

Christy's
TWO OF

IV. THE TEXANS AND WHAT THEY REMEMBER

Getting to Texas and working there was difficult for me because I lacked the resources. ^{it} This became impossible when I was so deeply involved in all the FOIA lawsuits and even more impossible after suffering a series of illnesses and ^{surgical complications} surgeries that severely limited what I am able to do ^{what} and ^{it can make} makes any travel especially hazardous ^{is that} because since 1975 I have lived on an anticoagulant ^{that} that makes even a slight bruise potential ^{fatal} fatal.

When I was there I found both Henry Wade, who was not a formal member of the Texas Court of Inquiry, and Dean Robert ^(Emeritus) Storey, who was ^{cordial} friendly, ^{and} cooperative, ^{and} willing to help as much as they could. *(17 A have)*

Once I learned this, because I could not be in Dallas and ~~work there~~ spend the time ~~there~~ required for a careful examination of the files both made available, I asked a friend to examine these files for me when she was able to ^{But} and the conditions of her life there after made that impossible. ~~Expecting~~ ^{more than two decades later} Expecting that it would be possible, I did not make detailed notes and ^{memos} after all these years, in the mass of records I later accumulated, I can find only some rudimentary notes I typed after I returned home. That I had some handwritten notes is clear because ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ the typed memos I refer to some of them.

^{These} My typed memos on interviews with Storey three days apart in 1971 refer to my having interviewed him three years earlier. I have neither notes nor recollection of that. But Storey did remember me from that earlier visit.

He was warm and friendly and seemed to be trying to remember all he could, ^{and} he did offer me access to ~~his~~ his records in his first-floor office of the Storey Building at Southern Methodist University, 3315 ^{Street} Daniels. He then spent afternoons there, mornings at his law ^{with a prominent firm, now} offices office, Suite 4600 of the Republic National Bank Building in ~~the~~ the heart of downtown Dallas.

The September 15, 1975 ^{an} Houston Chronicle ^{in 1975/6} story reporting ~~the~~ the Jaworski's effort to belittle what Waggoner Carr said about his demand of Warren and Rankin at that January 24 secret session quoted Storey's ~~so~~ as saying that he was then, 81 years of age and unable to talk. I took this to mean either too ill or too frail, not that ~~it~~ talking then was physically impossible for him. While in 1971 I had the impression that he was somewhat

97A

the 1971
Storey 's varied career was so long and so active his disting in Who's Who in
the South and the Southwest, with all the abbreviations and contractions and in very small
type is still half a column long.)

frail that did not ~~seem to~~ affect his mind *in any way at all.*

My memos are of interviews with him at 10:40 a.m. November 30, 1971 in the Republic National Bank suite and of an afternoon interview at his S MU offices December 2. He then was in full possession of all his faculties and his mind was sharp and clear. All his recollections were not, however. As my memo on the December interview states, he was cordial, very friendly and ~~even~~ had even offered me a ride from his ~~law~~ law office the previous Wednesday, when it was raining. (A friend was picking me up but when it was raining hard when one of my interviews with Wade ended, he had his chauffeur drive me to my next appointment in his official car.)

Storey

He was on the staff of the prosecution at the Nuremburg trials after World War II, he told me. ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ On his return he said he was involved in the organization of an *component* Air Force Intelligence ~~unit~~ *because he had held a number of important posts,* in Florida. Aside from his reputation as an excellent lawyer he did have experience that could have served him well on the TCI. and with the Commission.

During the early World War II period Henry Wade ~~never~~ ^{FBI} began his career in its Baltimore office. That included the area in which we live. He is familiar with it. He ~~then~~ *later* was stationed for a while in South America. Between ~~that~~ *his FBI* experience and his long tenure as Dallas District Attorney he was also well qualified to be of assistance to both the Commission and the TCI.

~~Wade is also a cordial, warm and friendly man. I was with him on occasion when he as a~~ He recalled ^{ed} his many activities of the World War II era with clarity and lucidity. By then he enjoyed a reputation that had General Hap Arnold seeking his services in the far east and Justice Robert Jackson in the opposite direction, *at Nuremberg,* (He opted Jackson) ~~cordial.~~

Wade is also a ^{he} warm and a friendly man. I was with him on occasion when as a prosecutor ^{over} practised the canons of the bar and sought justice ~~rather~~ *rather* than conviction.

Once when I was waiting to see him, his greeting me was delayed by a visit from the State Democratic party ^{leadership}. It wanted him to run for governor. He declined. He believed he was not known well enough in Texas away from the Dallas area. That he could decline an honor like that impressed me.

His files related to his prosecution of Jack Ruby. From cursory examination of them, a detailed examination being precluded by the limited time I had, it became apparent that

There is a possible explanation of this, not a justification for that is not possible.

