

response to this report was devastatingly empty and inadequate. Dr. Baker saw no excuse for the fact that the DIA had been afforded only two days notice to comment on the Board's report prior to the submission of views by the DCI. (Dr. Langer thought it incredible that the DCI had given DIA only two days to comment on the Board's December 28 interim report.) It was Dr. Baker's thought that such a procedure was contrary to the general agreement which had been previously reached with Mr. Bundy (in a discussion between Messrs. Bundy, Baker and Coyne) that White House action memoranda flowing from Board recommendations would go directly to the agencies primarily concerned. With regard to the latter point, Mr. Coyne observed that Mr. Bundy had in this instance acquiesced with the DCI's request that the DCI obtain and report the coordinated views of the various U. S. intelligence agencies concerned with the matters covered in the Board's report.

Dr. Langer pointed out to Dr. Land that at the Board's last meeting (which Dr. Land had been unable to attend) the Board had been briefed on current aspects of the Cuba situation. Dr. Land, pursuing the point which he had raised, hoped that the Board would be able to avoid the submission of a "boiler plate" report on the errors made in the intelligence handling of the Soviet build-up in Cuba. Dr. Land said he thought that the draft of the final Board report now before the Board was a "good effort", but he hoped that it would not draw from the agencies involved a book covering past errors. It was Dr. Land's view that in the intelligence system there should be someone who knows the whole story and can inform the Board fully about it. Dr. Land's concern was that the intelligence elements involved may have been inept and that a year from now they would be repeating the errors spotted in the Board's report, unless the Board can get the agency heads to accept the Board's help in profiting from lessons learned so that mistakes can be avoided in the future.

Mr. Clifford observed that there is a question of timing involved in the Board's present Cuba review, because the Board was under a special assignment from the President to prepare a report. Mr. Clifford thought that the Board would do a better service if it made a hard-hitting report and recommendations, and then after an appropriate interval the Board should ascertain whether the recommendations were being put into effect and urge action on those which the Board might find were not being implemented.

Dr. Land suggested that the Board should complete its work on the present draft of its Cuba report and then take steps to get to the heart of things with respect to intelligence plans and programs



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regarding Cuba. He added that the Board's responsibilities go to the effectiveness of the institution and framework within which the U. S. intelligence community operates, the meeting of day-to-day concerns which arise, and a determination as to whether re-creation or reorganization is needed based on the "massive approach" represented by the draft report which the Board had before it.

Mr. Murphy expressed agreement with points made by Dr. Land. It was Mr. Murphy's view that the intelligence community apparently does not know enough about what is presently happening in Cuba. He thought that photographic coverage was not enough and what was needed was deep cover clandestine agent coverage of Cuba. Dr. Land added that it was not enough for the Board to make recommendations but there should also be a "violent surveillance" of their implementation.

Noting the agenda for the day, Mr. Murphy wondered what the Chairman had in mind as to the nature and purpose of the Board's scheduled visit to the Secretary of State. Mr. Gray recalled that when Mr. Bundy had met with the Board previously he had suggested that in the course of the Board's Cuba review it might well be useful to discuss with the Secretary's of State and Defense, and the Chairman of the JCS, their views regarding the U. S. intelligence coverage given to the Soviet buildup in Cuba. Mr. Gray added that it was his impression that Mr. Bundy's suggestion had been based not only on the obtaining of facts pertinent to the Board's review for intelligence purposes, but also in anticipation of a Congressional investigation which might be made of the Cuba experience.

Mr. Murphy thought it important that the Board organize its interview to be had with the Secretary of State. Mr. Gray suggested that without going into a re-hash of the chronological summary of the intelligence aspects, the Board's questions to Secretary Rusk should include those which would determine the Secretary's views on what would have been done differently, from the vantage point of hindsight, with respect to intelligence handling of the Cuba development; whether there was a proper weighing of the risks and the intelligence advantages involved in overflights of Cuba; whether the intelligence analysis and reporting processes were hindered by preconceived views of U. S. "Sovietologists"; and whether raw intelligence reports were adequately communicated to the White House (Mr. Gray recalling that Mr. Bundy had expressed to him the belief that the President should have been informed of the contents of some of these reports regarding the sightings of offensive missiles in Cuba prior to the photography of October 14).

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

January 26, 1963

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Kp 25 Feb 98

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to the declassification  
of this document.  
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*Coyne to sign  
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Cuba

In the course of the Board meeting of January 25, 1963, the Board members and Mr. Coyne met at the State Department with the Secretary of State, Assistant Secretary Alexis Johnson and Mr. Roger Hilsman, Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State.

Utilizing the memorandum (copy attached) which contained a series of questions which had been drafted earlier in the day by the Board, the Board members elicited Secretary Rusk's views on a variety of intelligence subjects pertaining to the pre-buildup and post-buildup period in Cuba.

At the outset Secretary Rusk stated that the two Administrations must share the responsibility for Cuba and that each in turn has taken full responsibility for what was done or what was not done during their respective Administrations. He noted that Cuba is a national problem; that because of it "we came up to the edge of incineration in the Western Hemisphere"; and that he personally has a deep anxiety over the question as to where we go from here. He observed that in the case of a Communist take-over in Cuba or anywhere else, it is easier to prevent the occurrence than it is to correct it once it has taken place.

The Secretary was queried as to whether he agreed with the Board's present finding that from October 14 onward there was an effective performance by the intelligence community in supplying support in the policy decision process with respect to the Cuba situation. The Secretary agreed stating the intelligence community performance from October 14 onward was superb. He stated that this performance enabled the panels of the NSC Executive Committee to recommend the establishment of positions on which the Government as a whole could and did act.

Secretary Rusk was next queried as to whether he agreed with the Board's present findings that, prior to October 14 the intelligence performance was clearly deficient and that perhaps this deficiency was not fully known to the Department of State at the time. The Secretary observed that this was a complex question and a difficult one to answer. He felt it was terribly important that,

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
as an outgrowth of the review of how the intelligence community acquitted itself, we not paralyze the community "as was done by the Robert's Commission on Pearl Harbor day". He observed that from the point of view of high policy we have got to depend on people who see a great inflow of information and we must depend on them to give us balanced judgments, particularly in such a large area of operation as the Department of State where over one thousand cables are received and dispatched daily.

The Secretary stated that it was his impression that in mid September 1962 the intelligence community did not expect the Soviet Union to put MRBMs or IRBMs in Cuba; that this was the impression at higher policy-advisory levels; and that because of this overall judgment it is possible that intelligence analysts were diverted from the main point, namely, that offensive missiles were going in. He thought this diversion might also have been based upon the September 19 estimate of the intelligence community and that that estimate might have had the effect of the analysts feeling that they should pursue a "hands off attitude" as far as anything that came up which concerned the USSR's introduction of offensive missiles. He said the lesson to be learned from this is that some means must be found to assure that we do not take anything for granted in these areas. Also a means must be found for stimulating the expression of reservations at policy levels, noting that it is not easy to make these reservations operational.

