigation, coordinated by then chief counsel Robert F. Kennedy, had detailed Baker's role as Hoffa's personal liaison to various leading Mafia figures. In his McClellan testimony, Baker recited a long list of Mafia hit men with whom he had been associated. In 1960, Robert F. Kennedy wrote of Baker, "Sometimes the mere threat of his presence in a room was enough to silence the men who would otherwise have opposed Hoffa's ~~reign~~ ^{REGIME}."

Barney Baker was questioned by the FBI in Chicago on January 3, 1964, regarding his contact with Ruby. Baker stated that Ruby was a complete stranger to him until the very day he spoke with him, November 7, 1963. Baker explained that Ruby had called him earlier that day and that, in his absence, his wife had taken a message to call Ruby's nightclub in Dallas. Baker told the FBI that Ruby had not used his real name, but had instructed him to ask for "Lou", which he did, placing a collect call to Ruby's number. (It might be noted that this is the only ^{INCIDENT} instance the Committee has come across in which Ruby has used a false name or alias.)

In his 1964 interview with the FBI, Baker stated that the purpose of Ruby's call was to seek assistance in the labor dispute. According to the FBI report, Baker said he had "...concluded the conversation by firmly declining to offer any assistance in ^{THE} this matter." While in his FBI interview Baker ^{ADVISED} advised that...he had many friends (who) were...high-ranking hoodlums", he stated that he had had no prior association with Ruby, and he had no knowledge of any Ruby connections to such hoodlums.

On November 8, 1963, the day after he received the call from Barney Baker, Ruby placed a call to Murray W. (Dusty) Miller at the Eden Roc Hotel in Miami. The call lasted four minutes.

(SLOWLY
REPROBING)
AS USUAL

Dusty Miller was another key lieutenant of Teamster President James Hoffa, and, as head of the powerful Southern Conference of the union, he was regarded as a possible successor to Hoffa. ^{HIMSELF} Miller, who had been a Teamster leader in Dallas, was associated with numerous underworld figures.

In a recent interview with this Committee, Miller stated that he had had no contact with Ruby prior to being called by him on ~~November~~ ^{OCTOBER (NOT CORRECTED)} 8, 1963. Miller said Ruby complained of labor problems and asked Miller for help. Miller testified that Ruby said something to the effect, "Barney Baker gave me your number and told me that maybe you could help me out." Miller stated that on hearing the reference to Baker, he quickly ended the conversation, explaining he viewed Baker as a man with questionable associations. ^{FS}

At 5:22 p.m., November 8, 1963, 31 minutes after he called Dusty Miller, Jack Ruby placed a call to Barney Baker in Chicago. This call lasted 14 minutes. It occurred on the day after Baker telephoned Ruby in Dallas.

As noted earlier, Baker told the FBI on January 3, 1964 that he had terminated his November 7 conversation with Ruby by "...firmly declining to offer any assistance" to Ruby. In his FBI interview, Baker made no mention of the fact that Ruby had called him back on November 8, 1963. In fact, he indicated that he had had no further contact with him.

The Committee has extensively questioned Baker about his past contacts with Jack Ruby. When asked why he did not tell the FBI of his second lengthy conversation with Ruby, Baker said he must have forgotten about the second call.

The Committee has noted several other areas of telephone contact or relationship that are of ^{PARTICULAR} probative interest. Three examples:

1. In testimony before the Warren Commission, Jack Ruby's sister, Eva Grant, said that her brother had called Lenny Patrick in Chicago sometime during the summer of 1963. Mrs. Grant stated that Ruby had ^{had} some difficulty in locating Patrick's number, but he had told her he had finally found it and had, in fact, called Patrick in Chicago.

^{Lenny} Patrick is said to have been one of the Chicago Mafia's leading assassins, responsible, according to federal and state law enforcement files, for the murders of over a dozen mob victims. Patrick had grown up in the same Chicago neighborhood as Ruby and had been slightly acquainted with him. Later, Patrick became, it is said, senior lieutenant of Chicago Mafia leader, Sam Giancana.

2. A call made on September 24, 1963 by an investigator for New Orleans Mafia leader Carlos Marcello to a woman in Chicago, who was present with Ruby on the night before the assassination. The Committee found that David W. Ferrie had called the number of Jean ~~Case~~ West and had spoken for at

NO
ALLEGED

least 15 minutes. On November 21, 1963, Miss West visited Ruby in Dallas, accompanied by a mutual friend, Lawrence Meyers. Miss West and Meyers had drinks with Ruby shortly before mid-night on November ²²~~21~~ at the Cabana Motel.

3. The Committee found that Barney Baker had placed a telephone call to another onetime associate of Jack Ruby on the evening of November 21, 1963. The person Baker called was David Yaras of Miami. Yaras was a close friend and partner of Lenny Patrick. He had also been acquainted with Ruby during their early years in Chicago. Like Lenny Patrick, Dave Yaras has served, it is alleged, as a key lieutenant of Chicago Mafia leader Sam Giancana, reputedly as an executioner. In an FBI interview in 1964, Yaras stated that he had last seen ^(CORRECTED) Ruby over 10 years prior to the assassination.

UNFORTUNATELY
Once again, the ultimate meaning of these facts and circumstances remains as yet indeterminate.

POSS IMPPLICATION OF CALLS MAY BE EXPLORED
MORE FULLY (TOMORROW'S HEARING -
IN

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