(This is to follow what was eliminated when Case Open was published)

I. Deeply Troubling questions

Senator Russell's doubts and questions about the shooting were well grounded,

Commuser

although from the intensive propaganda campaign in which the staff participated inviting

more than w ole-heartedly - lustily - there is no wonder that he believed that

inversely believed that

inversely believed that

inversely believed that

it actually had no case against Oswald at all. It could not even place Oswald at the scene

of the crime at the time of the crime, It just said that he was and that was it, despite

the proof in its own records that he was not and could not have been. The Members who

were in Dallas at the time of that reenactment have no innocence in this. They were there

and at the least Warren participated and Their own reenactment proved the exact opposite

of what they wound up saying. From what we have seen, Oswald could not have been con
victed by an uncorrupted and unterrified jury. The commission's own records establish

a solid case for his innocence.

While it may seem strange to those who have no understanding of the actualities of the Commission's work and the fact that most of its Members were much too busy with have the time.

If it was the time to be under the condition work required of them for a toroughly informed decision, that is the fact, Compounding this is the mass of irrelevancies in which they were submerged. They could not possibly make their way through all of that chaff to get to the kernel. When there was the initial determination to decide that Oswald alone was the assassin, the staff made no effort to put any other the land of case together. And Renkin had the staff and what it could and could not do firmly under his control. What I have put together comes not only from its 10,000,000 published words but from what I could not be read and understood and then put together as they should have been in any honest investigation.

The questions Gussell raised about the shooting should have been reso ved at the very outset. But that was not done by quee the Commission began, to quote the

Later, of course, I had what Russell and others on the Commission did not have, what the FBI in particular did not let them have in the quarter of a million pages of FBI assassination records I got through all those FOIA lawsuits.

title of the chapter with which I began Post Mortem, with "Conclusions First."

Its first outlant of its own work began with the assumption of Oswald's guilt. As had the FBI in its intimidation of the Commission in its report that is CD1.

As at the least Katzenbach and Hoover had conspired to do, as I prove with the official records in MANNA AGAIN!

The official record is even worse with regard to any Oswald associates.

Russell believed that he had many of the left, particularly Cubans he met in

Ninsk where they were studying. He was deceived and misled by CIA Director John Mc

Cone, whose irrational and irresponsible lobbying of the story made up by that Ficaraguan

intelliegnce agent, Gilberto Alverado Ugarte infuriated Houver and who annotated relevant [8]

records with his strong disgust and contempt for it. As we saw in Russell's perceptive

handwritten notes of Pecember 5, 1965%, before the Commission was staffed or had done a

any real work at all, be was already convinced of that the validity of that complete

fabrication. The CTA and it alone, is directly responsible for that. There are questions

I did that it all

about 35 why but not of the fact. If it had not convinced ampassador [homas Mann he would

not have launched and persisted in his parallel campaign that could have led to Worlds

War III!

The exact opposite is the official records with reports of Oswald's associations of an entirely different character - of reports that he had some kind of informer or agent connection with the federal government. Those reports were early. The FBI was going through the pretense of an investigation of them then it passed CD1 on, that early.

On its part, the Commission pretended that these reports did not kist - even after they were published and the Commission was aware of their publication. It was only weeks later, when the situation precluded the Commission's continuing to ignore them, that it made the sham of an inquiry. What triggered that was the report to it from the Texas attorney General, Waggoner Carr, that his Texas Court of Inquiry, was going to looks into that. Then and only then did tankin bestir himself and he did that in a way that and its denied to the Commission's records a full and accurate account of it.

Two of the first reporters who Wrote such stories were oseph Goulden (right),

then of the Phildelphia <u>Inquirer</u>, and <u>Fonnie Hudkins</u>, then of the Houston <u>Chronicle</u>.

(Later, Fonnie and his wife Mary became friends of my wife and me.)

Lonnie's January 1,1,64 story was headlined, "Oswald Rungered As Enformant for U.S."

