

(Random Comments)

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Legend is a book that held great promise, but flunked for Jack of all-trades by the author. Epstein seems to have copied a "hand" with the devil in that he accepted the enormous renouveau Bender's threat (BT) offered him in (Lacé) exchange for adopting HD's viewpoint as to where the investigation would lead. He could have backed BT and reported exactly what he found, but the fact that his publisher and promoter was RD Pevne had a chilling effect on him. He might have felt the National Publisher-style TV commercial announcing the BT condemnation of his book. Epstein settled for burying his doubts in an appendix (the one listing questions he had put to the intelligence agencies in 1977). ((13 May 78 Note: The KSM interview of Epstein on 5 Apr 78 makes it clear that he is fully aware of the obfuscative role of U.S. intelligence in the Oswald Security Case/JFK Case. It is also clear that Epstein said virtually nothing about this in Legend. From reading the interview excerpt, it seems to me that Epstein is dying to tell all he knows, but feels he must L. Epstein's tripping up of Helms would have been a major highlight of Legend--if it had been mentioned there. In the KSM interview, Epstein reports that he told Helms that Nosenko claimed that KGB had had insufficient manpower to debrief Oswald. Helms laughed and said that's crazy, that if the converse situation developed here in the U.S. "we" (CIA) would have found the manpower to debrief the defector. Then Epstein pointed (if that can be believed) on Helms, asking, "But did you debrief him?" (Oswald). Helms gasped, "Oh my God," and realized that he and CIA had always discovered debriefing Oswald. If only this exchange was on tape! (Maybe it is.) Immensely more interesting than the Nixon Watergate tapper. See KSM-Epstein interview excerpt in Paul Hoch's Epstein notes at bottom of p. 17.)

My remaining comments will be keyed roughly to page numbers from Legend, which numbers will appear in the left margin of this paper.

Nowhere else does Epstein mention WJ (Suban political intelligence) snailing files and holding off-limits worldwide, no far as I can determine.

A CIA clandestine Service officer (probably CI Staff) wrote a memo in 1975 (CIA 1180-1000) noting that CIA (denial--prob. Foreign Intelligence Staff) had opened a 201 (Richard Perrenally) file on Oswald on 9 Dec 1960 because CIA had received the first of 5 pre-annihilation documents from other agencies (FBI, State, Navy).

However, there's no explanation as to why the delay from the Oct 1959 "defection" (Lense quote from 201 file) to Dec 1960. However, the 201 file contradicts the 1975 memo writer's account: The 201 was a "field" file--it was sent from some (deleted) station, or base, or field office of the CIA directly to CIA Headquarters (deleted component--prob. FLSM).

It seems highly unlikely that FM/State/Navy would send a report on a Marine Corps defector to some outlying CIA station rather than straight to CIA Headquarters. More likely, the 201 file Request, or p1-

related with the Moscow Station (one never hears about the Moscow Station, not even from Agne; it seems to be a widespread no-no) as a result of some agent, report. Perhaps it was not Moscow Station, but Tokyo Station or Atsugi Base or New York Field Office (CI Staff's mail intercept project).

Epstein reports (para 2) that ONI ignored CIA's request for Oswald's photo and did not volunteer the file on Oswald. Epstein mentions this only once more in the book (p. 225 note 14). This plus ONI's possible dereliction or obstruction of a (possible) damage assessment investigation of Oswald suggests ONI complicity. How little we know of ONI and the other military intelligence services as compared to the CIA. Remember that it was ONI that started the contacts with Mafia elements in 1943. See The Luciano Project.

Indeed, the little known history of CIA espionage (broadly lumped with other forms of clandestine collection into a category called foreign intelligence, or FI) activities hints of a motive and a mission for an Oswald-CIA agent. Little known even to the Church Committee (apparently) was the fact that the military controlled CIA espionage from 1947 to 1959. According to (moderately reliable) CIA espionage officer Dr. Harry Bonitzke, "For almost fifteen years after World War II the CIA's intelligence targets were dictated almost exclusively by the Department of Defense." (CIA's Secret Operations, RD Press 1977, p. xxii.)

When the wartime OSS was abolished in 1945, the clandestine components were transferred first to the Army (the Assistant Secretary of War), then to the Central Intelligence Group where it formed an Office of Special Operations (OSO) in July 1946. But the Army retained almost total control over the CIA/CIA's OSO: The OSO chief was Army Major General Edwin Luther Sibert from 1946 to 1948, Army Colonel "Arlemis Galinsky" (same plus rank from Miles Copeland; service code "Arlemis Galinsky" from 1948 to 1950, and Army Major General Willard Gordon Wyman 1950-1951. Note that Major General Sibert and Wyman actually outranked the then-CIA Director Rear Admiral Roscoe Henry Hiltnecker who was legally their superior in the CIA.

