

4. III. "WE SAID WE WOULD HAVE RECORDS OF MEETINGS"

"so we called the reporter" is the way the ^{January 22} previous executive session - the part that was taken down by the court reporter ^{ended}. It had probably been Warren speaking because no one else had the authority to say what he then said, "If you think what we have said here should not be upon the record, we can have it that ~~way~~ way." The misgivings he then started to express, "Of course it might..." ~~ended ended~~ ended unexpressed when first Dulles intoned that ^{should} nobody ~~she~~ ever see these transcripts. Boggs voiced the same belief and then the A of the Pentagon transcriber, ^{not} as certainly Warren this time, agreed with Boggs' hope that "none of these records are circulated to ~~anybody~~ anybody, in saying, "I would hope so, too."

The last recorded words of that January 22 session were Rankin's. He assured the ^(Only he did not know that Ford was an FBI informant. The FBI's records reveal that it had a full account - immediately.) Members that "if you don't want them," nobody else would see the transcripts.

As we saw ~~recorde~~ recorded in the records of court reporting services provided, Rankin kept his word by not arranging for any ^{of} court reporter to be present two days later, on January 24, when he and Warren ^{alone} met with and questioned the four Texans Rankin had asked to rush to Washington in the secrecy that was not secret from the FBI that wanted the Commission ^{to} "fold up and quit" because what it claimed to have already done "closes the case" in which "they found their man. There is nothing more to do." So, the Commission "can go home and that is the end of it." ^(The FBI kept tabs on the Texans, too.)

This is the way the previous executive session ^{of} ended and it is the way that of January 24 began, with the determination to control information and to suppress it. ^{Commissioners} ~~Not~~ keeping their word, that "we would have records of meetings," was not nearly as important as covering their asses from the FBI's ^{the FBI's} pounding that began with ^{its} leaking that before the Commission held its first hearing it ^{of} acknowledged, expecting the perpetual ^{in its January 22 executive session, the FBI's} secrecy they thought they had arranged, the ^{leaking} that the terrified Commissioners ^{of} their January 22 session recognized, had already controlled what they dare ^{at} think of doing and concluding.

So, as there is no record of most of what transpired at that January 22 session, there is no stenographic transcript ^{at all} of that of January 24. All that is known to ~~remain~~

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exist that might reflect what happened when Warren and Rankin met with the Texans is a self-serving "memorandum to files" by Rankin. He was so anxious to control what was on paper he did not even date his memorandum. From content it was written after the Texans departed for home after the January 24 session and before the beginning of the next session on January 27.

If ever there was an ass-covering bureaucrat it was Rankin. His memo includes only what he wanted it to include. With a single exception, an exception here saved for its use in context, there is nothing in the memo that could haunt the Commission ^{or} and its members ^{or its} and general counsel. That Rankin did record this one exception, with consummate brevity, in the starkest possible form, seems to reflect his fear that because the Texans who were his source might for some reason not keep it secret, covering his ^{own} and the Commission's ^{own} ass dictated that he not totally suppress what he barely mentions that is germane to the report that Oswald had served the federal government as an undercover informer.

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As anyone reading this memorandum later would have no way of knowing without extensive knowledge of the Commission's and FBI's records, this quotation from that ~~memo~~ memo is not true. They mentioned some of the allegations but did not "review" further about this "dirty rumor" ~~them~~ all and the only "action" the Commission took was to talk ~~some more~~ three days later. ~~And~~ There is ^{me} a ^Ctranscript of that January 27 executive session. *I got by Felt.*

(To the best of my knowledge the most thorough research into the domination and
 nullification of the TCI ^{ad} was by the late Sylvia Meagher. Her records are on deposit at
 Hood College, Frederick, Maryland, where mine also will be. The Johnson White House was
 intensively involved in seeing to it that this Texas Court of Inquiry would amount to
 nothing. It wanted the Commission to be in charge, with no competition at all.
 In this it and the Commission succeed so completely that when the TCI finally
 issued its "report," that shabby document was a mere nineteen plus pages in length,
 printed in ^{which is unfortunately large for fast types} small headline type, with wide margins and small pages. That egg was laid
 in public on October ¹ 5, 1964, after the Report was issued ⁴. It endorsed the Report.)

Rankin did more than "have a discussion with" Warren. Before he phoned Carr he also had "a discussion with" Jaworski. *He also does not say why he spoke to Jaworski first.* Now Jaworski was not a member of the Texas Court of Inquiry, as, for example, Dean Storey was. Yet the invitation recorded by Rankin, after "discussion" with both Warren and Jaworski, was to invite ~~only~~ Carr of the TCI *but not Jaworski.*

Rankin makes no mention of the existence of the TCI, which the Commission and the White House ~~got out immediately to nullify~~ *My sub'* ~~and it succeeded in that.~~ *1/ must I have*

Jaworski was, in effect, its hired hand as its general counsel. Rankin does not say that the invitation was extended to include him, but he was there. Without a word of what he said or did in Rankin's memo.

It is ~~also~~ as though the fixer, Rankin, knew Jaworski to be another fixer and wanted him involved, cleared ^{with} him first, ~~before asking the Texans to rush to Washington.~~ *for that* ~~extending the request for the Texans to appear at that exclusive executive session.~~ *of the twenty-fourth.*

~~Following reporting his asking Carr and the others to rush to Washington, Rankin~~

We have no other way of knowing what really transpired at that session other than a few indications I picked up. I have seen no reference to anything Jaworski did or said, no mention of his saying or doing anything there.