The Secretary stated that if one looks at the problem of intelligence in terms of the time factors involved he thought one would find that even before October 14 our intelligence was "pretty good". He observed that except for two of the long-range sites, overflights ten days earlier than October 14 would have seen nothing.

Mr. Murphy noted that the last observation of the Secretary seemed to suggest exclusive dependence on photographs. To this the Secretary observed that in its interim report the Board had called attention to the need for re-enforcing classical intelligence means. The Secretary said that he agreed with the Board's point and that he considered it extremely important. He said the Department

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 He noted also that a good rule is now being followed in this area, a rule which precludes a CIA agent to target in his country of assignment. The Secretary emphasized the view that our government



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...has "under-played old fashioned espionage". He observed that it is easy to fly U-2s but that such flights inevitably bring up international problems since they violate sovereignty; and therefore the Department of State welcomes the idea of beefing up traditional espionage activities [REDACTED] 16

The Board next inquired as to whether the Secretary believed that the interests and requirements of the intelligence community were aggressively spoken for at the policy level during the pre-October 14 period. He responded that the United States would have been better off with more intensive air (U-2 plane) coverage during the period beginning October 1, but at that time reports were sketchy, there was the problem of the stand-down of the U-2 because of the Chinat loss, weather conditions were not optimum, etc. Reverting to the principal question asked of him the Secretary expressed the view that the Special NSC 5412/2 Group operated adequately and is now operating adequately. He said that he is in touch with the Group from time to time on its plans and he noted that on the matter of intelligence collection flights we have run 2500 peripheral flights around the Soviet Union and every one of them is to some degree dangerous. He said that the President and he personally examine the particularly sensitive flights that are proposed. He noted that in the State Department intelligence requirements of the community are accepted in this area and that the Department goes along with the overwhelming number of flights proposed. He said that in the case of Cuban overflights he personally made two suggestions during the period in question. The first involved the step-up of peripheral flights around Cuba as a cover for putting flights over the island when we wanted to and he said that he had told the OAS representatives about this, noting that the "risks of strays" of such peripheral flights was "very high". His second suggestion involved breaking up one or two proposed flights into segments of four flights (the Board members were fully cognizant of this). Mr. Gray made reference to the delays which necessarily resulted from breaking the proposed mission into a four-segmented one. He inquired of the Secretary as to whether he had been advised of the fact that delays would necessarily result from his suggested amendment of the mission. The Secretary replied in the negative.

At this point Dr. Land observed that there is not enough personified pressure from intelligence; that a concentrated statement of intelligence requirements and purposes should be constantly served up to the policy level from suspicious intelligence personalities and that these, of course, should be subject to ultimate decision by the Secretary of State and others of high

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authority. The Secretary took issue with a portion of Dr. Land's statement on the grounds that it assumed that there is no one in the intelligence community who has any policy responsibility. The Secretary said that he thought this was incorrect because the Director of Central Intelligence frequently acted as one having policy responsibilities.

The Secretary observed that while the intelligence needs are great there are other requirements which the United States must take into account and that these must all be balanced out. He emphasized again at this point that overflying another country in peacetime is a difficult thing.

The Secretary then reverted to the question of traditional espionage and expressed the view that "we have gotten a little lazy on espionage". He noted that during World War II excellent espionage results were obtained by virtue of a "most fabulous combination of blue bloods and thugs". The Secretary favored resumption now of this World War II practice.

At this point Dr. Killian inquired of the Secretary as to whether he was satisfied that Mr. McCone's report on Cuba dated December 26th reflects a fair statement of the State Department's views. The Secretary said he had been unable to examine the report fully; that he had complete confidence in the relationships which his Department has with Mr. McCone, but that he would take exception to "the juxtaposition of things on the four-flight matter". Mr. Hilsman joined the Secretary in this view. The Secretary urged that the Board members be as analytical as possible in examining the Cuba situation. He encouraged them to remember the "atmosphere of the times". He hoped the Board would be "as precise as possible" in examining the overflight matter stating that "if you think the U-2 is not serious, you are on the wrong track".

Mr. Gray indicated that it was the Board's understanding that the President approved all overflights recommended, and he then suggested that apparently there were some flights that were not rejected, but neither were they made. To this the Secretary stated that what ought to be looked at were the flights that were laid on from September 20 to October 5 or 6. He noted that during this period, following the September 19 estimate of the intelligence community on Cuba, there was some delay in distributing reports from refugee and agent sources on the sightings of long-range missiles in Cuba. He again noted that just prior to this period there was a loss of a Chinat operated U-2 over the

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China mainland on September 9. On the latter point Dr. Langer inquired whether the Secretary felt that flights over Cuba were in the same category as flights over the Soviet Union or over China. The Secretary responded in the negative noting that "we felt much greater freedom of action in the case of Cuba". Mr. Hillsman added on this point that the USIB felt that two U-2 flights a month over Cuba were adequate.

The Secretary recalled that early in October he was requested to authorize overflights based on indications of two specific sites and he said he immediately approved.

Mr. Gray observed that there appeared to be some confusion as to whether we had a policy of not overflying SA-2 sites, and Secretary Johnson responded that the matter of overflying SA-2's invariably came up in the Special Group but that he could not recall any prohibition on overflying such sites. Secretary Johnson added that in the Special Group he could not recall any kind of operation ever being recommended where the atmosphere was as relaxed as it was in the case of recommendations pertaining to the Cuba problem.

Mr. Hillsman stated that at the operational level there was concern about losing a pilot over Cuba. Consequently a CORONA Mission was programmed for Cuba from September 21 to September 24. Mr. Hillsman thought this concern over the loss of a man may have been a factor which contributed to the low number of U-2 flights flown.

The Secretary was asked whether he was satisfied with the national estimating process and whether he considered that State Department participation therein was provided for adequately. The Secretary thought that State Department participation in the preparation of national intelligence estimates was adequately provided for. He said that from the point of view of the policy officer it is essential that he know what the intelligence people think; that on the other hand the policy officer wants to avoid taking the intelligence view as "the Bible", and he wishes to find a way for the intelligence community to "throw in contrary indicators in their estimates in order that they might be flagged for the policy maker."

The Secretary was then asked if he felt that the intelligence community analytical, estimative and reporting functions in the Cuba situation were hindered by international political considerations or by preconceived views of "Sovietologists" regarding Soviet

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intentions with respect to Cuba. The Secretary responded that he did not believe that the "Sovietologists" did what has been claimed. He did not believe that they had much influence on estimates. He thought, however, he detected an insufficient alertness on their part to the possibility that the estimates of the intelligence community were wrong. He expressed the observation on this point that the direct indicators came in after the September 19 estimate was prepared.