The subject is "Federal Egent approached So, nother quoted as Saying." Here is how the nucleins story begin and a paragraph down further in it:

DALLAS — Was Lee Harvey Oswald a stool pigeon for a federal government agency? That's the question being asked by many people in responsible positions. If the answer is "yes," then the 24-year-old accused as the slayer of President Kennedy pulled one of the biggest and certainly the most embarrassing double-crosses in the nation's

However, she was quoted in the Philadelphia Inquirer as saying her son had been approached by a government agent to be an informant and then had informed her about it.

The Inquirer story was "oulden's.

by M angulating to

Weither Goulden nor Mudkins was called to teysify to the Warren Commission.

The FBI's "investigation" was, to praise it, less than perfunctory.

But the Commission made no investigation a all!

Commission's ubpublished records. White ash was completed in mid-February, 1965, In it I said that what Cavald did in New Orleans "is consistent with what in intelligence is known as "restablishing a cover." Since then I have had no reason to come that opinion. The purpose for which he was establishing cover, hower, is not known although there can be basis for suspicions. Perhaps more will be disclosed in the ass of CIA records made available in response to the 1992 law requiring the fullest possible disclosure of all assassination and assassination-related records by all agencies.

I was working on a book on this when I lifed it aside to write HEVER AGAIN! which then emed more timely.

That was not a whim. My peer reviewers, both history professors and subject-matter experts, Dave Wrone and Jerry McKnight, believed after reading the rough draft that it was the most important of all JFK assassination books at least since the first of them.

havy & FB/ records showing no Lto Secerity charine-add on 1444 personnel

by No Navy itself The fact is that Oswald's records, when first xamined after his alleged defection, reflected no security clearence at all. This is clear in the FBI's records I have and application what I also have, the Navy's cable to the Moscow embassy when Oswald's defection was reported. That cable suggested that despite no security clearance being in the records, he could have had confidential clearance. he very buest.

in The late / 9600

I had the working title <u>Agent Oswald</u> for the book on which I was working. The title was a question, was Oswald an agent. I had several files of records from different sources also with that title. While the attention to the question, which did not last long during the Commission's life and got little attention thereafter, focused on the FBI, in fact the same question applied to the CIA and among other spooking agencies never mentioned, the Office of Naval Intelligence.

The Commission's pet pretended investion of the question, did Oswald work in any capacity for any intelligence agency, did not even pretend to include the ONI, the most obvious agency to inquire about. The Commission had what it never reported, ample reasons to have questions about the ONI. These include the shabby pretense of an investigation on Oswald's reported "defection" to the Soviet Union, a step he was careful nto to impliment, as I brought to light in my first book. The supposed ONI investigation was obviously no seal investigation at all. It was so obviously not intended to be a real investigation it did not include speaking to all the Marines with whom the records showed Oswald had worked and who knew him.

As an example of this I refer to what I brought to light in 1967 in Oswald in New Orleans and later confirmed with Navy records, that Oswald had that CRYPTO Security clearance which is not reflected in any way in the Navy's personnel refords on Oswald AAJAMM AT that it gave the Commission. Moreover, ONI never spoke to the Faring Oswald's Marine friend who was my source. The Commission also did not yet his name was on all the rosters that held oswald's name. And what he told me about Oswald, ranging from the kind of person he found Oswald to be to his little-known interests, ranging from shooting pool to classical music, was what I was able to confirm easily. So he did know Oswald. And what he told me about Oswald that whas exaggerated by those marines of little education and understanding that the Commission preferred, that he west around baiting officers, also was confirmed by this former Marine friend of Oss Oswald. The well-ranged officer under whom Oswald worked, John Donovan, who taught school after he left the marines, testified to before the Commission.

Then, still relating to the ONI and its phony investigation, there is the unresolved

No record of which I know, and my have I read them by the multithousands! reveals which to a without in luming and them pretense of any agency to learn this. Nor does any of them reveal any effort by any agency, including the Commission, to ascertain the answer from any other agency.

The FBI, for example, ded did not ask the ONI for the naswer that the FBI should have expected the ONI to be able to find, if it had not already found, in the Navy's own records. But Blowell Muse would have would have had not already found, to be able to find, if it had not already found, in the Navy's own records. But I should be in those records. But it with.

