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The CIA SR Division is supposed to have caught Nosenko in a discrepancy when he said he had received daily reports on the surveillance of the dead-letter drop used by CIA for its agent GRU Colonel Oleg Penkovskiy beginning in early 1961. Nosenko was then deputy chief of the American Embassy Section of KGB. But SR Division interrogators pointed out that the drop had been set up at the end of 1961 when Nosenko transferred to the Tourist Department. CIA said Nosenko was one year out of date. But Rositzke reports that Penkovskiy met two CIA and two British Secret Intelligence Service case officers in London on 20 Apr 1961 and that he sent back regular reports beginning with his return to Moscow (in May 1961). (Rositzke pp. 70-71)(See also The Penkovskiy Papers.)

I think I have caught Nosenko in a discrepancy. In fact, it was something I first noticed on reading Barron's KGB in 1974 and I considered it a major flaw in Barron's research. Barron tells Nosenko's cute story about how they grabbed an American tourist to use in an exchange for a KGB spy who had just been arrested by the FBI in New York on 30 Oct 1963. The "tourist" was Professor Frederick Charles Barghoorn. The head of the KGB 2nd Chief Directorate, General Oleg M. Gribanov, declared Barghoorn a spy. But Nosenko argued that while Barghoorn was once in the State Department he was merely a political scientist, a scholar interested in the USSR, and Nosenko had found <sup>no</sup> evidence that Barghoorn was a spy. Gribanov retorted, "Then make him a spy!" (Barron pp. 85-86). Barron forthrightly noted that Nosenko is the "sole source of information" for this story (p. 570).

The fact is that Barghoorn is listed as an "intelligence officer" in the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany (HICOG) Office of Intelligence from 28 May 1950 to early 1952. The HICOG/OI was the transparent cover for the CIA's OSO station in Germany. At the very minimum, the Soviets had to know Barghoorn was an "intelligence officer."

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It is interesting that Epstein identifies Richard E. Snyder as a CIA "intelligence operative." Snyder's background, in fact, was in CIA covert action (political, psychological or paramilitary warfare we do not know as yet). His training had been in the CIA Office of Policy Coordination in Washington, D.C., from 8 Nov 1949 to Mar 1950. OPC was the CIA covert warfare office until it was grudgingly merged with OSO on 1 Aug 1952. Even then problems remained and the two "cultures" (as Colby calls them in Honourable Men) of espionage-counterespionage (OSO-types) and covert action (OPC-types) stayed apart.

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Richard Helms was not CIA Deputy Director for Plans (DDP) in early 1959. He was Assistant DDP for Operations also known as Chief of Operations (COP) for the Clandestine Service. Richard Mervin Bissell had become DDP on 1 Jan 1959; Helms took over from Bissell on 17 Feb 1962.

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Epstein is wrong in claiming the CIA Office of Security "normally" did not handle counterintelligence matters. Certainly Angleton would've liked it that way. The fact is that the OS had a permanent counterintelligence group, the Security Research Staff (SRS). Indeed, the OS case officer for Nosenko, Bruce Solie, is cited in the Church Committee's report on counterintelligence for his expert opinions (Book I p. 168). The OS was heavily involved in Watergate, it started the illegal mail-opening project in 1952, initiated the Mafia contacts for the Castro assassination plots in 1960, and has had its hand in other shady activities.