

Highlights of an interview of Epstein by Peter Dale Scott and Larry Lea (KSSAN), taped 4/5/78, broadcast 4/16. Total tape is about 1 1/2 hours. [Bracketed material is paraphrase; comments in double parentheses are by Phil.]

(064) EJR: [I was interested in how organizational work.] And when I was asked to do a book about Lee Harvey Oswald, and the - Reader's Digest magazine came to me and said they would finance a study without my rights attached - and offered me unlimited resources and as much money as I needed to find as many witnesses as I could, I of course got into the idea that perhaps the Warren Commission had missed some very important witnesses who could comment on Oswald's life. And I began the book I began to find various evidence that the intelligence services of the United States, and of Russia, and of Cuba all had something to hide - not necessarily about the assassination of President Kennedy, but about something that I didn't even know about, and that was an open espionage case that was going against Oswald. At the time I wrote "Inquest," - the FBI, by transferring a number of agents, by destroying a number of files ((1)), had completely hid its involvement in this espionage case; in fact, it didn't even tell President Johnson about it. And so I began to get more interested in the espionage case....

((It's amazing how EJR can use his own ignorance of the Warren Report to bolster his 'discovery' of the FBI's interest in Oswald.))

(088) PL: [It's a brief book, less than 300 pp.; supported by full footnoting; you read me a little of Jazy Stone...; you had so much money from RJD, and a staff;] Did you ever worry that you were going to become the sort of organization that you had written [about] before...?

(098) EJR: Well, I worried all about the time - all about the Reader's Digest getting involved in [the] research, and I kept them out completely; and, in a sense they only entered it in the public relations phase, after the book was written; they laid time magazine, or somehow they led Time magazine to believe that it was some sort of tank force, but the fact is that I simply used two previous researchers who had worked for [the] Digest the brunt of the work, and then when I had special jobs, like finding the Martine that Oswald had served with, or finding his fellow employees at Jagger-Chiles-Stovall, and I had a questionnaire that could be asked of these people, the Reader's Digest very kindly lent me editors, who went around the country and filled out these questionnaires.

((CF. Legend, p. xv: Oswald (of the Digest) "has contributed to almost every phase of the project, including research, interviewing, and organization of the book. By far, however, I am most indebted to him for his deeply perceptive editing of the manuscript." In this interview, EJR confirmed my hunch that he had thought about the complications of his hypothesis more than the book indicated; however, these comments argue against my suggestion that he has been trying (e.g., in the Psychology Today article) to make it obvious that things were left out of the book, presumably at the Digest's suggestion or insistence. -Phil))

(195) EJR: This is the hypothesis I worked on: If the CIA was going to need anyone in Russia as a false defector - which is a possibility - it was a very delicate and sensitive mission, and something that required training; it wasn't something where you could meet someone in a bar and say, 'How listen, you defect to Russia, and just remember everything you see.' He had to be trained. This is the - I might be wrong, but that's the hypothesis I worked on. If that was the case, there had to be - I assumed at least six months detached from his Marine career. I couldn't find six days detached from the career....

((Typical Epstein - starts with the right assumptions....))

(258) PDS: How far do you see this KGB control of Oswald jangling, over him? Does it govern his behaviour when he comes back to this country?

(264) EJR: Well, my view - again, and this is very speculative - is that the Soviets soon found they had no use for Oswald, and sent him back; at worst, he'll be arrested, which will have propaganda value; more likely, the FBI will pursue him, and they'll be confused and confounded for years at best, he'll be some sort of sleeper agent.]

(1): The FBI followed him ineptly, which embarrassed Hoover.]

EJR: That's true, and I think the FBI involvement goes even deeper than - than we can ascertain at this point... [whatever the KGB involvement was, it was very low level; he was just a piece of garbage to them.]

(285) PDS: What about Marina? A piece of garbage, or of more interest to the KGB? EJR: The Hinkenhorn case fascinated me; went to USSR at same time as LHO; trained by high KGB people; his entire mission - open antique store in D.C. and bring back a Soviet wife, to be a radio operator. There's a CIA memo indicating that they should be interested in LHO because of this pattern of the Russians putting a spouse in that way. And so I would think that Marina, before she was allowed to return to the United States, was told that some day someone might approach you; if he does, you still have family here, do what he says. I mean, that's all that had to be her mission, or even Oswald's mission. ((1)) Y'know, I'm talking - just to really get to the point that you were making before, it's inconceivable to me that the Soviets had anything to do with the assassination of Kennedy, or that Oswald was under Soviet control at that point. So whatever influence they exerted on him was very low level, and then he separated from them, et -

PDS: [Can you date the separation? The moment of his return, or when he went to New Orleans?]

(322) EJR: Well, I would say that the point - yes, I think we - I can't date when the Soviets - they might never have actually contacted him after he returned to America, which might have added to his frustration and caused all those letters that he wrote to the Soviet consulate, and other activities on his part, but I would say that the shooting at Walker in April of 1963 definitely was a watershed. Not only the Soviets but I think a lot of other people started to shy away from Oswald at that point, whether he did the shooting or not is another question.

PDS: [Up to them, is it possible he was under someone's control?]

EJR: [Up to that point, he might have been listed as an asset - a notational agent, as in Greene's novel - i.e., a dubious asset.]

(358) EJR: [On Marina: lied about her own name, etc.]

PDS: [Which made her very vulnerable for deportation; there were suggestions she felt she was being pressured by her interviewers after the assassination.] Does that seem credible to you?]

EJR: Yes, and I would even go further and say that before the assassination the degree of pressure put on Marina might explain Oswald's more bizarre behavior.

(402) PL: [Marina's story to INS reeks of being an intelligence legend.]

EJR: Yes; I would think that conceivably the name Prusakova was given to her because someone might have seen her living at the home of Colonel Prusakova [etc.], and that that would explain why she was there, or maybe even Oswald didn't know her true identity.]

(423) PDS: [During discussion of Volokhin in California] Was it the Bolshoi ballet?

EJR: I think - the name was not the Bolshoi, but it was something like that. [Volokhin was in Santa Ana the day LHO applied for a passport; was in charge of Indonesian affairs for the KGB for a while; Oswald mentioned an Indonesia operation he was in, in a letter to his brother; then it wasn't publicly known.]

PDS: [The KGB was making a big propaganda issue of it at the time; the CIA was still denying involvement; I wonder why the Russians didn't use LHO as part of the propaganda operation?]

