

clusion reached by the Secret Service in a report ignored by the Warren Commission: "President Kennedy . . . was shot. Immediately thereafter Governor Connally . . . was shot once. The President was then shot a second time."

24. Hoover's second reference states:

Medical examination of the President's body revealed that one of the bullets had entered just below his shoulder to the right of the spinal column at an angle of 45 to 60 degrees downward, that there was no point of exit . . ."

This directly disputes the Commission's conclusion that one bullet, which entered the neck rather than "just below his shoulder," inflicted the seven nonfatal wounds of President Kennedy and Governor Connally.

25. This makes full disclosure of all the scientific tests which I have requested a matter of paramount importance. Hoover's references to the medial and ballistics evidence also give the FBI a clear motive for continuing to suppress the information I seek. When Hoover made the statements quoted above he had in his possession the spectrographic analyses which I seek in this suit. He did not say that these scientific tests proved that the same bullet hit both Kennedy and Connally. He did have the bullet which allegedly inflicted all these wounds tested, and also a fragment from Governor Connally. With these results in his possession, Hoover said the opposite, that separate bullets caused the nonfatal wounds on both victims. The Secret Service said exactly the same--that two bullets, not one--caused the nonfatal injuries.

26. The date of this formerly suppressed Secret Service report is November 28, 1963, five days after the FBI gave the head of the Secret Service the results of the initial scientific testing. The Directors of the FBI and the Secret Service are experts.

*FBI file
is opposite
all
shots*

Kristo

Both are in fundamental disagreement with the Warren Commission in a manner that refutes the Commission's entire Report and after both had this still-suppressed scientific evidence. Both agencies, however, entirely ignored the so-called "missed" bullet while accounting for all three allegedly possible shots.

27. The best experts the Warren Commission could get could not begin to duplicate in time or accuracy the shooting attributed to Oswald, who was evaluated by the Marines as a "rather poor" shot. So nobody could admit that more than three shots were fired.

28. Even three shots made an impossible story. This problem was made acute by the wounding of James T. Tague, a bystander whose cheek bled as the result of a bullet which missed the presidential limousine and struck the curb on the south side of Main Street. Within minutes Dallas Patrolman L. L. Hill radioed, "I have one guy that was possibly hit by a ricochet from the bullet off the concrete." Tague had immediately reported his injury to Deputy Sheriff Buddy Walthers. Photographs of the point of impact were taken by a newspaperman and a TV cameraman.

29. Tague was no less explicit than Walthers in describing the point of impact of the bullet which caused his injury. Walthers said "it appeared that a bullet had hit the cement" and Tague that "There was a mark. Quite obviously, it was a bullet, and it was very fresh."

30. The Warren Commission felt it could not get away with the Hoover solution, which was to ignore the wounding of Tague, as the Secret Service also did. So the Commission attributed Tague's wound to a bullet which missed the presidential limousine and struck the curb. This was the Commission's third bullet.

31. Hoover, who knew what the existing evidence could and could not bear, had to ignore more than the shot that wounded

Tague. Hoover also ignored the known and reported wound in the front of the President's neck. His supposedly definitive account--the result of the intensive work of 150 agents--after he had read every word passed on to the Commission, including the above quoted evidence--makes no reference at all to this anterior neck wound. But had Hoover not tried to stonewall it this way, he knew that he would be admitting what the facts make beyond question, that there had been a conspiracy, whether or not Oswald was part of it and whether or not Oswald had done any shooting.

32. All officials were horrified at the thought that there had been a conspiracy. This is made transparent by the transcript of the Warren Commission's January 22, 1964 executive session which was recently disclosed as the result of a Freedom of Information Act request by me. Former Solicitor General J. Lee Rankin, who as General Counsel ran the Warren Commission, told the Commissioners at that meeting about reports that Oswald had served the FBI and/or CIA. Rankin then expressed the thought which terrified the Commission: ". . . if . . . it ever came out and could be established, then you would have people think that there was a conspiracy to accomplish this assassination that nothing this Commission did or anybody could dissipate." Other members of the Commission reacted in horror. Dulles: "Oh, terrible." Boggs: "The implications of this are fantastic." Dulles: "Terrific."

33. Five days later the same subject with its "terrible" and "terrific" implications came up again. In the transcript of this January 27, 1964 executive session, obtained by me as the result of civil action No. 2052-73, Rankin did not charge the Commission with the responsibility to get to the bottom and disclose the truth, whatever it might be. Rather he told the Commission that