E. Goodell (R, N.Y.) [q.v.] and Robert P. Griffin (R, Mich.) [q.v.]. He frequently supported the Kennedy Administration's foreign and defense policies but remained opposed to most New Frontier domestic legislation. [See EISENHOWER, KENNEDY Volumes]

On Nov. 29, 1963 President Johnson appointed Ford to the seven-member commission headed by Chief Justice Earl Warren [q.v.] to investigate the assassination of John F. Kennedy. After the panel's report became public in September 1964, Ford defended its conclusions and in 1965 coauthored Portrait of the Assassin, which supported the Warren Commission's contention that Lee Harvey Oswald acted

alone in the President's murder.

The Republicans' disastrous showing in the 1964 elections convinced many House members that their leadership needed a new image. The "Young Turks" persuaded Ford to oppose Halleck, although both the Indiana Republican and he shared similar voting records. The conservative Americans for Constitutional Action gave Halleck an 86% rating and marked Ford 83% right on the same issues. But younger House Republicans considered Halleck inattentive to their views, and liberal members strongly condemned his unofficial coalition with Southern Democrats. Ford promised his colleagues a more open and positive leadership that would make every member "a sixty-minute player." In addition, the ruggedly handsome Ford appeared an attractive alternative to the 64-year-old, overweight Halleck, who bitterly assailed the confrontation as a "beauty contest." By a vote of 73 to 67, Ford unseated Halleck on Jan. 4, 1965. However, the Party caucus then defeated Ford's candidate for minority whip, Peter H. B. Frelinghrysen (R. N.I.) [q.v.] and elected Leslie Arends.

Ford worked to end the House Republi- 1967. In May 1967 Ford again expr cans' silent partnership with Southern the need for ending the conservative Democratic committee chairmen, which tion, "to drive Southern Democrats int prevented important legislation from reach- arms of the Administration—where the ing the House floor. Instead, the new long." But during the 90th Congres Minority Leader wanted Johnson's Great coalition enjoyed a vigorous revival. Ac Society proposals brought out of committee ing to Congressional Quarterly, the in order to permit House Republicans a tion won only 25% of the votes on sel chance to vote for or against the legislation.

He urged his colleagues to offer posit ternatives to White House legislatio the Southern Democrats vote wit fine," he wrote in January 1965, "bu will be voting for a Republican positio

The new strategy failed during the Congress because the massive Demo majority enabled the President's either to defeat, or when necessary, corporate Republican amendments Great Society legislation and then a full credit for each bill's enactment. I the Ways and Means Committee he on the medicare bill, Chairman W Mills (D, Ark.) [q.v.] agreed to a ments covering the cost of doctors' se and drugs in the measure proposed b Committee's ranking Republican, Rep. W. Byrnes (R, Wisc.) [q.v.]. Reporte of committee with the Byrnes provision narrow 70-68 majority of GOP I members voted for medicare in July Ford alone of Michigan's nine-memb ϵ publican congressional delegation against the law.

The Republican gain of 47 House se November 1966 gave Ford an oppor to demonstrate his leadership Through hard work and an honest, going personal style, he could us bridge the geographic and ideologica ferences among House Republicans endorsed the policy recommendati Reps. Goodell and Albert H. Qui Minn.) [q.v.] to replace programmed eral assistance to localities with a grant" appropriation to the states. A vigorous lobbying campaign, the Adı tration defeated the Republican effort clude the block grant system in the 1967 education aid bill. However House agreed, for the first time, to i ment the block grant method in the (Control and Safe Streets Act in A issues in 1965 and 32% in 1966; y