EJR: [I was very interested in that; I looked at the other defectors; LHO was one of a series of 8 or 9; from his letters to his brother, it looked like he was going to start off as a propaganda asset, he was never so used.]

(466) PDS: [Was Webster so used?]

EJR: [No; there's a similarity - if they intended to use someone for intelligence, "the assumption might be," (Whose??) they wouldn't use him for propaganda. I think Webster offered info on plants; I think both cases were considered intelligence, not propaganda.]

(016) EJR: [The day LHO passed through Amsterdam, Volokhin was a consul there, according to CIA traces. After reading Ptaschlik's book, about Marina mentioning

a Russian-speaking writer named Didenko, which is her father's name, and we couldn't find a record of him,] I always wondered if there might not have been some final briefing on the ship.

PDS: Angleton was concerned about Voloshin, wasn't he?

EJF: Yes; I mean, he's a man who goes by supposition, and he thinks that when you find 3 or 4 lines intersecting, that's triangulation. KJK: That's right; and - I don't know if he would assume (?) this, but he would assume that, y'know, here you have the probable recruiter, the man who handled him in Russia, and the person who gave him his briefing. (Would assume, or dare assume? -PJJ)

PDS: I was just wondering whether he brought this case to your attention, or whether you brought it to his attention?

EJF: No; No; Through Freedom of Information - I brought it to his attention; I mean, I mentioned it to him, that's ... (Inaudible) a good point. (7-unclear)

(070) EJF: [JIA tried to ferret out KGB penetrations, and did much more; RAND estimated that with the best quality control you would still have 1 in 10,000, but] Angleton never found - he thought he found one, two, or three; that was part of the job - his real job was to stop the KGB [which he saw as the only enemy; he didn't care about the minor countries - from manufacturing the CIA via disinformation...]

EJF: He studied - tried to create a continuity of Soviet intelligence going everything it does elsewhere is looked at as peripheral politicians was the CIA for many things, like Nixon in Chile; but in the CIA what fascinated them in the chess game against the USSR, the CIA's whole job is to warn us against a Soviet advance in technology, etc.; at the bottom of this whole operation in 1, 2, or 3 agents in the USSR, all KGB people, you can't penetrate Americans in and get secret; Angleton suspected these people, since he knew the Russians knew we were dependent on these channels; like a magazine, the CIA needs stories every day, under Golly, there actually was a daily (inside) paper; so] there was an organizational reason not to like Angleton throughout the CIA.... [Gottstein story.... Angleton's search for the women was disruptive.]

[JIA brings up Golly, and Angleton's apparent suspicion of him; JIA thinks that high-level people naturally do meet each other.]  
[EJF agrees.] I don't suspect Golly for one reason - his career wasn't lined on a set of brilliant spies that he ran; if it was, then he could be suspected, because [you promote a mole by giving him good stuff. Golly's career was] a set of dismal failures in covert action [such as Phoenix].

[JIA: I'm not saying that Golly was a mole, just that JIA thought so - wrong?]  
EJF: Angleton's staff suggested that he was a suspect, and at one point Angleton confronted Golly with questions about these contacts. What Angleton believed, I have never been able to fathom. But, now - y'know, it is a theory that goes around Washington, and at [a] very high level, because of things Golly did later on, but I think, y'know, one - it's not important at this point to try and find the mole, because I can't be of any help. [The fact that JIA was confronting people made him even more unpopular. When Golly got back from Vietnam and became executive director.] It became practically an obsession with him, and you can see it from his own book that he's just written, to fire Angleton. [Finally he called JIA in, pointed to the mail cover operation;] that led to so-called "family jewels" disclosures, and practically wrecked the CIA. [When JIA was fired, all the top CI people left;] then files disappeared, then finally [according to Senate Intelligence Committee sources] the institutional memory of the CIA was totally destroyed [because other parts were running operations without knowing how they fit together; it was CI who kept the continuity (e.g. when they recruited someone...)]

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[JIA agrees. EJF: Using the human analogy, I think when you kill the memory, you kill the individual] or the organization; that the CIA is dead without a memory of the past.

[PDS: Your book says the CIA is inside out; linked to the Nosenko case. You are suggesting, more or less, are you not, that] the good guys were pushed out and that the people who had something to hide are now - took over the agency at that point?

EJF: That's right; the people who protected the secrets of the CIA and the FBI came to power, no matter how dirty their secrets were, and no matter what skeletons were involved, and the people who had thought the worst possibilities, that the CIA had been penetrated ... were pushed out. Yes, I think that's what did happen.

[PDS: That's more important than the background of Oswald....]  
[EJF: Hacker's review suggested, aptly but critically, that my book is a jigsaw puzzle, with some pieces missing and some pieces from another puzzle mixed in. Could be; at certain points in the book I became more interested in the alignments in the intelligence game than in Oswald. But it all criss-crosses as follows: back in 1963, the FBI was considered omni-competent....]

[EJF: The FBI, and Hoover, knew of Oswald's note, saying he would blow up the FBI building in Dallas. I can't believe, nor can any other serious student of the FBI, that that was done except on Hoover's orders. If they would destroy that, it would seem that they would have destroyed] any other evidence, more important, i.e., that they had tried to double Oswald, or blackmail him or Marina, all of which is standard operations. My thesis is that he was perceived as being a Soviet intelligence agent. So, you try and provoke him - e.g. by giving him access to classified information.]

[PDS: E.g., at J-C-S] [EJF: Absolutely; also at Michael Payne's house.] It seems to me that what was happening against Oswald is that he was being put in positions where he should have gotten into contact with - if he had contacts - with contacts in other intelligence services. And that, whatever the FBI did - and I think that at the end they tried to blackmail him - although I think his wife was then blackmailed into not saying what happened - [I think they just threatened to deport Marina, which got him very angry; they couldn't let that come out, so they erased part of the case, which is why my book is indeed so... (cut off)]

[PDS: Can't you read LHO's note as part of a conspiracy, blackmailing the FBI into responding, predictably, as it did?]  
[EJF: That destruction was of the single most important piece of evidence.] What you suggest is possible. [It might turn out the note wasn't written by LHO. Just think of the situation if the Russians, or even the CIA, learned that Oswald was planning on shooting JFK, and they decided they didn't want to be involved, so they tipped off the FBI, assuming the FBI would immediately arrest someone, as they would in Russia, who threatened to blow up their headquarters.] That possibility struck me, that it wasn't Oswald who wrote the note, but someone who had become privy to the plan, and who wanted to destroy the plan... [It could also have been something different; we're relying on secretaries' memories; it could have been a diversion, anything, I'm going to Florida to blow up an FBI building, etc. If they note was authentic, I argue against a high-level conspiracy, which wouldn't tip off the FBI in advance. Destroying such evidence raises the possibility that they would destroy other evidence, which is why legend can be described as a jigsaw puzzle with pieces missing.] I've been criticized for not drawing conclusions, but it's impossible, because we don't have some of the basic pieces.

