

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM

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AGENCY INFORMATION

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RECORDS SERIES : PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD  
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TO : THE FILE  
TITLE : COVERT ACTION PANEL MEETING 6/5/64 (DISCUSSION WITH  
SECRETARY, SPECIAL GROUP, ET AL.)  
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Box 10

Covert Operations

1954-1967

NSA HAS NO OBJECTION TO THE  
DECLASSIFICATION AND PUBLIC  
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

88/31

*9/18/78*  
*State - expressions on foreign*  
*in connection with*  
*involvement*  
The Department of State has no objection to the release of this document in full under the provisions of the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (PL 102-526)

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*Pandolfi*

June 5, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Covert Action Panel Meeting 6/5/64  
(Discussion With Secretary, Special Group, et al.)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO  
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR  
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT  
with the AARJ/NBR  
bordered segments related  
9/3/58 EAS

On 6/5/64, at the Board's offices, Mr. Murphy held a meeting of the Board's Covert Action Panel (Messrs. Murphy, Gray and Langer) also attended by General Doolittle; J. Patrick Coyne; and A. R. Ash.


At the invitation of Chairman Murphy the meeting was joined by Mr. Peter Jessup who since January 20, 1964, has been serving as Secretary of the Special NSC 5412/2 Group.

In answer to questions asked by Panel members, Mr. Jessup provided a description of the Special Group and its activities, as follows:

The Special Group is chaired by Mr. McGeorge Bundy; Mr. Alexis Johnson represents the State Department; Mr. Cyrus Vance represents the Secretary of Defense; and Mr. McCone the CIA. These Group members are back-stopped by small staffs in their respective agencies.

Meetings of the Special Group are held once each week. They are "action" meetings not talk-fests, and the members have done their homework beforehand. The Chairman of the JCS attends when the agenda includes subjects of particular JCS interest (since January he has attended two meetings for discussion of Cuba matters).

Most of the covert actions considered by the Special Group are CIA proposals, although other members suggest actions (for example, State Department brought up for discussion the matter of supplying arms in Tangayika). The State Department is considered to serve as the "conscience" of the Special Group in its consideration of proposed covert actions. During the current year some 23 of 39 proposals were favorably considered by the Group.



*State - expressions on foreign*  
*in connection with*  
*involvement*  
*9/18/78*

NO OBJECTION as bracketed  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
LWS 9-4-98

*has not*  
*been*  
*reviewed*  
*(LWS)*

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Minutes of Special Group meetings are provided only to the members. (In answer to a specific question from Mr. Murphy, Mr. Jessup said that to his knowledge there has been no systematic review by the Special Group concerning the results of actions taken pursuant to previous Group approvals.)

The Group follows the policy of referring to the President those proposed actions as to which Group members have differences of opinion regarding the probability and acceptability of "noise levels" which would result from the actions. Since January, the subject of Cuba has been taken up with the President with a view to obtaining guidance on the level of covert action activity desired during this election year.


Mr. Jessup concluded his visit with the Board Panel and departed the meeting at this point.

Next, the Board Panel meeting was joined by Messrs. Dick Helms and Cord Meyer of CIA.

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
Mr. Helms said that with regard to Cuba there has been an effective stand-down in externally-mounted sabotage operations since February. Policy approvals have been given only to oddments of "passive sabotage", such as supplying agents with incendiary pencils, etc.; a mattress factory and a plastic works were burned down; but CIA does not consider that such operations are enough and they are not the whole program that CIA wants to conduct. The "Track II" paper in the State Department calls for CIA support of Cuban exile group activity, but no CIA direction and control; and few results are possible from such an approach, with Artime burning down a sugar mill, but Manolo Ray getting arrested by the British. There have been acts of sabotage performed on tractors carried by vessels en route to Cuba. On the economic front, after Castro had put out false rumors of an expected short sugar crop, in order to run up the world market price, the CIA countered by assembling correct information which when published brought the price down again.

With regard to Soviet personnel in Cuba, Mr. Helms estimated that there are from 15,000 to 18,000 on the Island, although U. S. intelligence community estimators place the figure at from 4,000 to 5,000.






Turning to the subject of Southeast Asia, Mr. Helms said that there have been many lengthy discussions about South Vietnam and about getting the Viet Cong out of that country. This objective has been talked to death, and all possibilities considered; but no one seems to be preoccupied with finding a way to replace the political fabric that was lost in South Vietnam when the Diem regime was overthrown. The present government is all a military show. Mr. Helms added that the Buddhists are a political group but not cohesive. As for prospects of effecting intelligence infiltration of North Vietnam, Mr. Helms said that CIA had been trying, but the target country is small and there is not much intelligence to obtain there. At present MACV is in charge of sabotage efforts against North Vietnam. In Mr. Helms' opinion there is a clear need to create a new political structure in South Vietnam or else there will be little use in "striking against the North".




Messrs. Helms and Meyer left the Panel meeting at this point.

The Board Panel meeting was next joined by Mr. Alexis Johnson of the State Department.



Panel Chairman Murphy asked Mr. Johnson for his views on the Viet Cong and the political situation in South Vietnam.

Mr. Johnson said that as State Department representative on the Special Group he tries to do the difficult job of viewing the risks against the gains involved in proposed covert actions. Issues rarely arise in the Special Group because problems are first staffed in the member agencies. In State Mr. Johnson is staffed by Mr. Scott of INR who maintains contacts with FBI and CIA -- the relation with FBI having been recently regularized as had been done earlier in the case of CIA. Mr. Scott consults Mr. Johnson on all covert operations and any issues, and also focuses on NRO matters for Mr. Johnson. In all, Mr. Johnson feels that the Special Group system is satisfactory. He acknowledged, however, that the Special Group does not have a procedure for systematic look-back at the results of programs previously approved. From State's point of view, he could see the need for such a procedure, for he never hears about projects once they are approved -- unless something goes wrong. Mr. Johnson said that within State a quarterly review is made of political action programs, and he sees a need for monitoring of programs in the Special Group.



