

in the regular mail by way of [redacted] and Mr. Fitzgerald stated in this connection that efforts are being made to equip the team members with additional radios (they have [redacted] agent-type radios now); and it is hoped that the team members will soon be equipped with radio units which are small in size (the transmitter and receiver together about the size of 2 cigarette cartons) and capable of medium speed transmissions for spans of only 60 seconds. Mr. Fitzgerald further informed the Board that there were [redacted] illegal agents in Cuba as of March 1, 1962, and in the 12-month period ending April 1, 1963, [redacted] agents were infiltrated, [redacted] were ex-filtrated, and [redacted] were lost, and as of April 1, 1963 there are in Cuba [redacted] agents comprising the [redacted] illegal agent teams.

With reference to the shipboard agents, Mr. Fitzgerald said that these agents are on board Cuban ships, of which there are only [redacted] operating outside of Cuban waters. With regard to penetrations of Cuban installations previously referred to, Mr. Fitzgerald stated that these involve Cuban diplomats and Cuban diplomatic installations abroad. He added that some [redacted] Cuban diplomats are providing information and [redacted] of these have furnished reports which are considered to be good. In answer to Mr. Murphy's question, Mr. Fitzgerald said that the only penetration of Castro's immediate entourage has been through Castro's younger sister. He added that the penetrations referred to included [redacted] of an audio surveillance nature. Referring again to the 655 intelligence reports which have been obtained from resident agents in Cuba, Mr. Fitzgerald said that these reports are heavily devoted to military subjects and a few of them have proved really worth while, as for example, during the October crisis when these reports served to pin-point MERM locations. On the economic side, it is reported that curtailed exports of special lubricating oil components gives the Cubans a serious problem in the operation of industrial machinery.

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At this point, Mr. Cottrell of the Department of State joined the Board meeting.

In answer to a question by Mr. Murphy, Mr. Fitzgerald said that the intelligence teams mostly confined their activities to intelligence gathering rather than covert action, although the teams do have the mission of creating "low-key" resistance and "subtle sabotage". Mr. Fitzgerald said that although CIA has no policy guidance for positive covert action programs of a specific sabotage nature, there is policy guidance for leaflet drops and radio propaganda, and an example of "subtle sabotage" would be the shorting out of a high tension power line by throwing a copper wire over it.

Mr. Fitzgerald stated that the Special Group approved the monthly plans of the CIA for infiltrations of illegal agents into Cuba, and thereafter the success of infiltrations is determined by such matters as weather conditions and the requirement for carrying out infiltrations in the dark of the moon. Mr. Coyne asked whether CIA was kept informed about U. S. Army infiltrations into Cuba, and Mr. Fitzgerald replied that while CIA received notice of such activity, none had occurred to his knowledge for the past 6 months.

Mr. Murphy asked whether there is available any evidence of organized resistance against the Castro regime within Cuba. Mr. Fitzgerald replied that while there is scattered resistance it is not organized. He recalled that in 1962 resistance organizations composed of students and other groups had been infiltrated by the Castro Security Service and after a time Castro rolled up the resistance groups and smashed them completely. The only resistance which is now active in Cuba is in the form of small bands.

Referring back to Mr. Fitzgerald's earlier comment that the CIA has no policy guidance with respect to the conduct of covert action programs in Cuba, Mr. Coyne

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inquired as to the function of Mr. Cottrell's Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee with respect to Cuba. In response to this question, Mr. Cottrell described his coordinating function, beginning with the point that the President had requested last January that coordination be supplied to the activities of the 6 or 7 U. S. agencies which were dealing with the 4 or 5 Cuban exile groups. The President directed that there be established a focal point for coordination of policy recommendations and execution of approved policies assigned for implementation by various U. S. agencies following decisions by the Executive Committee of the NSC with respect to Cuba. Having been given this coordinating responsibility, Mr. Cottrell named Secretary of the Army Vance and Mr. Eeles of CIA to serve on the committee, with provision for drawing upon representatives of other agencies as might be required from time to time. Mr. Cottrell said that his committee is charged with coordinating policy with respect to Cuba, the objectives being to prevent Cuba from becoming a base of Soviet aggression, to prevent the overt export of military equipment from Cuba to other Latin American countries for communist purposes, to prevent the export of subversive activities to other Latin American countries from Cuba, and to seek the removal of the Soviet presence in Cuba. Mr. Cottrell went on to say that when CIA proposes covert actions with respect to Cuba, the Cottrell Committee considers the proposals and comments on them to the Special Group, and if a policy issue is involved in a given proposal the matter is referred to the Executive Committee of the NSC for decision.