We do not know what Jaworski did before the special Commission executive session but we do know what he did back in Texas. Or intended doing- ^{real} putting pressure on Hudkins. He spoke to the paper's executive editor, J.P. Hobby, Jr., "for the purpose of ~~discussing~~ discussing with him the obtaining of an affidavit from Lonnie Hudkins, or in the alternative having him appear before the Commission in line with our discussion." ~~Thus~~ Calling Hudkins before the Commission was also considered in executive session but was not done.

Jaworski makes no mention of asking Hudkins to provide an affidavit, the ~~only~~ ^{wanted} kind being a denial of the report he had published or one in which he identified his source, as he had already refused to do. Asking this of Hudkins did not require speaking to his boss -except with the idea of asking the boss to compel Hudkins to do what he had ^{as a} principled ~~report~~ ^{made his source} reporter already refused to do, ^{ed} it clearly was an either/or deal, either Hudkins did what Jaworski, on behalf of Rankin, demand ~~of~~ he would be fired.

25 - 2
Jaworski did not even pretend to have any interest in what Hudkins could or would
say or be willing to say under oath, or would not He had no interest because he did not give a damn.

He knew what he wanted Hudkins to swear to and he did not give a damn about anything else.

And if Hudkins did not do it, he would be fired.

There was no other reason for speaking to his editor.

5/22

2/ (Hudkins ^{had} ~~got~~ became a reporter for the Baltimore News-American. He quit the Houston Post before Jaworski talked to ^Hobby. In ^Baltimore, not far from where we live, he, his wife, his son and my wife and I became friends. We remained friends when he went to work for the Buffalo, N.Y. Evening News.)

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As Jaworski and Rankin both knew very well, it was not necessary to speak to Hudkins' boss to have him appear before the Commission. The Commission need only have subpoenaed him- as it ~~never did~~ ^{never} never did. Involving Hudkins' boss was another effort to give him to understand that if he did not do ^{what} as he was wanted ~~to do~~ ^{he} he'd have ^{without a} to find another job.

Which ~~is~~ is what on his own Hudkins had done, without Rankin or Jaworski knowing about it. *(I must go back in person)*

So, that effort to pressure Hudkins failed. And it failed without the Commission or any of its staff ever talking to him. ~~But~~ ^R Jaworski's letter to Rankin, which I obtained from the Commission's files, is reprinted in Whitewash IV on page 146.)

What the Commission and Rankin almost never mention is that the published report and the version of it Rankin ~~got~~ ^{got} from Carr was to the effect that if Oswald had not worked for the FBI ^{- that} it was the CIA. There, as he ^{also} later (did when he was Chief Watergate prosecutor, Jaworski had a conflict of interest that troubled him not a bit. If it had he would have declined both positions, as TCI's general counsel and as chief Watergate prosecutor ~~but~~ because he had his ~~own~~ own CIA connections.

Jaworski, as I noted in ^(page 146) Whitewash IV, "was and remained a director of the M.D. Anderson Fund, a CIA front....Hobby also had a CIA foundation. Both were exposed in 1967" when the CIA's use of the National Student Association and a large number of funds ^{foundations} and other fronts came to light.

If at the end of 1963 it was not publicly known that Jaworski's life was complicated by his CIA connections, Jaworski ^{it} knew. And he knew he had a serious conflict of interest he could not shed. ~~He~~ Here he was, with his CIA connections, and he was part of an investigation that, if ~~it~~ ^{it} had been a real investigation had to have considered the possibility of Oswald ^{the alleged assassin} having had a CIA connection. It is a conflict of interest that could not be reconciled. He ignored it and accepted the responsibilities he could not properly have accepted.

^{on the Commission} Of course, Dulles, as former head of the CIA, had an even greater conflict of interest. But it seemed not to bother anyone. Dulles showed no sign of being troubled. He was

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in effect investigating himself and sitting in judge^mment on himself because he was the head of ~~the~~ the CIA when Oswald~~was~~ was in the USSR, where he was suspected of being an American ~~agent~~ ^{agents} ~~spy~~. And here was that "dirty rumor" that Oswald had served some American agency - and the Warren Commission was considering this. *Supposedly, anyway.*

Jaworski and Dulles were both lawyers, Jaworski one of the country's most prestigious. They know what a conflict of interest is. They ^{much} pretended there was ^{none} not. ~~and~~ from their peers not a peep of complaint that I can recall.

Extra space

After reporting his call to Carr, Rankin

Rankin, the long-time professional bureaucrat, knew his Orwell and here practises it, rewriting history for Big Brother. Who ~~ever~~ cares that they were supposedly investigating the assassination of a President, the most subversive possible crime in a society like ours- a crime that is in effect a coup d'etat, whatever the intent of the assassin or assassins. That is not important, known as it was as "the crime of the century." What was important was covering up for Big Brother in the official determination not to investigate the crime itself, to ordain Oswald the lone assassin. Which also means to protect the FBI and the CIA. *On this matter in particular,*

Rankin knew very well that the world ¹not "take whatever action as necessary to pursue this matter to final conclusion."

¹¹He knew that it could not, that it would not, and that it was absolutely terrified.

He thought he knew that they had destroyed all records of their executive session of two days earlier. He had even "confiscated" the stenotypist's tape that had not been transcribed. So, he thought he had control over all that happened and was said at that emergency January 22 executive session.

He had no way of ~~knowing~~ knowing that Ford was the FBI's stoolpidgeon inside the Commission's most secret proceedings so he had no way of knowing that before he wrote this memo the FBI had a full and an accurate account of what transpired at the January 22 session.

So, Rankin had every reason to believe that in this memo he would be making the only record that would exist of both sessions, that of the twenty-second and that of the twenty-fourth with the Texans.

Then he did not classify this memo, so he knew it would be available- to the best of his knowledge, it alone would be available, the only ^{in our history} record of those two sessions. With this his belief, and he had reason to be confident of it, he made a false record, a record of the exact opposite of what he knew to be true.