Hoover had had his vision the day of the assassination that Oswald was a lone assassin, that there was no conspiracy, the FBI did not want even to suggest that there could have been any conspiracy in his murder. A conspiracy to kill Oswald suggests he was part of a conspiracy to kill the President.

Oswald

could

Extrajudicial

How Bizarre!

Jack Ruby killed the only man ever ~~considered~~ ^{here} officially considered to have been the assassin of the President and ~~else~~ was the FBI withholding from his prosecution non-secret information that, before Ruby died, was ~~freely~~ available to anyone in Washington or by mail from the National Archives to anyone who knew it ~~existed~~ and wrote and asked the Archives for it!

What rational reason could there be for this strange behavior, withholding relevant information from ~~a local~~ ^{the} prosecutor in a sensational murder case? *(But then the FBI, like the CIA, withheld much from the Presidential Commission, too)*

The murder itself was seen live on international ~~TTTTVxx~~ TV all around the world. There was no question about the murder. But there ~~then~~ were and there lingered many questions about Ruby the murderer. The most obvious - and still unresolved - of these immediate questions was and is whether Ruby had been part of a conspiracy. For this the prosecution needed all the information available about Ruby and any connections he may have had.

With the criminal world in particular because he was known to had had connections with the criminal world. *99A1 here*

So, we still can only conjecture - and wonder what kind of an FBI we ^{really} have when it withholds from the prosecution information of possible use to it in so spectacular and ^{important a} crime.

Of the possible explanations the one that ~~seems~~ ^{seems} most likely to me is that the FBI, ~~xxxx~~ ~~xxxxxx~~ ~~xxxxxx~~ was much more concerned about the possibility of some embarrassment to it than with law enforcement. What could have been embarrassing is that -

Ruby had been an FBI informer! [#] The man who killed the President's accused assassin had worked for the FBI, in ^{very} the role attributed to ~~Oswald~~ ^{the man he killed} by those rumors and reports never really investigated!

I had picked ^{up} ~~this~~ ^{when the name of the FBI agent who recruited him.} information up in Dallas in 1968. My sources included a former FBI agent. But there was no proof.

A full account of the FBI's relationship with Ruby should have been included in the ~~Dallas~~ Dallas FBI JFK assassination records disclosed to me in CA 78-0320, but it wasn't. ^{John Lewis Smith} And thanks to the FBI Lickspitttle of a judge in that case, he let ~~them~~ the FBI get away

99x2
with that and many other obvious suppressions of relevant records.

(In a case against a notorious wire-tapper Judge John Lewis Smith once said in open court that he generally took his leads from the FBI!)

The little bit that these disclosed FBI records hold is that FBIHQ approved using Ruby as a criminal informer but that during his period of probation ~~he~~ ^{he} provided so little useful information it ~~dropped~~ ^{thereafter} him and did not use him as an informer.

The ~~records~~ relevant records still kept secret by the FBI include ~~the~~ ^{still} ~~required~~ those required to have been made and filed by the agent in contact with Ruby on a regular basis during the period of probation. There is an FBI printed form its agents are required to fill out after each contact. It and related attachments include an account of the information provided, if any, and the agent's evaluation of it. The money paid the informer, which must be approved in advance, ~~causing~~ ^{still} other records to be generated, is post, ^{also} with any receipts for the payments. In Ruby's case there were 137-classification files at FBIHQ and in Dallas. ⁽¹³⁷ That is the FBI's classification for "Criminal Informants.") Any information he provided would have been filed in Dallas in that file in an FD340, what is known as an "evidence envelope." As a minimum these records are required to exist by the FBI's own regulations and practises. But none of ~~it~~ ^{it} was disclosed when the law required its disclosure.

There is no known information that disproves the FBI's explanation that Ruby was an unproductive informer so it did not use him after the period of probation.

But if this is true, how explain the FBI's lying under oath in CA 78-0320, that lie being the felony of perjury, in stating that it had no undisclosed Ruby records?

Contrary to the public image the FBI created for itself, lying that extends to perjury are SOP for it. This was proven in each and every one of my FOIA lawsuits against it. But that it lied about disclosing all its Ruby records ~~does~~ ^{it} not have to mean that those still-secret records hold anything more embarrassing to the FBI than ~~that~~ ^{it} admits, that Ruby was ~~its~~ ^{is} informer for a short period of time and that because he did not provide useful information it did not continue using him as an informer. The FBI lies even when there is ^{apparent} no need for it to lie.

994 note to self re 2A1, LIVES 2-2,

Search my case file for this and if not there ~~get~~ get from the Fensterwald files. The case was his client, Bass's. ^{Bass} ~~Both~~ got the transcript and gave it to Bud who gave me a copy.