Mr. Murphy asked Mr. Cottrell if he would state for the Board Mr. Cottrell's concept of what U. S. policy toward Cuba is today, for instance whether the policy is of a defensive or an offensive character. Mr. Cottrell answered by saying that in his opinion that the U. S. policy toward Cuba is not defensive, and as an indication of this he referred to the visit which he and Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach made to Nicaragua where a conference was held with officials of Central American countries concerning visa and other travel controls which might be

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- 23 -

improved or instituted for the purpose of restricting the travel of Castro's representatives in Latin American countries. In further describing the U. S. policy, Mr. Cottrell said that in his own view our government does not intend to invade Cuba except as a last resort, and our policy holds that the liberation of Cuba is the responsibility of the Cuban people themselves. However, Mr. Cottrell added, it is felt by a number of people that the time has long past when we might expect a successful popular uprising in Cuba against the Castro regime.

Mr. Gray asked whether the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Cuba would alter the point of view just mentioned by Mr. Cottrell to the effect that we cannot hope for a successful popular uprising in Cuba. Mr. Cottrell preferred that this question be answered by Mr. Fitzgerald who expressed the opinion that withdrawal of Soviet forces would not significantly affect the situation because of the strong internal security measures which are maintained by the Castro regime in Cuba.

Referring again to Mr. Fitzgerald's earlier statement that CIA is lacking in policy guidance on covert actions, Mr. Coyne inquired as to whether requests for such guidance had been made. Mr. Fitzgerald replied that a decision in this area is being sought this week. Mr. Cottrell observed that previously the government's prime objective had been to obtain the release of the 22 Americans imprisoned in Cuba, and now that this has been accomplished, Mr. Cottrell predicted that future operations would include low-level reconnaissance missions, increased sabotage operations, and intensified efforts to obtain OAS action. He added that inasmuch as the "noise level" is down it is hoped that aggressive programs may now be pursued. Mr. Cottrell also said that he believes the time has come to begin creating tensions in the Cuban area, and he noted that critics of the Administration have been charging that our government has fallen into a co-existence policy with respect to Cuba. In Mr. Cottrell's opinion Castro must feel that his recent release of the American prisoners will aid rapprochement efforts with respect to the U. S., and Castro probably hopes that he may now quietly go on building up his communist

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strength.

Next Mr. Bruce Clark of CIA (the DD/I Area) briefed the Board with respect to certain aspects of intelligence coverage of Cuba.

Mr. Clark stated that during the period February 15 to April 20, 1963 the Soviets have removed approximately 4,700 personnel from Cuba. CIA believes that most of the 4,700 Soviet personnel were military people because of their age and appearance and because there is little likelihood that the Soviets would be removing economic personnel from Cuba. CIA estimates that only 500 or 600 Soviets have arrived during this period, and CIA reasons that the 4,700 Soviets who have been withdrawn are military personnel who have completed tours of duty, including some entire logistic units. CIA estimates that this leaves in Cuba Soviet personnel totaling on the order of "12,000 plus". Mr. Clark said that the validity of the latter figure depends on the validity of the original estimated total of 17,500 Soviet personnel in Cuba, a figure which was arrived at on a strict table of organization basis, taking into account the estimated number of persons logically required to operate the equipment which has been observed in Cuba. In the opinion of Mr. Clark, the estimated figure of 4,700 Soviet withdrawals is far sounder than the previous estimate of 17,500 total personnel in Cuba.

Dr. Hillien asked whether there is evidence of re-introduction of Soviet military personnel into Cuba and their deployment and concealment by means of camouflage. Mr. Clark said that in view of the redundancy of the high altitude coverage and the fact that nothing has been seen in photography since November 1962, evidence is to the contrary.