The Secretary was next queried as to whether we are currently informed in an adequate manner about Soviet objectives and activities in Cuba today. The Secretary responded that the principal gap is our inability to prove the negative because of the absence of on-site inspections. He said we are running overflights regularly; that we have improved our cooperation with allied governments in Cuba; but that we do not know for certain what the Soviet objectives are insofar as Cuba is concerned.

When queried as to U. S. Government knowledge as to the purpose of Mikoyan's stay in Cuba and as to what Mikoyan accomplished, the Secretary stated that he thought we know a great deal about the Mikoyan mission. He noted that for ten days Castro would not talk to Mikoyan. He said that we are getting much better information regarding Castro and particularly Castro's efforts in inspiring other Latin American countries. The Secretary expressed the thought that the Soviet Union may be deciding that Cuba is not the proper base from which to launch their Latin American operations. He said rewarding gains have been made in attempting to obstruct travel between Cuba and the Free World. He conceded, however, that we do not have the Cuba-Russian plan, adding that we have not penetrated the Cuban regime as well as he hopes we might be able to later.

The Secretary was asked with reference to the Monroe Doctrine, whether the Department of State has urged an aggressive intelligence collection effort to define any new violation of the Doctrine. The Secretary thought it would not be too profitable to concentrate on this point and it would be more profitable to concentrate on the Rio Pact. He agreed, however, that the Doctrine is violated by the presence of the Marxist-Leninist system in the Western Hemisphere for he said there is no question whatever about the Soviet presence in Cuba.

In conclusion the Secretary stated that he thought "our intelligence on Cuba today is not complete but it is not deficient."

*J. Patrick Coyne*  
J. Patrick Coyne

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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January 26, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE  
SUBJECT: Cuba

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hp 25 Feb 78

In the course of the Board meeting of January 26, the Board members and the writer met at the Pentagon with General Maxwell Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at which time the members discussed with General Taylor the series of questions set forth in the attachment to this memorandum. The highlights of the discussion follow.

General Taylor felt that the performance of DIA during the Cuba period was "on the whole good - in fact indispensable."

General Taylor noted that from August 31 to September 21, he, Gilpatrick and McCone were all absent from the Washington area but he quickly added that things probably would not have been different had they been here.

General Taylor disparaged the value of the refugee reports emanating from Cuban exiles in Florida during the months preceding the crisis. He said most of their information was unreliable although on reflection he concluded that some reports were in fact reliable. When General Taylor was asked by a Board member whether the intelligence community's estimating and reporting functions could have been hindered by pre-conceived views of Sovietologists regarding Soviet indications with respect to Cuba, General Taylor stated that either Khrushchev was stupid or we were. He said, "In the minds of most of us we just didn't think that the Soviets would put nuclear weapons on the island." He added that the dirt of U-2 flights over Cuba prior to SAC's discovery was occasioned by the shoot-down of a U-2 over the Chinese communist mainland (causing us to go slow on authorizing U-2 anywhere); and the highly unsatisfactory weather conditions which prevailed in the Caribbean during the period preceding the discovery on October 14.

Dr. Killian asked whether DIA had been as effective as it might have been and General Taylor responded that particularly after October 14 it had done such an excellent job that he could not suggest any way of improving on it. He said that in the pre-October 14 period the intelligence community "wasn't going at full steam." He added that all efforts in the Mongoose Committee to achieve a better intelligence base produced very little and that in the Mongoose Committee "we never received any urgent information of value on Cuba."

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Mr. Pace inquired as to why [redacted] had not been used more extensively as a base for the acquisition of intelligence. General Taylor responded that "We may have viewed it as a Sacred Cow." He had a feeling that the Navy might consider enlarged intelligence activities at [redacted] as prejudicing the U. S. Naval base there.

Mr. Pace inquired as to whether the intelligence community had been sufficiently aggressive in placing its requirements on the Special Group and on the Mongoose Committee. General Taylor responded to the effect that he knew of no intelligence requests emanating from the community that were not supported from higher levels. (In an aside General Taylor mentioned that when the missiles were discovered in Cuba, "I was a hawk", meaning that he favored the launching of the U. S. military strike against the missile bases in Cuba.) General Doolittle asked whether at the present time General Taylor feels he is getting sufficient intelligence on Cuba. General Taylor responded "obviously not" adding that "photographic intelligence is practically all we are getting today." General Taylor stated that "Most of us are well aware of the frailty of our intelligence system - we can beat the DCI over the head but he just can't produce the intelligence we need."

Dr. Killian elicited General Taylor's recommendations on the Special NSC 5412/2 Group asking whether the General had any constructive suggestions to make in light of his having chaired the Special Group prior to his appointment as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Taylor had no specific suggestions to make. He noted that as Chairman of the Special Group he always had the feeling that representatives of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board were closely examining covert action programs and were constantly going around the world to see what the intelligence community was doing both in the intelligence and covert action field. He said that this activity on the part of the Board gave him a good feeling - a feeling of insurance - in his capacity as Chairman of the Special Group. General Taylor added that "If your Board didn't exist we would have to invent you."

Mr. Clifford stated that he had the impression that relations between defense and CIA were not too close and General Taylor expressed the hope that that was not in fact the case. General Taylor recognized, however, that there was a feeling of considerable rivalry between CIA and Defense, particularly SAC, when responsibility for U-2 reconnaissance over Cuba was transferred from CIA to SAC. General Taylor said he favored the transfer of the flights, that CIA was really Cassandra-like on this issue and that is where the animosity arose. (Mr. McCone later denied to the Board that CIA opposed the transfer but the Board's files clearly reflect that CIA was in violent opposition; that it protested the flights to the White House both orally and in writing; and that the animosity became so severe that Deputy Director Scoville of CIA did not even speak to the Director MRO for a

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


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period of days, after SAC's first flight brought back the first photographic evidence of intermediate range nuclear missiles in Cuba.)

General Taylor volunteered the view that the creation of the DIA will improve rather than aggravate the relations between Defense and CIA although he acknowledged that there will always be some rivalry between civilian intelligence collectors in CIA and military intelligence collectors in DIA and the Services. To this Mr. Pace observed that some rivalry is good and healthy.

Finally, when queried about the posture of service attaches, General Taylor noted that he had recently returned from a lengthy trip in the course of which he visited with a number of the attaches and he had found that they had "improved enormously" over prior times.



J. Patrick Coyne

Enclosure.