Mr. Murphy next brought up the subject of the recently discovered audio penetration of the U. S. Embassy, Moscow. Mr. Murphy noted that the preliminary USIB damage assessment contained State Department comments to the effect that the compromise was not too serious, and he wondered if this accurately reflected the State Department view of the matter. Mr. Johnson said that during the audio penetration period the State Department sent many messages to our Ambassador in Moscow, telling him to make certain representations to the Soviets; and in turn the Ambassador sent messages to Washington reporting on what he had said to the Soviets and what they said to him; so, Mr. Johnson felt that no damaging breach had occurred in this regard -- except for perhaps any Department or Embassy analyser that might have appeared in messages intercepted by the Soviets. Mr. Johnson added that our people at posts behind the Iron Curtain assume that they are "bugged" and they behave accordingly; and Mr. Johnson related that the State Department has been very careful to keep this information from the press.

Mr. Murphy raised with Mr. Johnson the question as to whether subordinates should be allowed to make decisions such as the cutting of the co-axial cables discovered leading out of the Embassy in Moscow -- Mr. Murphy pointing out that such action appeared premature and prevented the technicians from making technical examinations of value and importance. Mr. Murphy also noted that subordinates in State and CIA had assumed responsibility for the decision that no attempt would be made to exploit the devices found in Moscow. Mr. Johnson was unaware of policy direction regarding such matters, and Mr. Coyne made known to him the provisions of NSC 5618 covering the subject.

With reference to North Vietnam, Mr. Johnson noted that the situation is most discouraging insofar as covert infiltration actions are concerned. He said that CIA had tried hard, and the activity has now been transferred to MACV in Saigon.

Mr. Johnson concluded his visit with the Board Panel and departed the meeting.

In executive session, Panel Chairman Murphy asked that the Board Staff's review of the Special Group minutes include summaries of items pertaining to Vietnam and Cuba, for later study by the Panel.

The Panel Meeting adjourned at 12:15 p.m.

*u*  
A. R. Ash

# Assassination Records Review Board Final Determination Notification

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AGENCY : PFIAB  
RECORD NUMBER : 206-10001-10015  
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AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

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September 24, 1998

Status of Document: Postponed in Part  
Number of Postponements: 12

The redactions in this document have been postponed under the provisions set forth in The John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992.

In the margin next to each postponement a number is provided to represent the appropriate substitute language from the list below.

Board Review Completed: 09/14/98

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01 CIA Employee	09 Identifying Information Postponed to Protect the Privacy of an Individual	17 Foreign Relations Issue
02 CIA Job Title	10 Date	18 Information Not Related to the JFK Assassination
03 NSA Employee	11 Location	19 No Suitable Substitute Language
04 NSA Internal Production Information	12 Country	20 Digraph
05 NSA Dissemination Information	13 Company	21 Number
06 Name of Person	14 Name of Organization	22 Crypt
07 Source	15 File Number	99 See the special substitute language on the Final
08 Identifying Information	16 Operational Details	Determination Form



JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM

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AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : PFIAB  
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RECORDS SERIES : PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD  
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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : NSC  
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5412/2 GROUP  
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206-10001-10015

Box 10

Covert Operations

1954-1967

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 11, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: CUBA (Review on 1/10/63 of Records of the Special NSC 5412/2 Group)

On 1-10-63 the writer reviewed in the offices of Mr. Tom Parrott, Executive Secretary, Special NSC 5412/2 Group, the records of the Special Group which Mr. Parrott identified as relating to considerations given by the Special Group to reconnaissance and covert action operations with regard to Cuba. (Attached hereto is a copy, supplied by Mr. Parrott from his records, of a "Memorandum for the Record" dated 10/21/62 on the subject "Reconnaissance of Cuba" which Mr. Parrott had prepared for another purpose.)

There follows a detailed summary of the results of a review made by the writer of the Cuba items referred to in Mr. Parrott's summary memorandum, and of other items which the writer reviewed in the Special Group records pertaining to Cuba.

Minutes of Meetings of the Special Group (Augmented) - "MONGOOSE"

Minutes of the July 12, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group (Augmented)

Those present were the Attorney General, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, Mr. McCone, General Carter, General Lemnitzer, General Lansdale, and Dr. Cline (for part of the meeting).

The Group noted a paper presented by the State Department member concerning "Guideline for a post-Castro Political Program."

General Lansdale briefed the Group on the number of agents now in Cuba, including legal residents, plus infiltrated teams. It was decided that a CIA proposal, for resupply of agent teams and possibly of resistance groups, should be deferred pending a broader review of the entire situation. General Taylor specified, however, that if an urgent need arose for air supply at any time, the proposal could be made to the Special Group (Augmented).

Mr. McCone and General Lansdale stated that a sizable number of intelligence reports were coming out of Cuba, largely on political and economic matters. Mr. McCone emphasized

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that no high-level penetration of the Cuban Government had been achieved. In answer to a question from the Attorney General, General Lansdale said that intelligence indicated that although there was widespread dissatisfaction with Castro, there was no rallying point for active opposition.

The Attorney General and Mr. Johnson emphasized the need for an effort to obtain hard intelligence on subversive activities by the Castro regime in the Hemisphere, Mr. McCone noting that such efforts to date had been fruitless.

Dr. Cline showed the Group the extent of reconnaissance coverage of Cuba. Mr. McCone emphasized that this program has developed complete information on deployments and facilities for the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and he particularly noted that these missions have verified that there is sufficient logistic support for a 75,000-man military force. "No missile sites have been found."

The Group agreed on a complete review of MONGOOSE toward the end of July, with participation by the Secretaries of State and Defense. General Taylor emphasized that in the preparation for such review, there would be a need for summaries of results obtained to date, of intelligence developed, and of future alternatives opened to the United States (including possible activities in other parts of Latin America).

Mr. Johnson said that the State Department is investigating the possibilities for subsidizing Japanese purchases of Dominican sugar to divert purchases from Cuba and thereby deprive Cuba of a source of dollars, and Mr. Johnson asked that MONGOOSE operational representatives look into this further. Mr. McCone said that the CIA could use unvouchered funds for this purpose, but it would be illegal to use covert funds as a means of evading the intent of Congress.

