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Tightened Controls Over Agency Urged

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WASHINGTON, June 10—The Central Intelligence Agency has conducted a vast network of unlawful or uncontrolled domestic operations that resulted in the creation of files on 300,000 individuals and organizations, mail openings, wiretapping, room bugging, burglaries, extensive "monitoring" of overseas telephone calls, secret drug testing and infiltration of American political groups, according to the report of the Rockefeller commission, released today.

In the first official report of what is the most sweeping investigation to date of the

Summary of panel's report is on Pages 18, 19 and 20.

United States intelligence agencies, the Presidential commission said that the "great majority" of the C.I.A.'s domestic activities complied with the law.

But, it said, there were incidents of poor judgment by officials, inadequate internal and external controls, meddling and pressures from past Presidents and operations that "were plainly unlawful and constituted improper invasions upon the rights of Americans."

Article Is Confirmed

The commission's report confirmed the basic elements of an article in The New York Times last Dec. 22 that quoted sources as saying that the C.I.A. had engaged in a "massive, illegal domestic intelligence operation against the antiwar movement and other groups."

Such activity violated the agency's 1947 charter, which limited it to foreign activities, and The Times article eventually led to the formation of the Rockefeller commission and today's report.

The eight-man commission, headed by Vice President Rockefeller, recommended to President Ford that he intro-

duce a bill to create a joint Congressional committee to assume oversight of the intelligence agencies.

Report Made Public

It also urged the President to tighten the control of the executive branch over the C.I.A. by making the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board an effective watch-dog agency, open the C.I.A. director's job to people outside the Government and put a 10-year limit on the director's term of service.

The commission's recommendations were contained in a 299-page report delivered to President Ford last Friday and

made public by his order today.

The panel had also collected information on reported plots to assassinate foreign leaders, but Mr. Ford said yesterday that he would withhold data on that subject because it was "incomplete and extremely sensitive." Instead, he referred

that material to the Attorney General and to Congress for further investigation.

The commission also reported:

"Numerous allegations have been made that the C.I.A. participated in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. The commission staff investigated these allegations. On the basis of the staff's investigation, the commission concludes that there is no credible evidence of C.I.A. involvement."

Language Conservative

Today's report, in conservative language, was the most revealing official document on C.I.A. domestic activities ever published. It did the following:

¶ Outlined a seven-year "Operation CHAOS" in which a secret group in the C.I.A. conducted an espionage operation against dissident American political groups and created dossiers on 13,000 persons and index records on 300,000 individuals and organizations and placed undercover agents in antiwar and black movements. The report said that the C.I.A. maintained files on 57,000 Americans in cases where the agency believed the person to be of "possibly continuing intelligence interest."

¶ Presented figures for wiretappings, electronic room buggings and burglaries that were in excess of those reported by the C.I.A. director, William E. Colby, last January and hinted at evidence that the activities were more pervasive than it could confirm. Nevertheless, the report verified 32 wiretaps, 32 buggings and 12 unauthorized entries.

¶ Documented a decade-long drug-testing program that resulted in the death of a Government employe after the agency administered a dose of LSD without his permission. The project ended in 1963.

¶ Made public for the first time monitoring programs on overseas telephone calls to Europe and Latin America.

¶ Disclosed that in one incident a defector from a foreign intelligence service was held prisoner in a C.I.A. facility for three years with the knowledge

Continued on Page 21, Column 4

Continued From Page 1, Col. 8

of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Attorney General, selected members of Congress and the United States Intelligence Board.

¶Reported a 20-year program of surveillance of mail between the Soviet Union and the United States in which the C.I.A. handled more than four million pieces of mail a year and opened 13,000 letters in the process. The report also disclosed a more limited project in which the C.I.A. scanned mail between the United States and the Far East and a third project in New Orleans, where it opened and photographed 200 pieces of international mail passing through this country.

¶Disclosed several relationships between the C.I.A. and local police departments including a routine system of paying gratuities to American police officers, an incident in which policemen aided the C.I.A. in a burglary and several cases where the C.I.A. supplied undercover operatives and surveillance equipment to the metropolitan police in Washington.

¶Disclosed a 20-year secret agreement between the C.I.A. and the Department of Justice in which all criminal charges against C.I.A. employees and contract personnel would be investigated by the C.I.A.

Agency Made Decision

The C.I.A. also made the final decision on whether the offending employee should be prosecuted or if prosecution would harm national security. If the agency decided that security would be harmed, the report said, its officials would only have to note the potential harm in the file and not report to the Department of Justice.