The fact is that by the time Oswald got to Russia he spoke Russion well enough

and how question, where did Oswald learn Russian when he was in the Marines? That is no t reflected in any record. The question is without an answer. From the ONI to the Commission, in any decent investigation of honest intent, that had to be answered and it could have been answered only with what was required and was not done, a real investigation. AASA

The fact is that Oswald spoke Russin well enough so that the Russian woman he married, Marina, believed he was Russian but with the accent of a spart of that vast land with which she was not familiar.

I no longer recall all the records I had accumulated in these special files that in some way related to the question, was Oswald somebody's agent of some kind. I do recall some of them because I used them in the beginning of my writing on this aspect in 1967, after I finished Oswald in New Orleans was published.

aspect in 1967, after I finished Oswald in New Orleans was published.

In Management In the In It assume the Industry

As I report elsewhere, those files were stolen when to the best of my recollection
only one person was in a position to steal them. All those who work here and have unun published
teartieted access work in the files of records I obtain by all those FOIA lawsuits.

They are in our basement. The working files were in my office files where nobdy worked
except the Baltimore policeman Richard Waybright. He had earned our confidence on his
many trips here where he was moonlighting in working for Harrison Livingstone. Harry's
third book has a self-descriptive title, illing the Truth. It is descriptive of his
book and of his approach and method. Waybright even told us that he was making use of
the police computer system for Livinsgone. He offered to do it for us a so we child
locate people. We had no such need or interest. We later learned that what he was doing
was not only illegal, it could have caused serious trouble for the Baltimore folice
pepartment. Which on learning all this did not him at all so it will and and he fully Juntal

Livingstone and Divid Lifton were then engaged in a blood feud. When Lifton's mistitled Best Evildence *** Available ** appeared - and it is neither- as I did withmany works that like it are so hurtful to the truth I prepared a lengthy analysis of it. Livingstone asked to see it and then to borrow it so he could save the xeroxing costs. Trusting him, we agreed. He never returned it and lied repeatedly about doing

AX6A

Neither Livingstone nor Waybright nor anyone else needs to steal from me because

I give all unrestricted and unsupervised access to all my Ffiles obtained by Fthose Many

FOIA lawsuits and unsupervised access to our copier. The only purpose served in stealing

any of those records is to deny others, including me, access to them.

Very few ask for access to my working files, as Livingstone had, but almost without exception I give free access to all of the T make an exception, for example, when the rights and privacy are others are involved.

But I believe that use of FOIA makes those of us who use it surregates for the people and thus as a matter of principle I give others wring in the field, even though as with ivingstone, I know I will not agree with what they write, full and free access.

what Waybright stole, first of what he stole to my knowledge, was only copies
that he knew noth only would lifton want, he knew lifton would not want me to have it.
That is why Lavingstone asked him to get a copy of it. It was my lengthy and detailed
analysis of Lifton's mistitled Best Evidence. It is not there best nor evidence in the
only part of it that had not been published several at long before Lifton published it.
But Lifton's sick ego is such that he ants it believed that he did all the original work
In the first field. The pretense of his best book is precisely that, with the inference
that others stole is from him and used it as their won work. His ego is such that as I
established with his own writings in Insade the JFK Assassination Indistry he is not
only a thief, he is a braggart of a thief. He bragged before his stealing what he would

A Hand of the his successful heist a that he had done it and how so an alliance bebetween the thief and blackmailer Lifton, also proven in Inside the JFK Assassination
Industry, and the thief of a cop Waybright was a natural alliance.

Lifton knows full well that he perpetrated an enormous fraud in his one thing new in his very bad book, that JFK's body was stolen, snuck to Waslter We'ed Army Hospital where it was altered, then snuck into the Navy hospital to control what the autopsy could say. It is because the entire basis of Lifton's book, fame and wealthy from it is this monumental fraud that he got away with is why he wanted no copies of my proof

multion his frame that litter dul

FOLA

Those MDW records Waybright stole are my duplication of Lifton's FOIA request for them. Tifton wanted me not to have them because they hold what he misrepresented in his book and explain the nonvexisting yestery Lifton invented of an alleged "second helicopter" he pretends spirited JFK's body to Walter Reed Hispirtal.