He knew that the Commission would not "take whatever action necessary to pursue this matter to final conclusions."

And it never did, living as it did in terror of Hoover and his FBI.
How dishonest it all was! And when a President was assassinated,

Rankin began his ~~memorandum~~ "MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES" by stating not that they had appeared earlier in the press, as they had, but that "Allegations have been received by the Commission to the effect that Lee Harvey Oswald was an undercover agent for the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Central Intelligence Agency" before the assassination and that "This memorandum ~~is~~ ^w reviews these allegations and summarizes the action taken by the Commission." *insert 3A*

Rankin next
~~He then~~ recounted ^{his} Carr's phone call on the twenty-second, ^{He} said that Carr "indicated that this allegation was in the hands of the press," not that it had been published ~~six weeks~~ ^{beginning} six weeks earlier, and then attributed Carr's information "ultimately" to Wade ^{Simultaneously} ~~while~~ stating that Carr said he had not discussed it with Wade.

Next he records that he discussed this with Warren and only Warren, not another Member of staff lawyer, and that Warren suggested that they ask Carr "to come to Washington as soon as possible" ^{fringing} with Wade and his assistant, Bill Alexander, "to discuss this matter." *3B1-3B4 here*

~~Following this he~~ records the calling of that 5:30 "meeting of the Commission" on Wednesday, the twentynd ^{members} second, with all present except McCloy and Russell. Although the five present "recognized" that the allegation "was probably not accurate," they decided that "this matter had to be regarded seriously by the Commission." and that "It was agreed that the Commission would have to take whatever action necessary to pursue this matter to final conclusion." *Approved talk but phony, p. 2, X here*

~~This it never did, living as it did in terror of Hoover and of his FBI.~~
^{at} *Rankin mentions* ~~Some of what transpired~~ ^{in January 22} after the Commission decided to destroy the stenographic transcript already taken down by Ward & Paul's Stenotypist Cantor: "During the meeting efforts were made to contact Attorney General Carr again." He "stated that District Attorney Wade had been unable or unwilling to specify the source of this allegation in more detail," ~~that more detail~~ ^{that} than what Rankin does not include.

Carr told him he was bringing more than Wade and Alexander with him, that Dean Storey and Leon Jaworski would be with them the next day.

again Rankin

Again he is more interested in covering his and the Commission's asses than it making any kind of record for history or for use in anything that can't without deep embarrassment be called an investigation:

"On the evening of January 24, 1964, a member of my (sic) staff was informed by representatives of the Secret Service that Allen Sweatt, Chief of the Criminal Division of the Sheriff's office in Dallas, had been interviewed regarding the allegations made in Secret Service Report No. 767."

~~Someone did write "767" on this one-page report alone~~ but that would not identify it in the Commission's records. It is Commission Document 320. *Its Secret Service file number is CO-2-34, 030.* It has a date that Rankin omits. *It is dated January 3, 1964* three weeks earlier. It also states the "Period COVERED" which was "12/16-17/63" *That* which was five weeks earlier.

The man Rankin identified merely as "Agent Bertram" was actually the Special Agent in Charge of ^{its} the Houston office, SAIC *Lee Bertram*.

Rankin's Memorandum for the "files" and for history thus omits the Secret Service's three week delay in conveying Bertram's report to the Commission following its two weeks delay in interviewing Sweatt - about the man the Commission said assassinated the President being having been an FBI informer. *or having worked for the CIA.*

The one paragraph of Bertram's report that Rankin quotes is:

1 space indented

On December 17, Mr. Hudkins advised that he had just returned from a weekend in Dallas, during which time he talked to Allen Sweatt, Chief Criminal Division, Sheriff's Office, Dallas, Chief Sweatt mentioned that it was his opinion that Lee Harvey Oswald was being paid \$200 a month by the FBI as an informant in connection with their subversive investigation. He furnished the alleged informant number assigned to Oswald by the FBI as "S172".

After five weeks the Secret Service still had not interviewed Sweatt, not even after, three weeks earlier, Bertram had asked its Dallas office to interview Sweatt. So, five weeks late, Rankin asked the Secret Service to interview Sweatt. ~~SI~~ published this Bertram report in facsimile in Whitewash IV, page 141, ~~from the Commission's files.~~

Lane Bertram's report indicates that he should have been called to testify immediately on so momentous a question. But this Commission did not question him then or ever. ~~He is a~~ He was not a Commission witness. ^{of any kind.} Not even in an affidavit, the Commission listing affidavits in its published list of "witnesses".

There were other and important reasons for calling Sweatt to testify.

As the sheriff's chief criminal deputy he was in charge of the sheriff's investigation. ~~Almost~~ Only a few minutes after the shots were fired the police and deputies started ~~to~~ bringing witnesses to his office for statements to be taken from them and sworn to. From what Sweatt told me he did more than supervise that part of the investigation. He also spoke to people who were not spoken to by the Commission, so he had that additional information, including the identifications of witnesses who had not been interviewed.

He also, as he told me in pointing to his desk drawer in which he had them locked, has his own set of assassination pictures.

Why he was not called as a Commission witness is not explained. But then this Commission was never called upon to explain anything at all.

