

**THE LONG-RANGE STRATEGY AND 'CONVERGENCE'
ANATOLIY GOLITSYN, AUTHOR OF 'NEW LIES FOR OLD', EXPLAINS HOW
WEST IS BEING DECEIVED BY COMMUNIST 'TRANSFORMATION'**

Shortly after it became known that **SOVIET ANALYST** had changed hands, there arrived in our New York office by Federal Express, an envelope containing what turned out to be the synopsis of a new book by *Anatoliy Golitsyn*. We applied a number of reliable and tested techniques in order to establish beyond any doubt the authenticity of this paper, since, as is quite widely known, Golitsyn's whereabouts remain a closely guarded secret for his own protection. Obviously, if his work had served the best interests of the strategists described here, he would not, after 30 years, still be living under the deepest cover. The document, which is published below, is to be read as a brief sequel to *'New Lies for Old'*, which accurately described the events of the past several years, despite having been first published in 1984 and actually written earlier. As perceptive and prophetic as Golitsyn's famous book, the present careful analysis, which dates from 1990, accurately forecasts the orchestrated 'splintering' of the 'former' Soviet Union which has recently been observed, while explaining how this phenomenon is controlled from the Centre, and how it relates to Lenin's experience in granting political 'independence' to the Far Eastern and Georgian Republics. But the main contribution of this remarkable paper is to describe what the Communists mean by 'convergence'.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

The author defected to the United States in December 1961 after 16 years' service in the KGB. He had also been a member of the Communist Party since 1945. He is a graduate of the counterintelligence faculty of the High Intelligence School in Moscow and of the University of Marxism-Leninism. He then completed a correspondence course with the Soviet High Diplomatic School. In 1959 he graduated with a law degree from a four-year course at the KGB Institute (subsequently the KGB Academy) in Moscow. From 1959 to 1960, at a time when the present long-range Soviet strategy was being formulated and the KGB was being reorganised to play its part in it, he served as a senior analyst in the NATO section of the Information Department of the Soviet intelligence service. He served in Vienna and Helsinki on counterintelligence assignments from 1953 to 1955 and from 1960 to 1961 respectively. His contribution to western security has been officially recognised by the American and British Governments.

Since 1962 he has studied Communist affairs and East-West relations in terms of Soviet political strategy and he has given his assessments to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and to other western intelligence and security services. In 1984 he

published *New Lies for Old* [1984], a study of Soviet strategic disinformation. He also prepared a book entitled *The Birth of 'Perestroika'*, covering the period in Soviet history between 1950 and 1960, when the present long-range Communist political strategy was formulated. He has continued to keep the Central Intelligence Agency informed of his views in a series of Memoranda on this strategy, of which *'perestroika'* and now the apparent collapse of Communism and the Soviet Empire is the cumulative phase. Since his assessments have not influenced American policymaking, he has requested clearance from the CIA to publish a selection of these Memoranda in a book which is to be called *Behind and Beyond 'Perestroika'*. **SOVIET ANALYST** is uniquely privileged to publish below a synopsis of this book.

THE COMMUNIST STRATEGY

In *New Lies for Old* and in Memoranda to the CIA, the author predicted that the Communist strategists would go beyond Marx and Lenin and would introduce economic and political 'reforms', a false 'liberalisation', in the USSR and Eastern Europe. He predicted the legalisation of Solidarity in Poland, and the return to 'democratisation' in Czechoslo-

vakia and the removal of the Berlin Wall. These predictions were indeed borne out by events. They proved accurate because they were based on the study of the long-range strategy developed in 1958-60, of which *'perestroika'* is the culmination.

The memoranda provided seven keys to understanding the strategy. They are:

- The innovative application of Lenin's New Economic Policy [NEP] experience to the whole Communist bloc.
- Preparation for the full use of the bloc's political and security potential.
- The systematic creation of controlled 'political opposition' forces by state security and by the security services of the other Communist countries.
- Lenin's ideas on the forging of new and old forms for the further development of socialism and the achievement of Communist victory. Chicherin's ideas on the creation of false 'representative institutions' by the admission of non-Communist members.
- The deployment of controlled 'political opposition' in the creation of new 'democratic' and 'non-Communist' structures.
- Lenin's experience with giving fictitious 'independence' to the Far Eastern and Georgian Republics.
- A new design for anti-Western strategy and the use of the bloc's comprehensive political potential for its execution.

The principal objective of Lenin's strategy under the NEP was to induce the West to create favourable conditions for building socialism in Soviet Russia and strengthening it as the base for world revolution by granting recognition to the Soviet régime and reviving its economy through trade, credits, technology and the help of western specialists.

The main objectives of the strategy of *'perestroika'* are as follows:

- To induce Western responses which will accelerate the process of Communist renewal and the transformation of Communist régimes into attractive models of 'socialism with a human face'; and
- To create favourable conditions for global Communist supremacy by means of convergence of the two systems.

[In order for this strategy to be able to yield the intended results, it is necessary for the old Communist threat and the 'image of the Soviet state as the enemy' to be removed. The West can then be relied upon to confuse its enemy's strategy for signs of its final, decisive abandonment of all aggressive and unfriendly intentions, making implementation of the subversive 'convergence' strategy much more liable to succeed.]

