

Breakdown of Hal on Riebling's Wedge

pp. 53ff Nosenko stuff

R's charge that everything Nosenko told CIA was throw-away stuff. His attempt to make a hero of Bagley and Angeltonians. Through here Hal makes the point that R was rewriting history and being an apologist and defender of the CIA. R makes phony argument tta it was Golitsyn and not Nosenko who gave up the 52 bugs in the US embassy. He ignores Hart's testimony on the value of Nosenko's intelligence.

In short, the FBI was taken in by Nosenko. When in fact it was Angelton and that crowd who followed Golitsyn's lead. (56)

The schism between FBI (Domestic Intelligence Division) and Angelton on Golitsyn and on Nosenko.

pp. 59ff R on Oswald in Mexico

Hal has an aside on the CIA's using Lee Henry Oswald in its 201 personnel file. The Mexican station produced the same slip up. How convenient. \*\*\*\*\*

(p. 59)

CIA did not tell the FBI about Oswald in Mexico until October 9<sup>th</sup>, a week after he left to return to Dallas (p. 59) Review pp. 59-60\*\*\*\*\*

R's Chapter 5

Entire Hal response is on Hart's HSCA testimony and how this is a countercheck to R's brazen dishonesty. \*\*\*\*\*

Chapter 6

Hal's Oswald

2nd file  
Chapt 5  
Hart's HSCA testimony

Hart's HSCA testimony

But whatever that "unexpected" business as a government Social Security clerk may have been, the committee accepted it and gave no further explanation of her no-show.

If the committee had really wanted her there she would have been there. The Mexican government that beat her up and defamed her for the CIA would have seen to it that she was there. But there are some things in the transcript of her questioning that although the committee published them it was not interested in attracting attention to them. As we see below, that I have both thought and spoken of them as the House assassins committee at that late date, 15 years after the fake Alvarado Ugarte effort to start World War III was confessed, without mention of his name or story while a left-handed effort was made to confirm some of the details he made up and has confessed to making this up.

In the next sentence, for all the world as though it were true, Riebling quotes Helms as saying that the CIA conducted a real investigation of Nosenko. That was the one thing the CIA did not do about him. All its effort was directed at seeing to it that they could phony up a case against him and in that buttress their animated disaster Golitsyn and all the crazy theories he came up with and Angleton and his associated paranoids just loved.

Nor is there either indication of or any reason to believe that the CIA made any effort at all to learn from either the FBI or the Commission what they had established about the fact of the assassination. Obviously the CIA could not conduct any real investigation without knowledge of the fact that had been established. The assassination of a President is not something that can be "investigated" without beginning with the basic fact that has been established.

What is no less a self-condemnation by Riebling and by Helms, quoted as saying that nonexistent investigation of Nosenko "reflected the concern or working hypothesis among many officers working on these matters that the Soviets might have been involved in this [i.e., the Kennedy assassination] in some fashion and that Cubans might have been involved..." (page 240) - for all of which Riebling has no source, none at all (page 506).

Quite aside from that non-existing investigation of Nosenko, the traditional and supposedly still the basis of intelligence is analysis. Not what became the focus of the CIA, dirty tricks, overthrowing

Helms  
said

Harold Weisberg

governments, intruding into elections and a little bit of "wet jobs." There is no competent analyst who would have endorsed what Helms said by analysis of the existing information. Except to political nuts and paranoids, it is obvious that neither the USSR nor Cuba preferred Johnson to Kennedy. Both were at the time of the assassination hoping to work out mutually-satisfactory arrangement with him - on his initiative and theirs. These were ongoing. He and Khrushchev had exchanged some 40 private letters on this. There was no such possibility with Johnson and knowing him, they knew it.

In this single paragraph Riebling telegraphs to any perceptive reader that he is not a scholar and is a flack. He is flacking for the CIA, which is addressing the most subversive of crimes as one writes a dime novel, as a flimsy story not a grim fact. In this he accepts Helms' word as something that not be questioned at all or in any way. If Helms says it is true no matter how obviously it is not true. He does that without regard for Helms' clear public record - of being a very big liar. As when he told the American Newspaper Publishers Association, when he was the first CIA Director to make a speech in public, "trust us - we do not target on Americans." At that very time Helms' CIA was targeting enormous resource in violation of the law in Operation Chaos, as the Church committee brought to light. In it the CIA was trying to and to a degree did disrupt the anti-Viet Nam War movement. It was prohibited from any domestic activity by law and it was forbidden to spend any tax money in any such effort. So, at the very time he sought the support of the ANPA, Helms was lying his head off to it and he was violating the law in what he did that he lied about. He was also a liar and knew he was a liar in other targeting on Americans that was also exposed by the Senate investigation in intercepting and copying mail inside the United States. The FBI did the intercepting at a number of post offices for the CIA, to which it delivered that mail.

Including mine and with that interfering with my being published.

With what the Church committee exposed being public and with Riebling being familiar with at least its report, coded in his strange source codes as FR-I, FR-II and FR-III, he had to have known that the Helms whose word he treats as beyond mortal questioning was in fact a world-class liar. 