Minutes of the October 4, 1962 Meeting  
of the Special Group (Augmented)

Those present for this meeting with regard to Operation MONGOOSE were the Attorney General, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, General Lansdale, Mr. McCone, General Carter, and Mr. Wilson.

The Attorney General informed the Group that higher authority was concerned about progress on the MONGOOSE program and felt that more priority should be given to trying to mount sabotage operations. The Attorney General wondered if a new look were



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not required in view of the meager results obtained, especially in the sabotage field, and he urged "massive activity" within the entire MONGOOSE framework.

General Lansdale thought that another attempt should be made against the major target which had been the subject of three unsuccessful missions and he said that six new missions were in the planning stage.

Mr. Johnson said that the "massive activity" would have to come from within, and he hoped to be able to present soon to the Group a plan for giving Cuban exiles more of a free hand, fully realizing that this will give additional visibility to their activities. Mr. McCone reserved judgment on the feasibility and desirability of such a program, and Mr. Johnson agreed that he had reservations as well.

Mr. McCone said that he had received the impression that although high levels of our Government wanted increased activity, they still want to keep it at a low noise level, but Mr. McCone did not believe this would be possible and he felt that any sabotage would be blamed on the United States. Mr. McCone cited the enormous number of telephone calls directed at CIA at the time the skin divers landed in east Cuba, and the time that the Cuban exile students shot up the apartment house. Mr. McCone therefore urged that responsible officials be prepared to accept a higher noise level if they want to get on with operations.

The Attorney General, in partial rebuttal, said that the reasons people had such concern were (a) the fact that the skin divers were Americans, and (b) the fact that the student activity was irresponsible and foolish -- and if either of these had in fact been engineered by the United States it would have been a great mistake. The Attorney General also related the possibility of attributability to the importance of the particular undertaking, and he questioned whether we are going down the right road or whether more "direct action" were not indicated. He urged that alternative and imaginative plans be developed.

Mr. McCone said that internal restrictions are so rigid that internal uprisings would surely be brutally suppressed. (It was agreed that the current guidelines did not call for inciting such an uprising.)

Mr. McCone and General Carter explained the tremendous efforts necessary to insure that operations such as the sabotage operation previously authorized cannot be pinned directly on the United States. (After discussion, the Group agreed that it was not necessary to go to such extreme lengths to insure

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nonattribution, and that short cuts were desirable.)

Mr. Gilpatric informed the Group that the Defense Department was hard at work on establishing a Cuban brigade. Recruits would be trained from four to five months and then placed on call for any future action.

General Taylor reported that the Joint Staff is refining various contingency military plans based on a variety of possible situations, including Soviet action against Berlin; "the presence of bloc offensive weapons in Cuba"; an attack against Guantanamo; a popular uprising; armed Cuban subversion in the Hemisphere; and "the establishment of a direct threat to the United States."

Dr. Scoville and Colonel Steakley were present at this Group meeting for an item regarding reconnaissance of Cuba. It was pointed out that the CIA is "restricted to using its high-performance vehicle in the southeast quadrant of Cuba, because of SAM sites." It was questioned whether this was a reasonable restriction at that time, particularly when SAMs were almost certainly not operational. \*

Colonel Steakley and Dr. Scoville described a spectrum of reconnaissance activities which could be undertaken, ranging from low-level, Navy fighters through drones, up to the Agency's capabilities, particularly equipped with new radar countermeasures. As a result of the discussion there was agreement that the Department of Defense and the CIA should get together on recommendations for targets within Cuba that require coverage, and on recommendations as to how to achieve this coverage. A meeting was set for the following Tuesday when Defense and CIA were to be prepared to discuss all possibilities, including requirements, capabilities, vulnerabilities, etc.

There was some discussion of the desirability of mining Cuban waters, using nonattributable mines appearing to be home-made and laid by small aircraft operated by Cubans.

It was agreed that the Attorney General would act as Chairman of the Special Group (Augmented) for the time being.

It was agreed that four major points which had emerged from this meeting were: (1) we ought to go all-out for increased intelligence; (2) there should be considerably more sabotage; (3) restrictions on attributability can be relaxed so that training and preparations can be subject to short cuts; and (4) all efforts should be made to develop new and imaginative approaches to the possibility of getting rid of the Castro regime.

In the "Memorandum for the Record," October 21, 1962, on the subject

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(Continuation of footnote from previous page)

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"Reconnaissance of Cuba" it is stated: "The DCI pointed out that the Agency is now restricted to using the U-2 in the southeastern quadrant of Cuba, because of SAM sites. It was questioned whether this was a reasonable restriction at this time, particularly since the SAMs were almost certainly not operational." Beside this item in the summary memorandum, there appears the penciled notation "Also agreed should go all out for intel."

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Minutes of the October 9, 1962 Meeting  
of the Special Group (Augmented)

Present for this meeting were the Attorney General, Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, General Taylor, Mr. McCone, Mr. Wilson, Dr. Charyk, Dr. Scoville, Colonel Steakley, and Colonel Ledford, CIA.

The Group discussed various possibilities of accomplishing reconnaissance of Cuba, ranging from low-level coverage by tactical aircraft to high-performance aircraft and drones. Overflights and peripheral flights were discussed. It was agreed that the first priority is one high-performance mission in the western part of the island, to be accomplished by all-out ELINT support, and depending on the results of this, a number of similar sorties might be mounted. (The first mission was later approved by higher authority, with the decision on the second proposition left open. The entire package was to be discussed at the USIB and by the Chiefs on Wednesday, October 10.)