Thereafter, the CIA succeeded in progressively weaning the espionage-counterespionage activities out of military control. The first to emerge from the Defense umbrella was James J. Angleton who consolidated all counterintelligence (CI) activities of the Plans Directorate (Clandestine Service) into a single CI Staff in 1954. (OSO was abolished by merger on 1 Aug 1952 and foreign intelligence functions were assumed by various splintered FI Staffs.)

During the 1950s, the FI Staffs (one staff for the whole Clandestine Service and one in each area division) emphasized clandestine collection by low-level agent infiltration to scout out, mine the military intelligence rather than by high-level recruitment-in-place. This emphasis came from the military dominance of CIA's FI. The military wanted quick results from CIA and it decided that military infiltration techniques were the quickest ones to get results. Most of the CIA's secret political intelligence had to come from liaison operations (cooperative contacts with foreign govts.) emphasized by Angleton's CI Staff.

ICI Allen Dulles appointed Lt. General Lucian King Truscott his Assistant for Coordination in 1954; at the same time an ineffective Office

of Intelligence Coordination headed by James Quincey Fisher was abolished because Fisher lacked clout with the military. Truncelli's job was to nullify CIA-military and CIA-State jurisdictional demarcation. Early in 1958, Truncelli succeeded in getting NSCID (National Security Council) Intelligence Directive) 5 rewritten so that CIA obtained limited management ( veto) authority over military espionage activities--preventing roles so that CIA gained the upper hand rather than just neutralizing military meddling in CIA FI. CIA was then renouncing its peak in bureaucratic power and influence. Coincident with the NSCID 5 revision, Truncelli and CIA forced the State Department to close down its espionage network (probably they were turned over to CIA). CIA received primary responsibility for intelligence gathering development (involving Air Force and Navy in secondary roles) in Feb 1958, and assumed some measure of control of military electronic and communications intelligence in 1958 (including the eventual merger of these functions into a unified Signals Intelligence program), mounted major new paramilitary operations in Indonesia, Tibet and elsewhere, etc. etc.

So, for years the Army had dominated CIA espionage. Now, suddenly, the CIA turned the tables. The CIA could intrude into G-2, ONI, and AFSA in clandestine collection operations.

Suppose ONI did not like the change. The first thing to do to keep CIA's nose out of ONI business would be not to tell CIA anything about ONI plans and operations. Suppose Oswald was one of them ONI agents omitted from the (CIA-military) Interagency Source Register. The lesson in the ONI Oswald records and lack of cooperation with CIA are thus explained: an containment of unauthorized ONI operations.

The Marine Colonel James Granger that Epstein found an "invaluable" seems to be Lt. Col. James H. Granger, USMC, who was Chief, Military Law Branch, Judge Advocate Division, USMC HQ, 1975; Chief, Research & Policy Branch, Judge Advocate Division, USMC HQ, 1976-1977; for what I don't know. Seems to be a strange sort of fellow to be helping Epstein.

Allen Dulles was not Director of Central Intelligence until 1962; he did not "retire" in 1962. He left office 29 Nov 1961. These and other trivial but stupid mistakes about names, dates and relationships of intelligence organizations are interlocking in light of Epstein's report that CIA tried to deceive him about the number of floors in the CIA headquarters building (New York article 27 Feb 70 p. 27). For example, on p. 102 of Legend, the likelihood of an Oswald deflection damage assessment in late 1959-early 1960 was discussed by Col. Thomas Fox, "then" chief of "Intelligence Services for the Defense Intelligence Agency." First of all, there has never been such a position within DIA. Secondly, the DIA did not exist until 1961.

Why should Nosenko have known about V. H. Kovchuk's trip to the U.S. in late 1957 to activate the project Epstein gave Nosenko was Kovchuk's deputy in the KGB, therefore he was in a "unique position to know." But when was Nosenko Kovchuk's deputy in the 1st Section (American Embassy operations), 2nd Chief Directorate (Internal Security), KGB (or KGB-II-1 for short)? Nosenko reportedly did not work in the American Embassy Section (KGB-II-1-1) during Kovchuk's 1957 trip, but two years later from Jan 1960 to Jan 1962 (Legend pp. 5, 39-40). Why would Kovchuk blab about the details of his trip two or more

years later? In particular, what was there to boast about in having had difficulty locating the mole (Legend p. 46)? If Kovchuk told Nosenko in 1957, rather than 1960-62, the question is still why? At that time Nosenko was merely a case officer in the 7th Department (Tourlets) of KGB-II (KGB-II-7).