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This hardly recorded "for the files" or for history the hysteria, the terror reflected ~~by~~ in what was really said at the ¹ January 22 executive session and ² it did not want the files or history to know ^{w/} that they all recognized, that Hoover wanted them to fold their ~~the~~ tents and disappear, Hoover and his FBI having already done the job for them. Or, ^{FBI's} be the rubber stamp they wound up being. *Rankin continues, saying,*

"On Thursday, January 23, 1964" ~~Rankin states~~ "Secret Service Report No. 767 was brought to my attention." It was dated that very day. It "summarized an ¹⁴⁷ interview by [Lane] Agent Bertram with Houston Post reporter Alonzo Hudkins III." He quotes what he refers to as "a pertinent paragraph." ^{83A} *4A here*
At Bertram's report
It begins with the information that Hudkins received his tip in Dallas on December 17 when he talked to Allen ~~(sic)~~ Sweatt, Chief ^{m/} Criminal Division Sheriff's Office, Dallas." (sic).

Contrary to Rankin's earlier representation, this is specific on Hudkins' source.

This prompts wonder about why he tried to place responsibility on Wade.

This
The Secret Service report states that Sweatt is to be interviewed. Rankin asked that Sweatt be interviewed immediately. *Rankin*
Wade's assistant district attorney
Service that Bill Alexander *(had been his source.)* ^{83B here}

Carr, Wade, Alexander, Storey and Jaworski did meet with Warren and Rankin only on Friday, January 24. All told ~~this duo~~ ^{them} "that the rumors to the effect that Oswald was an undercover agent were widely held among representatives of the Press in Dallas" and that "Mr. [Melvin] Belli, attorney for Jack L. Ruby, was familiar with these allegation."

Wade alone said these rumors also included the CIA, about which more will follow in later chapters.

Wade and Alexander "stated that the sources ^{for} of these allegations or rumors were several reporters," including Hudkins - who they did not pinpoint as their source.

Wade told them, based on his World War II experience as an FBI Special agent that "he did not think that the number [variously given as 172 and 179, with and without a prefixing "S") would be either a payroll or voucher number carried on the Bureau records." What led to controversy and FBI indignation is that ~~Wade~~ ^{Wade} "suggested that the records

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are not ~~kept~~ ^{kept} that way and would not show the name of the informant, who would probably be paid by the FBI agent in cash. He further stated that in his experience it was customary for the agent to carry the informer on his books as a number."

They ~~then~~ ^{then} discussed "information disclosed in the investigative reports ~~which~~ ^{which} were (from the FBI, as the memo does not state) which lend some degree of credibility to these allegations. ^{Stressed} were "(1) the use by Oswald of Post ^{Office} ~~free~~ boxes; (2) use by Oswald of aliases; (3) ~~the~~ the lengthy 2-hour interview conducted by the FBI of Oswald in August of 1962 [in Fort Worth, after Oswald returned from the USSR]; (4) interviews conducted by [FBI] Special Agent [James P.] Hosty in Dallas regarding Oswald's whereabouts and the [FBI's] failure to notify the Secret Service of this information (5) the comment after the assassination of Special Agent Hosty that Oswald had contacted ^{to} known subversive agents about 15 days before the assassination; Oswald had ~~Special Agent Hosty's~~ ^{Special Agent Hosty's} car license and telephone ~~in~~ numbers in his notebooks; (7) Oswald's mother had stated that her son was an agent for the FBI or some other federal agency; (8) ~~Special Agent Hosty~~ ^{Special Agent Hosty} was transferred from Dallas two weeks after the assassination."

Warren ^{d/} decided to "present the results of this meeting to the entire Commission on Monday, January 27, 1964" and "to propose tentatively that necessary inquiries be made concerning these allegations and that this memorandum be prepared for the record."

Other than as incidental to the January 27 executive session I recall ^{no} ~~no~~ ^{other} substantive Commission record, if this ^{memo of Rankin's} ~~memo~~ is considered substantive, as a substitute for the usual ^{verbatim} stenographic transcript. ^{that was}

^{Rankin's memo ends} Other than reporting the results of the Secret Service's Sweatt interview and Secret Service inspector Tim Kelley's "expressed view that Hudkins was not very reliable," ^{there} is nothing else at all in this supposed ^{MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD} ~~MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD~~ with which Warren and

^{Rankin} Rankin connived in advance to substitute for the exact words of the questions they asked ^{and the} ~~and the~~ ^{answers from} ~~of those~~ ^{Texans} they requested to appear in utmost secrecy before ^{and only} ~~them~~ ^{only} ~~and the responses~~ ^{Members and staff} ~~to these questions.~~ ^{of all the Commission's}

Thus, from the Warren/Rankin design, there is no ^{real} Commission information ~~of~~ ^{of} what transpired, what questions were asked and were not asked and what the Texans really said.

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There has to be a reason for this unusual decision by Warren and Rankin, without ^{any} consultation with any of the ^{other} ~~four~~ five Members of the Commission in whose name they also acted, the decision that departed from practice and broke the Commission's word to have a court reporter present at all ~~the~~ sessions - the decision that saw to it in advance that if the Texans had any definitive, reliable information it would not be recorded verbatim but instead would be recorded as only as Rankin saw fit to record it.

With ~~the entire Commission's agreement~~ ^{five of the members of all members in dissent} they intended suppressing forever what transpired at the January 22 emergency executive session. Only by the accident of the stenotypist's tape not finding the memory hole can we know anything at all about what then was made so explicit, that ^{Commission (and also in detail)} the ~~FBI~~ was terrified by the FBI, did not dare take issue with it, set out to state that ^{there} ~~there~~ had not been any conspiracy to assassinate the President and

that Oswald as the lone assassin. But that took up only ^a minor fraction of the hour and a half of that session. Rankin's "MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD" makes no reference to any of this or to what took place after they went "off the record," which they intended for all of that session, other than that Rankin ^{Jaworski used} had phoned ~~Mr~~ Carr during that session. In Rankin's brief mention of this he says ^{only} nothing other than what makes it appear that Wade was the source of the report ^{Wade} that Oswald had been an undercover agent when in fact it was before then clear that ~~he~~ ^{Wade} had not been and who, if any Dallas official was, ^{for} could have been.