In answer to Mr. Murphy's question as to what Soviet personnel are presently doing in Cuba, Mr. Clark estimated that 7,500 are connected with SAM installations and activity, another 7,500 are in the category of military engineers, and 2,000 are engaged in naval operations. Mr. Clark indicated that Soviet personnel are

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
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scattered out over the island of Cuba and the greatest concentrations are the 2,500 to 4,000 Soviet personnel in the 4 major Soviet armored camps. In answer to Dr. Langer's question as to what the 2,500 to 4,000 personnel are doing, Mr. Clark stated that their main mission was probably the furnishing of training to Cuban military forces. Mr. Clark said that COMINT obtained this week confirms reports that Cuban pilots are receiving training in MIG-21's.

Noting that Mr. Fitzgerald had stated that CI had [redacted] agents in Cuba in 1962 and now has [redacted] agents in Cuba in 1963, Mr. Clifford wondered whether efforts are being made through other Latin American countries to infiltrate clandestine agents in Cuba. Mr. Fitzgerald said that efforts are being made to develop agents from other Latin American countries to operate in Cuba. He added that while Mr. Clifford's recollection was correct concerning the constant figure of "illegal" agents in Cuba as of a year ago and at the present time, nevertheless there are approximately [redacted] "resident" agents in Cuba who are engaged in clandestine intelligence collection.

Messrs. Cottrell, Kirkpatrick, Fitzgerald and Clark departed the Board meeting at this point.



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[REDACTED]

18

With respect to SIGINT collection on Cuba, General Blake informed the Board that in March 1961 there were [REDACTED] ¹⁶ intercept positions and 5 processing staff personnel working on Cuba, which was increased by February 1963 to [REDACTED] ¹⁶ positions and 1,600 people. Mr. Clifford inquired as to whether any SIGINT which was obtained on Cuba entered into U. S. policy decisions during the October 1962 Cuba crisis. General Blake said that the policy makers were supplied with SIGINT on Soviet shipping to Cuba as early as the spring and early summer of 1962. Dr. Tordella added that also in the early summer of 1962 NSA was able to report on the SIGINT buildup of the Soviets in Cuba, and was able to provide information on defense communications networks as well as the plain text of communications sent [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Mr. Murphy inquired as to whether NSA now has an ability to penetrate Soviet communications ⁱⁿ to Cuba. Dr. Tordella stated that in spite of the short distance which separates Cuba from the U. S. the security precautions followed by the Soviets would not permit a hit-and-run commando type effort to pre-empt the communications equipment involved. General Blake had no suggestions to offer in response to Mr. Coyne's inquiry as to whether the NSA would like to extend its operations with respect to Cuba beyond those which are now programmed. General Blake did refer to efforts which are being made, through direction finding methods, to pin-point the location of the Soviet communications equipment in question, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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P. S. Tidwell

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

January 16, 1964

Dear John:

The next meeting of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board is scheduled to be held on January 30, 1964, and in line with established practice it would be very much appreciated if you would meet with us on the morning of that day, preferably from 10:00 to 11:00 a.m.

At the time of your meeting with us, it would be helpful if you would be prepared to discuss the subjects outlined in the attachment.

Sincerely,

Clark M. Clifford
Chairman

Attachment

Mr. John A. McCone
Director of Central Intelligence
Langley, Virginia

General Cordier will attend meeting in Mr. McCone's absence from the country.

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PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

Subjects Suggested by Board Members for Discussion by the Director of Central Intelligence at the Board Meeting of January 30, 1964

1. Cuba
(Status and effectiveness of clandestine collection and covert action programs; numbers and missions of Soviet personnel in Cuba; Castro's involvement in counter-insurgency and subversive programs in Latin America and other countries.)
2. South Vietnam
(Prospects for permanency of present regime; adequacy of coordination and effectiveness of indigenous intelligence organizations.)
3. Panama
(Availability of pre-oxis intelligence indicators and timeliness of current reporting thereon; extent of Castro influence.)
4. Separation of the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence from the Central Intelligence Agency
(Views as to desirability and feasibility.)
5. U. S. Counterintelligence Features
(Assessment of damage to U. S. intelligence sources and operations resulting from Dunlap and Howell cases. Status of CIA studies on protection of intelligence, intelligence sources and methods.)
6. Joint Congressional Committee on Foreign Intelligence
(The DCI's appraisal of effect such a Committee arrangement would have on CIA effectiveness and security of foreign intelligence and related activities.)
7. CIA Estimate on Economy of USSR
(The DCI's comments on substance of the estimate and dissemination of 121 public release by CIA.)