Why should Major Anatoli H. Orlitsin have known that Kovchuk traveled to the U.S.? He had merely been an officer in the 3rd Department (United Kingdom-Soviet-Australian-New Zealand operations), 1st Chief Directorate (Foreign Operations), KGB (or KGB-I-3). Kovchuk had been chief of KGB-II-1-1.

Incidentally, Epstein claimed in New York (27 Feb 70 p. 39) that "Stone" (informal nickname for Gollitsin) had never been mentioned in print before Epstein's work. But I easily found Gollitsin in John Barron's KGB book (ND Press 1974) on p. 430 and indexed on p. 607 (Bantam ed. page nos.), a book Epstein cites (Legend pp. 277 n3, 299 n18).

I am convinced that Epstein has deliberately underplayed and omitted evidence linking that JFK's assassination might have been a KGB operation. First, Epstein everywhere minimized KGB Department 13's role in the left of his book, but not in his direct questions to the CIA in 1977 (Appendix D): his first mention of V. V. Kostikov is that as a Department 13 officer Kostikov was merely involved with "saboteurs"--no mention of assassination responsibility (Legend p. 16). Only by p. 30 does Epstein concede that Department 13 was assigned "sabotage and assassination." By p. 237, Epstein says Department 13 was simply involved in "planting" such things as "sabotage" and (he vaguely mentions) "other violent acts." But, in his 1977 correspondence with CIA, Epstein simply and forthrightly describes Department 13 as the unit responsible for "assassinations, sabotage and kidnapping" (Legend p. 304 q12).

In Barron's KGB (p. 430) we learn that according to Gollitsin ("Stone" in Epstein's preferred parlance) at least 17 Department 13 officers were fired or demoted following the deflection of assassin Bogdan Stashinski on 12 Aug 1961. Then we're told, according to Nosenko, that the Soviet leadership ordered KGB to "strategically" curtail assassinations in late 1962 or early 1963. (This seems to be still further evidence that Nosenko was trying to steer U.S. intelligence away from the idea that KGB assassinated JFK--whether or not the Politburo order (Barron p. 452) to the KGB was real. How would Nosenko in KGB-II know about the affairs of a supersecret unit in KGB-1?)

But it was not until the mid-1960s (Barron p. 431) or 1969 (Barron p. 110) that "Western security services" independently "discovered a shift in emphasis in Department 13 operations from assassination to preparations for sabotage." (Barron p. 431)

All in all, it seems that Nosenko is the only source for the claim that KGB began abetting sabotage over murder prior to JFK's assassination. And Nosenko was not even in the name chief Directorate as Department 13. (Nosenko had always been in KGB-15; Department 13 was in KGB-I.)

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Moreover, Epstein suppressed from his book the vital datum that Goltstein was told by his superior, the chief of the 3rd Department of KGB-1 (the ANZUK-Scandinavia Department), that the KGB planned an assassination of the leader of an opposition party in the KGB-1-3's area, and that CIA suspected that the murder had been carried out against Sir Hugh Galtchell of Britain. (New York 27 Feb 78 p. 31) Another important point omitted by Epstein even in the New York article was the date of Galtchell's death: 18 Jan 1963.

**KGB**

Here was an important (alleged) political assassination in a Western nation closely allied with the U.S. Just ten months before JFK's murder. The timing, late 1962-early 1963, seemed to fit in the face of Rosenko's claim that the Tolsturo was then curtailng assassinations by the KGB.

On the other hand, Rosenko may still be right or wrong. Galtchell's death might have been natural; the Tolsturo order might have been a lie by Rosenko; and the real KGB assassination in the KGB-1-3 area might still be unknown or it might have been called off after Goltstein's defection in Dec 1961. Or: Goltstein's death was natural; the Tolsturo order was true; and the assassination was called off in accord with the other and/or because of Goltstein's defection. Or: Goltstein is the disinformation agent and Rosenko is genuine. Or: Both Goltstein and Rosenko are Soviet plants. In any event, Epstein withheld important relevant information from his book, the effect of which was to minimize KGB complicity in assassinations in general and in JFK's murder in particular.

Oswald's possible or actual contacts with KGB Department 13 are as follows: Goltstein explained "in detail" that Department 13 had primary responsibility for debriefing military defectors (Legend pp. 30-31)--Oswald was a military defector to the Soviet Union. In Munich, Oswald had been a member of a hunting club. Epstein notes the journal that a KGB "spy" called "Anton Sabotka" in Barron's KGB book (pp. 49-51) recorded part of his training at a "sporting club" where he practiced shooting at the clubhouse of the upper half of a man (Legend p. 299 n18). But "Sabotka" was not a KGB "spy." He was a KGB Department 13 assassin-subject, a fact Epstein could not have failed to notice since "Sabotka" was detailed in Barron's chapter on the activities of Department 13 and the preference/misconduct. Finally, of course, Oswald met with Department 13 officer Valeri Vladimirovich Kostikov in Mexico City on 28 Sep 1963, less than two months before JFK's assassination.

