

## Chapter 7. How Rankin "Wiped" That "Dirty Rumor" Out.

This and the transcript of the Commission's January 22 executive sessions are I believe among the most disgraceful official records in our history. These were among the most eminent men in our society, led by the chief justice of the United States and the man who had as solicitor general of the United States represented it before the Supreme Court. Here they are, two months after they should have confronted the issue, pretending to, making fine speeches about how to and how not to and then, cowardly and ignominiously, doing exactly what they knew and said they should not do and that the country should not accept. They reflect their determination not to investigate the crime and not to investigate the report that the man they began with the intention of saying was the lone assassin reportedly worked for the CIA or the FBI. They make it clear that if Oswald had worked for any agency, they did not want to know about it and would do all they could not to know about it.

And the crime they were investigating was a de facto coup d'etat, as the assassination of any president is!

They also make clear that they lived in mortal terror of Hoover and his FBI.

Not only did their knowledge of Hoover and his FBI and what they did warn them, as it had to have, they were right for an additional reason. As that damage control FBI tickler Mark Allen got from the FBI records, <sup>States</sup> as soon as the Commission was appointed Hoover had "dossiers" prepared on them! *of "Dossiers on such prominent men when they had such extraordinary responsibilities."* If that is not enough he also had "dossiers" prepared on the staff when the Commission was staffed.

And it that was not enough, Hoover had additional "dossiers" prepared on the staff after the Report was out.

Rankin wasted little time getting to see Hoover. In Hoover's own memo on it, Rankin was there the ~~very next day~~ day after that executive session, on January 28. Hoover did not get around to writing his memo on their meeting until <sup>January 31</sup> February 1. He sent copies to only the six top men under him and the agent he had in a liaison role with the Commission. (62-109090-83)

From my examination of many FBI records, this is precisely the situation. Because of the nature of that "dirty rumor" I believe it is worth repeating, every informer (the FBI prefers and always uses "informant" instead) must pass a period of probation, usually of about six months. Using him for this six months must be approved by HQ and if HQ ~~does~~ does not approve, after six months or less he is cut loose. Until finally approved by HQ that informer is a probationary informer only.

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And as anyone who knew him would have expected, Hoover used their meeting to lecture Rankin.

It was vintage Hoover, the Hoover who was one of the most predictable men in Washington.

After repeating what Rankin told him, knowing precisely what the Commission did not want, that is what he told Rankin;

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"...that the Commission should immediately call Mr. Hudkins before it, place him under oath and demand the source of his information. I stated that I doubted he would give it to them and would either take the position he could not recall where he obtained it or resort to the claim that a newspaper reporter's sources are <sup>a source</sup>privily privileged."

About the FBI's keeping records of funds it disbursed, he

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"outlined the procedures that are followed, namely that every cent is strictly accounted for and the identity of every informant is known and a record maintained at the Washington headquarters of the Bureau with indications of the amount of money paid to him. ...I would be very willing to make an affidavit covering these matters or to appear in person to testify under oath as to what the facts are. ...Lee Harvey Oswald was never at any time a confidential ~~informa~~ informant, an ~~under~~ undercover agent, or even a source of information for the FBI ~~and~~ and I would like to see that clearly stated on the record of the Commission... 1414 sep

After Rankin took the occasion while he was here to express appreciation of the cooperation from the FBI and "how helpful the Bureau has been to the Commission

Hoover unloaded:

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"... I had not appreciated what I interpreted as carping criticism of the Chief Justice when he referred to the Bureau's report ~~to the Commission~~ originally submitted to the Commission as being a 'skeleton' report and his more recent comment that the Commission was engaged in filling in the gaps in the investigation. I stated that the report was originally prepared at the direction of the President was intended to be released as promptly as finished by the White House

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in order to put an end to the many rumors already in circulation which had no basis in fact and that therefore the report was in narrative form unlike the usual reports which are prepared for use in a prosecution."

He then needled Rankin by telling him that the Commission had gotten from the FBI "over 10,000 pages and that he no doubt would ~~be~~ received thousands more as the investigation was still continuing."

If Warren had referred to that five-volume report as "a skeleton" he praised it.

It is a disgraceful sham that does not even account for all the shooting and makes no effort to, does <sup>even</sup> not state the cause of death, and is instead a <sup>political</sup> diatribe against Oswald. It is not even a "skeleton" of an investigation. But as Hoover knew very well, nobody in the government would dare criticize him. When copies of that report were later distributed in the higher echelons of the government there was but a single negative comment. That was by the ~~then~~ then general counsel of the ~~F~~ Defense Department, the late John McNaughton. The campaign of abuse the FBI then launched against him is proudly disclosed in its main headquarters file.

That report was of so little use by the Commission it ignored it entirely. When it had those 26 large volumes of appendix half of which <sup>is its testimony and the other half is</sup> are its exhibits or other ~~documents~~ documents it selected to publish in supposed support of its Report, there is not even a <sup>five volumes of</sup> mention of that trash that would have gotten a flunking grade in a fly-by-night mail-order course in detecting. Not only did the Commission not publish it-it made no mention of it at all as "evidence" or as anything else. There was no access to that report until the Commission's records began to be available at the National Archives. I then added a Postscript to Whitewash (pages 192 ff) in which I published in facsimile the FBI's only references- in all five volumes - to the shooting, a mere ten words, and to the wounds, only 42 more words! In all five volumes! It does not account for all the ~~and this~~ known shooting or even the cause of death! And this is what Hoover pretended to be so proud of.

So, Hoover had the Commission where he wanted it and it was where it did not want to be, in a position to have <sup>only</sup> what it knew <sup>and said</sup> should not be acceptable to the people, a pro

forma denial that could be regarded as self-serving by the FBI.

There remains the mystery, why was this transcript of the executive session of January 27 <sup>was</sup> withheld from research, why did I have to file suit to get it and make it available to ~~ask~~, as I did <sup>by</sup> publishing it in facsimile as soon as possible after I did get it? That was stonewalled by the government until in 1974 it <sup>then</sup> ~~just~~ chose the ~~type~~ to it lessser eveil of just giving it to me after it ~~pre~~ <sup>after removal</sup> provided at the district court level. Its alternative was a chewing out by the then excellent federal court of appeals for the District of Columbia.