[PDS: Can we conclude that the FBI and CIA had a lot to hide?]  
[EJF: CIA also hiding the 'mole' case, which they considered more important.... Inconceivable that they wouldn't be interested in debriefing him...]

[PDS: The WC didn't believe that the KGB didn't debrief him...]  
[EJF: When I mentioned to Richard Helms that the KGB hadn't debriefed Oswald, because they - because Nosenko said they were short of manpower, which is what he told me in (the) interview, Helms laughed and said, that's a crazy, if that ever happened here, we would of course, y'know, always find the people, and then I said,

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but, y'know, did you debrief him, and he said, Oh my God, he started to think that of course they claimed they hadn't debriefed him. [Also, Fox of DIA said every intelligence service in the world would want to debrief Oswald. PDS: Including his own? EJE: Yes; let me give the reasons: at one point Oswald claimed to know the apartment layout of Kyril Mazarov (phonetic), who is a possible successsor of Brezhnev. Also, the CIA was running a marketing program on Soviet machine tools, trying to see when they changed - important re machine technology. Also, how the Russians handled defectors. Were they given drugs, isolated, etc? In case anyone wanted to send a fake defector. PDS: What about ONI? EJE (remember a bit evasive): Webster case discussed. CIA psychiatrist - code name Robert Taylor (font clear if this is Webster's or the shrink's)... So, maybe if they thought KMO was very hostile, which is the only explanation EJE could get, they would use an unwilling debriefer. PDS: Are you suggesting Dem? EJE: That's what he told me. In the last interview he had with me. [PDS: With anybody.] (EJE sounds a bit sensitive here.) [EJE: he had worked for everyone. He admitted that the Russian had approached him. He's charming, very professional, not a fool during the interview. PDS: Report to my questions, etc. Finally admitted that Moore asked him to see Oswald. Dem knew who I was, may have been trying to confuse me by blaming the CIA.]

(013) [EJE: Did he strike you as on the brink of suicide? Had you gotten into an uncomfortable area? Have you ruled out murder?]

[EJE: It was a very disturbing thing; if you asked 100 people about a suicide's behavior just before, they would say anything you want, because you don't want to admit you did; I saw nothing odd.... I was suspicious. PDS: When was the admission about Moore? EJE: An hour or two before; just before, he was claiming he was being blackmailed; talked about the framed photo. PDS: Did you see that photo? EJE: Yes. The picture seemed to implicate Dem and Marina in prior knowledge of the Walker shooting; maybe someone was blackmailing him....]

(050) [EJE: CIA was doing expedite check. CIA told him that a security check on a U.S. citizen is almost unheard of done on an employe or applicant, or a possible penetrator. CIA wouldn't tell him why it was requested on Dem. When the Senate Committee (etc) gets the answer, we'll know if he's CIA.]

(085) [PDS: Suppose the CIA did debrief Oswald; didn't Helms like at least about the contemplating of that? Any reason to believe Helms?]

[EJE: The CIA officer said nothing was ever done; it seems to be a technicality whether it was contemplated or not.] (but) the possibility that the CIA lied seems very live to me; I asked people in other intelligence agencies if they thought that was possible, and they said, yes, because once the CIA admitted a contact with Oswald, it could never prove that it broke the contact.... I'm convinced that they debriefed him, and that this paper he wrote, "The Collector" was written at the behest of George Dem [which is why his family are the only people to have seen it. The question is whether they did a willing or unwilling debriefing. He has asked the CIA if the IG checked the Dallas office.]

(115) [PDS: Did you ask Fox if DIA debriefed Oswald?]

[EJE: I'm not sure DIA existed then; Fox said he didn't know of any such debriefing, but he would assume that it was done for them by ONI, FBI, or CIA, and] that he assumed it had to be done at some level. [I'm talking about what he assumed, not what he knew. The more interesting (who says?) thing I discussed with Fox was the damage assessment when he defected....] (EJE sounds evasive to me.) [EJE commented skeptically on the alleged nonexistence of ONI records.]

[PDS: What about Angleton's pre-assassination interception of the letters; you say Angleton was aware of that correspondence, right?]

[EJE: Yes, and let me just mention one other thing in support of what you're saying. [Nosenko gave CIA very important information in 1962 via the mole - defectors could confirm if Nosenko was in the court department in 1959 - a reason for the CIA to get info from Oswald. Thirdly, Oswald was contacting Kozlov and Gerasimov....] (Definitely sounds like Epstein evaded this question - or, at least, he didn't get the point.)]

(180) [EJE: Kozlov was under intense surveillance; was associated with off pipeline substance; CIA told FBI pre-11/22 that Oswald had met Kozlov.] The FBI probably knew anyhow; they probably traced Oswald to some little restaurant in Mexico City....]

[PDS brings up Cuba, Cuba]

[EJE: all these things would have brought Oswald to the attention of - in fact, the CIA asked for a list of FCCC organizers. I'm not disagreeing with your contention that the CIA and FBI had an interest in Oswald.]

(207) [PDS: You said the CIA intercepted Oswald's Powers letter. Wouldn't that have made him high-priority interest?]

[EJE: Not conceivable to me that it's other than as you say, but when you talk to CIA people, they say, we had so many people to debrief... Powers was so convinced that Oswald had given the Soviets information, and I couldn't see why he was so sure, just from deductive evidence; I thought he was a pretty honest guy; I thought in the 3 or 6 months that the CIA debriefed him, they asked him questions about Oswald that triggered his mind, and [I thought that] he couldn't say that, because he was probably - he was still getting paid by the CIA.

[EJE: talks about collection bias, the Reader's Digest was EJE's objectivity damaged; supposed KMO was an out-of-control CIA agent; was EJE's objectivity damaged; I'm't Angleton the perfect person to send him to Mexico, for example?]