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P.L. T...

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

14 January 1964

Dear Clark:

As you probably know, I am leaving for Europe on Saturday and hence will miss an opportunity to visit with you in the immediate future. However I wish you to know the background of the press incident which unfortunately has been "blown up" and hence the theme of a great number of editorials.

Therefore I am attaching a memorandum prepared for my file to review the series of events which led up to the release of information on the Soviet economy with CIA attribution. Also attached is a copy of a letter from Senator Stennis and my reply. Finally, there is a copy of the directive which I am issuing today in order to prevent an inadvertent recurrence of the situation.

Frankly I am surprised at the publicity and furthermore I cannot be overly critical of the attribution because of the long history of CIA's releases on Soviet economy. We have for 10 years been issuing volumes on this subject in unclassified form carrying the Central Intelligence Agency name and these are in universities, libraries, and in the hands of virtually all economists and newspapermen interested in the subject. Furthermore, Allen Dulles has testified in open hearing and on the record on this subject. It was a favorite topic for speeches by Allen, General Cabell and Bob Amory in the days when CIA officials were making speeches. Hence the denial of the privilege of attribution would have, in my opinion, not been respected by anyone in the press.

*ndev
P.P.K.*

Two additional points which might have something to do with this -- first, we recently lost Col. Grogan, who has handled press relations for CIA for years, because of retirement after a heart attack. His replacement, a capable officer in the field of public relations was in the process of getting acquainted with the press and hence was not as sensitive to the tricky problem of press relationship as a more experienced press officer might have been. Secondly,

*1-20-64
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P.B.T. 1695*

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
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I have known for some time, as I told you, that there are people in this Government, most particularly in the State Department, who enjoy harassing CIA in the press. I think, although I cannot prove it, that they have not been inclined to pass up this opportunity.

Sincerely,


John A. McCone
Director

Attachments as stated

The Honorable Clark Clifford
Chairman, President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board
Washington, D. C.

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UNITED STATES SENATE

C
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P
Y

January 13, 1964

Honorable John A. McCone
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. McCone:

Recently I read an article stating that the CIA had held a press conference during which the Soviet economy was discussed.

My impression is that the holding of press conferences is a distinct departure from CIA's past practice. I would appreciate it if you would advise me of the significance of this occurrence and whether it represents a change of policy which will be a precedent for the future.

Sincerely,

/S/

John Stennis
United States Senator

P.B. #1695

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

14 January 1964

The Honorable John Stennis
The United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

Dear Senator Stennis:

This is in reply to your letter of January 13th. As I told you when I saw you at my meeting with your Committee on Friday afternoon, the press report of a "CIA press conference" was something of an over-statement of fact, although circumstances were such that I can understand the reason for the statement.

What happened was that several reporters received unclassified information on the Soviet economy from us and one of them featured the CIA attribution. This brought an avalanche of requests from other reporters who felt that one had been favored with some "inside information." Therefore our people prepared a brief memorandum of just what had been told and invited the inquirers to come out and pick it up. All who inquired were asked to come at a particular hour. The fact that they were met and talked to by a CIA officer during the course of distribution of the memorandum gave rise to the report that it had been a "CIA press conference," which, I think, overstates what happened.

I have been concerned over the fact that the CIA attribution has been given such wide-spread publicity and frankly don't understand why because in this area, namely Soviet economics, CIA has been a recognized authority and has for the past 10 years issued volumes of unclassified reports of one sort or another which have been distributed to libraries and universities. Moreover, the subject was a favorite subject of my predecessor who looked upon it as one area which he could treat freely and publicly in open forum. You may recall there was an open hearing by the Joint Economic Committee on 13 November 1959 at which the Director of Central Intelligence testified.

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In view of all this, I cannot criticize the authorized attribution.

The above background of CIA interest in, and continued study of, the Soviet economy is so well known to the press that a request for non-attribution would most certainly not have been respected. Nevertheless I have restated our rules so that no such circumstance will again occur without my consent and approval; and this, I assure you, would be given only after consultation with all interested parties.