If ^{minor} as the ~~January~~ part of the January 22 session ^{that President from the official} that was taken down by the court ^{memory hole makes clear,} ~~reporter says,~~ the Commission ^{believed it would be} regarded it as simply "terrible" if this report turned out to be true, ^{That is an ample motive} then a reason for seeing to it that there would be no verbatim record of what the Texans were asked and said ^{Not having a verbatim transcript} has the obvious purpose of seeing to it that there would be no record of ^{any} ~~any~~ confirmation of that report.

This is hardly the proper role of a Presidential commission ^{supposedly} investigating the assassination of a President.

It can have had only one purpose, to suppress in advance information that could be, Rankin's word, so "damaging" to the Commission and to the executive branch.

It is Big Brother, rewriting the past to control the future.

It is also, tragically, the Commission's self-characterization and an accurate forecast of what it would and would not do and conclude.

It leaves without question the fact that before it held its first hearing the Commission decided to rewrite this terrible event in our history, ^{and} not to investigate it.

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Consistent with this wrongful purpose that in itself is an additional national tragedy and national disgrace is what the CIA ^{a Rankin memo} did with the copy ^{it} got from the Commission's files, not an original copy given it before the Commission filed it. At the CIA it was stamped "RECORD COPY." Of which ^{of} component is not stated. The CIA's copy was of a Commission file copy. It is marked with an illegible filing; with main filing as "GAI-CIA", the ~~the~~ "GAI" standing for Government Agencies Involved; and in the ^{Post} Russian Period of the Commission's Oswald, L.H. files.

At the CIA this Commission record I had gotten from the ^{as best I can remember, early} National Archives, in 1966 or ¹⁹⁶⁷ was designated for ~~release~~ examination for possible release, "for FOIA review," ~~for~~ ~~XXXXXX~~ on an unspecified day in "MAY 1976." ^{Two years after its release by the Commission}

The CIA was so uptight about the ^{Rankin's} passing and entirely inadequate reference to it that ^{the CIA} it sought to withhold disclosure of it for 13 years after the assassination, for ~~a decade of what it might not have known about, the fact that along with others, of whom I know for certain that my friend Paul Hoch, of Berkeley, California, is one, to continue the suppression of what could be "damaging" to it,~~ ^{when it had no content properly subject to "national security" classification. The CIA did not classify it. It merely withheld it.} the report that Ossald had worked for a federal spookery of which the FBI and the CIA are two.

I emphasize that the way Rankin and the Commission handled this it was made to appear that the rumor was limited to the FBI. ^{It} never was, except by Rankin and the Commission.

Rankin cover ^{ed} his and the Commission's asses with his one inadequate mention of the CIA in his memo, a mention to which we later return.

Abetted by Warren at the least ^{Rankin} he also sheltered the FBI by seeing to it that there would not be any real investigation of this allegedly "dirty rumor."

However, with the passing time time, much time, and the public knowledge of exciting developments, a ~~little~~ ^{little} of what was said at that January 24 executive session came out.

By then Rankin and Warren were no longer around to be embarrassed and their objectives had long since been accomplished. Their care in seeing to it that there would be no stenographic transcript of that January 24 session, ^{to haunt them,} despite the Commission's ^{reported} promise at its January 22 session to have such stenographic transcripts ^{all} of their meetings (transcript, page 13), while it did assure there would be no record to haunt them later- it guaranteed there would be

~~7A Feb~~ 8 Feb 87/16

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a lingering controversy, a controversy it would not be possible to resolve.

~~Exhibit~~ ^A One of the more sensational post-assassination disclosures was not made until after the retirement of Dallas SAC Gordon Shanklin was secure. Then, in the last half of 1975, there was a leak to the Dallas ^{FBI} Times-Herald of the fact that several weeks before the assassination Oswald had left a note threatening violence at the Dallas FBI office for James P. Hosty, Jr., the special agent who was the Dallas FBI's Oswald ~~case~~ case agent.

In considering the magnitude of the ^{harm} that could have been done to the FBI by ^{of the Oswald threat at the time of} disclosure after the assassination, it should be remembered that to the FBI, the Commission and to the rest of the government Oswald was the lone presidential assassin - and that there had also been this "dirty rumor" that he had worked undercover for the FBI.

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Having done nothing at all about Oswald's threat ^{when} after he left it and for the several weeks prior to the assassination and not having disclosed it at the time of the assassination, the FBI then decided to suppress all knowledge of having received any threat from Oswald. *The obvious reasons for then keeping it secret this was additionally* ~~That was necessary for it~~ because it had not informed either the Dallas police or the Secret Service of ~~Oswald's~~ "defector" Oswald's presence in Dallas, where the President was to appear in public. Its explanation of this failure after Oswald was arrested was that he had no history of violence and it had no reason to believe that he would be violent, or ^{posed} presented any threat.