"In doing this," the report stated, "The Department of Justice abdicated its statutory duties and placed on the Director of Central Intelligence the responsibility for investigating criminal conduct and making the prosecutorial decision — clearly law enforcement powers," powers not vested in the agency.

The report said, however, that its five-month investigation uncovered no incident in which the C.I.A. had abused this power. The arrangement was halted last January.

In a chapter on the question of who controls the C.I.A., the commission report said that neither Congress, the General Accounting Office nor the office of Management and Budget had a real knowledge of what went on or how money was spent.

"A new body is needed to

provide oversight of C.I.A. within the executive branch," the report said. "Because of the need to preserve security, the C.I.A. is not subject to the usual constraints of audit, judicial review, unlimited publicity or open Congressional budget review and oversight.

Effective Supervision

"Consequently, its operations require additional external control. The authority assigned the job of supervising the C.I.A. must be given sufficient power and significance to assure the public of effective supervision."

The commission also recommended that the powers of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board be expanded to provide executive oversight for C.I.A. The board has been criticized as being a rubber stamp. Mr. Rockefeller served on it for several years.

The report delved deeply into pressures brought by past Presidents on the C.I.A.

The report disclosed that "President Nixon and his staff also insisted in this period (1971) that the C.I.A. turn over to the President highly classified files relating to the Lebanon landings, the Bay of Pigs, the Cuban missile crisis, and the Vietnam war."

"The request was made on the stated grounds that these files were needed by the President in the performance of his duties, but was in fact made to serve the President's personal political ends," the report said.

According to the report, then C.I.A. director, Richard Helms, resisted the White House efforts to obtain the reports, which were sent forward under the guise of "declassifying" them. He eventually turned over all but the requested report on the Vietnam war.

On Oct. 8, 1971, Mr. Helms was summoned to a meeting with President Nixon, who again asked him to deliver the Vietnam file, the report said.

"The memorandum of the meeting states that Helms replied that he worked for only one President at a time, and that any papers in his possession were at the President's disposal," the report said. "He then handed the requested Vietnam file to Nixon, who slipped it into his desk drawer."

The report also disclosed that at one point under the Nixon Administration, the C.I.A. was forced by the White House to contribute \$33,655.68 to pay for White House replies to persons who had written to the

President after the Cambodian invasion.

According to the commission's report, Mr. Helms testified that it was Presidential pressure that resulted in the formation of what later became known as "Operation CHAOS," the most secret of the agency's domestic operations.

The report makes clear that there was no single "domestic" operation, but a series of domestic activities by different sections of the C.I.A. that over the years committed acts in violation of the 1947 National Security Act or domestic laws.

"Operation Chaos," though not publicly known by that name, was one of several domestic surveillance activities that were disclosed in a New York Times article on Dec. 22, 1974. As a result of the charges by Government sources quoted in that article, the Rockefeller commission was formed.

According to its report, President Johnson put pressure on the C.I.A. to become involved in combating rising domestic unrest in the summer of 1967. On Aug. 15, 1967, Thomas Karamessines, then in charge of the agency's covert activities, ordered the chief of the counterintelligence staff, James J. Angleton, to establish an operation to keep track of overseas student activities and "related matters."

A 'Special Group'

The unit was called the "Special Operations Group." Its offices were in a basement area of the agency's headquarters in Langley, Va., and only Mr. Angleton and his senior assistant knew of its scope and purpose.

In the next seven years, the report said, under two Presidents, the secret operation evolved from a unit to gather and correlate intelligence on student activities abroad into an operational entity that recruited 30 agents and used three agents for collection of intelligence about domestic dissident groups.

One CHAOS agent entered the political campaign of an unnamed Congressional candidate and supplied reports of "behind-the-scenes activities in the campaign."

Another rose to the leadership of an unnamed dissident party organization and, on at least one occasion, provided the C.I.A. with minutes of the group's meetings.

Operation CHAOS, the report said, appeared to receive its greatest stimulus in the early Nixon years, a time of rising concern over radical antiwar activity and the time of the reoperation, by the White

House, of what later became known as the Huston plan, named for Tom Charles Huston, its designer.

In addition to field activities, however, CHAOS had become the repository for vast data on dissident activities. At its height, the report said, it employed 52 professional intelligence officers, as well as the 30 operatives, and maintained detailed "personality files" on 13,000 persons, of whom 7,200

were American citizens. It had a "computer index" of 300,000 names and could draw on the main C.I.A. computer bank of 7,000,000 names.