I have tried to answer your questions by the above explanations but I assure you that there is no change of policy which will be a precedent for the future.

Sincerely,

JS/

John A. McCone
Director

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

September 24, 1964

SUMMARY

Recommendations Previously made by the Board
for Strengthening Capabilities of the U. S.
Intelligence Community in the Timely Analysis
and Reporting of Current Intelligence on
Developing Crisis Situations

PFMB

NO OBJECTION
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WMS 3-20-98

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Board Report of July 2, 1961

Rec. #4: That the U. S. Intelligence Board create the means for assessing and reporting early warning indications of developing "cold war" crisis situations in any part of the world (such early warning to be handled separately from "hot war" indications dealt with in the National Indications Center of the U. S. Intelligence Board's Watch Committee).

Board Report of July 2, 1961

Rec. #1(7): That the DCI be responsible for (1) overseeing the preparation of national intelligence estimates by the intelligence community, (2) assuring the timely flow of intelligence to the White House, and (3) providing intelligence briefings to the President and other White House officials as required.

Board Report of January 11, 1962

Rec. #26: (Based on a review of the Berlin Wall and Syrian coup incidents): That (1) a sense of urgency be imparted at field and headquarters levels of U. S. intelligence agencies, with a view to ensuring timely reporting, dissemination and assessment of intelligence indicating the imminence of crisis situations which are of potential significance to the foreign policy and national security interests of the United States; (2) without imposing undue delay on the transmission of raw intelligence to Washington, State Department officials at overseas posts prepare periodic appraisals of developing crisis situations, for use at the field level and for consideration at Washington in the preparation of intelligence analyses and estimates; (3) procedures of the U. S. Intelligence Board, and its subsidiaries such as the Watch Committee, ensure that intelligence appraisals reflect significant differences of view which may develop in the intelligence estimative process; and (4) in keeping with the DCI's responsibility for the timely flow of intelligence to the White House, the DCI be requested to review arrangements and procedures to ensure that (a) CIA's intelligence assessments and spot reports on developing crisis situations are made available for timely consideration by the President and other officials, and (b) copies of assessments and spot reports to the White House from other agencies are furnished to the DCI for information and for use in preparing intelligence estimates.

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Board Report of January 20, 1962

Rec. #32: That the Director of Central Intelligence, in consultation with the U. S. Intelligence Board, review the functions of the U. S. Intelligence Board's Watch Committee and National Indications Center, to determine their effectiveness in carrying out their mission of providing early warning.

Board Report of March 8, 1963

Rec. #49(11) (Based on the review of intelligence coverage, assessment and reporting by U. S. agencies with respect to the Soviet military buildup in Cuba in 1962): That concerted efforts be made to (1) devise an effective mechanism for the integrated assessment (and cumulative periodic appraisals) of early-warning and indicator-type intelligence and prompt reporting thereof to policy-making and command officials; and (2) conduct intensified research concerning automatic data processing techniques to facilitate the review and assessment of the great volume of material dealt with in the United States intelligence community.

Related Board Recommendations Regarding
Improved Communications Capability for the
Quick Transmittal of Vital Intelligence Data

Board Report of October 17, 1961

In lieu of a recommendation, this was a report to the President on progress achieved by the Defense Department in performing its share of the responsibility for the efficiency of the Critical Communications (CRITICOM) Network for the quick transmittal of vital early warning and other intelligence data from overseas posts to headquarters in Washington.

Board Report of January 20, 1962

Rec. #27(11) (Based on review of U. S. intelligence activities in seven Middle Eastern countries): That the Defense Department equip field elements of the Critical Communications (CRITICOMM) Network with capability for rapid communication of critical messages among major and subordinate military commands in the field.

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Board Report of October 5, 1962

Rec. #40 (Based on review of U. S. foreign intelligence activities in Southeast Asia and the Far East): that the Defense Intelligence Agency take action regarding the military Special Security Offices (SSO) Communications System for transmitting sensitive information with a view to: (1) consolidating parallel SSO networks running between Pacific military commands and Washington civilian officials, and (2) reorienting the SSO system to make it a primary service and support to Commands in the field and command (as distinguished from Service) elements in Washington.