With Ruby, Oswald's murderer, having admittedly been an FBI informer, how unusual, how exciting and provocative it would have been if the facts developed in a real investigation disclosed that in murdering Oswald, the only official candidate for Presidential assassin, Ruby had also killed another FBI informer!

It would have meant an FBI assassin and an FBI ~~the~~ assassin's assassin!

at the space

3
neither the Commission nor the FBI had wanted to help him and that they had in fact withheld from him what was readily available to anyone in the National Archives. Although by the time I went through his files Ruby was dead, I sent ~~him~~ ^{Wade} copies of FBI and Commission records I thought he might want for the completion of his files. ^{These were} records that neither the FBI nor the Commission had given him for use in the Ruby case. ^{993A here}

(By coincidence I spent several ^{in Chicago} hours the day Ruby was buried with one of his lawyers, Elmer Gertz, and ^u Mrs. ^u Gertz, Gertz and I were to ~~be~~ guests on the taping of a John ~~Madigan~~ Madigan TV show on WBBM-TV, ~~in Chicago~~. There were technical problems that delayed the taping. The ^u gertzes and I sat in the cafeteria and chatted until the studio was prepared for the taping. He told me that he had been at ^u Ruby's funeral that very snowy morning and that

he was satisfied there was nothing abnormal in Ruby's death. He did believe, however, that Ruby would have been hospitalized earlier if the sheriff himself had not been hospitalized because in his absence others appeared to be uneasy about Ruby being anywhere but in his jail cell. ^u I remember that particular day, a Friday in February, 1967 with clarity for another reason connected with Ruby. He had been interviewed ^{ed IN THE HOSPITAL} by Larry Schiller, as loathsome an assassination scavenger ~~as~~ as there was, ^{with Ruby family connivance Schiller made} with a tape ~~made~~ clandestinely and, natural for Schiller, used ^{it} improperly. I had to fly back to Washington in that snowstorm to confront Schiller, ^{on a talk show, he was} then plugging his book in which, scavenger that he was, he characterized all the critics of the Warren Report as scavengers. He would not confront ^{me} so I ^e appeared after him. He had obtained interviews with critics by misrepresentation ^{ING} of his project as scholarly, for a university, and he then edited the tapes to give them meanings they did not have. And instead of a university deposit he had a rushed ^{two} and wretchedly dishonest exploitations and commercializations of the JFK assassination, before long he abandoned the assassination for the ^{from behind which} woodwork behind which ~~he belonged~~ creatures like him emerge from time to time. The Ruby case had been ^{ordered to} designated for a new trial by the appeals court when he died of a cancer in his head. Some of the information Wade did not use in his prosecution in which it would have been prejudicial reflected a different kind of sickness in Ruby's head. ^u

~~Final Report~~

Ruby referred to his favorite dog, his dachshund^N Sheba as his wife. The SPCA
feared he was treating ~~his favorite dog~~^{her that way} as his wife.

In public Ruby fondled the just beginning to swell breasts^N of girls. When chided
for this he told his critics he was just breaking them in, preparing them to work for
him.

Together with his tendency to blab, to puff himself up over his connections, it
is not easy to believe that anyone involved in any kind of conspiracy would trust
Ruby to be part of it.

single extra space

Storey was convinced of Oswald's guilt. This seemed to come more from being influenced by the successful effort to portray ~~him~~^{Oswald} as some kind of "red" than by evidence of the crime, of which Storey seemed to have little knowledge. To him, with Oswald a "red," all else just fell into place. Thus the official story satisfied him. If he knew more of the ^{of the crime} fact than the general public, he did not reflect that in our interviews.

He was ~~actually under the impression~~^{believed} that Oswald had ~~actually~~ renounced his American citizenship. In fact he did not.

He was under the impression that the executive branch of the government had done all that was possible in the investigation but, as he had no way of knowing, that also was not true. ^{In this regard} He seemed to have been particularly impressed by the return of diplomats from ~~he said Latin American and Japan -~~ abroad) to be interviewed in the investigation

Hearing Oswald's voice ^{on a radical-right program under} if a record made of his debate with right-wingers in New Orleans seemed to have influenced how ~~he~~^{Storey} regarded Oswald ~~and along~~^{That} with the official portrayal of Oswald as a "red," convinced him ~~of that~~^{Oswald} was a true, dedicated "red."