Taffon's own letters to the late Sylvia Meagher hold his before-and-after boasts about how he was going to steal a point of better quality than was readily available of the Zapruder film. Roger Feinman, like Livingstone, was engaged is a controversy with Lifton. His was not as intense a blood feud as Livingstone's but there came a time when he decided to write a book exposing Lifton. His unpublished manuscript is titled, Between the B Signal and the Noise. Having been a close friend of Meagher's and knowing of her correspondence with Lifton Feinman obtained copies of these letters from the deposit of her records at food College. He made good use of them in his excellent expose of the real Lifton. Hearing about that Lifton began his threat/that frighten most people, word of the which leads others to do what he wants rather than face his terrorism. Lifton threatened to file suit against both Feinman and flood. Feinman in effect dared him to and ridiculed the letter lifton's lawyer wrote him. As Feinman wrote, he had already faced Lifton's blackmail when working for CBS News Lifton had threatened to tell CBS where with his copyright-infringement suit with which he threatened Feinman.

Hoda College could not treat Lifton's threat that way. It had to hire counsel to handle it. That was costly for Hood and for about six months, until its counsel told it not to worry, it closed the Meagher deposit, allowing no access to it.

The W unconfirmed account I was given about how Lifton got Waybright to work for his again a threat. Lifton claimed he had a friend in the Caryland attorney general's office. He told Waybright that if w Waybright did not work for him he would through that friend informa the State DAW of Liv Waybright's violation of law and regulations for Livingstone, including his unauthorized and forbidden use of the police computer system and those of other police agencies around the country and the world.

Wyabright had little coice because he knew that even if Lifton did not have that friend in the State DA's office a letter to the DA would have done the same thing and he would have been in deep to trouble.

Sp, he stole for Lifton. amfn fry.

From me he also stole those several files of research for the Agent Oswald wirizings book I'd started years earlier. Again, nobody else was in a position to s steal those files, either. Only Waybright worked in those file cabinents. And Lifton had already announced a book on Oswald. According to Publisher's weekly for May 3, 1993, it was to appear in 1994.

Included in what Waybright stole was myxempy the copy I obtained from the Commission's files of the memorandum Rankin prepared of his and Warren's executive session with the Texans on January 24, 1964, the memorandum that substsitutes for the stenographic transcript Rankin had seen to it would not exist. Since 1966, when I obtained it, that memo had been in those files in my office. That is the source of the correct number, 110669 attribited to Oswald that Rankin got from the Texans. It was when I went to those files to make a copy of that memo for John Newman who had begun his Oswald book before his visit that I discovered the them theft and the extent of the theft that was possible for Wayhright, meaning for Lifton only.

HHOU

Bearing on Waybright's initial intentions and his childish effort to hide his thievery, he had refiled one of two Military District of Washington files I still had in the large of letter-size fenvelopes in which they had been mailed to me. But those were Army records that were not initially disclosed to me. So I did not have them with those records that I obtained by FOIA. He knew that. In addition, he placed the envelope he returned in what was in two ways an obviously wrong place. He put it in a file of Department of Justice records, where We clearly it did not belong, and in a file cabinet for legal-sized records, which are larger.

He then placed it in the lowest file drawer knwoing full well that as a practical did matter I do not have access to those lowest file drawers and could not search them.

Moreover, he knew very well that they were in my office or working files, which is where he found them. His beginning intent was to steal them, which is what he did, to sell them to Lifton. On his part, Lifton has failed to deny this when I asked him.

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that, returning it. As what he said was a sign of good faith and to establish the truth, who had bloomed a pulmer of our he asked a policeman friend of his we knew to come here and search the fix file drawer in which he knowingly misfiled it and give it to me. He even drew a mpay map, we have that many files acibnets. It was not there.

When he stole those files were work working in the file drawer next to the one with the Oswald identification on it, an overfilled file drawer. We is the only one who could have these Agent Oswald files. And he pulled the keeper on the back of that file drawer so tightly that the drawer appeared to be still overfilled after he took those about two inches of records from it.

At my age and in the state of my hea; the an with the physical limit ations that imposes upon me it is impossible for me to create that file from the records I used.