The only basis for withholding the transcript from me is but ten words in a very brief affidavit by the then Archivist, James B. Rhoads <sup>He is</sup> of but a single page much of which is taken up by the necessary formalities. Of this transcript <sup>all</sup> ~~was~~ Rhoads/said is that "it has been and continues to be classified 'Top Secret'." <sup>He</sup> does not even claim it was properly classified. *It wasn't.*

Placing myself under the penalties of perjury if I swore falsely in my responding affidavit I ~~proved and~~ stated and proved that Rhoads had sworn falsely in response to interrogatories in attesting <sup>that</sup> the January 27 transcript was originally classified Top Secret pursuant to Executive Order 10501, "the executive order that ~~created~~ the Commission. There is no such <sup>or</sup> authorization in that executive order.

In pretended refutation of my affidavit the government produced and filed one by J. Lee Rankin. In <sup>it</sup> he attested that <sup>he</sup> ~~he~~ was instructed by the Commission that among my duties was the responsibility to security classify at appropriate levels of classification those records created by the Commission in its investigation <sup>and</sup> report that should be security classified under the existing Executive Order." He claimed the Commission had that authority, as it did not and as Rhoads was careful not to claim it did.

In response I attested that there was no such authorization in any of the ~~Commis~~ Commission's files I had seen and that no such authorization was provided to the court by the government, ~~it~~ specifically not by Rhoads.

The government affiants were very prominent men. Rhoads was the Archivist of the United States. Rankin had been the solicitor <sup>general</sup> ~~general~~ for eight years, then had been the

This was not unique. Perhaps it needs explaining and cont ext.

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January 22

Like the transcripts almost entirely ignore when when + gave copies to some reporters and made the longer one available in Whitewash IV, I know of no effort by anyone writing in the file field to draw together what is available about that report that Oswald has some official connection and the Commission's ~~the~~ treatment of it. Because of the seriousness of the matter and the remarkable insight into ~~the~~ inner workings of the Commission <sup>it provides</sup> (I here give this <sup>more</sup> some space and ~~more~~ attention than otherwise I would. It may be the only way the people <sup>ever</sup> have to know the facts.

Commission's general counsel and, at the time of his affidavit was the corporation <sup>he took with him as his assistant his Commission assistant general counsel, Norman Redlich.</sup> counsel for the City of New York. Yet prominent as they were each <sup>swore</sup> swore falsely.

Whether or not their false swearing was perjury would have been a matter for the ~~country~~ courts. But <sup>that</sup> they intended to deceive and mislead and did get away with that was clear and was <sup>proven</sup> proven under oath by me. <sup>are</sup> This raises <sup>many</sup> questions among which <sup>is</sup> why did the government go to this extreme to withhold that transcript for which no authority for ~~class~~ classifying it existed; when even if there had been such authority <sup>why was it classified!</sup> there is not a word in the transcript that justifies any degree of classification; and why men as prominent as Rhoads and Rankin would risk sanctions <sup>being</sup> imposed upon them by the courts, with the great damage to their reputations from it?

However <sup>these</sup> <sup>in addressed,</sup> these unanswered questions <sup>is</sup> responded to, and there was no official addressing <sup>them</sup> of ~~it~~, of course, what is obvious is that what the government was determined to keep secret was how the Commission addressed, or did not address, that "dirty" rumor" that Oswald had worked for the CIA or the FBI. The transcript itself explains this risky false swearing to continue to keep it secret.

If I had not made myself subject to the penalties of perjury, going head-to-head with such prominent men under oath, that transcript would not have been disclosed to me and through me to the people of the country. But in doing this I did not believe I was running the risk that may seem apparent, even though the government was also the prosecutor and the district court was clearly prejudiced otherwise it would have demanded the documents <sup>in support of the govt Rhoads and Rankin affidavits that were</sup> There was also the <sup>stark</sup> <sup>contradictions it did nothing to resolve.</sup> <sup>Another</sup> not attached to them. I swore to the ~~to~~ truth. That was one of my protections. <sup>That other</sup> was my certainty that the government would not let the <sup>question</sup> go before a court and a jury and risk the attention it all would <sup>get</sup> in the ~~papers~~ <sup>media.</sup> <sup>his, I believe,</sup> <sup>then</sup> account for the government decision to moot the case at the time its brief was due at the court of appeals rather than permit these questions to be faced by that court, then reputed by many lawyers to have been the best in the land. 144A + B

Political lying is as American as apple pie. We got even more used to it from the



*affiant*

lying about Vietn~~a~~m. With the Nixon administration those of us who were not subjected to official lying daily lived in isolation. <sup>But</sup> Lying to the courts, lying under oath, was not that commonplace. It ~~has~~ was so commonplace in my more than a dozen FOIA lawsuits there is only one in which I did not allege it. It was able to become this commonplace because the courts themselves and the media ignored it.

The first time a judge took notice of my attestation that FBI special agent ~~J~~ John Kilty had sworn falsely, that judge, John Pratt, first told my lawyer Jim Mesar and me that <sup>we</sup> could catch more flies with honey than with vinegar. As I set forth in detail Part IV of (in Post Mortem, in the chapter "Through the Lookingglass" (pages 423 ff) especially on page 427, where the st<sup>ro</sup>graphic transcript is printed in facsimile).

Pratt even accepted the most unusual defenses against perjury I've ever heard of. The Department of Justice response was that I "could make such claims (~~of~~ i.e., of perjury by FBI agents) ad infinitum since he is perhaps more familiar with events surrounding the investigation of President Kennedy's assassination than anyone now employed by the FBI." (Post Mortem, page 425) What the government actually argued in defense of perjury by its agent was that because I knew more about the JFK assassination and its investigation than anyone working for the FBI, the FBI was thereby licensed to swear falsely!

Was this news? Not to any newspaper or legal journal.

That was in Civil Action (CA) 75-226, the first suit filed under FOIA after it was amended in 1974. and then passed over the veto of our only unelected President, former Warren Commission Member <sup>G</sup>erald Ford, who, as we see above, had his own successful perjury that helped him become our first unelected vice president.

In the last FOIA lawsuit I was able to file, two combined into one by the court, CA's 78-0322/0420 combined, the FBI's affiant, SA John Phillips, had trouble swearing to the truth even by accident. Repeatedly I swore, making myself subject to a perjury charge, that he had sworn falsely to what was material. ~~The~~ Materiality is the test for false swearing being the felony of perjury. The FBI and its lawyers just ignore my affidavits. So also did Judge John ~~Lewis~~ Lewis Smith. Because there were so many instances of Phillips' undenied perjury all <sup>accepted</sup> accepted by Smith, I called them to the attention of

Hedrick Smith, then<sup>a</sup> the highly respected Washington correspondent of The New York Times. Smith, as he wrote me, conferred with a colleague he did not name. They decided that it was not newsworthy and declined to report it.