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PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

January 25, 1963

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE BOARD

SUBJECT: Board Meeting of January 25 - 26, 1963

*see Highlights 1/25 Feb 98*

For the information of the Board members the following documents are enclosed:

- Tab 1: Memorandum for the President from the Board dated January 19, 1963, concerning the handling of [redacted] and of projects in the Department of Defense associated with [redacted].
- Tab 2: Board's Interim Report to the President dated December 28, 1962, and the DCI's 1/22/63 response thereto.
- Tab 3: Draft of final report to the President on the Board's comprehensive study of intelligence activities relating to the military buildup in Cuba.
- Tab 4: Memorandum for the Chairman from Mr. McGeorge Bundy dated January 9, 1963, concerning Presidential instructions relative to control of intelligence information on offensive weapons in Cuba.
- Tab 5: Memorandum on Mr. Ash's review of Special Group records pertaining to developments in Cuba.
- Tab 6: CIA memorandum concerning cable correspondence between CIA headquarters and Mr. McCone while in Europe (August 30 - September 21, 1962).
- Tab 7: General Chronology of Events in Cuba, 1957 - 1962, prepared by the Board's staff.\*
- Tab 8: General Chronology of Specific Events Relating to the Military Buildup in Cuba, prepared by the Board's staff.\*

\* Reviewed at earlier meetings of the Board

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*D.S. [signature]*



- Tab 9: Memorandum concerning CIA Field Station Reports (received by NSC or White House staff elements) dealing with the military buildup prior to October 14, 1962.\*
- Tab 10: CIA Memorandum concerning the Caribbean Admissions Center, Opa locka, Florida.\*
- Tab 11: Memorandum for Mr. Bundy from Mr. Ray Cline, CIA, entitled "The Effect of Weather on Overflights of Cuba, 29 August - 14 October 1962".
- Tab 12: Report by the Director of Central Intelligence to the Board on "Intelligence Community Activities Relating to the Cuban Arms Buildup".\*
- Tab 13: Letter to the Chairman from Mr. Murphy dated Dec. 8, 1962.

J. Patrick Coyne

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\* Reviewed at earlier meetings of the Board

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Minutes of the October 9, 1962 Meeting  
of the Special Group (Augmented)

Present for this meeting were the Attorney General, Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, General Taylor, Mr. McCone, Mr. Wilson, Dr. Charyk, Dr. Scoville, Colonel Steakley, and Colonel Ledford, CIA.

The Group discussed various possibilities of accomplishing reconnaissance of Cuba, ranging from low-level coverage by tactical aircraft to high-performance aircraft and drones. Overflights and peripheral flights were discussed. It was agreed that the first priority is one high-performance mission in the western part of the island, to be accomplished by all-out ELINT support, and depending on the results of this, a number of similar sorties might be mounted. (The first mission was later approved by higher authority, with the decision on the second proposition left open. The entire package was to be discussed at the USIB and by the Chiefs on Wednesday, October 10.)

Along with the minutes of this October 9 Meeting there was in file a memorandum from Mr. Parrott to Mr. Bundy, dated October 11, 1962. It was reflected in Mr. Parrott's memorandum that Mr. Gilpatric had called at 2:15 P.M. to say he and Mr. McCone had finally agreed that the one high-performance flight would be flown as a military flight with a SAC pilot. CIA had wanted to stick to the existing system for the first flight, simply to avoid any delay. The SAC pilot would require some additional training because the equipment in the improved vehicle was new to him, but Mr. Gilpatric and Mr. McCone apparently felt that this was an acceptable delay and it was hoped to get the flight off over the weekend. It was further stated in Mr. Parrott's memorandum that it seemed agreed that within the terms of the authorization given by higher authority it would be necessary to go back for approval of the next phase, contemplating two or three more high-performance missions, and Mr. Gilpatric seemed to feel that the discussion which had taken place with higher authority was explicit enough to get an emergency authority by telephone. Mr. Parrott further informed Mr. Bundy that the Cover Committee (Messrs. Charyk, Hilsman, Scoville, Parrott, "et al") had met that morning and had agreed on a new cover story for a military pilot and a revised cover story for civilian pilots, and with the necessary changes it was thought that the cover story would be ready that afternoon. Mr. Parrott pointed out to Mr. Bundy that, on the military side, the flight is characterized as military reconnaissance of the periphery of the target area, with particular reference to the Secretary of State's recent comments to the OAS Ministers to the effect that we are increasing surveillance activities. (A penciled note on the file copy of this

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memorandum read: "Later was delayed due to disagreement on account of training required."


There was also an October 12, 1962 addendum to the above-mentioned October 11 memorandum from Mr. Parrott to Mr. Bundy, stating: "Later." The memorandum related that, according to Mr. Knocke, Mr. McCone had decided the day before (October 11) that these flights must be either entirely overt or entirely covert, and he didn't particularly care which so long as they were accomplished as soon as possible. In Mr. McCone's absence, General Carter had come to an agreement with General McKee, Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, along those lines on October 11; later, however, Mr. Gilpatric said that this was not his understanding of the terms of authorization from higher authority. Mr. Gilpatric felt that the idea was that a uniformed pilot should operate the Agency's vehicle.

On October 12 at 12:45, General Carter had a meeting with Mr. Bundy and at that time General Carter stated that the Agency operation was ready to go except for weather, and that this would hold it up until at least Sunday, and meantime the SAC pilot would have received the necessary training. It was agreed that if the pilot was sufficiently trained by the earliest time the mission could be mounted, the flight would go, with all other arrangements within the Agency framework. If the pilot were not ready by the time the vehicle was ready, the mission would be mounted as a completely Agency operation, i.e., with a civilian pilot. According to Mr. Lay, the USIB had taken the following actions at its October 10, 1962 meeting with respect to the targets listed in the COMOR paper of October 6:

- (1) The Group I targets were not discussed by USIB, the implication being that there was no problem from the point of view of USIB's jurisdiction.
- (2) Groups II and III should be covered as rapidly as possible initially, and after that the frequency of coverage would be further examined.
- (3) COMOR was to re-do the section of the October 6 paper dealing with Group IV, with targets to be broken out in categories of priority, and USIB would consider this new paper on October 17. USIB did not consider any operational aspects, but confined themselves to the importance of the targets and the frequency of coverage.

Minutes of the Special NSC 5412/2 Group

The following summarizes the minutes of the Special Group Meetings which were identified by Mr. Parrott as including consideration of the subject of Cuba.

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Minutes of February 1, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group

This meeting was attended by General Taylor, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. Helms.

On the subject of Cuba, the Chairman read his memorandum to higher authority dated January 26, summarizing progress up to that time. The memorandum from General Lansdale suggesting a different approach to the content of the minutes of the meeting of the preceding week on Cuba was discussed, and it was agreed that the minutes would stand as prepared. General Lansdale's report of February 1 on popular support for the OAS meeting was distributed. Mr. Parrott's summary states that the Cuba missions were stepped up from one per month to two per month.

Minutes of June 14, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group

This meeting was attended by General Taylor, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and General Carter.