Along with the minutes of this October 9 Meeting there was in file a memorandum from Mr. Parrott to Mr. Bundy, dated October 11, 1962. It was reflected in Mr. Parrott's memorandum that Mr. Gilpatric had called at 2:15 P.M. to say he and Mr. McCone had finally agreed that the one high-performance flight would be flown as a military flight with a SAC pilot. CIA had wanted to stick to the existing system for the first flight, simply to avoid any delay. The SAC pilot would require some additional training because the equipment in the improved vehicle was new to him, but Mr. Gilpatric and Mr. McCone apparently felt that this was an acceptable delay and it was hoped to get the flight off over the weekend. It was further stated in Mr. Parrott's memorandum that it seemed agreed that within the terms of the authorization given by higher authority it would be necessary to go back for approval of the next phase: contemplating two or three more high-performance missions, and Mr. Gilpatric seemed to feel that the discussion which had taken place with higher authority was explicit enough to get an emergency authority by telephone. Mr. Parrott further informed Mr. Bundy that the Cover Committee (Messrs. Charyk, Hilsman, Scoville, Parrott, "et al") had met that morning and had agreed on a new cover story for a military pilot and a revised cover story for civilian pilots, and with the necessary changes it was thought that the cover story would be ready that afternoon. Mr. Parrott pointed out to Mr. Bundy that, on the military side, the flight is characterized as military reconnaissance of the periphery of the target area, with particular reference to the Secretary of State's recent comments to the OAS Ministers to the effect that we are increasing surveillance activities. (A penciled note on the file copy of this

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memorandum read: "Later was delayed due to disagreement on account of training required."

There was also an October 12, 1962 addendum to the above-mentioned October 11 memorandum from Mr. Parrott to Mr. Bundy, stating: "Later." The memorandum related that; according to Mr. Knocke, Mr. McCone had decided the day before (October 11) that these flights must be either entirely overt or entirely covert, and he didn't particularly care which so long as they were accomplished as soon as possible. In Mr. McCone's absence, General Carter had come to an agreement with General McKee, Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, along those lines on October 11; later, however, Mr. Gilpatric said that this was not his understanding of the terms of authorization from higher authority. Mr. Gilpatric felt that the idea was that a uniformed pilot should operate the Agency's vehicle.

On October 12 at 12:45, General Carter had a meeting with Mr. Bundy and at that time General Carter stated that the Agency operation was ready to go except for weather, and that this would hold it up until at least Sunday, and meantime the SAC pilot would have received the necessary training. It was agreed that if the pilot was sufficiently trained by the earliest time the mission could be mounted, the flight would go, with all other arrangements within the Agency framework. If the pilot were not ready by the time the vehicle was ready, the mission would be mounted as a completely Agency operation, i.e., with a civilian pilot. According to Mr. Lay, the USIB had taken the following actions at its October 10, 1962 meeting with respect to the targets listed in the COMOR paper of October 6: (1) The Group I targets were not discussed by USIB, the implication being that there was no problem from the point of view of USIB's jurisdiction. (2) Groups II and III should be covered as rapidly as possible initially, and after that the frequency of coverage would be further examined. (3) COMOR was to re-do the section of the October 6 paper dealing with Group IV, with targets to be broken out in categories of priority, and USIB would consider this new paper on October 17. USIB did not consider any operational aspects, but confined themselves to the importance of the targets and the frequency of coverage.

Minutes of the Special NSC 5412/2 Group

The following summarizes the minutes of the Special Group Meetings which were identified by Mr. Parrott as including consideration of the subject of Cuba.

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Minutes of February 1, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group

This meeting was attended by General Taylor, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. Helms.

On the subject of Cuba, the Chairman read his memorandum to higher authority dated January 26, summarizing progress up to that time. The memorandum from General Lansdale suggesting a different approach to the content of the minutes of the meeting of the preceding week on Cuba was discussed, and it was agreed that the minutes would stand as prepared. General Lansdale's report of February 1 on popular support for the OAS meeting was distributed. Mr. Parrott's summary states that the Cuba missions were stepped up from one per month to two per month.

Minutes of June 14, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group

This meeting was attended by General Taylor, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and General Carter.

On the subject of "Request for Special Cuban Missions," it was stated that the COMOR proposal dated June 13, 1962 was approved. (A handwritten notation on the file copy of these minutes stated that "Higher authority informed June 15 about possibility of uprising," and there was also a notation that the June 13 memorandum regarding the COMOR request had been "rewritten for book.")

Minutes of the July 12, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group

The Group agreed to recommend approval of various requests for authorizations. In the case of Cuba, the minutes reflect agreement to continue with the presently authorized schedule of two flights per month. General Taylor asked that for the purpose of discussing this matter with higher authority, CIA should prepare a paper on Cuba, setting forth a summary of information which had been obtained to date, the number of missions mounted, what is proposed to be looked at in the future, and the frequency of further coverage desired.

Memorandum for the President from the Special Group, July 20, 1962

The Special Group records contain a memorandum for the President from General Taylor dated July 20, 1962, bearing a handwritten notation by General Taylor, "Approved by H. A. (presumably 'higher authority') 20 July 1962." In essence,

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the memorandum to the President was as follows:

In the Special Group we are aware that we have been proceeding on a day-by-day basis in requesting authority for overflight reconnaissance. At our meeting yesterday, we took a long look ahead at the estimated requirements for the next few months and agreed that the following program is the minimum which meets military requirements . . . . Cuba: Two flights monthly . . . . all U-2 flights with CIA civilian pilots. . . . We would like to get your approval in principle of the foregoing program with the understanding that on the first of each month you will be presented with the specific flights recommended for that month.

Minutes of August 9, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group

Those present were General Taylor, Mr. McCone, Mr. Hilsman, and Mr. William Bundy.

On the subject of "Cuba Reconnaissance" it was stated that the Group agreed that the second mission authorized for August should be flown whenever the DCI decides that the immediate situation with respect to Soviet materiel justifies it. It was noted that this would use up existing authority for August, and if a third mission should become necessary later in the month, it should be considered on its merits at that time.

Minutes of August 30, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group

Those present were General Taylor, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, General Lemnitzer and Mr. Bundy.

The minutes reflect that in connection with the Agency's monthly forecast, General Carter mentioned that there might be an additional requirement for flights over Cuba. (In the "Memorandum for the Record," October 21, 1962, on the subject "Reconnaissance of Cuba," attached hereto, there appears beside the item dealing with this meeting the penciled notation "primarily low-level.")