The FBI inspector general's investigation of this incredible FBI secret, which was the FBI investigating itself, did establish that Oswald had left his threat for Hosty/~~in~~ ^{(with the receptionist and in} an unsealed envelope ^{that all of them} and that she and others read it and talked about it, and thereafter all kept it entirely secret until it was leaked in 1975 to the Dallas Times-Herald. The FBI's investigation of itself succeeded in its design, to make it impossible for anyone to be charged with any crime and brought to trial - where evidence would be adduced, witnesses presented and cross-examined - assuring great embarrassment to the FBI ^{er} than it had already suffered and promising ^{greater attention to it and to} the disclosure of what ^{else} the FBI was able to keep secret. ~~Blah~~

(Whether or not completely, records relating to this and another Hosty flap were disclosed to me by the FBI in my FOIA lawsuit CA 78-~~0322~~ ⁰³²⁰⁻⁰⁴²⁰ ~~0420~~ combined and by the Department of Justice's criminal division from its 51-16-113 file. I have preserved all the records I obtain by FOIA action as I received them for scholars of the future. I have also duplicated some ~~it~~ copies for subject filing. Because the FBI's records cannot be ^{chronologically} serialized as generated ^{they} and thus are scattered ^{they} and are not in chronological order but ^{they} are serialized and filed as they reach the file ~~cor~~ clerks, I have a separate set of duplicate copies of disclosed records relating to Hosty's receipt and destruction of Oswald's threat, the destruction, ^{Hosty} he testified, at the [^] ~~d~~irection of SAC Shanklin, in this subject file under ~~Hosty's~~ name.)

insert on 89

AA (Except where ticklers hold records from the FBI's central files, where they bear
and serial file numbers essential in retrieving them, tickler records are not identified with file
and serial numbers. This record and many other like it are in author's files.

Unless later preserved in central files the ticklers do not get there and identifications
are not needed for retrieval from there. They remain in the divisions and often in the
desk drawers of the special agents or in the division's own file cabinets. V

While the recollections of those who admitted knowledge of this Oswald threat were not in entire accord, which can be attributed to ^{faulty} failed recollection from the dimming of ^{as many having been silent for so long about it} time or to deliberate dishonesty, the consensus was that Oswald threatened to bomb if Hosty did not ^{cess} end what Oswald regarded as his ~~the~~ hassling of Oswald's wife, Marina. Some recall ^{ed} that Oswald's threat was to bomb the Dallas FBI ~~his~~ offices, some that it was to bomb police headquarters and ^{fewer} some that he would bomb both.

This is hardly the non-violent record that the FBI said explains its failure to notify either the Secret Service or the Dallas police of ^{of this potential threat} the presence ~~of~~ where the President would long be in public view and subject to possible danger.

Guilty knowledge extended to and included FBIHQ. ^{If this is} ~~and~~ the FBI provided the investigative and scientific testing services the Warren Commission required, with both that Commission and the FBI ostensibly investigating the assassination in which both held this would-be bomber to be the lone assassin.

If the FBI's ^{suppression} suppression of this had become known during the life of the Warren Commission the magnitude of the resulting scandal and the harm to the FBI can hardly be exaggerated.


While the inspector general's report was hazy and inconclusive in allocating knowledge to FBIHQ a damage-control tickler disclosed to my friend Mark Allen by the FBI in one of his FOIA lawsuits is explicit on FBIHQ's knowledge. Under the subheading of "Oswald" this tickler in outline form states, "Hosty note destruction handled by Bureau on Nov 24 and ~~effect~~ effect in subsequent days." This tickler ^{also} ~~states~~ ^{includes} ~~states~~ under the most inappropriate of subheadings, "Assistance to Warren Commission," what could hardly have been of less "assistance" in any real investigation, "Destruction of Hosty note; implications."

The FBIHQ's ordering to Dallas to destroy Oswald's note ^{as soon as} almost the moment he was killed by Jack Ruby would not have been dared without Hoover's approval if it was not done at his direction. That Hoover ~~did order it is what his former assistant director in charge of his domestic-intelligence division, William C. Sullivan, says in his book.~~

Can it be imagined how much greater the disaster to the FBI would have been if Oswald had worked under cover for it - or if knowledge of his note had surfaced in a genuine investigation of that report?

because of its content,

When the news broke in 1975 it was still a major scandal because the FBI had kept secret what it should not have kept secret and because what it destroyed was really important evidence relating to the assassination of the President/^{*just before his news broke*} Waggoner Carr, who had been co-opted by Washington when as Texas attorney general he had headed its court of inquiry and who ~~he~~ had been involved in what he could not have ~~it~~ helped realizing was a phony investigation of whether Oswald had worked undercover for the FBI, then broke his long silence. He told the Houston Chronicle that, among other things, he had urged the Commission to "investigate all F.B.I. ~~work~~ (12 vols)



and C.I.A. personnel" who might have had any knowledge of Oswald as an informer or for any other "link" to Oswald. ^{a short version of} That copyrighted ~~Ch~~ Chronical story was distributed internationally by UPI. As it appeared in the New York Times of September 3, 1975, this is what it reported:

*1 page
insert*

are not breathing device.

Ex-Texas Aide Says He Bid Panel Seek Oswald-F. B. I. Ties

SEP 3 1975 NYT

HOUSTON, Sept. 2 (UPI)—The Texas Attorney General at the time of the assassination of President Kennedy said that he had urged the Warren Commission to investigate all F.B.I. and C.I.A. personnel for possible information linking them and Lee Harvey Oswald, but received no indication that it ever did, The Houston Chronicle reported today.

"All of the records were in the hands of the two agencies and, if they so desired, any information or files could have been destroyed or laundered prior to the time the commission could get them," Waggoner Carr, the State Attorney General, told The Chronicle. "We knew that then, which is why we recommended what we did."

Mr. Carr wrote to J. Lee Rankin, general counsel for the Warren Commission, on Jan. 29, 1964, to ask for such a check on agents, informants and spies of the C.I.A. and F.B.I. who were in Dallas before Mr. Kennedy's assassination on Nov. 22, 1963.

But Mr. Carr said that he had received no answer.

"At the time," Mr. Carr said in the copyrighted article, "I thought the suggestions were basic, very elementary. There were no doubts in my mind that they [the Warren Commission] wouldn't do those things. All along, I kept assuming they were interviewing all sorts of F.B.I. and C.I.A. people, from top to bottom. There was no way to double check, though, to see if they were."