And some of the records in the files were only copies, so I cannot duplicate them from my own files.

What Waybright stole he had a market for- David Lifton. Ultimately he confessed to Livingstone that Lifton as also paying him and Livingstone himself told me that Waybright had stolen some of his work and sold it to Lifton! Notwithstanding which, him, needing his ervices and his violations of laws and regulations to help Livingstone, continued to pay Waybright and to trust him. Waybright's doublecross of Livingstone and him to get to be so blatant he reported to Livingstone, in writing, what Lifton asked him to get. I have a copy of such a report, in Waybright's handwritten ing, that Livingstone gave to someone else!

This insight into the character and the writing of those who wrote the two books supposedly on the assassination that sold better than all others, while it is a fair and for two with any fortion in particular, it representation of the nature of most of that kind of writing, also explains why I cannot cite the ecords I made of what that former marine friend of Oswald told me and much else relating to the possibility that that Oswald was some kind of an agent, for a government spockery or some private interest.

Before getting to the writing of immediately afterxxxfinished the manuscript of NEVER AGAIN! I set the stage for it by explaining how the Commission should have conducted its investigation of whether or not Oswald was some kind of agent, how the agenkes should have informed the Commission, and to give an indication of the state of J.Edgar Hoover's mind in those days immediately after the assassination and at the beginning of the investigations.

The rules of evidence require that testimony be of personal knowledge. Other wise it is not testimony, it is hearsay. Hearsay is not evidence. It is no more than rumor.

In my FOIA litigation, with the tolerance of the fderal courts so few of which had any disposition to make the federal agencies abide by the law and by the rules of the courts, the FBI and the W CIS in particular got away with filing affidavits by those who did not have personal knowledge, affidavits in which they claimed to be stating what the supposed affiants they had learned from others. This despite the fact that those who did have personal knowledge were available to attest to it. Those who filed the hearsay affidavits thus had learned from the attest to it. Those who filed the hearsay affidavits thus had been away with lying. Lying that was not infrequently the felony of perjury of had had had maddly the felony of perjury of they

Commisson, like committees of the Congress, are not bound by the rules of evidence. This is because they are not judicial bodies and because other than first person information may be what their proper functioning requires. But that does not mean that in any real investigation, where first-person information is readily available, it is and have not preferred. In an honest inquiry, first-person information is obviously better and more dependable.

The one thing the Commission neither got now asked for in its supposed inquiry into the report that Oswald had ben some kind of agent is first-person information. A memorandum Hoover write pero personally and of hwich he sent copies to therefore his six top assistants is illuminating on this. It also reflects the lack of Commission diligence in trying to learn the truth. Hoover himself was not in any hurry to make a record and to inform his top assistants. He reported waited eight days, until January 31, 1964, to have the following what happened when Rankin visited him on January 23.

And January 23 was more than three weeks after Hudkins' story was published—and that story was not the first sich report of which the Commission and the FBI knew.

Hoover indictaed copies for four FBI files with the in addition to the copies for his assistants. The frecord or original copy is in the main Liaison with Warren Commission file, where it is one of the earlier fecords, Serial 83.

Whether or not Hoover was aware of it, and if he was his memo doesnot reflect it,

Rankin was less than forthreir forthright with him, according of Hoover's own memo,

in telling Hoover that we as an FBI info rmant Oswald "bore the designation '179'."

Aft er a few more of the cracks against Henry Wade, with which he began his memo Hoover

then says:

Mr. Rankin stated that the Commission was concerned as to how this matter could be resolved, and it was for this reason that they had asked him to see sie. He stated the Commission did not desire to initiate an investigation on the outside, such as the calling of Mr. Madkins, who was the originator of the story and from whom apparently Wade gained his first information as it might uppear the Commission was investigating the Fill.

I told hir. Lankin that I thought the Commission chould immediately call Mr. liedkine before it, place identifier onto, and demand of him the source of his information. I stated that I doubted he would give it to them and would elther take the position he could not recall from where he obtained it or record to the claim that a newspaper rejector's sources are privileged.