Minutes of September 10, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group

Those present at this meeting, which took place in Mr. Bundy's office, were the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Acting Director of Central Intelligence, "and others."

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The Secretary of State expressed concern at the Agency's planned coverage of Cuba, involving extensive peripheral coverage as well as two legs directly over Cuban air space, all in one flight. He said he had no objection to the peripheral parts and, in fact, thought it useful to continue to establish our right to fly over international waters. On the other hand, he recognized the necessity of obtaining vertical coverage of the Isle of Pines and the eastern portion of Cuba at this time. He felt, however, that it was unwise to combine extensive overflying of international waters with actual overflights. He pointed out that the long peripheral flights would draw undue attention to the mission and, further, should the aircraft fall into enemy hands after an overflight had occurred, this would put the United States in a very poor position for standing on its rights to overfly international waters.

Taking these views into account, the Agency's plans to break this proposed coverage into four parts: the Isle of Pines; the area roughly east of longitude 77 west; and two legs along the coast, one north and one south.

Within this framework, higher authority gave approval this morning for two additional missions to be added to the one for which authority is currently outstanding. Priority will be given to the two overflights. (A notation on the file copy of these Special Group minutes states that as of this morning it appears that weather will not permit a flight until at least Friday, and longer range weather prospects are not very good, consequently it will be some little time before these three authorizations are used up.)

In connection with the minutes of this meeting, the Special Group records contain a note for the file dated October 25, 1962, stating that COMOR later recommended that the Bay of Pigs area should be looked at since it had not been seen since June . . . . Time over mainland would be  $12\frac{1}{2}$  minutes for a total of 75 miles . . . . depth of penetration, 13 miles . . . . nearest known SAM site, 35 miles away. The file note further stated that after considerable negotiation with the Department of State it was agreed that this additional coverage would be accomplished.

(In quoting the minutes of this September 10 meeting in a memorandum from Mr. Tom Parrott to Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric dated November 30, 1962, there was an addendum which stated: "N.B. Mr. Bundy said on 13 September 1962 that he thought the intent of higher authority's approval was such that the entire number of four missions would be considered as being approved. This thus extends the outstanding authorizations from three to four.")

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Minutes of September 14, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group

Those present were Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Nitze, General Lemnitzer, and General Carter.

The minutes of this meeting reflect that a JCS representative (Colonel Steakley) outlined the capabilities for low-level coverage of certain targets in Cuba. It was noted that the Secretary of Defense did not wish this operation considered further until the results of Agency reconnaissance in the same area became available. General Carter said that special efforts will be required to identify certain installations, the nature of which is not clear at present. Colonel Steakley distributed charts for the monthly book, on supplementing ELINT coverage of Cuba which was begun today. The Group had no objection to these missions. It was agreed that the Joint Reconnaissance Center should keep an eye on all military reconnaissance or surveillance flights in the Cuban area. (The Special Group record of these minutes is contained in a memorandum dated November 30, 1962, from Mr. Tom Parrott to Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric.)

Minutes of September 27, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group

Those present were General Taylor, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, General Lemnitzer, and General Carter.

CIA's October forecast of reconnaissance activities was noted. The special mission request for Cuba was approved. This brings the number of authorizations for this area back to four, i.e., four had been previously authorized and one has been successfully completed, leaving authority for three outstanding.

Minutes of October 15, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group

A memorandum prepared for the Special Group records by Mr. Parrott reflected that at a special meeting on this date two U-2 missions, designed to cover all of Cuba, were approved, and that these were concurred in by higher authority. It is reflected that after the 15th of October additional coverage was agreed on at other meetings, but the Special Group was not convened for this purpose.

Memorandum from Mr. Parrott to Deputy Secretary Gilpatric, November 30, 1962

The Special Group records contain a copy of a memorandum (previously referred to) from Mr. Thomas A. Parrott to Deputy

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through the established channels

~~TOP SECRET~~

Secretary of Defense Gilpatric dated November 30, 1962. The memorandum began with the statement that it had been prepared in answer to Deputy Secretary Gilpatric's request on the preceding day for minutes of the special meetings of the Special Group which bore on Cuban reconnaissance, in order that Mr. Gilpatric and General Taylor might be informed. It was stated in the memorandum that Mr. Gilpatric and General Taylor had been present on August 30 and had then returned to the Group on September 27. It was further stated that at the meetings of the 6th and 20th of September the subject of Cuba reconnaissance did not arise. The memorandum then pointed out that the meeting of September 10 was not a regular meeting of the Special Group but had nevertheless resulted in particularly significant decisions. The memorandum then went on to set forth the minutes of the meetings of September 10, 14 and 27.

A. Russell Ash

Attachment

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- 11 -

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Tel System

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~~TOP SECRET~~

# Assassination Records Review Board Final Determination Notification

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AGENCY : PFIAB  
RECORD NUMBER : 206-10001-10016  
RECORD SERIES :  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

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September 24, 1998

Status of Document: Postponed in Part  
Number of Postponements: 19

The redactions in this document have been postponed under the provisions set forth in The John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992.

In the margin next to each postponement a number is provided to represent the appropriate substitute language from the list below.

Board Review Completed: 09/14/98

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01 CIA Employee	09 Identifying Information Postponed to Protect the Privacy of an Individual	17 Foreign Relations Issue
02 CIA Job Title	10 Date	18 Information Not Related to the JFK Assassination
03 NSA Employee	11 Location	19 No Suitable Substitute Language
04 NSA Internal Production Information	12 Country	20 Digraph
05 NSA Dissemination Information	13 Company	21 Number
06 Name of Person	14 Name of Organization	22 Crypt
07 Source	15 File Number	99 See the special substitute language on the Final
08 Identifying Information	16 Operational Details	Determination Form

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM

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AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : PFIAB  
RECORD NUMBER : 206-10001-10016  
RECORDS SERIES : PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :  
-----

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : NSC  
FROM : A.R. ASH  
TO : THE FILE  
TITLE : BOARD PANEL ON COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS  
DATE : 09/10/63  
PAGES : 7  
SUBJECTS : COVERT ACTION

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT  
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET  
RESTRICTIONS : 1B, 1C  
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 08/06/98  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : Box 10, Covert Operations, 1954-1967. Duplicate  
contained in 206-10001-10001.