Had any of the media ever reported this new government specialty in FOIA lawsuit, *repetitious perjury* ~~to frustrate /~~ ~~these to enforce~~ the law that says the people have a right to know what their government does, it would have been less likely that ~~all~~ <sup>those</sup> judges could just ignore it.

In ignoring this endless official perjury the courts surrendered ~~by~~ their Constitutional independence of the executive branch. And that was not news either.

Perh Perjury is one of the means by which the government ~~frustrated~~ <sup>could and did prevent</sup> the disclosure of ~~record of~~ assassination records it could not withhold under the law by any other means.

And that is what Rankin and Rhoads, ~~on~~ <sup>d/</sup> on behalf of the government, sought to do in my CA 2052-73. (The court later reversed the numbers of the cases and the years.)

There was nothing too bizarre for the FBI to pull or <sup>in</sup> the courts to accept.

In my first suit for the results of the FBI's scientific testing in the JFK assassination testing by its vaunted Labor Laboratory, <sup>CA 2301-70,</sup> on August 20, 1970, SA Marion E. Williams ~~fil~~ executed an affidavit that addressed <sup>only</sup> the results of "spectrographic examinations" performed by the Lab. That test was entirely non-secret and there was no legitimate basis for ~~withheld~~ <sup>withholding</sup> these results. But what Williams actually attested to is that "the release of raw data (which is not what I asked for in asking for the "results" of those nonsecret tests) would seriously interfere with the effecient operation of the FBI...It could lead, for example to exposure of confidential informants;..." // Whitewash IV pages 173-5, 187-9)

Greater and more obvious nonsense was never dumped on a federal court. It simply was ~~laboratory testing has nothing at all to do with "confidential informants."~~ not possible, as innumerable lawsuits since 1974 illustrate. The judge who accepted that

sworn-to poppycock was then known as "Maximum John" Sirica. In accepted it he permitted the FBI to rewrite the law and give it meaning not in that law. He is the judge ~~was~~ <sup>in my case</sup> whose decision was cited in the <sup>1974 debates on the Act by</sup> legislative history of the 1974 amending of it by the sole surviving Kennedy brother as requiring the amending of the investigatory-files exemption of that Act. (Congressional Record, May 30, 1974 page S9336)

Sirica's nickname came from his record of soaking poor and unimportant people with

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harsh sentences and as this Williams matter illustrates, going easy on the government. That was his record until he drew the first ~~Waterha~~ Watergate case. But then he had the flunkies as defendants, so he was still again "maximum John" to earn his Watergate fame.

Still, Rankin and Rhoads were prominent ~~and~~ men and in higher positions in the government than FBI special agents. While the question persists, regardless of rank, why did the government seek to and to a large degree get away with the serious felony of perjury for the sole purpose of keeping secret what should have been and in all instances was non-secret information about the assassination of a President?

The college generation of that era asked, almost without exception at all my many appearances before them, "If the government has nothing to hide, why does it hide so much?" It is, obviously, a self-answering question. The government had much to hide.

There are few better illustrations of what it believed it had to withhold to avoid exposure of its disgraceful record when it was supposedly investigating the assassination than these two executive session transcripts. *Not a word in either was properly classified.*

It is not that the government had any reason to expect great attention and serious embarrassment from media attention to those transcripts. The record of the media was by then more than apparent: it supported the official mythology. A more likely explanation, aside from the policy of seeking to prevent just about all assassination-information disclosures- and I did have to file and fight for as much as a decade all those lawsuits to free that information from its official oblivion- it was to block exposure of its disgraceful record from our history and to prevent the embarrassment of those responsible who were still alive.

In these transcripts they were confronted with reports that the man they had already decided was the lone assassin had worked for the FBI or the CIA. That raised the question of a government conspiracy to kill the President. Regardless of how unlikely it may have seem<sup>ed</sup>, that above all other <sup>reports</sup> lead required the most vigorous pursuit. In addition, if the Commission did not know by then that Oswald had <sup>had</sup> very high security clearances as a <sup>man</sup> "aring it should have know and with any kind of investigation of his Marine records it would have known. <sup>For</sup> his MOS or military occupational specialty

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required a Crypto clearance and that required a Top Secret clearance. Add this to the reports that Oswald had worked for one of the agencies and there could hardly have been any leads the Commission might have had that demanded <sup>painting</sup> more investigation. (The Commission, of course, did not want <sup>leads</sup> any leads. It began with its conclusion. Documentary proof of this led to my titling the first chapter of Post Mortem "Conclusions First.")

Few things could <sup>have</sup> been more embarrassing to the Commission and later to the government than what this Commission did to bypass any investigation of those reports, as these transcripts leave without any real question.

What Rankin and the Members did not know is that <sup>H</sup>Hoover had been working on the Hudkins angle for some time, beginning beginning in December. We have no way of knowing when the FBI sent which of its reports to the Commission or how much attention those under Rankin paid to the reports they had, but Hoover and the Secret Service had been onto those reports for quite some time, as the Commission records I began to examine in 1966 and FBI records I got as a result of the later FOIA lawsuits establish.

This is to say that aside from what the FBI had learned through <sup>W</sup>Wulles, Hoover knew exactly what he was doing in telling Rankin he should subpoena Hudkins, put him under oath and question him. It is nonsense, as some on the Commission argued, that calling any reporter to testify about those reports would have given him a <sup>story</sup> peg to excite the country with more. All calling him as a witness permitted any reporter to add to what was publicly known <sup>to</sup> only the fact that he had been called as a witness.

~~Quite a few interviews of reporters and those known to reporters did not lead to a single story. And that was no peg for any sensational story to be hung on.~~

There was absolutely nothing to be lost by calling Hudkins or any other reporter-- and that Rankin singled Hudkins alone out is in itself cause for suspicion -- and putting him under oath and questioning him. If he refused to give his <sup>source or</sup> sources the Commission was not only no worse off, it was better off. That was because it would have made the <sup>act</sup> effort to learn at least.