He had that record in a display case in his SMI office. Along with it were a ~~set~~^{display} of the Commission's 26 volumes, ^{of appendix,} some of them standing and open, a paperback reprint of Mark Lane's Rush to Judgement, and a few ^{w/} carefully-labelled ^{bound} files. These files were titled:

Marguerite Oswald, King Candy Co.; Investigation of Operational Security Involving the Transfer of Lee Harvey Oswald 11/24/63; Dallas Police Reports; Photographs Oswald Shooting in ~~the~~ Basement; Photographs J.D. Tippit Area of Shooting and Location Oswald Arrested; Evidence; Lee Harvey Oswald; Transcript Dallas Police Radio Transmissions; ~~Photographs~~ Photographs Persons Appearing with Lee Harvey Oswald in Dallas Police Identifications Line-Ups; Photographs Oswald's Property; Officer J.D. Tippit; Edwin A. Walker File; (Dallas Police Department; Photographs Trade Mart Aerial View Trade Mart Floor Plans (JFK was en route to the Trade Mart, where he was scheduled to speak, when he was assassinated); Investigation of the Assassination of President Kennedy, John Fitzgerald, 11/22/63 (my note indicates this far from complete record of any investigation was limited to copies of the information compiled by the ~~Sheriff~~ sheriff and published by the Commission ~~ix~~. It was only about an inch thick and cannot contain the results of a real investigation of the crime);

02

Photographs Downtown View Oak ~~Cliff~~ ^{Cliffs} Section Dallas Showing Oswald's ~~Known~~
 Known and Probably ^{e/} Routes (this refers to Oswald's alleged route from his rooming house to
 the ~~movie house in which he was arrested~~ Texas Theater in which he was arrested, allegedly
 having shot Officer Tippit en route. In fact he had no "known" route and was not seen
 " en route by anyone.); Photographs Interior and Exterior of Texas Depository Building
 (from which Oswald is alleged to have shot the President and governor Connally); Re-
 construction- Investigation of Assassination of ^{the} President ~~Kennedy~~ Dallas ^{Police}
 Department.

These file titles reflect ^{little} information from Washington for the consideration of
 the Texas Court of Inquiry, (either from the Commission or the federal agencies like the
 FBI and the Secret Service. They do reflect a ~~hand~~ ^{hand} feeding of men too busy in their normal
 lives to be active in anything like a real investigation, the ~~hand~~ ^{hand} feeding by the Dallas
 police ~~the~~ and the Dallas County Sheriff ~~the~~

With regard to the report that Oswald had been an ~~federal~~ ^{secret} undercover operative for
 the FBI or the CIA, ^{about which handwriting included no file} All ^{his display} Storey remembered is that his pay was said to be \$200 a month,

^{made} With regard to trips to Washington by the members of the Texas Court of Inquiry ~~he~~
^{Other than} referred to more than for the Commission's January 24, 1964 executive session. ~~He dis-~~
 tinguished between that one, when Wade was with them, and other trips when ~~he~~ ^{Wade} was not.

^{He referred to Rantin as "Lee."} These notes contain no other references to those other TCI trips to Washington or their
 purpose. ^{or Storey's} While ~~his~~ recollections of what transpired at that January 24 executive session
 were hazy, they were sharp and clear on the fact that there was a ~~steno~~ ^{woman} present to
 record what was said. In fact, Storey was confident that he had a transcript of that
 session. He indicated that ~~the~~ ^{was the} typescript ^{of it} was about an inch and a half thick. While
 there ~~was~~ ^{is} no such transcript his thinking he had one tends to confirm his certainty that
 what was said was being taken down by ~~steno~~ ^{the woman} he believed was a court
^{reporter, Storey} reporter. Storey believed he also had notes relating to that session. He thought he had notes
 relating to that session. He said he would ^C check and see. He never sent me copies of any.

Wade's recollection is consistent with Storey's, with some variation in the detail of
^{what} ~~what~~ he recalled.

Wade

He told me that he was certain Rankin was not in the designated room of the Commission's offices in the Veterans of Foreign War building when the Texans got there. Inside that room they were greeted by a woman he thought was the same one he saw making notes. He is certain that there was a woman making ^{of} notes. Storey was certain that they were told the notes would be preserved. Wade seemed to recall that they were told it would not be a published hearing.

They agree in their belief that a record of some kind was being made and that it was being recorded by one they both identify as ^a woman.

This is entirely consistent with Rankin's trick to deceive Senator Russell, ~~the~~ ^{Conclusions} Commission Member who did not agree with some of the ~~language~~ ^{language} of the Report and who had forced the executive session of September 18 to record his disagreements. It was with the Texans as it was with Russell, Rankin ^{later} ~~had~~ ^{saw} seen to it that there would be no stenographic transcript for the historical record while going through the motions of leading the Texans, as he later did Russell, ~~arranging~~ ^{arranging} to believe that what was said was being taken down.