206-10001-100

Box 10

Covert Operations

1954-1967

ITEM	TIME	SUBJECT
11.	3:30 - 5:00	DISCUSSION With the Director of Central Intelligence Mr. McCone

12.	7:00	Dinner at Mr. Clifford's Residence [REDACTED]
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June 26, 1953

13.	9:00 - 9:30	Executive Session
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14.	9:30 - 10:30	[REDACTED]
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NOT TO BE KEPT UP

15.	10:30 - 11:00	Status Report on Covert Action Activities Murphy-Gray-Langer Panel
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16.	11:00 - 11:30	[REDACTED]
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17.	11:30 - 12:00	Status Report on DCI's Coordination Role and on Intelligence Community Relationships with and Support of the White House Clifford Panel
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18.	12:00 - 12:30	Executive Session
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19.	12:30 - 1:30	Lunch -- The White House Mess
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20.	1:30 - End of Day	a. [REDACTED]
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See Revised 6/26 agenda

b.	[REDACTED]
c.	[REDACTED]

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d.	Discussion of frequency of future Board meetings
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e.	Discussion of future business of the Board and the Board's Panels
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f.	Determination of next Board meeting date
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Rec. #36: That the U. S. Intelligence Board evaluate the intelligence potential of the "Big Dish" moon-reflector project, and that thereafter the Secretary of Defense reach an early decision as to the future of this project.

Board Report of August 1, 1962

Rec. 37: Based on a review of intelligence disclosures in a New York Times article by Hanson Baldwin, the Board recommended that: (1) the President emphasize to Government officials his concern about such disclosures and his intention in this case to identify and take action against the source of Government leaks to the newspaper writer; (2) the President take drastic action against the offender if identified by the FBI, or against the heads of offices from which the leak emanated; (3) the Departments of State and Defense and the CIA require their personnel to make memoranda of record on talks with the press, and to clear such contacts in advance with departmental Public Relations Officers; (4) those responsible for protecting intelligence data and techniques identify selected areas of sensitive data requiring special handling; (5) ways be sought to reduce the number of persons involved in preparing highly sensitive intelligence estimates; (6) the DCI and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency be provided with the investigative capability to run down leaks of sensitive intelligence data; (7) a confidential policy be established within the Executive Branch as to the degree of disclosure of intelligence data to be made to Congressional Committees; (8) a re-study be made of possible proposals for legislation to protect official secrets; and (9) a review be made of Government policy and procedures with a view to declassifying non-sensitive information and thereby strengthening programs for the safeguarding of sensitive data.

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Board Report of October 5, 1962  
(Based on an on-the-scene review by Board representatives of U. S. foreign intelligence and related activities in Southeast Asia and the Far East)

Rec. #38:

That the Defense Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Defense Intelligence Agency strengthen the intelligence elements of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Unified Commands (drawing on resources of the military intelligence services in the process.)

Rec. #39:

That the flow of intelligence guidance from the Defense Intelligence Agency to Unified/Specified and component commands be oriented toward a controlled, integrated effort on the part of the numerous U. S. military intelligence organizations overseas (e.g., in South Vietnam, Thailand and Japan), in order to make the most effective use of their substantial resources.

Rec. #40:

That the Defense Intelligence Agency take action regarding the military Special Security Offices (SSO) Communications System for transmitting sensitive information with a view to: (1) consolidating parallel SSO networks running between Pacific military commands and Washington civilian officials, and (2) reorienting the SSO system to make it a primary service and support to Commands in the field and command (as distinguished from Service) elements in Washington.

Rec. #41:

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That the National Security Agency accelerate [redacted] searches in [redacted] in order that the U. S. Intelligence Board may give guidance to the U. S. Ambassador in negotiating a permanent U. S. intercept site in [redacted] (which is a most favorable location for U. S. Signals Intelligence operations against targets in the Soviet bloc, North Vietnam, [redacted].)

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Rec. #42:


That the Special NSC 5412/2 Group consider authorizing selective, airborne defoliation operations against the Viet Cong in South Vietnam.

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As to the fifth and last item in Mr. Clifford's list (inviting suggestions for increasing the Board's access to covert action matters and Special Group activities) Mr. Bundy said that he frankly did not know the Board's present method of covering NSC 5412/2 matters. Dr. Langer said that the Board Panel on the subject gets briefings from time to time on covert action operations. Mr. Bundy stated that he himself looks to CIA for reports asked for concerning the status of particular programs, but he did not want to have in his office a compilation of all of such sensitive activities. But if the Board appoints a Panel to do a review of all covert actions to date, or of selected programs, he stands ready to meet the Board's needs.

Mr. Clifford said that he or Mr. Coyne would be in touch with Mr. Bundy regarding the desired review of NSC 5412/2 activities.

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*-1 Physical act*  
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PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

September 11, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE BOARD

SUBJECT: Covert Action Operations

The Board Panel on Covert Action Operations (Messrs. Murphy, Gray and Langar) was formed for the purpose of keeping the Board fully advised on the status of the planning and execution of covert action operations.

On previous occasions, the Panel's activities have included a review of minutes of the Special NSC 5412/2 Group (with respect to Cuba only), and briefings by the Secretary to the Special Group and by CIA officials. Most recently, on September 6, 1963, the Panel again consulted with CIA officials and was briefed on a variety of developments in the covert action field. The Panel Chairman, Mr. Murphy, will make an oral report to the Board on the foregoing.

J. Patrick Coyne

NO OBJECTION  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
*ms 5-17-68*

*4-27-78*  
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO  
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR  
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

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NO OBJECTION *as sanitized*  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
*was 3-19-68*

*minutes*  
CIA HAS NO COMMENT TO  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RELEASE OF THIS INFO AS SANITIZED  
AS SANITIZED *as 2/19/68*  
TOP SECRET  
September 10, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE


SUBJECT: Board Panel on Covert Action Operations

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*no objection*  
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*informed*  
*8/6/98*

The Board Panel met in the Board's offices on September 6, 1963. Panel members present were Mr. Robert Murphy, Chairman; Mr. Gordon Gray; and Dr. William Langer. Messrs. Coyne and Ash also attended the meeting.