From his long years in the Department of Justice and all the dealings he then had with the FBI and its ecords Rankin should have known this is not the way the REMXFBI recently refer to its informants and it is not at all the FBI's numbering systems for its symbol informants.

Rankin also made no mention of the actual number he himself recorded, 110669. But what he <u>did</u> say, and Hoover's version has confirmation in the Commission's Fecord, is that it "did not desire to initiate an investigation on the outside, such as the calling of Mr. Hudkins, who was the originator of the story..."

Translated from Officialese Goobedegook, Rankin told Hoover that the Commission wanted

The Commission would have been no worse off if Hudkins had claimed confidentiality of source that it was without a word from him at all. It also took its testimony in secret so its testimony would not have attracted any attention Hudkins could not have gotten on his own if he had had any such desire. His long record is that he had no such desire. The only apparent real difference is that Hudkins might not have claimed to have had a confidential source and then the Commission would have had to investigate what it learned from him. This, clearly, the Commission and Rankin in particular did not want.

Otherwise it would have called him, Hudkins, Harold Feldman, who wrote a similar article for The Nation magazine and a number of others all of whom to its knowledge wrote similar stories or had knowledge of that report.

not to make any investigation at all and for him to make that possible for it.

Ever mindful of covering his own as and that of his FBI at the same time, Hoover Commission told Rankin "that I thought the should immediately call Mt. Hudkins before it, place him under oath, and demand of him the source of his information."

Hoover told Rankin what Rankin had just told him the Commission was not going to do.

At the same time Hoover told Rankin what Rankin did not have to be told, that Hudkins could claim not to remember or "slaim that a newspeper reporter's sources are privileged."

After this bit of dancing around Hoover did solve Rankin's problem for him. After saying that "Oswald was never at any time a confidential informant," he added "and I

Without talking to Hudkins, as the Commission never did, Lonnie tells me, it in effect made his claim for confidentiality for him. But that is not what Rankin said.

**Rankin, the taken to Justice Rankin, the taken to those years its lawyer.

who pres represented it before the Supreme Court - whose chief justice was the Commission chairman. And what Rankin, speaking for the chief justice, told Hoover is that they wanted no investigation at all.

And what hoover did is say he would make that possible for him.

As he did in his testimony the morning of May 14, 1964. (5H97ff.)

Charle Was none, (ever, either.)

would be willing to so state under oath."

What Rankin, from "oover's memo, did not tell him is that what Rankin told him was the Commission"s decision, as we shall see.

My, how simply awful it would have been if the man the government had already decided to say killed the President, alone and entirely unassisted, had had any kind of government connection at all — worst of all if he had been an FBI informer or had a different such connection!

And the Commission decided not to investigate to learn whether that was true!

More than 30 years later this question has no real answer.

The normal and the proper profedure which did not require what Hoover says Kankin referred to as man "outside" investigation, is to make an investigation on the insideand that now by hearsay or by Hoover testifying to his opinion, all he could testify to,

having in personal temoraledge.

at three places, headquarters, Dallas and New Orleans.

Those records would consist of a field office request of headquarters for permission to try him out as an informer for a probationary period usually of six months. One way of the other, headquarters would reply. If the request were approaved, a file would be started and Oswald would be given an arbitrary symbol to be used inside the FBI in the place of his name. That symbol, for Dallas, would begin with the letters "Da" For New Orleans, those letters would be "NO."There then would be four digits. They would be followed for the period of probation with a "P" and that would be followed by a "C" fto probation with a "P" and that would be followed by a "C" fto denote if he were a criminal informer or an "S" to conform with the FBI's prtende that it was not engaged in what is unConstitutions, any inquiry into political opinion or legal political activites. The "S" represents "security," which that kind of domestic called that "spying is not.

The persons in charge of those files at either of the three places could make a first-person attestation saying that he made a search of all the relevant records in all the possible places and that search that Oswald was not placed had never been a symbol informer or, had it bee true, that he had been.

That would have been, if truthful, a first-person attestation, what is required by the rules of evidence and by honest procedures and intentions,

What is not easy to understand is that on its own the FBI did not do precisely that. Nor is it easy to understand why the FBI did not do that in its own interest as soon as it heard of that report.