With the passing ^{of} time recollections do get less certain and become less complete. Recollections also can be influenced by interviewers, whether or not with that intent, from the questions they ask that, over a period of time, ^{people} can ~~get~~ ^(what they were asked) confused with what ~~is~~ ^{they once knew,} actually recalled. ^{But} both Wade and Storey were certain that a record of that January 24th executive session was being made. Wade appeared not to be certain that a court reporter was present to provide a verbatim stenographic transcript of the session ~~but~~ ^{but} Storey not only was certain, he believed he had a copy of ~~the~~ ^{the} typescript of that session. ^{However} ~~But~~ Rankin, Rankin, in accord with the January 22 decision of the Commission, saw to it that there would be no official record of that session while creating the impression in the minds of the Texans ^{that a} ~~that a~~ ^{the record he was making certain would not exist} ~~the record he was making certain would not exist~~ ^{still} was in fact being made.

Rankin, for the Commission, imposed upon their trust. They had no reason to suspect that he tricked them or that he wanted no record to exist. On their part, they had no reason to suspect that the Commission itself had decided that it would have no record of

(Unknown to them, the FBI had prepared for any such contingency as soon as the ^{names} were known. In an FBI damage-control outline (tickler) disclosed to my friend Mark Allen, under "Bureau Relationship With Warren Commission" and then under the first of its subheadings, "A. Formation of Warren Commission," ~~is,~~ ^{is,} "5. Preparation of dossiers in staff and members." Under the third subheading, "C. Related Bureau Actions and Activities," the first item is "1. Preparations of ~~the~~ dossiers on WC staff after the Report was out." (Emphasis in original) Next to the last of these subheadings reflects the extent to which the FBI went in preparing its police-state dossiers, "7. Subsequent preparations of sex ~~and~~ dossiers on critics of probe." This tickler also confirms the power and influence Hoover had in reporting under its "Relationship With Warren Commission" that "4. Hoover ~~blocked~~ blocking Warren's choice for general counsel." (Ticker outline in my files.)

Obviously, the only reason for preparing dossiers is to be able to use them and the only uses possible were ^{for} blackmail or for ^{the} destroying the reputations of Commission Members and staff.)

~~While~~ (Although the FBI had already prepared dossiers on the staff, "after the Report was ^{out} its ~~prepared~~ ^{preparation of additional} ~~additional~~ dossiers on the staff ~~after the Report was out~~ has to have included ^{as} among the purposes ^{its} of ~~preparing additional staff dossiers for parts of the~~ report the FBI found particularly objectionable.)

057X

When I examined the Commission's records in the National Archives with some intensity/I saw nothing that even suggested anything as underhanded as Rankin pulled on the Texans, nothing suggesting there had been any demand or request from them for any investigation of the report that Oswald had worked undercover for an agency of government. I saw nothing at all indicating that there had been any record made of that January 24 session, no reference other than is in the Rankin memo on it of ^{w/} what transpired there.

And But there is no way of knowing what was filed in the ^{government's} circular file, *Dr. Ruell's* "memory hole."

I went into the Archives refusal to replace records that had disappeared in my ^(see the Epilog on pp 236-41) second book, Whitewash II. The agencies of original ^{Dr. James B. Rhoads,} could have xeroxed the missing records without any difficulty at all, but the then ^{some of} archivist would not ask this of them.

While the copies I obtained of ^{some of} the Commission-TGI correspondence are of all in the ^{July 7, 1971} Commission's file of them at the Archives, it admitted in a letter to Howard Roffman, then a student, there were five letters of which it had a record but of which it had no copies. One of these was written to Warren by Carr shortly after that session, It was dated February 14, 1964. Another of those missing letters is one Storey wrote Carr the next month.

Carr's request
~~and~~ on ~~this~~ the Commission's files are barren.
Whitewash II, my

On page 238 of ~~that~~ 1966 book, I stated, without contradiction since then, that

"The Attorney General of the State of Texas provided a large amount of information, It is in File 102, broken into 29 different files, identified alphabetically. Of these, ²¹ 21 are ~~missing~~ missing."

Carr's letter and much else could have been in those 21 missing files.

~~Not~~ doing what Carr asked means

Only the Commission, its staff and those at the National Archives are known ^{if no others had access,} to have ^{of these records,} had access to these files. So only they can account for their disappearance.

105

the urgent session it had asked them to drop everything in their busy lives to attend with less than a day of notice. My impression of both men is that they were fine and honorable men and were not consciously any part of any kind of ^{is}coering up, including with regard to the report that Oswald had been an FBI or a CIA undercover informer.