On the subject of "Request for Special Cuban Missions," it was stated that the COMOR proposal dated June 13, 1962 was approved. (A handwritten notation on the file copy of these minutes stated that "higher authority informed June 15 about possibility of uprising," and there was also a notation that the June 13 memorandum regarding the COMOR request had been "rewritten for hook.")

Minutes of the July 12, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group

The Group agreed to recommend approval of various requests for authorizations. In the case of Cuba, the minutes reflect agreement to continue with the presently authorized schedule of two flights per month. General Taylor asked that for the purpose of discussing this matter with higher authority, CIA should prepare a paper on Cuba, setting forth a summary of information which had been obtained to date, the number of missions mounted, what is proposed to be looked at in the future, and the frequency of further coverage desired.

Memorandum for the President from the Special Group,  
July 20, 1962

The Special Group records contain a memorandum for the President from General Taylor dated July 20, 1962, bearing a handwritten notation by General Taylor, "Approved by H. A. (presumably 'higher authority') 20 July 1962." In essence,

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the memorandum to the President was as follows:

In the Special Group we are aware that we have been proceeding on a day-by-day basis in requesting authority for overflight reconnaissance. At our meeting yesterday, we took a long look ahead at the estimated requirements for the next few months and agreed that the following program is the minimum which meets military requirements . . . . Cuba: Two flights monthly . . . . all U-2 flights with CIA civilian pilots . . . . We would like to get your approval in principle of the foregoing program with the understanding that on the first of each month you will be presented with the specific flights recommended for that month.

Minutes of August 9, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group

Those present were General Taylor, Mr. McCone, Mr. Hilsman, and Mr. William Bundy.

On the subject of "Cuba Reconnaissance" it was stated that the Group agreed that the second mission authorized for August should be flown whenever the DCI decides that the immediate situation with respect to Soviet materiel justifies it. It was noted that this would use up existing authority for August, and if a third mission should become necessary later in the month, it should be considered on its merits at that time.


Minutes of August 30, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group

Those present were General Taylor, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatrick, General Lemnitzer and Mr. Bundy.

The minutes reflect that in connection with the Agency's monthly forecast, General Carter mentioned that there might be an additional requirement for flights over Cuba. (In the "Memorandum for the Record," October 21, 1962, on the subject "Reconnaissance of Cuba," attached hereto, there appears beside the item dealing with this meeting the penciled notation "primarily low-level.")

Minutes of September 10, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group

Those present at this meeting, which took place in Mr. Bundy's office, were the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Acting Director of Central Intelligence, "and others."

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The Secretary of State expressed concern at the Agency's planned coverage of Cuba, involving extensive peripheral coverage as well as two legs directly over Cuban air space, all in one flight. He said he had no objection to the peripheral parts and, in fact, thought it useful to continue to establish our right to fly over international waters. On the other hand, he recognized the necessity of obtaining vertical coverage of the Isle of Pines and the eastern portion of Cuba at this time. He felt, however, that it was unwise to combine extensive overflying of international waters with actual overflights. He pointed out that the long peripheral flights would draw undue attention to the mission and, further, should the aircraft fall into enemy hands after an overflight had occurred, this would put the United States in a very poor position for standing on its rights to overfly international waters.

Taking these views into account, the Agency's plans to break this proposed coverage into four parts: the Isle of Pines; the area roughly east of longitude 77 west; and two legs along the coast, one north and one south.

Within this framework, higher authority gave approval this morning for two additional missions to be added to the one for which authority is currently outstanding. Priority will be given to the two overflights. (A notation on the file copy of these Special Group minutes states that as of this morning it appears that weather will not permit a flight until at least Friday, and longer range weather prospects are not very good, consequently it will be some little time before these three authorizations are used up.)

In connection with the minutes of this meeting, the Special Group records contain a note for the file dated October 25, 1962, stating that COMOR later recommended that the Bay of Pigs area should be looked at since it had not been seen since June . . . . Time over mainland would be 12½ minutes for a total of 75 miles . . . . depth of penetration, 13 miles . . . . nearest known SAM site, 35 miles away. The file note further stated that after considerable negotiation with the Department of State it was agreed that this additional coverage would be accomplished.

(In quoting the minutes of this September 10 meeting in a memorandum from Mr. Tom Parrott to Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric dated November 30, 1962, there was an addendum which stated: "H.B. Mr. Bundy said on 13 September 1962 that he thought the intent of higher authority's approval was such that the entire number of four missions would be considered as being approved. This thus extends the outstanding authorizations from three to four.")

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Minutes of September 14, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group

Those present were Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Nitze, General Lemnitzer, and General Carter.

The minutes of this meeting reflect that a JCS representative (Colonel Steakley) outlined the capabilities for low-level coverage of certain targets in Cuba. It was noted that the Secretary of Defense did not wish this operation considered further until the results of Agency reconnaissance in the same area became available. General Carter said that special efforts will be required to identify certain installations, the nature of which is not clear at present. Colonel Steakley distributed charts for the monthly book, on supplementing ELINT coverage of Cuba which was begun today. The Group had no objection to these missions. It was agreed that the Joint Reconnaissance Center should keep an eye on all military reconnaissance or surveillance flights in the Cuban area. (The Special Group record of these minutes is contained in a memorandum dated November 30, 1962, from Mr. Tom Parrott to Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric.)

Minutes of September 27, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group

Those present were General Taylor, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, General Lemnitzer, and General Carter.

CIA's October forecast of reconnaissance activities was noted. The special mission request for Cuba was approved. This brings the number of authorizations for this area back to four, i.e., four had been previously authorized and one has been successfully completed, leaving authority for three outstanding.

Minutes of October 15, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group

A memorandum prepared for the Special Group records by Mr. Parrott reflected that at a special meeting on this date two U-2 missions, designed to cover all of Cuba, were approved, and that these were concurred in by higher authority. It is reflected that after the 15th of October additional coverage was agreed on at other meetings, but the Special Group was not convened for this purpose.

Memorandum from Mr. Parrott to Deputy Secretary Gilpatric, November 30, 1962

The Special Group records contain a copy of a memorandum (previously referred to) from Mr. Thomas A. Parrott to Deputy

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Secretary of Defense Gilpatric dated November 30, 1952. The memorandum began with the statement that it had been prepared in answer to Deputy Secretary Gilpatric's request on the preceding day for minutes of the special meetings of the Special Group which bore on Cuban reconnaissance, in order that Mr. Gilpatric and General Taylor might be informed. It was stated in the memorandum that Mr. Gilpatric and General Taylor had been present on August 30 and had then returned to the Group on September 27. It was further stated that at the meetings of the 6th and 20th of September the subject of Cuba reconnaissance did not arise. The memorandum then pointed out that the meeting of September 10 was not a regular meeting of the Special Group but had nevertheless resulted in particularly significant decisions. The memorandum then went on to set forth the minutes of the meetings of September 10, 14 and 27.