Mr. Carr, according to The Chronicle's article, said that to this day he was frustrated by the Warren Commission's total reliance "on the integrity of the agency at the time."

*ignore tender -
living*

After all those years Carr finally realized he had legs and could stand on them ~~and~~
only for Jaworski to try to chop them off at the knees.

~~also~~
- who had been president of the American Bar Association -

Doc - Chronicle refers to Kelly with y a article

Carr thus disclosed that he had followed up whatever he had told the Commission at that January 24 session in a letter that makes it clear that he had urged on the Commission a course of action it did not take, ~~that there be~~ as full an investigation of any official connections Oswald may have had as was possible.

He told the Chronicle that Rankin never answered that letter.

He followed this disclosure up with a demand for "for a limited investigation by Congress into the possibility that Lee Harvey Oswald was connected with the FBI or CIA."

~~and experienced~~ official Jaworski, that old had at whitewashing of what was official embarrassing, sought to ridicule Carr's request for a belated investigation. *by what he had that paper, published September 15, 1975* (Houston Chronicle, September 15, 1975.), saying,

~~Although the whatyheons dpinglflocomhatwaperosgetoimtpageyanospparedithontly~~
before knowledge of the FBI's destruction of that Oswald threat, it was a one-day wonder wonder that ~~glapst~~ no attention outside of Houston.

Warren

"I don't know what he is doing....I personally stand by the conclusions of the Warren Commission report and our own Texas supplemental report. ...no doubts about Lee Harvey Oswald being the assassin. There is nothing to suggest that a conspiracy to assassinate the President existed. ... He (Carr) is going to have to eat his words."

What words would Carr have to eat? *propaganda* This quote from Jaworski has no relationship with them: In the Chronicle's words,

same

"Carr had recommended to the Warren Commission in January, 1964, that the Commission 'comb the depths' of both agencies (i.e., the FBI and the CIA) to find out if any agents, informants, undercover agent or spy in its ranks had any knowledge of Oswald. The Commission instead, he said, allowed the agencies to investigate themselves. The answer we got from both was no, Oswald ^{is} not connected with the CIA or the FBI, Carr said."

BA here

What triggered Jaworski's propaganda in which he did not address what Carr had done and said is that Carr demanded that the Senate, "through a proper committee such as the Senate Intelligence Committee," conduct "a thorough, independent and public investigation to determine the truth of (1) whether Oswald was connected in some way with the FBI or the CIA, or (2) whether the FBI and/or CIA and/or Secret Service had advance ~~knowledge~~

information that Oswald was a threat to the life of the President."

Carr, who, remember, as the State's attorney general also head^{ed}/its "Milktoast excuse for an investigation, had learned much in the intervening years, at the least ~~was~~ suspected much, ^{what came to light in those years} and those years, validates his knowledge or his suspicions, whichever it ~~they~~ may be. Here is what he told the Chronicle that ~~did not put on its national wires~~:

span
ident

"If your Senate investigation reveals act^s of perjury, false swearing, obstruction of justice or other crimes on the part of those testifying before the Warren Commission on those events, those who committed ~~those~~ ^{such} acts should be dealt with ^{as} severely as those who committed like acts during the Nixon era."

^{Chronicle}
The ~~news~~ story continues with, nothing here omitted in quotation,

"Carr had told the Chronicle in recent interviews that he had been 'frustrated' to this day because the Commission had failed to act upon his recommendations of January, 1964, those recommendations, he said, were based on rumors and reports 'all over Texas' that Oswald was in some way connected with the ~~to~~ FBI, CIA or both."

^{wrote}
Carr ~~had written~~ his demand to the Senate. In his letter he said,

free
ident

^W
Do not be misled into thinking the people of this country are going to believe the result of a federal agency investigating itself. It is a sad thing to say but it is true that we have been misled too many times in recent years to ~~buy~~ ^{buy} that again."

Carr ~~then~~ ^{specifically} referred to the leaked and truthful account of the FBI suppressing all knowledge of the Oswald threat to ~~Hosty~~ ^{the FBI}. The Chronicle added that after sitting on the report of a similar admission by Hosty to one of his officers, Dallas's former chief of police, ^{Jesse Curry,} "had written a confidential, registered letter to Chief ^{Earl} Justice Warren about that in May, 1964 but "The letter was ~~it~~ ^{it} apparently ignored."

As Carr forecast, popular dissatisfaction with the Commission's work continued. It was expressed ^{in 1970 by} in the popular reception a series of trashy, conspiracy-theory books and the sensational movie, JFK, ^{again} by Oliver Stone were ~~to receive~~ ^{to receive} a decade and more after Carr broke his long silence. He did believe that the agencies had investigated themselves but in fact, as we shall see, they did not do even that.

Q Its inside informer, Gerald Ford, Commission Member, was, like all the Members, precluded from that session, which Warren and Rankin arranged they alone would conduct. Not being privy, he could not stool-pidgeon that information to DeLoach for Hoover.

94B

Having given his word to keep the information confidential, Shaklin immediately broke his word and violated Wade's confidence with this seven^N-page teletype based on and including what he had promised to keep confidential.

15
94
The FBI, instead of investigating itself, was spying on what the Commission and the Texans ^{w/}ere up to! 15A here 944

As 11:36 a.m. the day the Texans were before the Commission, January 25 24, Shanklin sent an "urgent" teletype to FBIHQ in response to Inspector Malley's phone call to it of ^{each} that day. The teletype begins with the obliterated information identifying Shanklin's source for informing FBIHQ that Wade had been called before the Commission "in connection with allegation that ["]Oswald was on payroll of FBI."

