

1965 Rusk opposed at a settlement. With the Front controlling more Vietnam and the Saigon ing, the U.S. could not ition of strength. Until n Hanoi tilted the bal- ard the South, Rusk as- ould have little incentive at whatever talks could ave little value. Rusk ing halt of December for the same reasons. use could be effectively , he recommended that ned until the bombing point where North Viet- er tolerate the damage l to accept a settlement

on years Rusk emerged e defender of the Ad- n. In February 1966 he d hearings of the Senate Committee, chaired by ight (D, Ark.) [q.v.], to on policy. Rusk sought charge that the conflict which the U.S. had no describing what he be- term pattern of Com- ession. One year later, 7 press conference, he esence as necessary to om the future threat of n the mainland, armed s." Rusk often used the o explain the American um. In a January 1967 leaders, he maintained ie world community to thiopia, Manchuria and ing the 1930s had re- ar II. "In short," he olved in Vietnam be- painful experience that ition for order on our sion must not be per- For when it does suc- nce is not peace, it is on of aggression. And ie responsibility in our have not for one mo-

ment forgotten that a third world war would be a nuclear war."

According to journalist David Halberstam, as Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara [q.v.] began to question U.S. policy during 1967, Rusk felt it his duty to be more steadfast in his support of the President's actions. In Halberstam's words, Rusk "became a rock, unflinching and unchanging and absorbing, as deliberately as he could, as much of the reaction to the war as possible."

Following the Communists' Tet offensive of February 1968, the military requested over 200,000 additional troops for the war. Rusk recommended that the President approve the increase. However, a bipartisan panel of statesmen specially convened to advise Johnson on the proposal opposed a further increase because of the detrimental effects it could have on the U.S. economy and society. Johnson accepted the panel's advice and on March 31 announced a policy of de-escalation. He hoped that the step would prompt Hanoi to enter negotiations. Hanoi quickly accepted the offer with the provision that initial meetings deal only with conditions for a total bombing halt. According to Undersecretary of the Air Force Townsend Hoopes [q.v.], Rusk "tried to slow down, and if possible avoid altogether" the initial talks. He emphasized the limited purpose of the discussions and denigrated the possibility of a complete bombing halt. Preliminary peace talks began in Paris in May 1968. Rusk played little part in them; the American delegation was headed by W. Averell Harriman [q.v.].

Rusk left office in January 1969. After a few months in semi-retirement, he became professor of international law at the University of Georgia.

[EWS]

For further information:

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Townsend Hoopes, *The Limits of Intervention* (New York, 1969).

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**RUSSELL, RICHARD B(REVARD)**

b. Nov. 2, 1897; Winder, Ga.

d. Jan. 21, 1971; Washington, D.C.

Democratic Senator, Ga., 1933-71; Chairman, Armed Services Committee 1951-53, 1955-69.

Elected to the Georgia Assembly in 1921 Russell became its speaker six years later. In 1930 he won a two-year term as governor of the state and in 1932 was elected to fill a vacant U.S. Senate seat. During his early years in the Senate, he generally supported New Deal programs, but after World War II he became an opponent of most social welfare measures.

Throughout his career Russell was an unrelenting foe of civil rights measures, and by the late 1940s he was the solidly established leader of the Southern bloc in the upper house of Congress. At the 1948 Democratic National Convention, he was put forward as his region's candidate for the Party's presidential nomination, but he did not join the Dixiecrat bolt from the national ticket after the nomination of President Harry S Truman.

Despite Russell's identification with the dissident Southern wing of the Democratic Party, he was highly regarded by almost all senators. A member of a patrician family, he was known for his dignified bearing and courteous manner as well as for his formidable intelligence. Aided by this reputation and a single-minded dedication to his work and an intimate knowledge of parliamentary procedure and his leadership of the powerful Southern senatorial caucus, Russell became one of the most influential members of Congress in the 1940s and 1950s.

Russell reached the peak of his prestige in 1951, when he chaired an investigation of President Truman's removal of General Douglas MacArthur from his Korean command. He was credited with defusing a potentially explosive situation by his tactful handling of the matter. The following year Russell made a serious bid for the Democratic presidential nomination but was hampered by his sectional identification and received only 294 out of 1,200 votes at the Party's convention. Somewhat embittered by the loss, he declined an opportunity



become Senate majority leader in 1953, preferring to serve as a spokesman for the South. Instead, he successfully promoted Sen. Lyndon B. Johnson (D, Tex.) for the post of majority leader.

Russell became chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee in 1951 and in that position played a major role in the area of military affairs in the 1950s and early 1960s. An advocate of a strong national defense, Russell criticized the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations for depending too heavily upon nuclear deterrence as their prime military strategy, and he succeeded in increasing appropriations for Air Force bombers during the Kennedy presidency. In that period he also led Southern resistance to the Civil Rights Acts of 1957 and 1960 and directed a successful filibuster against a bill barring discriminatory use of literacy tests by voting registrars. In 1963 he declared his vehement opposition to the public accommodations bill proposed by President Kennedy in June. [See TRUMAN, EISENHOWER, KENNEDY Volumes]

Russell's power declined in the 1960s as the Southern delegation in Congress became less ideologically conservative with the election of younger and more moderate men. However, he remained an influential figure during those years. In addition to his Armed Services Committee chairmanship and second-ranking position on the Appropriations and Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committees, he was a member of the Democratic Policy Committee and led the conservative majority on the Democratic Steering Committee, which distributed committee assignments. Early in 1965 liberal Democratic senators attempted to reform the Steering Committee, but Russell succeeded in preserving a slender conservative edge on the panel. Writing in *The Reporter* in May 1964, Meg Greenfield stated that "he is the unofficial chairman of what amounts to an interlocking directorate of Southern committee and subcommittee chairmen without whose cooperation it is not possible to run the Senate."