A. Russell Ash

Attachment



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21 October 1962

*CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED see highlights pp 25 Feb 98*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Reconnaissance of Cuba

Following is a chronological resume of considerations by the Special Group (5412) and the Special Group (Augmented) of U-2 reconnaissance activities over Cuba. This summary begins as of 1 May 1961 (i.e., after the Bay of Pigs).

11 May 1961. It was agreed that policy approval for U-2 flights over Cuba is still in effect.

1 February 1962. The Cuba missions were stepped up from one per month to two.

14 June 1962. A COMOR recommendation that two additional flights be authorized for June was approved by the Group.

12 July 1962. (Augmented Group) Mr. McCone emphasized that reconnaissance of Cuba has developed complete information on deployment and facilities for the Army, Navy and Air Force, and that it has verified the fact that there is sufficient logistic support for a 75,000 man military force. No missile sites have been found.

12 July 1962. The Group agreed to continue with the presently-authorized schedule of two flights per month.

19 July 1962. Cuba was considered as part of a set of proposals covering reconnaissance world-wide. The two flights per month pattern was reiterated. (This was later approved by higher authority.)

9 August 1962. The Group agreed that the second mission authorized for August should be flown whenever the DCI decides that the immediate situation with respect to Soviet materiel justifies it. It was noted that this would use up existing authorizations for August and if a third mission should become necessary later in the month, it should be considered on its merits at that time.

NOTE: Coordinated with Reber, then shown to General Carter who put a covering memo on it. The Carter memo, this one and a compilation from the COMOR point of view, done by Mr. Reber, were given to Mr. McCone at the White House just before the 2:30 meeting today.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION REFERRING TO [REDACTED]

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30 August 1962. In connection with the Agency's monthly forecast, General Carter mentioned that there might be an additional requirement for flights over Cuba.

10 September 1962. At a special meeting attended by the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Acting DCI and others, the Secretary expressed concern over the Agency's planned coverage of Cuba. He objected particularly to the proposal to combine extensive overflying of international waters with actual overflights. As a result of this discussion, it was agreed that the Agency's proposed coverage would have to be broken into four parts - one over the Isle of Pines, one over the eastern end of Cuba, and two legs along the coast - one north and one south. Within this framework, higher authority later gave approval for three flights in addition to those already authorized, with priority to the overflights. (NOTE: The Agency later secured agreement to continue the Isle of Pines leg over the Bay of Pigs area, after considerable negotiation with State.)

14 September 1962. A JCS representative outlined the capabilities for low-level coverage of certain targets in Cuba. It was noted that the Secretary of Defense did not wish this operation considered further until the results of Agency reconnaissance in the same area became available. General Carter said that special efforts will be required to identify certain installations, the nature of which is not clear at present.

27 September 1962. An additional mission for Cuba was approved.

4 October 1962 (Augmented Group). The DCI pointed out that the Agency is now restricted to using the U-2 in the south-eastern quadrant of Cuba, because of the SAM sites. It was questioned whether this was a reasonable restriction at this time, particularly since the SAMs were almost certainly not operational.

9 October 1962 (Augmented Group). The Group discussed the spectrum of possible reconnaissance activities. It was agreed that first priority should be given to one U-2 in the western part of the island. Depending on the results of this, a number of similar sorties might be mounted. (Higher authority later approved the one mission, leaving the second proposition open.)

15 October 1962. At a special meeting, two U-2 missions, designed to cover all of Cuba, were approved. These were concurred in by higher authority.

After the 15th of October, additional coverage was agreed on at other meetings. The Special Group was not convened for this purpose.

Thomas A. Parrott




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PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

AGENDA FOR MEETING OF NOVEMBER 9, 1962

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>
1.	9:00 - 9:30	The Chairman's Time - Executive Session
2.	9:30 - 10:15	<u>Preliminary Review by Board Staff of Recent Cuban Developments</u> Mr. Patrick Coyne
3.	10:15 - 10:30	<u>Recent Discussions of Cuban Developments with the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Reconnaissance Office</u> Mr. Gordon Gray
4.	10:30 - 11:00	<u>Recent Photographic Intelligence Acquisitions</u> Mr. Arthur Lundahl, NPIC
5.	11:00 - 12:00 <del>11:30 - 2:</del>	<u>Defense Intelligence Agency Activities Including DIA's Role in the Cuban Situation</u> Lt. Gen. Joseph Carroll, USAF, Director, DIA
6.	12:00 - 12:30 <del>4:30</del> 5:15 - 5:55	<u>State Department Views on Recent Intelligence Developments Relating to Cuba</u> Mr. Thomas Hughes, Acting Director, Intelligence and Research, Department of State
7.	12:30 - 1:30 1:05	Lunch - Room No. 21, Executive Office Building
8.	1:30 - 1:45	<u>Status Report on CIA's Covert Operations</u> Mr. Robert Murphy
9.	<del>1:45 - 2:15</del> <del>3:00 - 3:30</del>	
10.	2:15 - 2:30	Executive Session

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DCI = 11:00  
DIA = 11:30

No Board book for this meeting

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<u>ITEM</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>
11.	2:30 - 4:00 11:00 - 12:55	Discussions with the Director of Central Intelligence including Review of U. S. Intelligence Activities Relating to the Cuban and Berlin Situations. Mr. John McCone
12.	4:00 - 4:15 4:30 - 5:15	Discussions with the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Mr. McGeorge Bundy
13.	4:15 - 4:30 18	[REDACTED]
14.	4:30 - 5:00	Status Report on Implementation of Board Recommendations Mr. Ash
15.	5:00 - END	Discussion of Board Panel Assignments and Future Board Business Board Personnel Only

Due to absence from the country, Board members Langer and Pace will be unable to attend this meeting.



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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

This document consists of 42 pages  
No. 1 of 3 Copies, Series A

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Board Meeting of November 9, 1962

The Board convened in meeting at 9:00 a.m., on November 9, 1962, at the offices of the Board in the Executive Office Building. Dr. Baker presided as Acting Chairman in the absence of Dr. Killian. Board members Gray, Doolittle, Murphy and Clifford were present as were Mr. Coyne and the writer. (Messrs. Pace and Langer were out of the country at the time of this meeting. Illness prevented Dr. Land's attendance.)

Dr. Baker informed the Board that Messrs. Coyne and Ash had done a unique assembly of material for the Board's use in considering the intelligence aspects of the Soviet missiles buildup in Cuba. Dr. Baker expressed the view that the materials which had been assembled are far too complicated for the Board to consider in the course of only one day, and therefore the Board would look to Mr. Coyne and Mr. Gray for selective reporting to the Board concerning the highlights of the coverage which had been accomplished thus far in the Board's review of the Cuba situation.