(261) [EJE: There are 2 parts to that. First, was he recruited by the CIA pre-defection? I started with that hypothesis, and found that he was an unlikely candidate, and there was no time. Second possibility: that he was recruited upon his return. That's much likelier, because they would have had a reason. If you want to go to the idea that he was an FBI or CIA agent, you look there, not at the pre-defection stage. About the objectivity: the stuff in the RD is not exactly pro-FBI....]

[PDS: Angleton and Sullivan were both forced out; not just personal grudges, but very committed to greater vigilance.]

[EJE: I'll get to that, but I don't think that the RD link - They really didn't have anything to do with the research; an outline was never submitted to them; they didn't know what the book was about until they received it. And I'm sure that the Washington office of the Reader's Digest - [interrupted - IL suggested that they could just give Angleton to Epstein late in the project, and expect him to run with it.]

[EJE: The RD's interest was that the book on the KGB was] heavily spoon-fed to them by Nosenko, and it has a completely different tack - PDS: But let's face it, by the CIA? EJE: By the CIA, absolutely, absolutely. I shouldn't say absolutely! (All laugh) Certainly the CIA gave them a lot of information for the KGB book. PDS: Would that have been Angleton specifically? EJE: No; Angleton refused to speak to Barton; he was very much against that book, because it portrayed the KGB as a bunch of thugs; Angleton considered them sophisticated and elegant opponents; his view was that that was all a disinformation operation, from Nosenko to - so that we would lose - if you read Colby's book, [the one that Angleton spends too much time dramatizing the capacity of the KGB, which is just a bunch of thugs. Yes, the book comes in large part from Angleton, Sullivan, etc., the main part comes from the Soviet Russia Division, who are also disgruntled, although they and Angleton hate each other. I spoke to some current CIA people - Helms, IG Gordon Stewart, John Hart, who are part of the book. It's hard to be sure you're not being used. I spent 6 months going around to CI staff; when I got to speak to the Soviet Russia people in Brussels, I was told that much had been left out - the '62 Gollitsin story, mole.]

(368) [PDS: Weren't you surprised by JJA's pre-ass'n knowledge of Oswald; the Powers letter, Voloshin, etc., not given to the WC?]

[EJE: I'm not sure about that; from the POIA requests; they got a good deal of information; I think the WC just didn't want to deal with the problem of Russia. (Definitely evasive this time.)] CIA didn't give me photo of Voloshin, but would have given it to the WC. CIA and FBI were hoping things wouldn't come out.]

(400) [PDS: But wouldn't Angleton have wanted more to come out?]

[EJE: There are 2 Angleton's - in and out of power. Now he sees his only chance of getting the mole story out is to flush it out through the Senate Select Committee or a journalist; in 1963, he was practically running the CIA; he was the most powerful man there, didn't want even his name to come out. CIA had interests in the Cubela stuff not coming out.]

[Concluding discussion about whether the case can be solved, etc. EJE thinks that guns & bullets may be a blind alley; with one gunman, there could still be a conspiracy; the second alternative is looking at Oswald's connections. Epstein does think it is a live case.]

[End of highlights of interview of Epstein by Peter Dale Scott and Larry Lee of KSAN, taped 4/5/78. If the earlier pages of this interview (which starts on page 14) are missing from your copy, they can be obtained on request.]

Some general comments: Epstein has obviously thought about some of the evidence about Oswald and U.S. intelligence in a more subtle way than is reflected in the book. I don't think we have yet heard the full story of why the book is so asymmetric. It seems possible that editing was done to keep the book simple, and that Epstein actually believes it was done for stylistic reasons. I'm certainly not convinced that the book was not the result of an intelligence operation by the Angleton people, even if Epstein didn't know it.

After the taping, Epstein inscribed Peter's copy of Legend with favorable comments about Peter's work, and gave him a New York phone number. Epstein supposedly claimed familiarity with our book, and recalled my help with Inquest.

\* \* \* \* \*

A few days ago, I was considering adding to these notes some speculation that the recent defection of Shevchenko at the U.N. was somehow connected to Epstein's disclosures about Fedora. I decided that this would make me sound too much like Mae Brussell or J. Jesus Angleton. However, I am informed that today's NY Times (and Time) report that Shevchenko has offered to tell us something about Fedora, for the right amount of money. Very interesting.

So, I will mention my suspicion that there is more to the indictments of Gray, Felt, and Miller than meets the eye. I don't have any idea what it is; I'll just suggest that it might be worth the effort to ask people connected with this case if they can shed any light on the cases of Fedora, Nosenko, the mole in the FBI's NY office, or the Kennedy assassination.

One thing that did catch my attention is that the NY FBI agent, LaPrade, specifically alleged that the Weathermen were tied to the PLO. It is now well known that Angleton doesn't care for the PLO at all, considering them a KGB front.

It will be interesting to see if Angleton's Security and Intelligence Fund goes to bat for Gray et al., now that charges against Kearney have been dropped.

More sources:

(39) Hacker's review (NYRev, 4/V/78) is remarkably low key. In marked contrast to Hoch & Stetler, he finds the Oswald part more compelling than the mole part, and actually complains that Epstein "allows Angleton's recollections to wander far afield from Oswald." Some of Hacker's criticisms are well taken, but phrased most gently. Inquest is praised as the best single study of the assassination, with no indication that Hacker had anything to do with it.

(40) Courtesy of Peter Scott: NYT, 3/10/76, p. 1 - a story by Crewdson about alleged penetration of the FBI. The source is a former intelligence official, presumably Angleton (or maybe Sullivan). Golitsin is named, and quite a bit of his story is told, including the claim that the FBI had been damaged worse than the CIA. The story of the stolen documents which were offered back to the FBI is mentioned. Very interesting; and another reason to wondering about the chronology of Epstein's project. By 3/10/76 he was certainly well into it. In New York, (part I, p. 38), he said he didn't know of any previous mention of Stone's story. Hmm. Was this Crewdson story Angleton's first attempt, which didn't take, without the sex appeal of the Oswald angle? Hmm.

[Continuation of note on item (40), NYT 3/10/76:] Epstein did know of this article, since he referred to it (without a citation) in note 3 on p. 329. The note, unlike the article, avoids the question of penetration of the CIA, and does not mention Golitsin. Epstein ~~states~~ attributes the conclusion that the FBI had almost certainly been penetrated to "a former senior FBI official," while the article says that the source was simply "a former intelligence official," who could easily be CIA. (Actually, maybe Epstein's attribution is not false; he may have gotten more information about the identity of the source, e.g. Sullivan.)