In 1964 Congress considered the public accommodations bill originally proposed by President Kennedy; it was the most far-reaching anti-discrimination measure since

Reconstruction. When the bill was received by the Senate in February after House passage, Russell directed the Southern forces in a debate that involved some of the most complex parliamentary maneuvering in the history of the Senate. His goal was to delay passage of the bill until the summer, believing that the Administration would then drop it to avoid the spectacle of an intra-party dispute during the Democratic National Convention.

However, President Johnson indicated to the Senate leadership that he was prepared to sacrifice all other legislation rather than abandon the bill in the face of a Southern filibuster. Meanwhile, public sentiment in favor of legislation promoting racial equality was steadily mounting. On June 10 the Senate voted to close off debate on an anti-civil rights filibuster for the first time in its history. Angry over his defeat Russell shouted on the Senate floor, "We're confronted here not only with the spirit of the mob but of the lynch mob." Some observers believed that Russell had made a strategic error by his refusal to accept a compromise bill.

Russell was hospitalized for emphysema in 1965 and could not lead the fight against the voting rights bill. In the remaining years of the Johnson Administration, he suffered additional defeats in the area of civil rights. Despite these setbacks and the growing size of the black electorate in Georgia, he refused to modify his views.

Although Russell voted for President Johnson's mass transit and Appalachia aid bills, he generally opposed Great Society programs. In 1964 he refused to campaign for Johnson or even to endorse him by name. But the two men had developed a close friendship during their years in the Senate, and the President discussed political strategy with Russell even concerning matters on which they disagreed.

Russell supported swift and decisive military actions, such as the invasion of the Dominican Republic in 1965, but he was wary of involvement in protracted foreign wars. He had opposed American assistance to the French in Indochina and felt strong misgivings about the escalation of the conflict in Vietnam during the mid-1960s. Rus-



sell believed, however, that the American commitment in Southeast Asia, once made, had to be honored. In 1964 he and the three other ranking members of the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees introduced the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in the upper house. Two years later he opposed an amendment by Sen. Wayne Morse (D, Ore.) [ *q.v.* ] to repeal the Tonkin Resolution and urged its rejection as a "reaffirmation of the President's power." In 1966 Russell and Sen. Leverett Saltonstall (R, Mass.) [ *q.v.* ] cosponsored an amendment granting the President new authority to mobilize substantial numbers of reservists to meet manpower requirements for the Vietnam war.

However, during the same year Russell warned that the war was unpopular and that Americans would not indefinitely support a policy that did not promise foreseeable victory. Ultimately, he said, political pressure would compel a change in policy. In April 1966 Russell indicated his own view of the direction in which change should occur, asserting that he hoped that "our bombing operations will be intensified to take in all of the military targets in Vietnam. . . . I think we should use our full strength to push this war to a conclusion."

After the National Liberation Front's Tet offensive early in 1968, Russell, believing that the time for a change in policy had come, declared that he would not support the sending of additional ground troops to Indochina unless there was a drastic escalation of the air war. He said that the initial American entry into the war was a mistake but that the United States could not abandon South Vietnam to the Communists.

Russell's personal influence in defense matters was largely responsible for the Senate's 1967 decision to drop Administration-requested funds for a fleet of fast ships designed to give the United States a rapid transport capability in future brushfire wars. Fearing that such ships might encourage further entanglements like Vietnam, he commented, "If it is easy for us to go anywhere and do anything, we will always be going somewhere and doing something."

Although Russell wanted to avoid future American entry into similar wars and op-

posed the funding of military projects that would facilitate such involvement, he was a leading congressional advocate of defensive missile installations. In 1966 he played a key role in securing Senate approval of funds for production of the Nike-X, an extensive antiballistic missile system, which the Defense Department regarded as ineffective. The Administration did not build the Nike-X system, but in 1967 it supported a more modest Sentinel antiballistic missile (ABM) system for defense against a Chinese nuclear attack. Russell, still favoring the larger program, did not regard the threat of a Chinese attack as a serious possibility and ridiculed the proposal. But the following year, when the Sentinel ABM was presented as a defense against Soviet as well as Chinese missiles, Russell supported it as "the first step in a defense system against atomic attack from the Soviet Union," and the Senate appropriated construction funds.

In 1969 Russell stepped down as chairman of the Armed Services Committee to head the Appropriations Committee. During the same year he became President Pro Tempore of the Senate. In 1970 a United Press International poll found that Russell was one of three Democratic senators supporting President Nixon's decision to send U.S. troops into Cambodia. On Jan. 21, 1971, while still a senator, he died of respiratory insufficiency after six weeks of hospitalization. [See NIXON Volume]

[MLL]

For further information:

Meg Greenfield, "The Man Who Leads the Southern Senators," *The Reporter* (May 21, 1964), pp. 17-21.

Don Oberdorfer, "The Filibuster's Best Friend," *Saturday Evening Post* (March 13, 1965), pp. 90-92.

## RUSTIN, BAYARD

b. March 17, 1910; West Chester, Pa.  
Civil rights leader.

An illegitimate child, Rustin was raised by his grandparents in West Chester, Pa. His grandmother belonged to the Society of Friends, and he was influenced by the