Shanklin's inside source even told him when the Texans would be landing on their return. (FBIHQ 105-82555-1749)

Shanklin followed this up with a phone call to Belmont the next day. As Shanklin's additional teletype of later the second day, also sent as "urgent" ^{marked} was ~~noted~~ with an FBIHQ stamp, these documents went to "MR. BELMONT FOR THE DIRECTOR." (105-82555-1706)

Aside from using Wade in an effort to refute The Nation's story, Shanklin disclosed the secrecy on which the Commission insisted with the Texans. Belmont's memo for Hoover through Tolson on Shanklin's call (~~FBIHQ~~ 105-82555-1820), says that "District Attorney Wade told Shanklin, in confidence, that he and Alexander were called to testify before the President's Commission, but were sworn to secrecy." (emphasis added)

Belmont concluded recommending that the Commission be advised that the FBI had investigated itself, not the words Belmont used, and that "if the Commission has any further questions concerning this or any other phase of FBI activities we would appreciate a direct contact from the Commission relative thereto."

Hoover's notation, in his distinctive crabbed handwriting, is "Yes. This is pretty slimy tactics upon part of Warren & Rankin. H"
lengthy January 25 (Serial 1706)
Shanklin's teletype of seven pages quotes Wade on page five, "WADE ADVISED HE ~~IS~~ ^{WTS} FURNISHING ME THIS INFO IN STRICT CONFIDENCE AS HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED THAT UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES WAS ANY ~~RE~~ INFO RE THIS INTERVIEW OR INTERVIEWS TO BE GIVEN OUT, AND HE DESIRES TO BE PROTECTED." (FBIHQ 105-82555-1706) 1FB here 94B

So, despite Rankin's and Warren's effort, we know a little about what ~~transpired~~ ^{exceptional} transpired at that January 24 executive session held with such exceptional secrecy and for which they

^{Commission}
~~had~~ broken their promise to have their court reporter present at all meeting^s so there would be a record. We know from Carr that he had asked the Commission to do the job it had been appointed to do, investigate, and that it had not done so; and^we know from Wade that the Commission tried to silence him and the others by Shanklin's version of what Wade had told him~~t~~ in the "strictest confidence" that Shanklin could not wait to violate, that they had been "instructed" to say nothing at all about what happened when they~~w~~ere were before Rankin and Warren.

This is the way to investigate the assassination of a President?

It was this Commission's way, a way in which it would refuse absolutely ~~in~~^{to} conduct any real investigation and then would seek to protect itself from reaction against its abdication of its neight to ~~so~~ sacred responsibilities in a country like ours by seeing to it that it left no record, that none of the Members of the Commission be present to have any personal knowledge of what the Texans testified to, of taking all possible steps to see that the Texans also spoke not a word about that secret session, and that the only and inadequate and dishonest record, generated by Rankin, not ~~revela~~ reveal what actually did happen there. *that he and Warren wanted more of what Carr disclosed.*

Rankin's ass~~u~~vering memo was truthful in stating that Warren had ~~decided~~ to call the Commission into a secret session on Monday, January 27, the first working day after the Friday on which the Texans testified. ^{was} It is to deny me the transcript of that session that the government lied repeated to the ^{federal district} court and produced perjurious affidavits by both Rankin and Rhoads, the means by which it prevailed ^{stat} before the ~~in~~ federal district court in my FOIA lawsuit, CA ~~73~~ 2052 -73. (The court later reversed the number~~s~~ representing the year and the case.) *The Department of Justice and the Archives did not risk*

I made this charge
 Rather than ~~risking~~ what the appeals court of that era, before it was ^{proven} reorganized with judges of the right extreme, might do, including with the charge ~~of~~ my charge of their perjury, made by me under oath and ~~this~~ ^{myself} making me subject to the penalties of perjury if I lied about that very material fact in the litigation ^{to this and with the} and with the ^{properly} content of the transcript, which was not (subject to classification- by the Commission which did not have the authority to classify in any event) that the government ~~so~~ quietly just mailed me a copy of ~~me~~ transcript under date of June 14, 1974 (White Wash IV p. 15)

1964,

There was no Freedom of Information Act in ~~these days~~. The Commission did expect perpetual secrecy for their TOP SECRET transcript.

So, some of them let their hair down a bit.

Even to the extent of saying that lying and perjury about whether ~~anyone had~~ *Oswald had had* any such connection with any spookery ~~as was attributed to Oswald~~ was right and proper for the government!

As we ~~next~~ ^{shall} see, more about.

~~NOTE TO SELF - BEGIN WITH BRIEF ACCOUNT OF LITIGATION~~

The dishonesty of all of this is hard to believe. It was omnipresent, it was intended - really often schemed - and that about the assassination of a President and the official investigations of it.

One extra space

On September 22, 1975, a week after the second Chronicle story quoted above appeared, the "Lonnie Hudkins official^{a/}dom sought to make a villain of while avoiding him entirely, the reporter "Lonnie Hudkins who befame my friend after he left "Houston, told me that it was Henry ~~W~~ades Wade's former assistant Bill Alexander who leaked the sensational story about the FBI's destroying ~~of~~ that Oswald ~~note~~ pre-assassination threat to violence ~~aga~~ against the FBI, the police or both. Lonnie said Alexander's reason for that leaking was ~~ht~~at he was mad~~d~~ at the FBI.

I had believed it was someone inside the Dallas FBI office.

I know of no confirmation of ~~ea~~ either explanation.

It also should be noted that the Commission avoided an obvious question it could and should have asked of the FBI and the ~~of~~ CIA: does any of these numbers match your numbering system? The FBI would have said "no" but the CIA could not have said that.

Or is ~~ht~~is the reason so obvious a question was not asked?