During the course of its meeting the Panel was briefed by Mr. Richard Helms (Deputy DCI/Plans, CIA) and his assistants, Mr. Cord Meyer and Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald (head of CIA's headquarters staff dealing with Cuba). Highlights of the briefings were as follows:

MESSRS: HELMS and MEYER



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
Mr. Pace asked what are the priority intelligence objectives which are assigned for coverage by CIA agents sent into Cuba. Mr. Fitzgerald said that the agents are targeted against the strategic military situation. In answer to a query about the question of the use of Cuban caves, Mr. Fitzgerald said that this question had been pretty well resolved but CIA is keeping at it.

General Carter stated that CIA presently estimates there are from 4,000 to 7,000 Soviet military personnel in Cuba who are operating the SAM sites and providing military training to Cubans, plus about 4,000 non-military Soviet personnel. He added that by April the Cubans will probably be ready to take over the air defense systems if the Soviets choose to turn them over to the Cubans. Mr. Fitzgerald added that a flash had been received this morning of the first evidence of a Chinese pilot taking part in air operations in Cuba (this from a COMINT source).

Mr. Murphy inquired as to whether CIA had succeeded in planting agents in Castro's immediate entourage. Mr. Fitzgerald said that this is another priority intelligence objective being pursued by CIA, including the objective of obtaining intelligence on the inter-relationship of factions within the Castro regime; on the extent of Cuban counter-insurgency programs (in which Cuba has a good capability); and on the Soviet bloc training of Cubans in counterintelligence activities (Cuba has a fairly wide intelligence system with "plenty in the United States").

Mr. Fitzgerald departed the meeting at this point, upon conclusion of the discussion of the subject of Cuba.

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instigated the recent incidents in Panama, although the Communists were quick to exploit the situation once it arose. CIA succeeded in photographing 13 Castro-ites who were engaged in fomenting the incident after it started. Of a total of 45 Communist Castro-ites involved, 13 had been trained in Cuba, and they distributed leaflets and disseminated propaganda over the radio. CIA also learned that one Thelma King personally led a mob of Panamanians in the streets. Dr. Langer wondered if Panamanians and the world at large are aware that radio stations in Panama were in the hands of the Communists. General Carter replied that one could not say that precisely, but it can be said that 30 minutes after the incident began there were inflammatory broadcasts on the air. As for the sniper activity, General Carter said that one sniper had been identified as a known Communist.

With regard to Vietnam, General Carter said that the bloodless coup which began yesterday afternoon was accomplished by a group of young generals who are pro-American and anti-neutralist. General Khanh is the leader. General Khin, 3rd Corps Commander, will be chief of staff. The coup group had been plugging for more counter-insurgency effort against the Viet Cong, and the new leaders will take stronger action. General Khanh has said that he will look to U. S. Ambassador Lodge for guidance on political matters in the immediate Saigon area.

General Carter said that CIA had received advance information from General Khanh that he was worried about French moves with respect to Vietnam. (In answer to Mr. Coyne's question as to whether CIA had been back of yesterday's coup, General Carter replied that it is well known that the CIA does not instigate coups.) Mr. Murphy, noting the conspiratorial


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aspects involving France in the Vietnam situation, asked whether CIA had received advance intelligence from <sup>17</sup> [redacted] sources concerning involvement of the French Government in Vietnam. General Carter said that none had been received, <sup>16</sup> [redacted] Mr. Murphy found it difficult to understand why there had been no hard intelligence on this matter, particularly when there had been public statements by the French concerning France's neutralist objectives in Southeast Asia. General Carter said that there had been no evidence of a covert French <sup>effort</sup> against the Vietnam regime. ✓

Chairman Clifford asked whether there had been an improvement in the Vietnam situation following the previous coup which overthrew the Diem regime. General Carter said that social reforms have been made but their timing and acceleration have been disappointing. He thought it too early to say whether the new regime will have the will and ability to intensify the fight against the Viet Cong. General Khanh has indicated to Ambassador Lodge a desire to retain General Minh in the new government. General Khanh also said that he saw no malfeasance on the part of the generals in the Minh regime although they were known to have cooperated with French intelligence in the past.

In answer to a question by Mr. Murphy, General Carter said there was no evidence that the murders of Diem and Nhu in the previous coup were motivating factors in the recent coup. General Carter answered Dr. Langer's question by saying that there is no hard evidence of an increased flow of supplies, arms and men into North Vietnam. (from Communist China). ✓




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Mr. Clifford mentioned to the Board the recently copyrighted newspaper article by former President Truman who took the CIA to task for engaging in activities which were not within the function of CIA as originally created. Mr. Clifford reminded the Board that while Mr. Truman was President the CIA was authorized and directed to engage in covert actions (e.g. in Italy) which had much to do with stemming the Communist tide in post-World War II in Europe.

Chairman Clifford brought up another matter, which he felt could become more serious, namely, the aggressive campaign being waged by CIA to improve its "public image". Mr. Clifford asked that the Board members think about this subject, which would be placed on the agenda of the next Board meeting. At that time the Board should hear from the DCI regarding this matter, and consider it in the light of previous Board recommendations that the DCI and other CIA officials refrain from making public speeches, with a view to reducing the visibility of intelligence activities. Mr. Clifford said that he had learned that one of the subjects which the DCI is now

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discussing in the course of his visit with heads of state overseas is the advisability of their countries engaging in economic reprisals against Cuba. Dr. Baker confirmed this, stating that today he had learned that CIA is taking specific covert steps to influence cessations of trade with Cuba, particularly in the case of [redacted] <sup>12</sup>. Mr. Clifford could only speculate that the DCI had suggested that the fostering of economic reprisals is properly a task for the CIA, and the President may have agreed in the absence of any other advice or consultation. Mr. Clifford thought that the DCI's meetings with heads of state is the course least likely to succeed in CIA's efforts to contradict its growing image as becoming a policy-making organization in the Government. Mr. Clifford repeated that the Board should hear from the DCI on this at its next meeting and consider making a recommendation to the President. (W)

At 4:00 p.m., until 5:30 p.m., the Board met with the President in the Cabinet Room of the White House (a pertinent memorandum on the meeting is filed elsewhere in the Board's records).