Dr. Baker observed that the conflict involving Cuba is an intelligence conflict. The government does not know for sure the positions of anti-aircraft artillery units which are protecting the SA-2 sites in Cuba. Furthermore, intelligence is lacking on such elementary things as the support facilities which serve the SA-2 installations. Based on the intelligence which has been obtained, it appears that except for Moscow and Leningrad the island of Cuba is now equipped with the best air defense system in the world. It is possible that Cuba is now on the verge of insuring against invasion by reason of its possession of an assembly of the most dangerous armaments which have heretofore been collected in an area of that size. In the UN the United States is discussing inspection and surveillance proposals and positions which in Dr. Baker's view are a century out of date. Dr. Baker said that he does not know how much the President is aware of these things, but there is a serious proposal being discussed which would contemplate one or two inspections a month, whereas we well know that within 72 hours there can be made operational a most dangerous offensive capability.

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Mr. Murphy wondered what specifically had caused the decision to be made to transfer from CIA to SAC the responsibility for reconnaissance of Cuba. Mr. Murphy thought that an understanding of the reasons for this shift of responsibility is important because the Board itself seemed to have been oblivious to developments which were of such a nature as to warrant the stepped-up coverage by SAC. Mr. Gray's comment on this was to the effect that he had noted an uncertainty in the past with regard to whether the problem of Cuba had been removed from the Board's area of responsibility. Mr. Gray recalled remarks by the Chairman at a Board meeting last summer indicating that the Cuba situation was being looked at elsewhere in Government. Therefore, Mr. Gray thought that if in fact the Board's responsibility extends to Cuba this should be made clear for the benefit of the Board. In Mr. Gray's opinion if the Board in fact had such a responsibility, then the Board should have been addressing itself to the implications of public statements such as those being made by Senator Keating and others, and particularly the statement by Senator Keating on October 10, 1962, that ballistic missile installations were being constructed in Cuba.

Acting Chairman Baker informed the Board that he had confirmed with the Chairman that the Chairman's remarks at the last summer's Board meeting were intended to convey that it was only in the NSC 5412/2 area that Cuba matters were being handled outside the purview of the Board.

Continuing, Mr. Gray said that it was a matter of personal regret to him that the public statements by Senators Keating, Humphry and others had not served to flag the situation.

Mr. Coyne said that following that line of reasoning he himself could be said to have been at fault. Mr. Coyne went on to point out in this connection that Senator Keating and others were speaking from the benefit of Executive Branch briefings which they had received, including General Carter's briefing of the Republican Policy Committee. In any case, the Senators had only information which was in the possession of the Executive Branch. Insofar as this information was based on foreign intelligence acquisitions, Mr. Coyne pointed out that all of the U.S. foreign intelligence agencies are under instruction and have an obligation to furnish the Board with all significant information derived from the foreign intelligence effort, and if such instructions and understandings were not in effect the Board would be in the position of having to dig out the intelligence information which the agencies are obligated to provide to the Board on a systematic basis. In the case of the developing Cuban situation, however, Mr. Coyne pointed out that a top level decision was made to give limited distribution of intelligence information on Cuba and the Board was excluded from those elements of the government which were designated to receive it.

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
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Mr. McCone next turned to the subject of Cuba. He said that in late July there was first witnessed an increased tempo of Soviet bloc shipments to Cuba, and by August the rate of shipments had more than doubled. On August 10, 1962 there was held a meeting of Principals (the President not participating) to discuss Cuban operations which had taken place during the preceding months of 1962. Up to that time there had been an exploratory intelligence effort primarily aimed at providing a basis for deciding what covert actions could be taken against the Castro regime. The results of this intelligence effort had been reflected in reports appearing in the Central Intelligence Bulletin and in items which were set forth in the Presidential Check List. At that time, Mr. McCone said, he analyzed the developments in Cuba as indicating (1) the establishment of a sophisticated SIGINT operation to be directed against our space activities at Camp Canaveral, (2) the establishment of a comprehensive air defense system, or (3) the introduction of a MRBM capability, or possibly all three. However, no one shared Mr. McCone's feeling that the Soviet activities in Cuba were directed toward the establishment of a ballistic missile capability. On the contrary, the Department of State and the Office of National Estimates within the CIA considered that such action by the Russians would be a departure from established Soviet policy.

Mr. McCone said that throughout August, intelligence work was continued with respect to developments in Cuba, and in the August the establishment of ICBM sites was detected. Mr. McCone left the meeting on August 11, 1962, and returned to the United States on August 12, 1962. He said that he had discussed the situation with the President and the Vice President on August 12, 1962, and that he had also discussed the situation with the Secretary of Defense on August 13, 1962. He said that he had also discussed the situation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on August 14, 1962, and that he had also discussed the situation with the Director of the CIA on August 15, 1962.

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and prior to his departure from the country, on August 23, he took the occasion on August 21, 22, and 23 to express his worry to the President and to the Secretary of Defense. Mr. McCone acknowledged that he had no positive evidence to support his concern, but he reasoned that the extensive air defense buildup which was underway in Cuba had as its immediate purpose the denial of the surveillance by the United States of the Soviet missile buildup in Cuba. The U-2 photography which was being obtained reflected that 26 SA-2 sites would be installed in Cuba. Mr. McCone observed that while the photography obtained at the time did not provide evidence of missile sites, a current review of that photography indicates the presence of tents and some construction equipment. Mr. McCone said that when he left the country on August 23, he instructed that a daily CIA bulletin be initiated at once with respect to Cuban developments, and he initiated issuance of this reporting after consultation with the USIB. When in September an incident was created by the U-2 which "wandered" over Soviet territory, and also when the U-2 was shot down over Communist China on September 8, these incidents caused Mr. McCone to be concerned. Nevertheless, overflights were ordered. It developed, however, that from September 17 to September 20, weather conditions would not permit the overflights of Cuba.

At about that time the Special NSC 5412/2 Group, as well as the CIA, became convinced that some risk was involved in the conduct of U-2 operations over Cuba. For that reason, Mr. McCone said, the flights which were scheduled were of a peripheral nature. Four flights were authorized and flown in late September and in early October, but because of their peripheral or semi-peripheral character they did not cover the western area of Cuba. Mr. McCone recalled that in early October there had been seen refugee reports concerning mysterious shipments being transported over Cuban roads, and there were other things of this nature reported by refugees.

As reflected in the SNIE dated September 19, 1962, Mr. McCone said that the USIB dismissed the possibility that MRBMs were being introduced into Cuba, and this view was based on the belief that such introduction would confront the USSR with so many difficulties that the action would not be undertaken. Mr. McCone said that he was in France when he received a summary of the SNIE, and he disagreed with its conclusions because he could not see why the Soviets were establishing such a comprehensive air defense system in Cuba unless this was being done to shield the island against U. S. surveillance and to protect the conduct of some clandestine operation.