The reason the Commission wanted no record to exist is clear in the previously-quoted portions of the January 22 executive session transcript - they lived in fear of Hoover and his FBI and they were not ^{about}able to do anything that might lead ^{Hoover react against}him to get ~~back~~ at them. They were experienced in our Byzantine ^{um} on the Potomac and had ~~no~~ doubt that as he had in the past, Hoover could and would retaliate against them if he felt he had cause to. *7x here 105X*

What ~~a~~ ^{m/}former Texas Attorney General Carr, who headed the TCI, told the Houston Chronicle he had asked the Commission to do, to really investigate the report that Oswald had ~~linked~~ ^{spied} for the FBI or the CIA, tells us something of what transpired at that January 24 session. It is the very thing the Commission did not want ^{anything that would offend offend} to tangle with Hoover and his FBI ^{to investigating} ~~over~~ whether ^{would} Oswald had worked for it. Having no record of what the Texans told them and asked of them made it easier for the Commission not to do what Carr wanted it to do, what it on its own had already decided not to do, really investigate. *105A 74 here*

~~This means~~ that the Commission ~~is~~ ^{d/}decide not to meet the mandate of its creation. And, as we shall see with Oswald, it did not.

Its intended, its deliberate chicanery of January 24, 1964, was one of its means to that end, an indispensable means to that end.

When the fullness of what had been done to ~~him~~ and his TCI dawned on Carr is not clear. An excellent account and ~~after a space~~ among the earliest of them was Sylvia Heagher's ^{22 als} Wheels Within Deas: How the Kennedy "Investigation" Was Organized, brought much of ~~this~~ to light in the small and since-defunct Minority of One magazine for July/August 1968, (pages 23-7) But it was no long before Carr had an indication of what was to happen.

105.0

Within the week following that January 24 executive session Carr understood that he and his court of inquiry had been doublecrossed by Rankin. His ^{July February 4} letter of protest to Rankin, from the Commission's "Texas Investigation" file, ^{protests} that they had been precluded from hearing Marina Oswald's testimony.

Every word of which was subsequently published by the Commission.

After complaining to Rankin that "you have/broken your commitment to have Texas represented" at the hearing, ^{Carr} he said that this commitment had been made "several times over the on my presence and the presence of special counsel."

But if his "special" counsel ^{Jaworski} had given a damn he and not Carr would have made the protest to the double-crossing Commission.

So we seem to have another indication of what went on at that January 24 executive session called to learn what the Texans knew about the reports of Oswald having been an undercover spy for a federal agency and another indication of why Rankin and Warren, ~~assured~~ assured in advance that no other members of the Commission or its staff would be present and that there would not be the promised stenograph ^{ic} verbatim transcript of what ~~was~~ then was said and agreed to.

Poor Carr had more than the wily Rankin to deal with. Aside from his CIA funds connection, a little about Jaworski from before his national fame as Watergate prosecutor reflect ^{his} Jaworski's attitudes and beliefs and tells us a little about ~~the~~ how and why as counsel for the Texas Court of Inquiry, ^{his} his native state's, he was part and parcel of completely immobilizing it and rendering it impotent and worse that useless.

105D JAS

105 D1

(After
~~Miss~~ Random House published Gerald Posner's commercialization and exploitation
of the JFK assassination in which he endorses and supports the official mythology,
Oelsner was ^{its} associate general ~~counsel~~ of Random House. ~~She~~ She then defended him and
his book.)

105 D

From the determination with which the Johnson White House set about seeing to it that the Texas Court of Inquiry would be without any influence in the assassination investigation, which is also to say that it would be controlled in Washington, accomplishing that has to be have been a major Johnson interest in those earliest days of his administration. In this effort Jaworski and Rankin were indispensable and in it that they could not have helped LBJ any more than they did.

Johnson showed his appreciation of the invaluable help from his old friend and sometimes lawyer, Jaworski. Johnson appointed him to five Presidential Commissions.

This and a little about Jaworki that was not well known in Washington was reported ~~by~~ by the New York Times on July 6, ~~10-1944~~ 1971 in its account of his election to be president of the American Bar Association the day before. His election, Lesley Oelsner wrote was "won in the A.B.A tradition in an uncontested election." (105D) (has)

This is to say that the fixer's election itself was fixed.

(The usual way.)

The election was by the bar association's house of delegates, not by popular vote,

In his news conference after his election Jaworski expressed concern for the bar's "ethics" and said it had to do a better job of cleaning the bar up, including by "house-keeping," which does suggest disbarring licensed lawyers.

"Above all," Oelsner wrote, Jaworski was "adept at fielding questions." "Meaning evading direct response and not really responding when he did not want to respond.

As a member of Johnson's "Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence" Jaworski "joined the minority in that panel's 1967 report, siding with those who thought the Warren Court had gone too far in some of its decisions regarding defendant's ~~we~~ rights," Oelsner also wrote.

The United Press syndicated account of that press conference is only about a quarter the length of the Times' account of it as published that day by the San Francisco Chronicle, but three of its six paragraphs indicate that what Jaworski was really talking about in speaking of "ethics" is applying a political test as a precondition for those wanting to study the law and become lawyers.