More on the mail interception: Lardner has now published part of the CIA's letter of August 10, 1976 to the Abzug Committee, in which Bush stated that the only correspondence to or from Oswald which was intercepted was a letter to him from his mother, dated 8 July 1961. (I have a copy of this letter, which I don't think has been published; it seems quite innocuous.)

I recently came across a reference to the mail interception in the Schweiker Report which I had forgotten about. Page 59 notes that "one of the CIA mail surveillance operations did acquire at least some of Oswald's correspondence from the Soviet Union. Despite the fact that this operation was of the highest sensitivity at that time, the CIA did furnish the FBI with the information the Agency had acquired." The impression given is that more was intercepted than the one letter to Oswald, but that is uncertain. Also, it is unclear whether the information was given to the FBI before or after the assassination. (I don't think there is anything in the one letter to Oswald that would warrant the CIA risking exposure of their operation by passing it on to the FBI.)

The Schweiker Report's cited source is a CIA letter of 5/7/75 to the Rockefeller Commission, which is CIA Item #????-1087. [That is, #1087 in the original numbering system.] A request by someone in Washington for this specific item might be worthwhile.

On April 6, I wrote the CIA, renewing my request for all records relating to the Oswald mail interception. (The original request, which has been unproductive, was made on 8 June 1976; as noted above, that is early enough for it to have possibly influenced what Angleton told Epstein.) My letter cited the three mail interceptions described by Epstein, and pointed out the implications of the apparent suppression. The CIA chose to interpret my letter as a request for comment rather than a request for records, which it clearly was; so what I got was, in essence, a "no comment." I expect that if I pressed the CIA on this, they would urge me to wait for the forthcoming general release. They would not be able to put off a new request for (e.g.) item 1087 from someone else, especially a reporter, so easily.

The CIA also told me that the last general release is now expected in another 6 to 8 weeks. (That's what they said on 14 February!) They said that they had "encountered delays in coordination and related processing."

\* I understand that the CIA gave the Abzug Committee some additional interesting information. Oswald was put on the CIA's watchlist on 9 November 1959, which is not surprising. He was removed on 15 March 1960, reason unknown; put back on on 7 August 1961, and removed 28 May 1962. I am not aware of any explanation for this watchlist activity. Ideas are welcomed.

More published sources:

(41) Washington Monthly, April 1978, p. 65. A one-paragraph review. "Legend does not purport to shed any light on who killed JFK, which shows admirable restraint on Epstein's part."

(42) Boston Globe, 16 April. Review by Priscilla McMillan. Quite critical, and rather reasonable. (There is no complaint about Epstein's description of her, which would be justified.) "The book's final casualty is context, the atmosphere in which LHO breathed and lived his life." (The first casualty was truth.) While McMillan's book underemphasizes Oswald's political and intelligence aspects, it is certainly true that Epstein leaves no room for non-sinister, non-political motives. For example, the simplest explanation for DeMohrenschildt's interest in Marina would be lust. There are some good criticisms on factual points in this review also.

(43) The Capital Times [Madison, Wisc.?], 17 April, p. 18; review by David Wrone. Calls Legend irresponsible and vicious; the focus is on errors of fact and omissions of evidence.

(44) NYT, 18 April; story by Anthony Marro on the Shevchenko case. He has supposedly suggested that he can provide information about Fedora.

(45) Washington Post, 16 April, p. B1; long piece by Tad Szulc on Shevchenko. Suggests a possible link to the Fedora case; Epstein is mentioned. Probably contains less of substance that Szulc has heard, I would guess.

(46) Seven Days, 21 April, p. 32; review by Jeff Goldberg (AIB), "Orchids from Epstein." A good overview; critical of Epstein's errors about the shooting, including the affair of the oak tree.

(47) Washington Post, 23 April, p. E1. Long review by George Lardner, who hits Epstein hard both on the war of the moles, and the JFK shooting. The book is called "fascinating, important, and essentially dishonest... paranoid ... naive." Right on! Mentions the oak tree, Epstein's coyness about what he and Angleton believe (making the good point that Angleton's disclaimer is in an early chapter; it may not cover what he believes now), the mail interception matter, etc. Colby's anti-Angleton position is quoted (from his forthcoming book.)

I wonder if Lane and/or Epstein will complain about Lardner being a tool of the CIA on this matter?

(48) Washington Star, 23 April; review by Jacob Cohen. Critical of the absence of much new information, the bad footnotes, the misrepresentation of the diary, the incomplete presentation of the graphologist's opinions about Oswald, the reliance on Angleton, and the general implausibility of Oswald's behavior if he was a KGB spy. As usual, Cohen is effective in criticizing people who have not thought through the implications and consequences of their claims; as usual, his arguments against a conspiratorial explanation of the shooting are not quite convincing, but deserve to be taken seriously. (His book, "Conspiracy Fever," is now promised for this fall.)

(49) Washington Star, 23 April; another review, this one by David Wise. Good background on Angleton, and his "sinister" testimony to the Church Committee (to the effect that the CIA doesn't really have to obey a President's "overt orders"). Wise effectively raises the possibility that Nosenko was a plant with a true story. He complains about Epstein's failure to spell out his conclusions on DeMohrenschildt, but there is not much on the assassination part of the book; Wise calls it "well written, carefully researched, and ultimately very disappointing." He raises the possibility that Nosenko was a plant who was supposed to be found out, thus raising the false specter of a mole inside the CIA and sowing 'confusion and suspicion.'

(50) Washington Post, 24 April, p. 1; a long story by Robert G. Kaiser, stating that the Senate Intelligence Committee has begun an inquiry into the Nosenko case (which is summarized). The Post has talked to some of Epstein's sources. David Murphy and Tennent H. Bagley are named as top men in the Soviet Russia Division, who joined in Angleton's challenge of Nosenko. The Post has confirmed that Igor Agu, the "press attaché" who told Epstein about Nosenko, was not a press attaché and may have been a KGB agent. Comments on Nosenko by Helms and Colby are included.

(51) New York, 24 April, p. 9. Another "Intelligencer" item: "An End to the War of the Moles?" Suggests that Shevchenko may confirm the (Angletonian) suspicions about Fedora and another undercover agent inside the Russian mission, "Top Hat." (Where is New York getting all this stuff? Epstein?)

(52) Time, 24 April, p. 37; the original report that Shevchenko has offered to talk about possible disinformation agents, for a price.