Then there were so many appropriate questions not covered by privilege, like, "Did you make any effort to confirm what your source told you?" Or "do you know <sup>w/</sup> of any confirmation or refutation we can get and if so, how?" Also "Do you know of any other repor-

ters working on this report?" or "do you know of anyone to whom we might speak in an effort to learn more about this report?" There was no end to the reasonable questions that could have been asked that were not covered by source privilege. *if any investigation at all were intended.*

As that gaggle of lawyers did not have to be told.

The January 27 transcript itself make a joke of the pretense that this report had not been widely published. In addition to the papers and small magazines that had published it the transcript itself includes The New York Times and TIME magazine. They also get enormous attention and what they publish is frequently reprinted. *there were many other stories.*

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The obvious reason the Commission did not want to take testimony about this report is that the Commission wanted nothing to interfere with the conclusion <sup>it</sup> Hoover had already seen to it they would have to reach, and that coincides with the conclusion with which the Commission began, lay it all on the safely-dead Oswald.

Lyndon Johnson got Warren to agree to serve as Chairman of his Commission by giving him to understand that if he did not 40,000,000 people might be killed. *(white wash IV, page 29)* That could have happened only if there had been a conspiracy involving the USSR. And that is what had to be "wiped out." Aside from the fact that there was not even a reasonable basis for suspecting this, the Commission was determined to stay away from investigating any possibility of any conspiracy.

In summary, there was no good or legitimate reason not to take testimony from the reporters who wrote those stories and there was every good and necessary reason to do just that.

Also, in taking testimony the Commission could not anticipate or control what witnesses would say and it very obviously wanted to have complete control over what it would and would not say, do or would not do about it. One element of this control, clearly by Rankin, is that he saw to it that aside from pro forma questioning of the CIA for its denial there is no mention of the actuality of the fact that all sources, and Hudkins was not the only one, said it was the FBI, CIA or other government agency. But only the FBI (5h97ff) and the CIA (5h120ff) were asked.

Because I knew of this report and more, after ~~Hudkins~~ and I became friends, I kept a file of duplicates of the records <sup>+</sup> obtained by FOIA (I have kept those I received exactly as I received them for archival purposes) that seemed to refer to this unresolved matter. That file is probably not complete but for present purposes it is more than enough to depict how the so-called investigation was limited by Rankin, whether or he Warren was involved; that the report was public much earlier than these executive-session transcripts reflect; that it was Rankin who eliminated the CIA from their supposed investigation; that the Commission excuse for not calling witnesses to testify on this matter was spurious; that the one thing the reporters would not do it give the name of their source or source <sup>they would and they</sup> but did provide all other information asked of them; and that the FBI, from the first moment it heard of this report, made the obvious inquiries and interviews.

Where I cite FBI records they are not from the Commission's files unless so indicated.

This does not mean that they were or ~~were~~ not given to the Commission. If any were, those copies lack the FBI's file serialization and the notes added to them.

<sup>one of</sup> ~~By date~~ the first of these records is the December 9, 1993 teletype to ~~FBIHQ~~ FBIHQ from SAC Gordon Shanklin in Dallas. Jim Lehrer, then of the Dallas Morning News, later of the ~~MacNeil-Lehrer~~ <sup>MacNeil-Lehrer</sup> report on public television, phoned Shanklin ~~at~~ to tell him "he had been contacted by an unknown reporter of the Philadelphia Inquirer re ~~sp~~ spelling of name of SA James. P. Hosty, Jr. This reporter advised Lehrer to the effect that SA Hosty had interviewed Oswald in an attempt to develop him as an informant for Fair Play for Cuba ~~A~~ Committee." (That reporter was Joseph Golden. More on him follows.)

Shanklin added that Lehrer gave the correct spelling of the name and that Dallas ~~had~~ informed HQ that Hosty had not interviewed Oswald. In his crabbed handwriting Hoover wrote, "Have we at any time, at any place approached Oswald to develop him as an informant"? As with all his annotations, he <sup>Signed with only</sup> ~~used~~ the letter "H". (105-82555-469)

That was seven weeks before the Commission's January 27 executive session.

The next serialized record in that FBIHQ <sup>main</sup> "main" Oswald file is the memo from his assistant to Assistant Director in Charge of the Domestic Intelligence Division William

*This was*  
 C. Sullivan, the normal FBI procedure, responses to Hoover being bucked upward through the rigid chain of command until it reached Hoover, in which <sup>it</sup> Branigan stated that Oswald had not been approached to be an informer in Dallas or in New Orleans.

That Inquirer reporter was Joseph Goulden. The FBI interviewed him that very day. (CD 226 in the Commission's files, reproduced in facsimile in Whitewash IV, page 142) Goulden said <sup>that earlier</sup> he had been a Dallas Morning News reporter. His Inquirer story was published December 7. With regard to what he reported, "He said he had obtained this information from a law ~~en~~ enforcement official in Dallas whom he declined to identify." And what is exculpatory of Oswald, as indicated above, <sup>Mr.</sup> Goulden advised that in the same article he had made reference to the fact that witnesses had seen LEE HARVEY OSWALD in the Texas School Book Depository Building 15 minutes before the shots were fired at the President. He stated he had received this information from the Dallas Sheriff's office."

While the story may have been published earlier, from this incomplete file of duplicates of records disclosed to me the story was in the public domain in a major newspaper not later than December 7. That was 46 days before the first Commission executive session on ~~the~~ the report that Oswald had worked for some federal agency. The FBI's practise was to deliver records to the Commission fairly promptly and by <sup>Crowner</sup> hand.

Next is the previously cited Houston Secret Service report on Hudkins phoning that office on December 16 about a different matter and the next day ~~in~~ he "advised... that he had talked to Allen Sweatt, Chief, Criminal Division, Sheriff's Office, Dallas; Chief Sweatt mentioned that it was his opinion that Lee Harvey Oswald was being paid \$200 a month by the FBI as an informant in connection with their subversive investigations". Houston asked the Dallas Secret Service office to interview Sweatt. (CD 767)

So, ~~Hudkins'~~ source, or one of them, was known, disclosed by Sweatt himself, and the Commission had that record. It was used in that January 27 executive session. Thus at the very <sup>e</sup> last Rankin <sup>w/</sup> <sup>a/</sup> that Sweatt was <sup>a/</sup> Hudkins' source. But as noted above, he never called Sweatt as a witness, either. (*Hudkins denied identifying Sweatt as his source.*)

The Houston FBI's December 31 report refers to an earlier one about which a Mrs.