105E July

105 E

In its lead United Press said that what Jaworski demanded is ^{that} "that potential law students be subjected to thorough investigation before being admitted to law schools in an effort to weed out 'bad apples'."

"Admission" to law schools" he wanted to be controlled by a "prior" and otherwise undefined "investigation."

A direct quotation on this is "We may need to be a little more careful about who we let study the law."

But according to Oelsner's account he could not have had in mind students who might as lawyers defend criminals because he "in the past defended men charged with crimes."

In fact, as the youngest lawyer admitted to the bar in ~~Ta. Y. Dec~~ Texas, when he was a mere 20 years of age ^{in Waco} he successfully defended "A bootlegger charged with operating a still in nearby Moonshine Valley."

(In those days when the Volstead Act prohibited even possession of liquor, those who distilled it ~~illeg~~ illegally were known as "moonshiners" because for them the operation was largely nocturnal and those who sold the liquor were known as "bootleggers.")

Jaworski could not have had some political offenses in mind in his demand for "house-cleaning" by the bar as investigations prior to admission to law school to "weed out 'bad apples'," because in 1960 he successfully defended Lyndon Johnson in a lawsuit brought by the Republican Party to block Johnson's running for both his Senate seat and the vice-presidency in the same election. This meant, of course, that with Johnson vice president all those who voted ~~for him~~ to return him to the Senate were defrauded of their votes ^{and Texas} of a Senate until one was appointed not elected.

Obviously, Jaworski did not consider himself a "bad apple" not in keeping with his concept of "ethics" for the bar. Nor could he have had in mind those who were part of the

It is only those he opposed politically who should be subjected to pre-admission investigation by the bar to ~~weed out~~ "weed out" those he considered to be "bad apples." Like those who disagreed with him and did agree with the Supreme Court on "defendant's rights."

CIA's violation of the constitution and our law and innumerable ~~tea~~ treaties because his association with the CIA associated him with those wrongful acts that extended to assassinations, what his TCI was to have investigated and didn't.

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Who were "bad apples" to the Jaworskis? Those whose ideas and beliefs were dangerous.

In Japan before World War II there were what were called, literally, the "thought police." I did a little little reasearc^h on them when I was in the ~~POSS~~. In the urban areas they were ~~said to have~~ ^{had} a ~~rep~~ representative in each city block where the thoughts of those who ~~exp~~ expressed them were monitored ^{closely}.

Hitler had his own ^{thought police,} as did Stalin, but their's had duties other than ~~merely~~ seeking out that who held dangerous thoughts. They did something about them, ^{their} those "bad apples." *To many millions of Dem.*

"Bad apples" to Jaworski were not those Frankin^l Delano Roosevelt referred to as "malefactors of great weath^h." No, they were not "bad apples" to Jaworski and the ~~many~~ ^{and ~~me~~} since ~~proliferated~~ other Jaworskis. He represented them, he prospered from them, ~~he~~ ^{- engaged in election fraud -} those who stole elections were ~~not~~ "bad apples" to him. He represented them and they honored him for it.

The general coun^{sel} of the Warren Commission who, with help that included Jaworski's former client the President, one of those who honored him, was not a "bad apple." All ~~he~~ ^{Rankin} did was to Jaworski good, not bad. Like ~~seeing~~ ^{seeing} to it that "the crime of the century" would not be investigated and then controlled the ^{on it} report that was issued and was a gross fake. And with Jaworski's help seeing to it that one of Jaworski's then clients, his state's Court of Inquiry ^{into that assassination,} could and would do nothing but rubber stamp the Report to which Rankin saw. ^{no dangerous thoughts there.}

"Bad apple"? No t Rankin and all those other lawyers who did what Rankin wanted them to do so they could boast that "truth is our only clients" and later that they were all honorable men for doing what they did.

Patriots, real patriots. They took care of their own "bad apple." Good care, as the record since then shows.

As did those in our earlier days at Salem. They knew a "bad apple" witch~~e~~ when they saw one.

As so many of their^s successor Jaworski's with their own eyes for all those ^{if} bad

apples with their dangerous thoughts ever since then, in our more recent history represented by Joe McCarthy.

Thoughts can be more dangerous than ~~bombs~~^{guns}, as King George III learned.

And so, ~~anxious~~ always to protect the nation, as he did in helping the CIA around the laws with their ~~findation~~^{of} fronts, Jaworski as his first words on becoming head of the American Bar Association, announced his intention of getting rid of all those "bad apple" lawyers who had in mind something for the practise of law other than representing those career- insuring, prosperity providing ~~ill~~ malefactors of great wa wealth.