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INDICATIONS INTELLIGENCE/ INFORMATION

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*Note: Distributed to members at meeting
by Mr. Steldon*



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NO OBJECTION
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WNS 3-20-98

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET

February 27, 1963

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 226

TO: The Secretary of State
 The Secretary of the Treasury
 The Secretary of Defense
 The Attorney General
 The Secretary of Commerce
 The Director, Office of Emergency Planning
 The Director, Bureau of the Budget
 The Director, United States Information Agency
 The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
 The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
 The Director of Central Intelligence
 The Administrator, National Aeronautics and
 Space Administration
 The Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Directive Relating to Transmittal of Information
 to the Watch Committee of the United States In-
 telligence Board

I hereby approve the attached directive relating to the
 transmittal of information by appropriate departments and agencies
 of the Government to the Watch Committee of the United States
 Intelligence Board.

*DOS
 no objection
 8/6/98*

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
 DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
 RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
 25/0/98 *indiv*

PB #2328

Attachment
 Above-referenced directive

*Note: Distributed to members
 at meeting by
 Mr. Skoldon*

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Signature

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Directive Relating to Transmittal of Information to the
Watch Committee of the United States Intelligence Board

1. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102(c) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and for the purpose of providing necessary support to the Watch Committee of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) in the accomplishment of its mission, all appropriate departments and agencies of the Government are authorized and directed by the President:

a. To make fully available to the Watch Committee of the USIB all information and intelligence of reasonable credibility pertinent to its mission and functions (as defined in DCID 1/5 (now series), attached hereto), without restriction because of source, policy or operational sensitivity.

b. To keep the Watch Committee of the USIB informed concerning significant diplomatic, political, military, or other courses of action by the U. S., approved for immediate implementation or in process of execution, which might bring about military reaction or early hostile action by the USSR, or its allies, thus endangering the security of the U. S. This information is for the explicit and express use of the Watch Committee and those members of the National Indications Center who need to know of it in order to perform their functions.

2. When, in the opinion of a department or agency, overriding considerations affecting the national security exist which justify an exception to a. or b. above, the decision as to withholding or delaying the transmission of the information to the Watch Committee shall be taken up with the Director of Central Intelligence and, if there is disagreement, referred to the President. In the case of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the matter shall be taken up by the Director thereof with the Attorney General who shall consult with the Director of Central Intelligence, and if there is disagreement the matter shall be referred to the President.

3. Under normal circumstances such data should be sent to the Director of the National Indications Center, Pentagon Building. When an item is considered of exceptional sensitivity, it should be addressed

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to the Chairman of the Watch Committee, in care of the Director,
National Indications Center.

Attachment Copy of Director of Central
Intelligence Directive (DCID)
No. 1/5 (New Series).

Copy furnished: Each member of the United States
Intelligence Board.

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Assassination Records Review Board Final Determination Notification

AGENCY : PFIAB
RECORD NUMBER : 206-10001-10001
RECORD SERIES :
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

September 24, 1998
Status of Document: Postponed in Part
Number of Postponements: 45

The redactions in this document have been postponed under the provisions set forth in The John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992.

In the margin next to each postponement a number is provided to represent the appropriate substitute language from the list below.

Board Review Completed: 09/14/98

- | | | |
|--|--|--|
| 01 CIA Employee | 09 Identifying Information Postponed to Protect the Privacy of an Individual | 17 Foreign Relations Issue |
| 02 CIA Job Title | 10 Date | 18 Information Not Related to the JFK A |
| 03 NSA Employee | 11 Location | 19 No Suitable Substitute Language |
| 04 NSA Internal Production Information | 12 Country | 20 Digraph |
| 05 NSA Dissemination Information | 13 Company | 21 Number |
| 06 Name of Person | 14 Name of Organization | 22 Crypt |
| 07 Source | 15 File Number | 99 See the special substitute language c |
| 08 Identifying Information | 16 Operational Details | Determination Form |

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : PFIAB
RECORD NUMBER : 206-10001-10001
RECORDS SERIES : PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : PFIAB
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : MEETING OF THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
ADVISORY BOARD ON SEPTEMBER 12-13, 1963
DATE : 09/12/63
PAGES : 33
SUBJECTS : AGENDA FOR SEPTEMBER 12 AND 13, 1963 MEETING
SUMMARY OF SEPTEMBER 12 AND 13, 1963 MEETING
DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 1B, 1C
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 08/06/98
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