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Rosenthal, of Fort Worth had already been interviewed by the FBI. In referring to his conversations with Mrs. Rosenthal, a friend of Ruth Paine, with whom Marina Oswald lived, HUDKINS concluded by stating he was on a 'fishing expedition' and was attempting to ~~try~~ determine if LEE HARVEY OSWALD had been a 'stool pidgeon' ~~or~~ for some government agency such as the CIA or the FBI." A Dallas notation <sup>on</sup> in this record, 100-10461-67, its main Oswald file, reads. "Mrs. Rosenthal interviewed 11-29-63." This seems to indicate that Hudkins was working on the story ~~by~~ <sup>before</sup> that earlier date.

Houston followed this up January 2, 1964 (100-10461-2296) in ~~sa~~ sending Dallas a copy of Hudkins' story of the day before, the story cited above.

Hosty wrote Shanklin a memo January 4 (100-10461-2297) citing a report by SA Bardwell Odum of a conversation with Ruth Paine. She told him that Hudkins had "contacted her on Saturday, 12-26-63" in which Hudkins had referred to Hosty trying to develop Oswald as an informant. It also gives Marguerite Oswald, Lee's mother, as Mrs. Rosenthal's source.

It is interesting that Hosty does not deny in this memo that he had tried to develop Oswald as an informant, although he did deny it elsewhere.

On January 17 Dallas sent Houston four leads for it to cover. The fourth is to interview Hudkins to learn who the woman he had referred to ~~Mrs. Rosenthal~~, was so Dallas could interview her. This record, 100, 10461-2642, has "disregard" after identifying Mrs. Rosenthal.

Rankin had asked ~~The~~ Texans not to say a word about being called ~~there~~ to meet with Kim and Warren on January 24. But on January 23, Shanklin wrote a memo to file (100-10461-2799) reporting that Robert P. Gemberling, the Dallas assassination "case agent", had been told ~~by~~ by a man whose name is obliterated but ~~is~~ "of the Dallas PD" that Wade had been asked to go and discuss what he knew about the report "that OSWALD was on the pay roll of the FBI at \$200.00 a month."<sup>1</sup>)

Shanklin phoned Inspect Malley at FBIHQ immediately and told him. He also told Malley that he had been told The Nation story discussed at that January 27 executive session had appeared.



"Mr. Malley stated Mr. HALLIEY stated that there had been numerous articles such as this" in publications of the left.

In the same memo Shanklin refers to a phone conversation with Wade that morning in which Wade told him that in December Hudkins asked him "some leading questions about whether OSWALD was an informant of the FBI or some Government agency. Wade claims he told him ~~nothing~~ he knew nothing about it...."

Also on January 23 SA M.A. Jones of his office <sup>wrote</sup> sent Cartha DeLoach, then the Number ~~4~~ <sup>4e4</sup> man in the FBI and <sup>he headed</sup> ~~the~~ head of its "Crime Records" division as well as <sup>handling its</sup> ~~it had led in~~ of leaking, lobbying and occasional ~~polite~~ blackmail and in overall charge of what the FBI reported, <sup>Jones attached a copy of</sup> ~~a memo with~~ The Nation story attached. Jones assumed that the Domestic Intelligence Division, which had sent the story, "will review it carefully for anything of pertinence." (105-82555-1974)

Among the annotations on the James memo is one of three points by Hoover:

"1. I want this analyzed.

"2. In view of wire from Dallas ~~the~~ SAC today re inquiry of Wade by Warren Commission, I think attached is <sup>(short illegible word)</sup> to it for The Nation is

Warren's Bible.

3. I think SAC should ask Wade's assistant, Wm. Alexander & also Wade questions re quotes attributed to them.H"

Hoover's note is not dated.

REL, the initials of Raymond E. Long, later an assistant director, are ~~on~~ <sup>in</sup> the memo by W.A. Branigan to Sullivan, the analysis Jones assumed <sup>would</sup> ~~would~~ be made. It is dated January 25. It is of 10 single-spaced pages, Serial 1975 in the same HQ main Oswald file.

Its first sentence says "The Nation....has a long history of writing scurrilous articles about the Director and the FBI." In referring to Harold Feldman, who wrote the article, two paragraphs were obliterated on disclosure. They refer to Feldman and <sup>to</sup> ~~an FBI~~

security check on him. <sup>(what state not by)</sup> It denounced the article and says it takes "the line being taken by the Communist Party" ~~it~~ does not state it is also the "line" of all the extensive major-media reporting of the same story.

is page  
wanted

In the story <sup>Police</sup> Feldman referred to Dallas Chief of Police Jesse V. Curry's complaint on TV that the FBI had not been <sup>in</sup> forthcoming about Oswald and his presence in the Dallas area <sup>of this De Long/Cronin memo says:</sup>

space  
accept

"We also confidentially requested our sources at United Press International and Associated Press to get Curry on record repudiating his false accusations. This was done." <sup>as they all knew from</sup>  
Well, not entirely that way only, <sup>for</sup> other records of which I <sup>have</sup> had a file of duplicates in my "subject" file.

~~Asi~~ Aside from making use of the media in a way of which the media does not boast and usually denied, Hoover got Shanklin to get after Curry. <sup>He</sup> demanded that Curry go on nationwide TV <sup>and</sup> to retract what he had said. <sup>That</sup> was entirely accurate, contrary to what this memo says. Once Curry did that <sup>FBI</sup> Hoover broke off all relations with the Dallas police, including ever training.

It also tries to explain away some of what Feldman wrote that was accurate. Hoover annotated the "explanation" <sup>for</sup> transcribing every word in Oswald's pocket addressbook <sup>S.A.</sup> except what refers to Hosty, "I think this was a mistake."

The memo also recaps FBI records cited above, giving some special interpretations. Hoover put his "OK" on the memo.

In reporting his call to Shanklin of that day, <sup>he in charge of investigations, told</sup> Allan H. Belmont, then one of two assistant to the director, <sup>telling</sup> him some of what the FBI had learned Wade told Rankin and Warren. (105-82555-1753) In it Belmont says he told Shanklin that the FBI had suggested to the Commission "that they call Hudjkins and put him under oath, regardless of the fact that he might go back and write a story that the FBI was being investigated by the Commission."