(53) S.F. Examiner, 25 April, p. 29; Dan Schorr's syndicated column. A summary of the Shevchenko-Fedora-Nosenko-Epstein situation. Colby is said to have been planning to fire Angleton because of the harm his obsession with counter-intelligence was doing.

(54) Boston Phoenix, 25 April 78; review by Dave Williams (AIB). Properly

critical, of course, e.g. on Epstein's handling of his sources. Includes some interesting quotes from Willie's interview of Epstein.

(55) Nation, 29 April, p. 509; review by Aaron Latham. Critical of Epstein's style, and his reliance on Angleton. The focus is on Angleton, who saw spies around him "as Howard Hughes saw germs." Latham suggests that "Legend" may itself be the false biography. (By the way, can someone give me a citation for, or a copy of, Latham's interview of Angleton some time ago - in "New York?")

(56) New Republic, 29 April, p. 35; review by Alice van Buren of "Legend" and "Marina and Lee." A somewhat imprecise but generally valid critique of Epstein. The comments on McMillan are positive, and fascinating; ask for a copy, if you are interested. Now we know why most assassination researchers are males.

(57) AIB newsletter, April-May; review by Carl Oglesby. Properly critical; the focus is on Angleton. "The best guess [about the purpose of Legend] is that Oswald had been involved, from the CIA side, in a combined CIA-KGB operation of a most secret character, and that it was this operation which was placed in jeopardy when Oswald was made the patsy for the JFK hit." An interesting idea, new to me: any evidence? Any guess as to what that joing operation might have been? Any evidence of actual joint operations?

(58) Newsweek, 1 May, p. 9; a letter from Eli Karson (Somers, Conn.), who claims to have been a USAF U-2 intelligence officer and unit historian. He finds Epstein's claim that the information known to Oswald (rate of ascent and cruising altitude) could have helped shoot down Powers to be "absurd."

As noted above, Epstein's claim did sound implausible to me; on the other hand, I recall from Powers' book that he did his best not to let the Russians know his height when he was shot down. (Incidentally, the McMillan review, #42, states without attribution that the Russians knew the cruising altitude and (at the time of the defection) lacked only missile capacity to shoot the U-2 down.)

(59) Esquire, 9 May, p. 59; excerpts from Colby's book. Nothing on Epstein-Angleton-Nosenko here, but it's generally interesting. The Rockefeller Commission is covered, along with the first surfacing of the reports of foreign assassinations.

Of most interest to me is the statement that the 1973 "family jewels" report included, "in a separate and even more secret annex," a summary by the Inspector General of the 1967 I.G. report, said to be about "the CIA's involvement in assassination attempts or plans against Castro, Lumumba, and Trujillo." My first question, of course, is what (if anything) this 1973 report said about the JFK assassination's possible connection to the plots against Castro.

**FILLER:**

(S.F. Chronicle,  
19 Jan 78, p. 14)

"Angie" is presumably  
J. Jesus Angleton.



**EPSTEIN INVOLVED  
IN SCANDAL!**

Can Angie, the new Sweathog, help Epstein out when he hands in a "hot" term paper? Gabriel Kaplan stars.

**WELCOME BACK, KOTTER**  
8:00PM

CIA documents relating to other defectors: At Harold Weisberg's suggestion, I dug up some of the documents released by the CIA in 1976 which refer to comments by defectors other than Nosenko on the Kennedy assassination.

If you're in a paranoid frame of mind, the most interesting is a CIA memo [# ??-193] of 16 Jan 1964, reporting on a meeting between CIA and Warren Commission people on 14 January. The meeting seems to have dealt with various Soviet matters, such as how to go about asking the Russians for more information. There are quite a few deletions, including the sentences surrounding the statement that "CIA has not systematically collected nor compiled information on Soviet defector handling" [i.e., their handling of American defectors]; this is surprising, in light of Epstein's statement to the effect that lots of countries' intelligence agencies would be particularly interested in this matter.

Page 3 deals with questions asked by the CIA to the Commission, "pertaining to our use of defectors in analyzing the Oswald papers." This discussion was apparently precipitated by "[defector source's] initial analysis of Marina Oswald's documents," [This could be a reference to CIA Item #76, discussed below, or to another analysis which I vaguely recall but can't locate offhand.] Two of the four questions seem reasonable enough: was the WC formally asking the CIA to have defectors analyze "the material," and would the WC honor the CIA's classification of its correspondence. The two remaining questions seem a little peculiar in the alleged context; however, they make more sense if we assume that the CIA was laying the groundwork for an analysis by defectors which was not strictly restricted to the Oswald papers. (In fact, an unrestricted CIA analysis of Oswald's Russian stay would seem at least as appropriate as a study of "the Oswald papers.") These two questions were: "Would the Commission be prepared to assume the burden of responsibility if such a defector should disagree with the Commission's opinions or come up with a radically different hypothesis or interpretation?" (to which the answer was, essentially, yes), and "If a defector who had contributed to the analysis of the documents should be unwilling to appear personally and formally before the Commission, would the Commission exercise its subpoena powers against him?" (to which the answer was, probably not, if there was a risk to the defector).

Isn't the latter question, in particular, a bit odd? In retrospect, it is clear that the Commission wasn't about to demand detailed documentation for a lot of the CIA's comments, much less subpoena reluctant witnesses. I don't know what reason the CIA might have had to worry, on January 14, that a defector who had analyzed the Oswald papers would be forced to testify.

\* What I find provocative is that this meeting occurred just six days before Nosenko (according to Epstein) contacted the CIA and set in motion his own defection - allegedly his first contact with the CIA in 19 months, and allegedly at his own initiative. Epstein told Dave Williams that "he felt it likely that the CIA had asked, or at least encouraged, the Russians to send over a defector who could state that Oswald was not KGB." (This is Willie's language; not Epstein's; this is from the part of their interview that Willie could not tape. See p. 6 of his notes.) Maybe Epstein is just reading this CIA memo the same way I am; maybe he has other sources. This might be worth pursuing.

Judging from the CIA and WC memos on their meeting of 12 March 1964, I would not be at all surprised if the CIA's memo distorted the thrust of their discussion. There is a relevant WC memo, which is apparently still withheld. [Willens to Rankin, 15 Jan 64; item #2 on the Archives' list #1.] Someone in Washington ought to ask the Archives to review this memo.

Someone could also ask Angleton if he ever suspected that the CIA had asked Nosenko to defect. Wouldn't that confuse things!