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MEETING OF THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
ADVISORY BOARD on SEPTEMBER 12 - 13, 1963

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to be made
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PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD
AGENDA FOR MEETINGS OF SEPTEMBER 12-13, 1953


ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-19-89 BY SP-6
AS SANITIZED
CAB 31-4969

ITEM TIME

September 12, 1953

① 9:00 - 11:00

The Chairman's Time



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
8

② 11:00 - 12:00

③ 12:00 - 12:15 Executive Session

④ 12:15 - 1:00 Lunch - The White House Mess

⑤ 1:00 - 1:45



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
⑥ 1:45 - 2:45 Counterintelligence Program of CIA

Mr. James Angleton

Executive Session

⑦ 2:45 - 3:15

⑧ 3:15 - 4:15



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⑨ 4:15 - 4:45

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Angleton will be late

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>
10.	4:45 - 5:45	Consideration of Revised SIGINT Report of Board's Communications Panel <u>Dr. Baker</u>
11.	5:45 - 6:00	Status Report on Covert Action Operations <u>Murphy-Gray-Langer Panel</u>
12.	6:00 - 6:15	Status Report on State Department Intelligence Activities <u>Murphy Panel</u>

September 13, 1963

13.	9:00 - 9:30	The Chairman's Time
14.	9:30 - 10:15	Covert Action and Intelligence Operations Relating to Cuba <u>Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald, CIA</u>
15.	10:15 - 12:15	Discussion with the Director of Central Intelligence <u>Mr. John McCone</u>
16.	12:15 - 1:00	Lunch - The White House Mess
17.	1:00 - 1:30	Discussion with the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs <u>Mr. McGeorge Bundy</u>
18.	1:30 - 2:00	Executive Session
* 19.	2:00 - 6:00	Preparation of Draft Report to be Submitted to the President at a Later Date, Following Appropriate Review and Coordination with the Board Members.

*CIA Ops -
Against Cuba*

*McCone -
Bundy
P. 75
Several
CIA ops were
100*

** not taken up with Board Mtg.*

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : PFIAB
RECORD NUMBER : 206-10001-10003
RECORDS SERIES : PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

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FROM :
TO :
TITLE : PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD AGENDA
FOR MEETING OF NOVEMBER 21-22, 1963
DATE : 11/21/63
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.. SUMMARY OF NOVEMBER 21 AND 22, 1963 MEETING

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COMMENTS :

206-10001-10003

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 20, 1963

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS

SUBJECT: South Vietnam

The Director of Central Intelligence has suggested to the Chairman that the Board might wish to be brought up to date on recent intelligence and related activities involved in South Vietnam, including the activities of CIA preceding and following the overthrow of Drem. The Chairman concurred in this suggestion.

Accordingly, arrangements have been made for the Board to be provided an oral briefing on the subject by Mr. William Colby, Chief of the Far East Division, of the DD/P Staff, CIA.

/s/

J. Patrick Coyne

SECRET

NO OBJECTION
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
LMS 3-20-98

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
EST 2/1/98

November 20, 1963

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS

SUBJECT: South Vietnam

The Director of Central Intelligence has suggested to the Chairman that the Board might wish to be brought up to date on recent intelligence and related activities involved in South Vietnam, including the activities of CIA preceding and following the overthrow of Diem. The Chairman concurred in this suggestion. (PH)

Accordingly, arrangements have been made for the Board to be provided an oral briefing on the subject by Mr. William Colby, Chief of the Far East Division, of the DD/P Staff, CIA.

/s/

J. Patrick Coyne

SECRET

Assassination Records Review Board Final Determination Notification

AGENCY : PFIAB
RECORD NUMBER : 206-10001-10004
RECORD SERIES :
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

September 24, 1998

Status of Document: Postponed in Part
Number of Postponements: 20

The redactions in this document have been postponed under the provisions set forth in The John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992.

In the margin next to each postponement a number is provided to represent the appropriate substitute language from the list below.