A great deal of CHAOS material, the report said, was raw, undigested F.B.I. data, which CHAOS organized and evaluated.

There were files on 1,000 American organizations including such well-known groups as the Black Panther party and Students for a Democratic Society. But, the report said, other organizations came under scrutiny for obscure reasons. Grove Press, Inc., got into the file, the report said, because it published a book by Kim Philby, the British intelligence officer who defected to the Soviet Union.

Employee Under Suspicion

The commission found evidence that within the C.I.A., high officials were concerned that Operation CHAOS was improper or illegal.

The chief of one division, the report said, refused to cooperate with CHAOS after a period of time.

"It is safe to say that the C.I.A.'s top leadership wished to avoid even the appearance of participation in internal security matters and were cognizant that the operation, at least in part, was close to being a proscribed activity and would generate adverse publicity if revealed," the report said.

CHAOS was only part of a network of domestic operations. Under a program in 1967 and 1968, ostensibly to protect C.I.A. facilities in the Washington area, the report said, the C.I.A. infiltrated dissident groups in the Washington area in cooperation with Washington's Metropolitan Police Department.

Among the 16 groups that came under scrutiny were such established organizations as the Washington Ethical Society and the Washington Urban League.

Of the activities in the report that appeared to raise serious question was the agency's in-

vestigation of its own employees or, in some cases, outsiders that crossed its path.

The agency conducted 32 wiretaps, the report said, 32 electronic buggings and 12 burglaries, mainly in connection with investigating possible defections of its own employees. It obtained, without following proper channels, the tax returns of 16 persons.

In one instance, an unnamed employe came under suspicion for attending meetings of a group with foreign left-wing support. The agency's office of security kept him under physical surveillance for almost a year, made a surreptitious entry to his apartment by cutting through the wall and planted seven microphones that picked up conversation in every room.

The agency checked his tax returns and kept track of his mail for two months.

"This investigation yielded no evidence of disloyalty," the report concluded tersely.

The report said that the telephones of three unidentified newsmen were tapped to learn their news sources. One tap was placed in 1959 and the two others in 1962, apparently with the knowledge of the then Attorney General, Robert F. Kennedy, the report said.

The commission said that the burglaries were illegal at any time or under any standards. One of the wiretaps may have conformed to the law at the time it was placed, according to the report, but all would be illegal under present law.

Possibly one of the most startling findings was the secret scientific program that resulted in at least one death.

According to the report, the C.I.A. began to experiment with behavior-producing drugs like LSD in the late nineteen-forties after coming to believe that the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc nations might have used drugs to elicit confessions and in brainwashing.

"The drug program," the report said, "was part of a much larger C.I.A. program to study possible means for controlling human behavior. Other studies explored the effects of radiation, electric shock, psychology, psychiatry, sociology and harassment substances.

"The primary purpose of the drug program was to counter the use of behavior-influencing drugs clandestinely administered by an enemy, although several operation uses outside the United States were also considered," the report said.

In 1953, the report said, the

drug LSD was administered to a Department of the Army employe attending a C.I.A. training school. It was administered without his knowledge. He had an adverse reaction, the report said, and the C.I.A. took him to New York for psychiatric treatment.

"Several days later, he jumped from a 10th-floor window of his room and died as a result," the report said. The general counsel of the C.I.A. ruled that the death resulted

from "circumstances arising out of an experiment undertaken in the course of his official duties for the United States Government," which, the report said, permitted his family to get death benefits.

There was no indication that the death was ever investigated by any external body, either the local police or a Federal agency.

The program continued from 1953 until 1963. In 1963, a critical report by C.I.A.'s inspector general brought an end to testing drugs on persons without their consent, the report said.

When the commission began its investigation, it said, it was told that 152 files on the program had been destroyed in 1973, and that "in addition, all persons directly involved in the early phases of the program were either out of the country and not available for interview or were deceased."

The commission's report indicated a capability for massive telephone "monitoring."

In connection with Operation CHAOS, it said that the C.I.A. had received material from the communications activity of "another agency" (presumably the National Security Agency with which it could trace communications with Europe. In another case the C.I.A. tested a monitoring device on domestic telephone calls.

In yet another case, it monitored telephone calls between the United States and Latin America "in an effort to identify foreign drug traffickers. The project was done at the behest of N.S.A.," and, the report said, many American citizens were overheard.