On February 7 Alex Rosen, head of the <sup>very</sup> ~~Internal~~ General Investigative Division, wrote Belmont, meaning Hoover, about the ~~deliberat~~ <sup>deliberate</sup> of Hoover's affidavit denying any connection with Oswald. The memo was actually written by <sup>James R.</sup> Inspector <sup>Walley</sup>, who had a liaison role with the ~~Comm~~ Commission. ~~105-~~ (105-82555-1944). The memo reports that Rankin said <sup>the</sup> ~~Comm~~ Commission was "considering <sup>MC</sup> this problem" (of the report that Oswald had worked for some federal agency) <sup>from</sup> ~~from~~ two angles". The second is:

*space indent*

"(2) having the records ~~and~~ sufficiently complete so that at such time as the public would ~~it~~ have an opportunity to see the work of the Commission there would be sufficient facts to show that the matter was fully exploited and that the record ~~was~~ <sup>would</sup> completely reflect the true situation."

At that point the only plans for publication the Commission had was for its Report.

Specifically, it not only had not decided to publish any appendix, there was some disagreement about that months later when the question came up on a later executive session. Rankin no doubt did talk about "the public" and its "opportunity to see the work of the Commission" but when he said it there were no <sup>y</sup> such plans.

Rankin also told them that the report that Oswald had worked for some federal agency was getting considerable attention ~~at~~ <sup>from</sup> at the ~~30~~ Congress. The only named ~~in~~ this memo are of three Senators of the far right. Rankin also told them that this was not only a problem for the FBI because "rumors were beginning to circulate (at the Congress) involving other intelligence agencies and for this reason the Commission intended to go into this matter thoroughly and would explore it to whatever extent necessary to clarify the record."

It never happened and from the executive session was never considered.

Under "ACTION" the memo concludes with six recommendations. Hoover wrote "OK". ~~and~~ <sup>z</sup> annotations record when those recommendations were ~~d~~ <sup>d</sup> followed.

A short General Investigative Division memo summarizes what was done about one of the "actions" recommended and reported in a Dallas teletype of February 8. (105-82555-1906) <sup>in</sup> it the Dallas interview of Hudkins he did not this time give Sweatt as his source. "He alleged a local official told him Oswald was an FBI or CIA informant" the short memo says. The teletype says little more. <sup>It</sup> does say that although Hudkins did describe his source in general he <sup>refused</sup> to provide the name or ~~signature~~ a signed statement. However, Hudkins did say that he heard the same report from Goulden. Hoover annotated this sentence (Locate and interview Hudkins <sup>&</sup> <sup>at</sup> once." (Goulden had by then <sup>b</sup> been interviewed twice.)

At the end of the teletype<sup>ed</sup>, which includes other information, Hoover wrote and underlined, "Get rept to Rankin ~~re~~ promptly."

~~Also~~ on February 8 Shanklin<sup>ed</sup> wrote another memo to file. Its serial number was not included when the xerox was made for me. The file is 100-10461. Domestic Intelligence Division Section Chief Branigan had phoned with "specific instructions to pin" Hudkins down, have ~~to~~ him put up or shut up" and, if he is willing, get a signed statement. Shanklin check<sup>ed</sup> with the Houston SAC, Robert Rightmyer, they both sent agents looking for Hudkins, and he was not at his home in either city. The FBI was working on this so intensively that Shanklin spoke to Branigan at 9 p/m.

Still on February 8 Dallas teletyped HQ again. (105-82555-1969) It reports an interview of Wade. Wade did recall, from World War II service in the FBI, that any ~~and~~ informant's "identity... was always known in the FBI headquarters." A little later,

*is same incident*

"Wade claims there was a limited discussion about the fact that Oswald might have been an FBI informant and that there was much more speculation that he might have been a CIA informant. He recalls that Robert Storey said that he was with the war Crimes commission in Germany after World War ~~II~~ two and ~~that~~ either worked for of with the CIA in Europe, and he indicated that the CIA had informants no one knew about except the CIA agent, and that the informant might have an informant."

The gets us back to Rankin and his seeing to it that there was no court reporter to make a verbatim transcript of the question <sup>was</sup> on the Texans by Rankin and Warren on January

24 ~~and~~ to Rankin's self-serving memo substituted for it. And to what Rankin eliminated from his less than honest memo.

*what Storey said is exactly what Dulles said at that January 27 special session, as we saw above.*

*is quoted as saying*

Here Wade ~~says~~ that they spent more time on the report that Oswald had worked for the CIA. <sup>Rankin's</sup> The memo mentions the CIA <sup>once</sup> ~~in~~ only <sup>in</sup> the single sentence quoted earlier,

*is same incident*

"Wade stated he was also aware of an allegation to the effect that Oswald was an informant for the CIA and carried Number 110669."

This is far from the same as what Wade told the FBI, that they spent most of their <sup>on January 24</sup> time on this. As on all other occasions, Rankin either omitted any reference to the CIA,

~~and~~ making it seem to be all FBI or, ~~as~~ as infrequently he did, he made mere passing ref-

erence to the CIA. As I said earlier, from his years in the Department of Justice Rankin should have known that 110669 is unlike any FBI numbering system. <sup>yet</sup> But the records do not reflect his asking anyone a single question about this number. <sup>Rankin saw to</sup> It was all the <sup>limited</sup> phony number Lonnie told ~~me~~ <sup>to that</sup> I had had made up, S-172 or S-179, <sup>These are</sup> which is also not like any FBI numbering system.

~~Next~~ <sup>does not</sup> does Rankin's memo make any reference to the presence of Dean Storey. From <sup>his</sup> Rankin's memo, there is no way of knowing <sup>from</sup> in the record he was making that he and Warren had gotten the <sup>information</sup> report this FBI teletype attributes to Storey.

Storey, who was on the TCI and was ~~not~~ asked to come by Rankin, as both he and Wade told me, did have other intelligence experiences in that period of time and later, as he <sup>also</sup> told me. It is not likely that he would not have told Rankin and Warren what he told me. So, Rankin's failure to even mention that he had been asked to come, or that he was present, or what he said, and the main thrust of the report that Oswald was some kind of official ~~informant~~ informant was on a CIA connection, cannot be regarded as an accident. Rankin knew what he was doing and that is why he did it.

Poor an apology for an investigation as it was, <sup>it</sup> was an entirely misdirected effort and that was Rankin's ~~work~~ <sup>virtually</sup> doing. The <sup>virtual</sup> total omission of the CIA from it also is Rankin's doing.

It was Rankin who saw to it that the focus was on Lonnie Hudkins. But of this his own memo says of the Texans and what they said,

*space indent*

"They did not pinpoint Hudkins as being the source of this information",

which follows by saying ~~"they"~~ but they did not name any other individual reporters."

