Some released CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director

Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT:

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Lee Harvey OSWALD's Access to Classified Information About the U-2

dr. 105-8-111-3-6:

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1. Reference is made to your letter, dated 13 April 1964, captioned "Lee Harvey OSWALD, Internal Security - Russia -Cuba", and to the attachment which contained statements made by one, Eugene J. HOBBS, HMC, USN. Your letter requested certain information regarding subject's Marine assignment at the Naval Air Station, Atsugi, Japan, in 1957 and 1958. The remarks furnished below are addressed to the contents of your letter and to the statements in the attachment.

2. The Atsugi Naval Air Station is located approximately 35 miles south and west of Tokyo, Japan. At the time in question, Atsugi was a "closed" base in the sense that American and indigenous personnel entering the Station were required to possess official identification cards. Within the Station, the flight line areas were restricted, as is the case of all such Stations, and certain hangar areas were further restricted for the performance of classified functions.

3. The Joint Technical Advisory Group (JTAG) occupied an area within the Station, consisting of 20 to 25 individual residences, two dormitories, an office area, a power plant, several Butler-type warehouses, and a club building used for recreation and a bachelor officers' mess. The JTAG area was not closed, but it was located about 400 yards from the main

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Station area and there wet in maaion for the regularly about. Station personnel to visit the JTAG area. The club was open only

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were occupied by the Navy commanding onicer and mis deputy because the quarters at JTAG were of better quality man the housing accommodations provided at the Station.

4. JTAG air activities were conducted from a classified hangar area at one end of the flight line. OSWALD did not have access to this area. Prior to the time in question, JTAG had been publicized by Radio Peking as being a headquarters for American intelligence activity. For this reason, and because JTAG was obviously not a part of the Naval Air Station complement, there were rumors and gossip regarding the unit and its activities. This condition was regarded as normal under such circumstances. Being there at that time, OSWALD could have heard such gossip; however, there is no information to indicate, nor is there reason to believe, that he obtained factual knowledge regarding JTAG and its mission. (For your information, an incident involving the landing of a U-2 in a rice paddy in Kanagawa Prefecture, Japan, was reported in the press and aroused some public interest. That incident, however, occurred in December 1959, which was some time after OSWALD had left Japan).

5. There were no Navy personnel assigned to JTAG. Moreover JTAG did not participate in, or transfer any of, its activities to a Station in Bangkok. Regarding the statement by HOBBS that a Navy Commander was recruiting Navy Personnel for an assignment in Bangkok, it is noted that the Navy at that time was conducting certain air reconnaissance activity from Atsugi using other types of aircraft.

6. The following should be considered with respect to your source's assertions that OSWALD's squadron was in Cubi Point, Philippine Islands in January 1958 where it kept its gear in what the source <u>now knows</u> to have been a hangar for a U-2 airplane; and that the squadron was back in Atsugi, Japan in May 1958. The term "U-2" was not known publicly and did not gain world-wide notoriety until the ill-fated Powers mission some two years later. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that the term "U-2" would have meant anything to OSWALD, even if he had heard it and had been able to identify the term with any aircraft at Cubi Point, at Atsugi or anywhere else.



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7. To summarize: There is no evidence or indication that OSWALD had any association with, or access to, the JTAG operation or its program in Japan. This applies also to information regarding the U-2 or its mission. Even if OSWALD had seen a U-2 aircraft at Atsugi or elsewhere, this fact would not have been considered unusual nor have constituted a breach of security. Limited public exposure of the craft itself -- but not of its nomenclature or mission -- was accepted as a necessary risk. It is most unlikely that OSWALD had the necessary prerequisites to differentiate between the U-2 and other aircraft engaged in classified missions which were similarly visible at Atsugi at the same time.

8. A copy of this memorandum is being forwarded to the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy.

Richard Helms Deputy Director for Plans

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