The other particularly interesting CIA memo is #????-76 [the first part is illegible], an 8-page memo of 27 November 1963 entitled "[Soviet Defector] Comments on President Kennedy's Assassination." Very interesting, and difficult to summarize. The author is not convinced that the KGB ordered Oswald to kill JFK; it is possible that he came on another KGB "mission" and shot JFK on his own initiative, but that leaves the KGB culpable anyhow. There are lots of questions for Marina, who has to be at least a low-level KGB informant. (If you want a copy of this memo, ask.)



In digging up the above material, I also came across CD 49, pp. 41-42, which reports information given to the FBI by Peter Derjabin, another defector. CIA items #465 through 467 deal with information attributed to Andrew Zaryk, said to be a former Soviet Army lieutenant, but not known to the CIA.

1976 dissemination of Angleton's view of Nosenko: Jacob Cohen's review (#48, supra) notes that "Angleton had been leaking his suspicions to journalists and congressional committees long before he met Epstein; conspiracists have been talking about him and his views on Nosenko for years." (Not to me they haven't!) The Fensterwald-Ewing book (which contains several interesting references to Angleton and Nosenko) reports, without citation, that Angleton "is reliably reported to view the whole [Nosenko] episode as 'a definite set-up'." (P. 224) I have already noted (pp. 20-21) an apparently relevant 1976 NYT story. One thing I am interested in, of course, is the chronology of Epstein's contacts with Angleton and Nosenko in 1975-6.

Starting with the citations in the Fensterwald book, I have located several stories which appeared in March 1976, on the occasion of the first release of CIA documents. [For what it's worth, this was while the Schweiker Committee was finishing its report, which has only a passing reference to Nosenko (p. 59).] Those articles are:

(60) L.A. Times, 23 March 1976, p. 1; story by Jack Nelson, about CIA #497 - "CIA Discredits Defector's Statements About Oswald." Nelson notes that Nosenko "still is regarded as suspect by some U.S. intelligence sources."

(61) AP (in S.F. Chronicle, 25 March 1976, p. 6): "KGB Defector's 3-Year Grilling." Information from informed sources about the conditions of Nosenko's confinement. The story points out that Angleton signed a memo to the WC stating "that the CIA had no information that would either prove or disprove Nosenko's story." Offhand, this looks like reaction from the anti-Angletonites.

(62) L.A. Times, 28 March 1976, p. 1; story by Jack Nelson: "Defected Russ Agent Still a Mystery Man." Covers the Sam Jaffe connection, the CIA documents on Nosenko, etc. Nelson was told that "some U.S. intelligence officials still express doubts" about Nosenko. A former CIA official said that Nosenko's confinement did not begin until four or five months after the defection. Barron described how he got to talk to Nosenko.

More sources:

(63) Letter of 25 April 1978 from the Security & Intelligence Fund to its supporters. Angleton, as chairman, is one of the three co-signers. This is less strident, and therefore less interesting, than the earlier letters (which were quoted in part in the Hoch-Stetler review). Nothing of direct relevance. The toning down may be because the group is trying to get Congress to improve the proposed guidelines for the intelligence agencies, and it wouldn't do to refer (as they did earlier) to the "sabotage efforts of the Church-Mondale committee." In this letter, the "anti-intelligence wreckers" remain unnamed.

If I were in Washington, I would drop in on these people (Suite 1000, 1101 17th St NW, DC 20036) and see if anyone wants to talk about what they really think is going on now.

(64) 2 May 1978, column by Daniel Schorr (S.F. Examiner, p. 31). Concerns the deletion, from the Nixon memoirs, of a couple of sentences about the report received - from Fedora, it now appears - that the Soviet Embassy got a set of the Pentagon Papers early. Schorr reports that someone had delivered a set of the papers to the Embassy, and that Ambassador Dobrynin, "scenting a provocation, quickly brought them to the State Department." Schorr quotes Kissinger as saying that it doesn't make much sense for a Soviet double agent to provide false information about the Soviet Embassy; Schorr suggests that Fedora was truthfully reporting "what he had heard - that the Embassy received a copy of the Pentagon Papers." I lean to the hypothesis that the CIA or the FBI would have had an interest in putting this story into Fedora's mouth.

(65) New York, 8 May 1978, p. 42; Tad Szulc on the Shadrin Affair - "A Double Agent Double-Crossed." Includes a box on a possible connection to the Nosenko case, which I find quite obscure. (Notes in passing that in late 1958 ONI was very eager to get information about the Soviet Navy.)

More clippings relating to Epstein and Angleton, interpreted broadly:

(66) London Sunday Times, 19 Mar 78. Courtesy of Harold Weisberg, the entire Epstein interview (6 pp.), of which item (5) supra is one page. Much overlap with the New York interviews

(67) Yipster Times, April-May 1978; "Epstein: Assassin or Super-Jinx?," by David Miller. ("None of the above" doesn't seem to be an allowed choice.) Pretty much what one would expect. "There are Shakespearean gaps in the life of Edward Jay Epstein." Sure! (Provided by Ted Rubinstein.)

(68) N.O. Times-Picayune, 13 April 1978; by David Jackson, Chicago Sun-Times. Based on an interview; considerable quotation. Epstein says he knew Oswald-type student leaders in the late '60's - intelligent, articulate, etc. [From MA via HW]

(69) Book of the Month Club News, May 1978. Three pages on the book, by Wilfrid Sheed; one page on Epstein by Jack Newcombe. Gushy, as expected. [From TR]

(70) Commentary, May 1978, p. 30. "Hiss, Oswald, the KGB, and Us," by Michael Ledeen (author of the WSJ review, #34 supra). The book is "brilliant." Complains of US intelligence being unwilling to accept evidence of Soviet espionage in these cases. Very interesting review, especially in light of ongoing developments.

(71) Daily Cal (Berkeley), 5 May 1978 [date uncertain]. Overly positive review by William Bates, who also thinks of Oswald as a proto-new leftist.