Isn't that what lawyers who are not "bad apples" and do not hold bad thoughts they can practise do when they guide their clients around the ~~the~~ laws?

"De mortuis nil nisi bonum" is the old Latin phrase.

So let us speak well of Leon Jaworski. He knew a "bad apple" when he suspected one, ^{as soon as} He knew what dangerous thoughts are. He knew how to prevent those "bad apples" just out of college from entering law school. And even, if he did not persuade the bar association he headed to have its own thought police to block entry into the law schools for ~~Jaworski's~~ "bad apples" he was not without other achievements, as his friend and ^{wagoner} client Carr can attest.

As could Rankin if he had not gone on to his own reward for his very special kind of patriotism in which Jaworski was so helpful in keeping any Texas "bad apples" from intruding their bad thoughts on Rankin's good works. As Carr wrote in 1964, not after

~~De mortuis nil nisi bonum, speak only well of Leon Jaworski: Sieg Heil!~~

some "bad" thoughts reached him in 1975, these ~~next to the~~ last words in his TCI's monumental report of almost 20 small pages with wide margins and spacing for its small headline-size type,

1 space indent
"... All Texans owe a deep debt of gratitude to two distinguished members of the State Bar who so unselfishly answered my request for assassinatnce as Special Counsel in this investigation. Mr. Leon Jaworski and Dean Robert G. Storey have given many hours of their time. Without their invaluable counsel and assasistance, our work could

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not have been as so thorough nor complete."

So thorough and complete that it required fewer than 4,000 words for the entire report on the biggest crime in Texas' history.

De mortuis nil nisi bonum, speak only well of Leon Jaworski? Sieg Heil!

single
extra
page

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What is it that Carr wanted the Commission to do that the Commission was so anxious not to have as a matter of record? As stated in ~~the previously quoted~~ the previously-quoted Houston Chronicle interview of Septmeber 15, 1975, it also included what Carr, as Texas Attorney General and as head of its Court of Inquiry into the JFK assassination, did not want the Commission to do:

of
the
CIA
and
FBI

"Carr had recommended to the Warren Commission in January, 1964, that the Commission 'comb the depths' of both agencies (The FBI and the CIA) to find out if any agents, in-~~formant~~ formant agent or spy in its ranks had any knowledge of Oswald. The commission in-
stead, he said, allowed the agencies to investigate themselves. The answer from both was no, Oswald was not connected with the CIA or the FBI, Carr said."

If there had been anything wrong or inappropriate for Carr, as the official representative of the State of Texas as both its attorney genral and the head of its assassi-
nation inquiry, to ~~make~~ ^{make} such a request of the Commission, or if there were anything wrong or inappropriate in what he requested of it, is it not strange that the Hall of Fame fixer, Jaworski, is not quoted in the Chronicle as pointing ~~this~~ out what he believed may have been wrong or inappropriate.

The Commission's aplogists, members, staff and syciphants, all were publicly silent in the face of these quite serious ^{public} charges by Carr.

He was actually accusing the ~~Commision~~ ^{selm} and its staff of refusing to do their appointed jobs. They were supposed to investigate all aspects of the crime and what related to it.

And they did not.

This and how Warren and Rankin conducted that January 24 executive session to which Carr refers should be in mind ~~as~~ ^{when} we examine the transcript of the January 27, 1964 executive session Warren called ~~ostensibly~~ to inform his fellow Commission members about what they did at that January 24 session.

^{we} We do know what the partial transcript of ~~that~~ ^{the January 27} session records, and it is pretty hairy stuff! Their fear of the FBI in particular, and their understanding that the FBI ~~hold~~ "fold their tents" and told them to go packing because the FBI had done all there was to do - and in effect ~~dared~~ ^{them} to say otherwise.

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in assessing the January 27 transcript and what it says and means, ^U that the ^{admitted} ^{on January 22} Commission disclosed in secret that it had already decided to find that there had not been any conspiracy, should also be kept in mind.

The January 27 transcript represents what the Commissioners said and decided after the developments at the two prior and related executive sessions.

Despite Rankin's picturesque phrase, "we have a dirty rumor," ~~that was not the~~ January 27 was not the Commission's first knowledge ^{of} or its first deliberations over the matter Rankin also told they they had to "wipe out," the report that Oswald had served ^{the} the FBI or the CIA as an undercover informer.

If the Commission had ever given this report about Oswald any serious consideration or had conducted any real investigation of it, would it not, then, have really been looking into the possibility that the President had been assassinate ~~d~~ as the end product of conspiracy? *a government agency conspiracy?*

This is what that January 22 partial-transcript reflects.

"Terrible" and "fantastic" is how they described this possibility.

And as soon as they said that they agreed to order the court reporter not to take anything else down.