When the Board members returned to the Board's offices, Chairman Clifford remained at the White House at the President's request to confer on other matters of a non-intelligence nature.

April 2 and 3, 1964, were selected as the dates of the next meeting of the Board, a two-day session.

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*a*  
A. R. Ash

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IDENTIFICATION FORM

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AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : PFIAB  
RECORD NUMBER : 206-10001-10011  
RECORDS SERIES : PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

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TITLE : PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD AGENDA  
FOR MEETING OF JANUARY 25-26, 1963  
DATE : 01/25/63  
PAGES : 88  
SUBJECTS : AGENDA FOR JANUARY 25 AND 26, 1963 MEETING  
: SUMMARY OF JANUARY 25 AND 26, 1963 MEETING  
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COMMENTS :

55

NSA has no objection to the declassification of this document DS/9 Mar 96

206-10001-15011

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PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD  
AGENDA FOR MEETINGS OF JANUARY 25 - 26, 1968

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Ko 25 Feb 98

ITEM TIME SUBJECT

January 25th

- 1. 10:00 - 10:15 Executive Session \*
- 2. 10:15 - 11:30 Consideration of Draft Report to the President on Board's Review of Cuba Situation
- 3. 11:30 - 12:30 Discussions with the Director of Central Intelligence
- 4. 12:30 Lunch
- 5. 2:20 Depart Executive Office Building for New State Department Building
- 6. 2:30 - 3:00 (Approx.) Meeting with the Secretary of State
- 7. 3:00 Return to Board's Offices
- 8. 3:10 - 3:40 Report on Special Board Meeting with the President on January 21, 1963  
Dr. Killian
- 9. 3:40 to End of Day Resume Consideration of Item 2

*Handwritten initials and date: D... 1/11/98*

NO OBJECTION as per... NATIONAL SECURITY... 1/15/98

January 26th

- 10. 9:00 - 9:30 Executive Session
- 11. 9:30 Depart Executive Office Building for Pentagon
- 12. 9:45 - 10:55 Review of Results Obtained from Reconnaissance Relating to the Military Buildup in Cuba  
Lt. General Joseph Carroll, Director  
Defense Intelligence Agency, Room 2 C 468  
(Members will be met at the Mall Entrance)
- 13. 10:55 Depart 2 C 468
- 14. 11:00 - 11:30 Meeting with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Room 2 E 873
- 15. 11:30 - 12:00 Meeting with the Secretary of Defense  
Room 3 E 880
- 16. 12:00 Return to Washington - Lunch
- 17. 2:00 to End of Day Completion of Final Report to the President on Board's Cuba Review and Discussion of Future Board Business

*Dept of State has no objection to release of this document to members of the press*

*Allow DoD and/or JCS need to review this content*

CONFIDENTIAL

\*Dr. Killian will be unable to join the meeting until after lunch; at his request Mr. Gray has agreed to serve as Acting Chairman.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

REVISED AGENDA FOR MEETING OF JANUARY 26, 1963

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>
1.	9:00 - 9:30	Executive Session
2.	10:45	Depart Executive Office Building for Pentagon
3.	11:00	Review of Results Obtained from Reconnaissance Relating to the Military Buildup in Cuba <u>Lt. General Joseph Carroll, Director</u> Defense Intelligence Agency, Room 2 C 468 (Members will be met at the Mall Entrance)
4.	12:25	Depart 2 C 468
5.	12:30	Meeting with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Room 2 E 873
6.	1:00	Meeting with the Secretary of Defense Room 3 E 880
7.	1:30	Return to Washington - Lunch
8.	2:45 to End of Day	Completion of Final Report to the President on Board's Cuba Review and Discussion of Future Board Business

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TOP-SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

NO OBJECTION TO  
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Kp 25 Feb 98

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Meeting of the President's Foreign Intelligence  
Advisory Board, January 25-26, 1963

*filed in  
this meeting*

The Board convened in executive session at 10:15 a.m. on January 25, 1963, on the first day of a two-day meeting in the Board's offices, Room 297, Executive Office Building. Present were Board members Gray, Baker, Land, Clifford, Pace, Doolittle, Murphy, and Langer; and Messrs. Coyne and Ash.

Mr. Gray presided as acting Chairman in place of Dr. Killian whose arrival was delayed by bad flying weather. Mr. Gray noted that the DCI, Mr. McCone, had been called to testify before a Congressional Committee and would therefore be unable to meet with the Board at 11:30 as scheduled. The acting Chairman then called for a general discussion of the Board's pending review and draft report on the intelligence aspects of the circumstances leading to the Cuba crisis.

Dr. Land expressed the view that although tidying up is an obligation, and although looking back is a useful technique, the Board's responsibilities go beyond the conduct of post mortems for the purpose of identifying past mistakes in the foreign intelligence field. Without detracting from the importance of the Board's after-the-fact review of the Cuba situation, Dr. Land thought it equally important that the Board become fully informed on current developments as well.

Mr. Coyne called Dr. Land's attention to the fact that previously, in Dr. Land's absence, the Board had submitted a December 28, 1962, report to the President which was interim in nature, and which contained recommendations looking ahead to the strengthening of U. S. foreign intelligence capabilities in matters not necessarily confined to the Cuba situation. Taking note of this, Dr. Land nevertheless thought that the Board should make sure that it knows what is going on in Cuba today and what are the intelligence and related actions which are being taken by the U. S. intelligence community with respect to the Soviet presence in Cuba.

Dr. Baker, referring to the Board's December 28 interim report on Cuba, felt that this is one of the most searching and far sighted that the Board has produced, and he noted that the DCI's written

*DOS  
8/6/98*

TOP-SECRET