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
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Mr. Murphy wondered what had been the inspiration for the commitment not to invade Cuba. Mr. McCone supposed that this resulted from a Russian offer to do certain things in return for things which they asked for.

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Mr. Clifford asked whether it is possible for the United States to develop intelligence sources in Cuba which would relieve our dependence upon photographic intelligence. Mr. McCone said that this is difficult to do primarily because Castro had instituted a police state in Cuba and, as an example of this, Mr. McCone cited the practice of the Castro regime in following a procedure whereby in effect the ration cards of the Cuban people serve as identification cards. Mr. McCone said that previously [redacted] teams of trained agents had been introduced into Cuba since April. [redacted] of these teams remain in Cuba; the rest have been either killed or came back from their mission. Mr. McCone said that we have not been able to obtain much intelligence from these [redacted] teams because their principal activity has been to maintain their survival.

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Mr. Clifford said that he found it hard to understand why the United States has not been able to develop intelligence sources within Cuba, a country situated only 90 miles away from the United States, and one with which we have enjoyed the friendliest relations for 60 years. Mr. McCone said that approximately 2000 Cubans are coming out of Cuba every week and at that rate practically all of the responsible Cubans have left the island. Mr. McCone said after the Bay of Pigs invasion an intelligence "paralysis" set in for a time. Then, in December 1961, the President and the Attorney General and Mr. McCone had discussions leading to the instigation of some operations in Cuba. Mr. McCone said that he was aghast to learn at that time there were no refugee interrogations being conducted, and so the interrogation center was established at Opalaka. He said that within CIA a [redacted]-man task force was set up to work on the Cuba problem and disappointing results have been obtained. Mr. McCone said that

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
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he is now concerned and he has had under review the question as to whether too much dependence is being placed on refugees as sources of information, and consideration is being given as to whether it may be necessary to send U. S. citizens into Cuba as intelligence agents. He said that we are not getting intelligence on Cuba through conventional means. Mr. Murphy observed that this is a salient point of interest to the Board. Mr. McCone repeated his concern which he had earlier expressed that even with the Soviet missiles removed, the Castro regime will continue to be a center of insurgency for Latin America, as indicated by the fact that during the recent days of the Cuban crisis orders were issued from within Cuba for the initiation of insurgency action in other Latin American countries.

At this point Mr. McCone's visit with the Board terminated and the Board recessed for lunch.



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# Assassination Records Review Board Final Determination Notification

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AGENCY : PFIAB  
RECORD NUMBER : 206-10001-10011  
RECORD SERIES :  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

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September 24, 1998

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of Postponements: 55

The redactions in this document have been postponed under the provisions set forth in The John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992.

In the margin next to each postponement a number is provided to represent the appropriate substitute language from the list below.

Board Review Completed: 09/14/98

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01 CIA Employee	09 Identifying Information Postponed to Protect the Privacy of an Individual	17 Foreign Relations Issue
02 CIA Job Title	10 Date	18 Information Not Related to the JFK Assassination
03 NSA Employee	11 Location	19 No Suitable Substitute Language
04 NSA Internal Production Information	12 Country	20 Digraph
05 NSA Dissemination Information	13 Company	21 Number
06 Name of Person	14 Name of Organization	22 Crypt
07 Source	15 File Number	99 See the special substitute language on the Final
08 Identifying Information	16 Operational Details	Determination Form



# Assassination Records Review Board Final Determination Notification

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AGENCY : PFIAB  
RECORD NUMBER : 206-10001-10006  
RECORD SERIES :  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

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September 24, 1998

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of Postponements: 11

The redactions in this document have been postponed under the provisions set forth in The John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992.

In the margin next to each postponement a number is provided to represent the appropriate substitute language from the list below.

Board Review Completed: 09/14/98

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01 CIA Employee	09 Identifying Information Postponed to Protect the Privacy of an Individual	17 Foreign Relations Issue
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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM

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AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : PFIAB  
RECORD NUMBER : 206-10001-10006  
RECORDS SERIES : PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

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FROM :  
TO :  
TITLE : MINUTES OF BOARD MEETING OF APRIL 2 AND 3, 1964  
DATE : 04/02/64  
PAGES : 8  
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SUMMARY OF APRIL 2 AND 3, 1963 MEETING  
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206-10001-1016

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MINUTES  
OF  
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
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may be released  
4 Apr 98  
[Signature]



*P. J. Friedman*  
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PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD  
AGENDA FOR MEETINGS OF APRIL 2 and 3, 1954

ITEM	TIME	SUBJECT
		<u>April 2, 1954</u>
1.	9:00 - 9:30	Chairman's Time
2.	9:30 - 1:00	Reports on Recent Study Made by Board's Panel (Chairman Baker, Doolittle and Land) on NRO Activities, including highlights of: <u>a. Baker/Coyne Discussions with Mr. McCone Dr. Baker</u>



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April 2 Agenda (Continued):

ITEM TIME

SUBJECT


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3. 1:00 - 2:00

Dinner - White House Mess

4. 2:00 - 2:45



W.S.

5. 2:45 - 3:30

6. 3:30 - 4:15

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7. 4:15 - 4:30

8. 4:30 - 6:00

April 3, 1964


9. 9:00 - 9:15

Chairman's Time

10. 9:15 - 9:30

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11. 9:30 - 10:30




12. 10:30 - 11:00

13. 11:00 - 12:00



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April 3 Agenda (Continued):

ITEM	TIME	SUBJECT
14.	12:00 - 1:00	<u>Briefing on the World Situation</u> Mr. Ray Cline Deputy Director/Intelligence, CIA
15.	1:00 - 2:00	Lunch - White House Mess
16.	2:00 - 2:15	<u>Status Report on Implementation of Board's Recommendations Growing Out of the Dunlap Case</u> Mr. Coyne
17.	2:15 - 2:30	<u>Status Report on Implementation of Other Recent Major Recommendations Made by the Board</u> Mr. Ash
18.	2:30 - End of Day	

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\* The Chairman will outline his views as to the handling of this report (a) initially with Secretary McNamara and Mr. Bundy and (b) ultimately with the President.

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
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

September 10, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board  
Meeting of April 2-3, 1964

A regularly scheduled two-day meeting of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board was convened by Chairman Clifford at 9:00 a.m., April 2, 1964, in the Board's offices, Room 297, Executive Office Building. Present were Board members Doclittle, Gray, Baker, Langer, Pace and Murphy; J. Patrick Coyne, Executive Secretary; and A. R. Ash. (Dr. Land was unavoidably detained at the Boston airport, and joined the Board meeting later in the day.)




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


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At 12:10 p.m. the Board meeting was joined by Mr. Roy Cline, Deputy  
Director of Intelligence, and Mr. Bruce Clark, of CIA. Mr. Cline indicated  
that the Board's interest in receiving a current intelligence briefing  
of the world situation.

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JOINT CHANNELS C. L. P. 1

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