Goltstein ("Stame") is supposed to have told Angleton that Rosenko could not have been deputy chief of the Tourist Department (KGB-11-7) "or Stone would have known him." But Rosenko was Deputy Chief/KGB-11-7 from January 1962 to January 1964 (with some gaps for temporary duty in Finland) (Legend pp. 5, 11, 259, 344; Barron pp. 85, 96). Goltstein defected in December 1961 (Legend p. 27; New York 27 Feb 78 pp. 20, 11). Goltstein was not working for the KGB when Rosenko became Deputy Chief/KGB-11-7. However, Epstein might have gotten Goltstein's statement confused since he speaks erroneously of an "American Embassy Department" in the same paragraph (Epstein knows this should be "American Embassy Section": Legend pp. 5, 27, 33, 35, 36, 39, 40, 41, 46). Goltstein actually might have referred to Rosenko in the position of Deputy Chief, American-British Section (1st Section), Tourist Department, (7th Department). KGB 2nd Chief Directorate (or Deputy Chief/KGB-11-2-1 for short), a position Rosenko claimed from June 1958 to January 1960 (Legend p. 5; Barron p. 452).

The organizational details must seem terribly confusing. To clarify, let me point out that the KGB's 2nd Chief Directorate (Internal Security) is divided into twelve numbered departments plus several miscellaneous units. Department 1 in the American Department, and it is divided into sections--Section 1 in the American Embassy Section (of which Kovshuk was chief). Department 2 is the Tourist Department, and it is divided into six sections--Section 1 is the American-British Section (Canadian too). The American Department (KGB-11-1) concentrates on government officers, while the Tourist Department (KGB-11-7) stresses tourists and visitors. Now, Rosenko's alleged biography or career record is:

- 1949 Naval Intelligence
- 1953 American Embassy Section/American Dept/2nd CD/  
KGB (became KGB 13 Mar 54)
- 1955 Tourist Dept/2nd CD/KGB
- Jun 1950 Deputy Chief/Amer-British Sect/Tourist Dept/KGB-II
- Jun 1960 American Embassy Sect/American Dept/KGB-II (It is not clear that Rosenko immediately became deputy chief of this section: By 1961 he claimed he had--Legend pp. 39-40.)
- ca 1960-1961 Deputy Chief/American Embassy Sect/Amer Dept/  
KGB-II
- Jun 1962 Deputy Chief/Tourist Dept/KGB-II (on leave to Geneva ca. Feb-Jun 1962 and Jan 1961).
- 4 Feb 1964 Defector to CIA Soviet Russia Division

Rosenko supposedly admitted to CIA that his highest rank in the KGB was Captain, that he fled when he told CIA-Geneva in June 1962 that he was a KGBer, and that he fled after his defection in 1964 when he claimed he'd been promoted to Lieutenant Colonel. So why did Rosenko tell John Barron in May 1970 et seq. that his rank on defection in 1964 was Major? (Barron pp. xv, 16, 164, 241; reference on p. 108 indicates he was a Major as early as 1960.) What reason was there to make up a third story about his rank? Why didn't he stick to his first story (Lt. Col.) or his second (Capt.)? Perhaps all this really means is that Rosenko's account is coming to us through too many hands, that errors and prejudices are creeping into the details.

The conflicting reports about Rosenko's rank and position are matched by the equally conflicting accounts of the CIA's principal defector-in-Chief (or "mole") of the 1950s, an officer of the GRU (Chief Intelligence Directorate of the Soviet General Staff). According to Epstein (Legend pp. 31-34, 42, 117-118, 270 n10; New York 27 Feb 78 pp. 35, 37), this was Lieutenant Colonel Fodor Semyonovich Popov who was arrested by the KGB in Moscow in September 1959. It is not clear whether this was Popov's first or last arrest because the KGB sent him to a rendezvous with his CIA case officer after his arrest--of course the KGB kept him under tight surveillance. He was later executed as a spy. But according to Barron (p. 464), the GRU officer for CIA was Lt. Colonel Yuri Popov who was arrested by the KGB in 1958. This case was upset, Khrushchev that KGB Chairman Ivan Serov left KGB to take control of GRU in December 1958. And according to Harry Rositzke (pp. 661f, 146) the GRU officer was a Major recruited in Vienna on 1 Jan 1953, arrested in February 1959 shortly after returning to Moscow, but maintained contact with his CIA case officer (a KGB trap) until October 1959 when the CIA man was arrested and expelled. The GRU Major's execution was "announced" soon thereafter.