From its records as disclosed to me and from the Commission's rescords it did no such thing.

Instead it asked each of those field offices to have each of its agent who had had anything at all to do with Oswald swear to an affidavit in which no such connection with Oswald is sworn to.

This did not preclude the possibility that an other agent used Oswald as an informant, however. In The Mussian of cryents who had used I small.

Even then the FBI did not make this request of all the agents of whom it should have. One example is former New Orleans Agent Milton Kaack.

February 11, 1964

ZZAccording to an FBI internal emmo memo on what it did (a 105-82555-1967) they by

then had gotten affidavits from all the Special Agents who handled interviews or other

pertinent investigations in the Oswald matter.

Kaack had had enough of a connection with "the Oswald matter" for him to be recommended for disciplining over alleged deficiencies. Rather than make any such admission he resigned. I spoke to him in New Orleans on November 20, 1971.

First, according to my notes on that phone conversation, he told me he was not one to Wishington, of the againts "asked to go up there," I told him that was not the question, the question was had he been asked to execute an affidavit saying Odwald was never an FBI informer.

My notes say that in response to this "He laughed."

I then asked him if it was not unsual that when Oswald was areested in "ew "rleans he had asked for an FBI agent to come to the jail to see him and that the evidence the Commission had is that two agents went. With only one, John Quigley, figuring in the report filed. My notes say "He again laughed."

Kaack was very much an agent who to "handled" what the FBI itself described as "pertinent interviews." I cited one of several to him when we spoke.

the FBI saw to it that the proper investigation it could have made and did not was not ade made and it went to more trouble and expendrexpense and delayed the other work of a number of agents by having them go to Washington instead od making the easy, inexpensive and definitive investigation, a file sea search and a competent affidavit based on it by the person who knew the files and procedures and attested to making that search personally.

So instead of the Commission doing the obvious and asking for competent affidavits and instead of the FBI as also doing the obvious approviding those competent affivdits, for each by far the easiest and the cheapest and the most definitive procedure as well as the proper one, both went to some time, trouble and cost for an inadequate response that instead of answering the question, did Oswald have any kind of an FBI connection,

hup how to that the that question lingers without an acceptable answer.

Unless Kaack's laughs were such an answer.

This is a view of how the Commission and the FBI appraoched the troubling question and decided, separately and collectively, to see to it that there was no definitive a answer. to see to it that the question would linguer.

Another view was provided by the highly respected Leon Jawosski, the prominent On May 5, 1964

Hest Houston attorney who was counsel to the Texas Court of Inquiry. He wrote Rankin, which was him to be sent copies to the Carr and Storey. Jaworski told Rankin that after his return from ashington he spoke to "James P. Hobby, Jr., executive vice president and executive editor of the Houston Post yesterday for the purpose of discussing with him the obtaining of an affidavit from Lonnie Hudkins." Only Hudkins had left that appaper a month ago. Jaworski then wrote,

wondering if it is really worth your effort to follow up on Eudkins.

Hudkins' story does not say that Oswald was an informant.

He simply raises the question based on the speculation of others, including that of Bill Alexander, assistant to Henry Wade,

In plain English, Jawosseki as saying, leave it alone, go with what you have.

also
Which meant the question would pnot be answered and would linger. As it does.

This is the Jaworski was was the bar-association celebrity, the man who

later was special Watergate prosecutor and who in that position of responsibility saw to with gate it that many questions would linger, as they do, and who did not wharge felonies that did exist. He was content to do something about what was known and would get enough from what was already public attention and put in jail some of those who belonged there from what was public.

AAIZ This was months later and the lingering question then still lingered. After Hoover's testimony. Prowowski's

that there was no answer to this question.

That it was a deeply troubling question is the way what I wrote earlier begins.

end

Jaworski's above-quoted letter, with its incerence that Hudkins be pressured by his employer to do what A Jaworski undathwagavernmentxwantedxh

wanted him to do, was months later than the Commission's first knowledge of the report that Oswald had worked for the FBI or some other agency.

Hoover's testimony, which was duplicated by the CTA's, was no answer to the question that still lingers and haunts.