Writing Notes Re: Chapter 8

Birth of the Single Bullet Fabrication

Opening P: Tie the autopsy w/ the Commission's construction of the so-called single bullet theory. This was the WC's silver bullet underpinning the single assassin story. Despite the medical and physical evidence that pointed to the impossibility of this theory the Commission pushed ahead without fear and without evidentiary confirmation. (validation)Politics, not evidence, was in the driver's seat.

Even two of the Commission members (Russell and Cooper) rejected the single bullet theory. Russell wanted to go on record that he dissented from the single bullet theory but was stymied and deceived by Rankin. (good to have this up front)

See the WCR for the weight it places on the single bullet theory. Contrast the Report's language (it was a theory) with the absolute necessity of this to their case. The language in the Report was as shaky as Galloway's editing of the official autopsy. (See Chpt. 7) with "presumably of entry" and "presumably of exit." Took great liberties with the language in the most important autopsy of the 20th century.

Lay out in para here what the WCR says about the shooting. (See Wrone piece on Connally for the page citations and language).

Begin with the (strange) career of the single bullet fabrication.

FBI's CD 1 Report. Report of the shooting of JFK was only (number of word) long. And it totally neglected one of the president's wounds, , , , but it was clear in that three shots were fired. Tow hit JKF and a separate shot hit Governor John Connally; and the third shot blew apart JFK's head. Three shots and three hits. CD 1 written without benefit of reference to the official autopsy report.

The SS report on the assassination reached the same conclusion ; The President was hit by two of the shots and Connally was hit by one, a third and separate bullet.

Three shots was consistent with the three spent shells found at the "sniper's nest" on the sixth floor of the TSBD. Point to make: Despite the fact that the FBI never bothered to examine the official autopsy report before submitting CD 1 to the Commission it may have had other reasons for insisting that Connally was struck by a separate bullet. (Find dates for CD 1 and when FBI ran spectro exams on the CE 399 and frags from Connally's wrist and arm. Note here that the spectro evidence never appeared in the WCR or in the 26 volumes of Exhibits and Hearings. Or the wounds sustained by the governor were so extensive that they had to be caused by a separate bullet.

Mention here the FBI's model of Dealey Plaze here? (already covered in earlier chapt). Mention that even today the FBI has never changed its position on three shots and three hits. (May want to cite this in footnote or in text).

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Shift to the Bethesda drs. views on Connally's wrist wound. All recyed in March testimony that gov, was hit by same bullet that struck the president. View also held by the Parkland drs. who worked on Connally. Unusual unanimity in the JFK case.

Transition into the need for a re-enactment by WC.

Time limits. Rankin/Warren wanted to wide up the investigation by June, months before the presidential election (Check w/ Ex Sess and staff memos.)

WC begins with doubts about FBI/SS account of the shooting. See Rosen to belmont 1/29/'64 (62-109060-2367). WC still held "hostage" by the FBI Model of Dealey Plaza. WC staff wants to check the Z film against the Nix film. Hoover comment: OK. "looks to me as if they are playing games."

FBI based its shooting sequences and Dealey Plaza shooting scenario on the Z Film. See 62-109060-2324 FBI narrative with the Model. "Shooting Sequence as located on the scale model." Eisenberg wanted to look again because the Z film and Nix film were counterindicated, not compatible with the FBI/SS interpretation.

Griffith to Conrad 1/28/'64 (62-109060-24050 Hoover comments OK. Sounds like a lot of poppycock to me."

Gauthier to Callahan 1/28/'64 notes Kelley's comments about WC staff suggestion of a single bullet causing all JFK and Connally's nonfatal wounds. Kelley calls it "ridiculous" and that the shot would have gone "wild."

At second conference Connallys were present. See Griffith to Conrad 4/22/'64 (62-109060-2985. Here Governor insists he was hit by the second shot immediately after JFK was hot by the first shot. (When did Connallys testify before the WC?)

Rosen to Belmont 4/20/'64 (62-109060-2999 Rankin explains need for a reenactment to clear up some "technical problems." See FBIHQ memos where Hoover and assistants not anxious to cooperate with a re-enactment.

Rosen to Belmont 4/28/'64 WC is a state of confusion,. Remarks that WC staff still feels handicapped by lack of detailed information.