<sup>'s memo</sup>

Rankin does not say that he or Warren asked them ~~and~~ about "any other individual reporters," either.

This is to say that in addition to seeing to it that as little attention as possible was paid to Oswald's having some kind of CIA connection, Rankin also saw to it that all questions were directed at Hudkins even though the Texans "did not pinpoint Hudkins as being ~~their~~ source" of the reports they were supposedly investigating.

Is there- can there be - any honest reason ~~we~~ Rankin could have had for suppressing all mention of this CIA-type number from the members other than Warren? Or of how Wade said they spent their time? Or of what Stogrey said?

<sup>Rankin</sup>  
~~He~~ was to have reported to the Commission on that session and what they learned at it.

On January 27 he told them that he did.

He did not!

Nor in supposedly reporting <sup>of</sup> this January 24th session to the Members on January 27 is there any mention, long as that transcript is, <sup>during the</sup> almost three hours that the session lasted, <sup>of</sup> what Wade told the FBI transpired at that January 24 session or of anything at all that Storey said there. There is no mention to the other Members of the number ~~of~~ 110669. In this Rankin was plain dishonest, <sup>and</sup> in this Warren did not provide the Members what Rankin withheld from them- actually suppressed.

There is no mention of this number in any of the FBI's reports, so it made no investigation of it, either. *158A here*

In all the Commission records I saw I recall only ~~this one~~ mention, <sup>other mention of that number other than the single mention of it</sup> in this Rankin memo <sup>of that number</sup>. It is in a memo from the Secret Service's Houston SAC, Lane Bertram, <sup>to</sup> ~~then~~ James J. Rowley, <sup>Bertram</sup> his chief in Washington, <sup>he</sup> wrote it the very day of that session, January 24, ~~and~~ its subject is "Lee Harvey Oswald- Long Distance Call." That call was the day before, from Secret Service Inspector Elliott Thacker. He asked for additional information <sup>about</sup> of Bertram's January <sup>quoted above,</sup> 3 report. When Bertram returned the call to Thacker, he says of what he told Thacker- and this was the day before that January 24 session -

"He was ~~my~~ <sup>partner</sup> ~~informed~~ advised that number ~~1110~~ 110669 was now considered by various people with the news media as being the informant number assigned to Oswald by the FBI."

At the Commission this brief Bertram memo of but a half of a typed page, single ~~line~~ spaced, is heavily underlined. There are a dozen underlinings, <sup>usually</sup> ~~as~~ perhaps indications of instructions for indexing. (The <sup>the Commission</sup> Archives had provided <sup>indexers</sup> and they were busily engaged in that until the <sup>U</sup> department of Justice lawyer loaned to the Commission <sup>and</sup> its number 3 man on it staff and its liaison with his employer, ended the indexing as an economy measure.) All the numbers except the dates are underline-except 110669. So are all the proper names and titles <sup>of</sup> publications, articles <sup>they ran it were to run and their</sup> authors. (The <sup>is</sup> Bertram ~~the~~ memo is CD 372 in the Commission's files, from which <sup>I</sup> got it.)

It does seem that the Commission staff was determined to memory-hole 110669- and ~~it~~ succeeded.

The FBI was well aware of the probability that Hudkins was not the source <sup>and</sup> ~~its~~

records are clear enough on this. Earlier we saw that Deputy Sheriff Sweatt was given as the original source. In a February 10 memo <sup>B</sup> Branigan ~~wrote~~ addressed to Sullivan but actually ~~w~~ written by "REL" who was <sup>as</sup> ~~we~~ saw <sup>by</sup> Raymond E. Long, the information <sup>was</sup> intended for Hoover, who was never address<sup>ed</sup> by name (deniability?). There is more on this. And it did get to Hoover. (The serial number in the 105-82555 file is illegible)

Hudkins is quoted as saying that he source was "official" but not a "not a Federal official," and he again is quoted as saying that Oswald worked <sup>for</sup> "either ~~for~~ the FBI or CIA".

Goulden is quoted as saying his source was "a law enforcement officer in Dallas whom he declined to identify," <sup>a</sup> a refusal he maintained when reinterviewed by the FBI.

Both Hudkins and Goulden pinpoint a non-federal Dallas law-enforcement official.

The three recommendations in this memo, that specified FBI records be forwarded to the Commission, are all annotated, "Yes.H."

The memo concludes, <sup>the</sup> last thing before its recommendations,

"...inasmuch as it appears ~~that~~ William Alexander may well have been the ~~of~~ source of the allegations that Oswald was an FMR FBI informant...we are having Dallas confront Alexander and ask him pointblank if his statements are true that he obtained such information from an unnamed informant as he previously has alleged."

This was done in a letter Hoover wrote Rankin the next day, February 11. <sup>It</sup> is in the Commission's "GAI (FBI) file. It quotes what Long wrote for Branigan to write, that Hudkins "said he had obtained this information from a law ~~enfo~~ enforcement officer in Dallas whom he declined to identify." It also reports that the Dallas police department <sup>This would seem to eliminate the police as the source.</sup> had no record of any such Oswald as an informant record or report.

In a brief "Domestic Intelligence Division Informative Note" dated <sup>February</sup> October 13, Long begins by stating that Hudkins

"has advised us his story was based on information he received from Dallas

Assistant District Attorney William Alexander." Long <sup>as</sup> refers to Alexander's having told Rankin and Warren on January 24 that he had heard this ~~rep~~ report on January 21, after a Ruby bond hearing, that discussion being of the "possibility Oswald was a counterspy for the FBI, CIA or some Government Agency." <sup>Long</sup> ~~It~~ also reports that because



H<sup>y</sup>ldkins gave Alexander as his source headquarters had "instructed Dallas to immediately contact Alexander and pin him down on his allegations." Long also says that a letter to Rankin was being prepared. Again, "OK, H."

The teletype to Dallas is attached to Long's memo. The file number is illegible. The text concludes by telling Dallas that

"Alexander was visibly shaken and extremely nervous during the course of the interview (referred to), and leaving the interview with Alexander stated he wanted the interviewing agents to know he was ~~empt~~ emphatically not the originator of these false allegations and if he knew he would tell the interviewing agents."

Hoover added this note:

"The fellow is just a low s.o.b. (not caps) Instruct our Dallas office to have no contacts with him & <sup>-pc?</sup> (illegible) most circumspect with Waffe - H."