(72) The Tribune (Labour's Independent Weekly) [England], 2 June 1978, p. 8. Reasonably critical review by Chris Mullin. [From Russ Stetler]

(73) Wilmington, Del. Morning News, 7 June 1978, p. 1. "Senate Unit Probes CIA Security Breach," by Joe Trento and Ralph Moyed. Angleton fears he is being set up to take the blame. Senate Intelligence Committee intends to talk to Colby and Helms also. Interesting, esp. the Angleton quotes. (Cf. #50, 4/24 report of SCI interest in the WP.) [From Harold Weisberg]

(74) Wall Street Journal, 13 June 1978, p. 1. This has only an indirect relevance. Recall Angleton's "who struck John" remark. This story, on radioactive waste disposal in West Virginia, quotes the plant manager as saying that, by deduction, it isn't hard to tell "'who shot John,' meaning who is responsible." [WSJ explanation] I guess "who shot/struck John" is some sort of regional slang, but I still suspect Angleton used it to just to get us all worked up. [From Brad S.]

(75) [S.F.] Bay Guardian, 22 June 1978, p. 18: Critical review by Bill Turner.

(76) New York Times Magazine, 25 June 1978. "The Angleton Story," by Seymour M. Hersh. Very important - the first major salvo from the other side. Hersh politely but emphatically depicts Angleton as a liar, a fanatic, maybe not such a hot poet, and an all-round s.o.b. The discussion of the Epstein book is short and critical, but could be more so.

(77) Inquiry, 26 June 1978, p. 22. The Hoch-Stetler review, better late than never. You may want to add the original last line: According to Epstein, the one thing Angleton doesn't believe in is coincidence.

(78) [From wire services, S.F. Examiner, 9 July 1978, p. 1] The London Sunday Times of 9 July reportedly has information based on an article by Epstein to be published in the August Commentary. The Times article (which I expect to get soon) says that Lipavsky was a KGB agent, recruited by the CIA as a walk-in in 1975. The Times said that Shcharansky helped Lipavsky "collect information on the way the U.S.S.R. used Western equipment to keep tabs on members of the human rights movement."

Very interesting. I guess I should wait to see if Epstein is really saying that Lipavsky and Shcharansky had these CIA connections, but I can't help wondering if we are seeing some sort of "I told you so" from Angleton's people. Angleton is supposedly very strongly against trusting walk-ins, and it looks like his successors got caught. Angleton might be willing to let the CIA connections come out, despite (or because of) the considerable embarrassment to the current administration.

Remember the Barghorn case? It seems at least fair to ask what kind of interest the CIA would have in the Soviet dissident movement; it's hard for me to believe they would have none. While arguing convincingly that Shcharansky was in no way engaged in espionage, Robert Toth's own description of the sources and subjects he was dealing with through Shcharansky (S.F. Chronicle, 12 July, p. 11) makes it seem that the CIA would be very interested in this information. We know from the JFK case

documents that the CIA had (around 1960) a remarkable appetite for even minor details about Russia. Toth may think that there is nothing about parapsychology worth highly-classified attention (and I'm inclined to agree), but there have been convincing major stories (New Times, Washington Post) indicating that the CIA is very interested (either for real, or to confuse the Russians).

Finally, after Shcharansky's conviction, Sen. Moynihan (to whom Epstein is reportedly close) called specifically for a ban on the sale of a computer to Tass, on the grounds that the device would help the Soviet government keep track of "every dissident in the Soviet Union." [Washington Post, in S.F. Chron., 7/15, p. 14]

It's really too soon to form a judgment, but so far the work of the press in covering recent developments hasn't impressed me. Some analysis of the political and intelligence (U.S. and Israeli) aspects of this cold-war escalation seems called for. I haven't seen much beyond explanations of what s.o.b.'s the Russians are, which I think we all already knew.

(79) Penthouse, August 1978, p. 62. About 4 pp., on the KGB at the UN. Covers Angleton's concern about the security of the CIA's computer, of the Nevada Test Site, etc. Mentions the death of Dag Hammarsjold, thought by some in the CIA to have been a KGB murder; allegedly, this was so reported to President Kennedy, who chose to cover it up. (What must Angleton have thought of JFK, if he believed JFK was covering up a KGB assassination?) [I have read, but not copied, this article. The first person to send me a copy gets 10 free clippings of his choice!]

[(80): see below]

Other material:

Please refer to the discussion on p. 24 of the CIA-Warren Commission meeting of 14 Jan 64. The WC's account is indeed available, as CIA #480-191B, 3 pp. There is only a brief paragraph on the discussion of the advisability of the CIA making WC material available to "its few outside consultants." Looks innocent enough.

CIA #483-193A is a WC routing slip of 10 Jan 64 (which the CIA presumably got on the occasion of some review!) which refers incomprehensibly to a Rankin-Warren discussion of "the CIA problem," which could be one of several problems.

The defector in CIA #???-76, discussed at the bottom of p. 24, is clearly Derjabin. An 8-letter last name is deleted from the cover letter, CIA #413-76A, which specifies that the author of the analysis defected about ten years ago.

Dave Martin pointed out to me an interesting reference in the Schweiker Report (p. 31), to a report by a WH Desk Officer which went to LBJ, evidently shortly before Angleton horned in and took over the investigation. (The desk officer, whose identity I do not know, was probably wrong in saying his report was in the latter part of December, since the allegedly subsequent report of the FBI Summary Report is probably the one which took place on December 6. [CIA 337-135]) From a hasty review of just the first part of the CIA release, I found no such report, and no references to it. I'm pretty sure that the first CIA report to the WC on Mexico was CD 347 (31 Jan 64). From some of the early CIA-WC correspondence, it's hard for me to believe that they got any general (i.e., non-USSR focused) report earlier. So, we may have another missing CIA report (which the HSC should already have).

CIA #471-190A (10 Jan 64) suggests an outline for "the report to the Warren Commission" which appears to deal only with Soviet angles; it is presumably from the Angleton crew which took over from the desk offices. Many sections were given to the WC as separate CD's (chronology, etc.), but I don't recall anything like the proposed section 3: "Analysis - the CS commentary. This should be the heart of the report ... presentation of hypotheses...." This analysis evidently "suggests a more sinister possibility - that Oswald and his wife were Soviet agents, whether or not the assassination ... was carried out with Soviet knowledge or on Soviet orders." [P. 1] It looks like the Angletonians, pre-Nosenko, were already accepting the idea (repeated by Derjabin) that the Russians might have been responsible. It's possible that cooler heads prevailed and kept this analysis from going to the WC, at least as the CIA's official position. Interesting business; I hope we can find out more.

Whoops - I forgot: (80) Playboy, July 1978, Colby interview - lots on Epstein; rather important.

Some more odds and ends: I think that if we can document Epstein's use of CIA records which have not been released, the Senate Intelligence Committee would