Board Review Completed: 09/14/98

01 CIA Employee
02 CIA Job Title
03 NSA Employee
04 NSA Internal Production Information
05 NSA Dissemination Information
06 Name of Person
07 Source
08 Identifying Information

09 Identifying Information Postponed to Protect the Privacy of an Individual
10 Date
11 Location
12 Country
13 Company
14 Name of Organization
15 File Number
16 Operational Details

17 Foreign Relations Issue
18 Information Not Related to the JFK Assassination
19 No Suitable Substitute Language
20 Digraph
21 Number
22 Crypt
99 See the special substitute language on the Final Determination Form

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : PFIAB
RECORD NUMBER : 206-10001-10004
RECORDS SERIES : PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

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TITLE : MEETING OF THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
ADVISORY BOARD ON JUNE 25-26, 1963
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PAGES : 8
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SUMMARY OF JUNE 25 AND 26, 1963 MEETING
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206-10001-10004

MEETING OF THE
PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
ON
June 25 - 26, 1963

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
AGENDA FOR MEETINGS OF JUNE 25 - 26, 1953

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>
		June 25, 1953 (all were present)
1.	9:00 - 10:00	The Chairman's Time Mr. Clifford
2.	10:00 - 10:15	[REDACTED]
3.	10:15 - 11:00	Status Report on Organization and Operations of CIA in non-Covert Action Areas Doolittle Panel
4.	11:00 - 11:30	[REDACTED]
5.	11:30 - 12:00	Status Report on State Department Intelligence Activities Murphy Panel
6.	12:00 - 12:30	[REDACTED]
7.	12:40 - 2:00	Lunch - Metropolitan Club (Anderson Room - Second Floor)
8.	2:00 - 2:30	[REDACTED]
9.	2:30 - 3:00	Executive Session Discussion of DCF's Comments on Report and Recommendations Growing Out of the Board's Cuba Review
10.	3:00 - 3:30	[REDACTED]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/24/88 BY 24158

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For material on Panel assignments see ① Blue Panel Material ② Black, of Ash and Copy

Assassination Records Review Board Final Determination Notification

AGENCY : PFIAB
RECORD NUMBER : 206-10001-10000
RECORD SERIES :
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

September 24, 1998
Status of Document: Postponed in Part
Number of Postponements: 25

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In the margin next to each postponement a number is provided to represent the appropriate substitute language from the list below.

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02 CIA Job Title
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23 See the special substitute language on the Final
Determination Form

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : PFIAB
RECORD NUMBER : 206-10001-10000
RECORDS SERIES : PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

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PAGES : 21
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RESTRICTIONS : 1A, 1B, 1C
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 08/14/98
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

25

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D/A
MacDonald
8/14/98

MINUTES OF
BOARD MEETING
OF
OCTOBER 1 and 2, 1964

Protect however
highlighted info for NSA
4/29/98


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PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
AGENDA FOR OCTOBER 1 and 2, 1964

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RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
25-2-98 mlh

October 1, 1964

ITEM	TIME	SUBJECT
1.	9:00 - 9:45	Chairman's Time
2.	9:45 - 10:15	Major Board Recommendations - Status Report Mr. Ash
3.	10:15 - 11:15	Audiosurveillance Collection and Counter- measures:
a.	10:15 - 10:30 10:45	Final USIB Assessment of Audio Penetrations of U. S. Embassy, Moscow Mr. Howard Osborn Director of Security, CIA, and Chairman of USIB's Security Committee Mr. Marvin Gentile <i>Kevin C. Brown</i> Director of Security, Department of State
b.	10:45 - 11:45 10:30 - 11:15	USIB Conclusions and Recommendations on Organization, Management and Coordination of the Effort Mr. Richard Helms <i>and [unclear]</i> Deputy Director/Plans, CIA Mr. Howard Osborn
4.	11:15 - 11:30	Executive Session
5.	11:45 11:30 - 12:15	
6.	12:15 - 1:00	Lunch - White House Mess.
7.	1:00 - 1:30	Recent Tonkin Gulf Incident:
a.	1:00 - 1:15 1:40	General Highlights Mr. Coyne
b.	1:40 1:15 - 1:30 2:10	White House Intelligence Requirements in Developing Crisis Situations Mr. Bromley Smith Office of the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

NO OBJECTION
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
445 5-20-76

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