<sup>There</sup> ~~There~~ is an oddity about these last two letters Hoover sent the Commission. When Rankin wrote Hoover to thank him for them Paul Hoch found this copy in a Commission CIA file. That was not by accident. A copy was also in its FBI file.

In writing Rankin again on February 17 <sup>and</sup> ~~and~~ updating him a little Hoover quotes Alexander as telling the FBI on January 25 ~~that~~ that when he was before ~~the~~ Rankin and Warren two days earlier "he told the Commission that he had no information as to Oswald being an informant for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency or any other governmental agency."

Shanklin wrote another memo to files, which means he did not send it to headquarters, on February 28. That is because all the information in it he was given by headquarters when Alex Rosen, head of the General Investigative Division, phoned to get Dallas to interview Melvin Belli, the <sup>"</sup>Jack Ruby's ~~set~~ lead attorney. The second paragraph is particularly interesting:

To hide the fact that it engages in domestic political spying and to kid itself about that police-state practise so widespread in the FBI it uses "security" when it in fact means political. Similarly it prefers "informant" as a referenes to its informers.

164

On 2/25/64, Mr. DICK BERLIN and KINGSBURY SMITH,  
(General Manager and Editor respectively, Hurst Publications,  
advised the Bureau that an unnamed Hurst reporter, described  
by BERLIN as very reliable, had been told by MELVIN BELLI,  
Attorney for JACK RUBY, that OSWALD was an FBI informant.  
BELLI also told this reporter that although he would not  
care to comment so much regarding RUBY's connection with  
the FBI, he knew from reliable sources that RUBY had been  
an informant for eight weeks, and OSWALD an informant of the  
FBI for thirteen weeks. BELLI also told this reporter that  
RUBY informed on gamblers and people of low character, and  
that OSWALD was a security type informant. SMITH advised  
that this Hurst reporter has a tape recording of BELLI making  
these allegations. *100-10461-20005* *100-10461-2863*

*164* *in* The first misspelling of "hearst" is corrected in longhand.)

Except for some <sup>of its</sup> tricky semantics to which we return the rest of what Rosen told  
Shanklin dealt with how to and how not to approach Belli and where not to try to  
interview him.

With regard to Oswald having been an FBI informer for 13 weeks, Shanklin was told  
"Find out what he knows" and no more. It is <sup>to denied that</sup> with regard to Ruby as an FBI informer for  
eight weeks, which the FBI later admitted he had been, the FBI's denial about Ruby,  
Shanklin quotes Rosen as saying "We don't have to tell him that RUBY has never been an  
informant for the FBI." In a second reference to this the words Shanklin uses are, "we  
(Belli) he (ORuby) can tell him ~~he~~ has never ~~been~~ been an informant."

The semantics here is that Ruby was an informer <sup>but was</sup> on probation. When after eight week  
he produced no information the FBI regarded as valuable it dropped him. He did not  
survive his probationary <sup>an</sup> period as an informer. But for those eight weeks he was <sup>an informer</sup> that.

Only to the FBI was this not a deliberate lie. Their fig-leaf is that Ruby did not  
survive his probation. But as Ruby probably told his lawyer, he had in fact been an  
FBI informer on probation.

Shanklin had another occasion for another memo to files on March 3:

162

Assistant Director W. C. SULLIVAN called at 10:50 AM today and stated that the Bureau keeps getting indications that WILLIAM ALEXANDER is the source of the rumor that OSWALD was an FBI informant. Mr. SULLIVAN instructed that WADE be contacted and told that in effect "ALEXANDER should either put up or shut up;" that we insist upon it." Qualify your statement to WADE to effect that if it is so that ALEXANDER is the source of it, he must either come up with the evidence or stop making these statements. SULLIVAN instructed that the Bureau be advised as to what WADE says, etc., and to use best judgment as to best time to contact WADE. (100-10461-3945)

From the first report that Oswald had worked for some federal agency one of those most likely to have begun it was Alexander, yet the Commission's records omit him almost entirely and focus on Hudkins. Why Rankin wanted to scapegoat Hudkins is without explanation, as is his ignoring all the many other reporters who worked on that story.

But then ~~that~~<sup>it</sup> was the same Rankin who omitted virtually all mentions of the CIA and made a false record that the only report was that Oswald had worked for the FBI with the phony number either S-172 or S-179.

Why Rankin did what he did may be a mystery but that he did it is not. The record he himself made is clear,

This is the last of the records of the period of those executive sessions of which I made extra copies for subject filing.

Of their many meanings, what I regard as most significant is the absolute refusal of the Commission to ~~take any testimony~~<sup>make investigation of</sup> on the report that Oswald had had some kind of agency connection ~~and~~<sup>H/</sup> refused to investigate ~~it~~<sup>this</sup> in any way. This as does so much else addresses the Commission integrity and reflects its intent to ordain Oswald the lone assassin from the outset. It thus was unwilling to pursue any indication that there had been a conspiracy, as the January 22 transcript reflects, particular not one that could involve the government - a coup d'etat.

Possibly the reasons Rankin focused on the FBI is his belief that the FBI would pursue it with enough vigor, which for its purposes it did. It did not as it should have in an assassination investigation.

No part of the government functioned as it should have when its President was assassinated, a tragedy and a national disgrace. That a Commission of such eminences could

deliberately refuse to meet its ~~of~~ responsibilities may not be unprecedented, given the uses make ~~of~~ presidents of ~~the~~ presidential commissions ~~to~~ to do for them what they cannot do any other way - but when the matter to be investigated was coup d'etat, which is what the assassination of any president <sup>really</sup> is, <sup>the</sup> abdication and dishonesty are real shockers.

Without secrecy this could not have happened.

For any honest purpose, no secrecy was needed or appropriate. It was imposed so that what was perpetrated could be perpetrated. Not for any other reason.

*extra space*

*163A jobs*

The foregoing does not reflect all of Rankin's dishonesties relating to the investigation he saw to it was not made of that "dirty rumor."

What should not be overlooked as a measure of his intentions and of how he mis-directed the whole thing is that neither Hudkins nor Goulden ever said that the report related to the FBI only, the way Rankin made it look.

There was no basis for the excuse he made up for not calling Hudkins, the only reporter anyone ever suggested be called. He and Goulden both told the FBI all they could, everything but their sources ~~names~~ or sources' name or names.

Wade, who had been an FBI agent, did tell Rankin and Warren that what had been reported was not consistent with FBI procedures and record-~~ing~~ keeping. *as he knew them.*