Develop: By end of April WC was no longer held hostage by the FBI model. WC had every reason in the world not to place unconditional trust in the FBI's investigative record in the case. See examples: Tippit bullets, Connally's clothes, the failue of CE 1 to mention all of JFK's wounds and Connally's wounds; failure to swap the alleged assassination rifle; could I mention the wiping clean of CE399?????? FBI record was not one to inspire trust if if the WC attributed these investigative lapses to unseemly haste rather than deliberate suppression and obfuscation of critical evidence.

Slide into the Tague bullet

Pirk

April sessions: April 15th(or 14th) and April 21st.

Note the drs. present. Humes takes the lead. Viewing the Z film. Humes speculates that nonfatal back bullet entered Connally and fell out of his clothes. A second bullet smashed his writs. A third shot hit JFK in the head. See Rosen to Belmont, 4/15/'64 (62-109060-2933). See also Gauthier to Callahan, 4/14/'64 (FBI serial no?) Consistent w./ FBI/SS of three shots and three hit. Purpose to fill in the "skeletal" FBI report on the shooting. Does CD 1 mention Connally's wounds. Purpose of this session to explain how Connally was wounded.

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Seque w/ Tague bullet. Begin w/ Belin's report of the WC's May visit to the locus en quo. PR venture. Mention about tying up Elm Street for most of the day. Did not question Zapruder who had the best look at the assassination. Belin's report is silent on the curbstone shot.

When did FBI know of the Tague bullet. (Check chpters for mention of the "missing bullet." Alan Sweatt (find facts from earlier chpt. His office was only blocks away from Elm Street assassination scene. He notified the FBI. Bureau sent Barrett. Sweatt called KRLD (Channel 4 in Dallas) and the station sent Underwood who took pixs. (Doc. #6 in file. Hal interviewed Sweatt when? No Date on doc. Curbstone shot no secret in Dallas. It went out over police band radio. FBI monitored all DL police transmissions and sent copies onto the WC.

Find Buddy Walters report on the curbstone.

Note: Tom Dillard photos to be mentioned.

Doc. #9 FBI 12/16/'63 interview of Tague

Did WC know of the Tague bullet. Doc. # 23 Hoover to Rankin 6/30/'64 Hoover tells Rankin that FBI via the Gemberling report (12/3/'63) on p. 31 noted the Tague bullet. Report was sent to the Commission. This was probably the only notification. Buried in the 25,000 pages of FBI reports sent forward to the WC. FBI made no other effort to alert the WC to the possibility of a "missed shot." Nothing in the released FBI documents that indicate that the bureau drew special attention to the Tague bullet.

The story develops in June 1964. See UPI story and interview with Tague. Story develops when Dillard asks Barefoot Sanders about the curbstone shot. Dillard learn about the FBI report (CD 1). Sanders had his assistant Martha Joe Stroud to get in touch with Rankin and the Commission. Stroud writes Rankin 6/9/'64 and puts him in the picture (Doc. # 14)

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Doc # 1A Shanklin to File 6/5/'64 on the UPI story on Tague bullet,

Doc # 11 Rankin to Hoover July 7, 1964 (105-82555-4668X or. Filing 62-109060-3659. The WC has to address the missed shot. Rankin calls on FBI to do the testing, etc. No explanation asked for why this matter was not brought to the attention of the Commission sooner; and none was offered. Other than Hoover's 6/30 memo to Rankin and mention of this in the Gemberling Report.

Docs. where Hoover and FBI go through the motions.

Doc. # 10 FBIHQ sends DL FO pixs taken 11/22/'63 of the curbstone by Dillard and Underwood.

Shanneyfelt to go to Dallas and bring back the curbstone, FBI interviews Dillard and Underwood Doc.# 24

Docs. Hoover to Rankin 8/12/'64 (62-109060-3659) Hoover reports on what Bulab findings about the curbstone. This is an astonishinbg document. Must be quoted. Withg lab illustrations.

See Doc. #72 Construction company independent report on the curbstone.

Add here other curbstone bullet markings (Aldregde) and other bullets turned over to the FBI and their return to Dallas because they could not fit Oswald's rifle. Case Closed.

Taguie affidavit Doc. 32 in Supplementals # 2/ And his interview by Liebeler. Doc. #5

See Supplementals No# 1Hal's litigation to get the spectro plate of the curbstone. FBI stonewalling. And Doc. # 6 Batch contains SA Heilman statement that the spectro plate was destroyed as a matter of course. See Lesar's counterargument in his brief.

9060-3659.

etc. No
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mention of