Lenin's New Economic Policy offered concessions to foreign and home-grown capitalists. The strategists of 'perestroika' emphasise joint ventures. This is understandable. Joint ventures can become bridges for the promotion of convergence. Because of the narrow political base of Lenin's régime, the NEP was limited to economic reforms. The strategists of 'perestroika', drawing upon their political and security potential, have developed political as well as economic reforms which assist in the execution of their anti-Western strategy.

Lenin used activist diplomacy to swing the unfavourable balance of power in his favour and to prevent a European anti-Soviet coalition. Exploiting the contradictions between the victorious Western allies and the defeated Germans, he concluded the Rapallo Treaty with Germany. The strategists of 'perestroika' have similarly resorted to activist diplomacy, exploiting the contradictions between the United States, West Germany and other European countries. They are exploiting the changes which are perceived to have taken place in Eastern Europe, the consequences of the removal of the Berlin Wall and the reunification issue, with a view to neutralising Germany and later to dissolve NATO. They are concealing their intention to exploit the new 'democratic' image and the political potential of their renewed régimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (China having evidently got 'cold feet', putting the process temporarily into reverse, as its heightened leadership explained to the visiting Gorbachev immediately ahead of the Tiananmen Square massacre), so as to promote basic restructuring in Western Europe and especially in the United States. [The Chinese having gained Hong Kong as a result of their own 'charm offensive', felt able to adopt their own pace within the overall long-range strategy.]

political and security potential had only one dimension: the Soviet security services used their political and security potential repressively against their own population. Now the employment of this potential has two dimensions: domestic and international. The domestic aspect is the use of this potential to broaden the political base of non-Communist parties and create new non-Communist parties and to establish non-Communist structures, replacing the outdated 'dictatorship of the proletariat' with the theme of the 'state of the whole people'. With the introduction of deceptive, controlled 'democracy', this process is virtually complete.

The international aspect is the aggressive application of the political and security potential of the whole bloc in the execution of the Communists' anti-Western strategy. Given the growth of this potential and their military power, the design of the strategy is broader, much more comprehensive, more aggressive and more realistic than was Lenin's anti-Western strategy under the NEP. Lenin's strategy relied upon the creation of new united fronts between Communists and socialist parties. The design of 'perestroika' is based on the deployment of the bloc's political and security potential for the practical promotion of convergence on Communist terms, of the [hidden] Communist and non-Communist systems.

Given the maturity by the late 1980s of the Communist régimes, the strength of their political and security potential and the long period of preparation of controlled 'political opposition', methodology, these régimes were in a position to give representatives of non-Communist parties a third, a half or even more of the seats in their governments and parliaments so as to present these institutions as 'representative' and 'democratic'. It should be noted that Chibichov's letter to Lenin was held as a state secret until its publication in 1964, after the adoption of the strategy. The timing of its publication shows its relevance to that strategy.

The deployment of controlled 'political opposition' has rendered possible the introduction of deceptive non-Communist and 'democratic' structures. Even so-called 'free elections' do not present a problem for the old Communist parties. Because of their secret partnership with the opposition, the Communist parties are always in a winning position. It is

their candidates - Communist or non-Communist - who always win. No other truly independent candidates exist.

This is the new statecraft of the Communist parties and their security services. It is a new form for the development of socialism. Its introduction permitted the Communist parties greatly to broaden their political base and, in accordance with a decision taken by the 22nd Party Congress held during October 1961, to replace the outdated concept of 'dictatorship of the proletariat' with the new concept of the state of the whole people while also maintaining their power and strengthening their actual leading role. The Communists have succeeded in concealing from the West that the non-Communist parties are secret partners of the Communists, not alternatives or rivals to them, and that the new power structures, though they have democratic form, are in reality more viable and effective structures introduced and guided by the Communist parties with a broader base. Because of this Communist control, these countries are not true democracies and cannot become so in the future.

The earlier acceptance of false 'political opposition' mechanisms by the West has led logically to the present unorthodox acceptance of deceptive 'democracy' as part of the strategy - a point of view repeated recently in almost every relevant Western television broadcast and news report in the printed media.

The switch from one generation of Communist leaders to another has followed a logical pattern. In general, the old leaders have resigned without a struggle. Those who have been arrested have usually been spared that because of old age or ill health. Romania was a special case: the reports from there, had evidently forgotten the original sources of its power, which of course had been used to it by Moscow. It had sought to perpetrate personal and family power within that context, thereby breaking all the rules and committing cardinal sins for which the Ceausescus were bloodily liquidated, after refusing to listen to 'reason'. What the Ceausescus can do failed to remember was that once a ruler's time was up, it had been expected since 1961, to remove itself from power reasonably gracefully - or else!

It was under the old generation of lead-

ers that the reforms were prepared - under Brezhnev and Andropov in the USSR, under Kadar in Hungary, under Honecker in East Germany and so forth. It was this generation which created and developed the controlled 'political opposition' and allegedly persecuted it. For the reforms to be credible, the old generation had to make way for the new, including non-Communist members of the former 'opposition' who had allegedly been persecuted. Since these new, non-Communist leaders are the secret partners of the Communists, there is no hostility between them.

It was thus logical for the new President of Czechoslovakia to have advised the United States to support Gorbachev and to finance 'perestroika', or to accept a Communist as his Defence Minister or, when asked whether his country would remain within the Communist alliance, to give the cryptic reply:

'If a totalitarian system is dismantled some problems will remain. Some things I cannot discuss with *The New York Times* before I discuss them with President Mikhail Gorbachev in Moscow.'

It is logical that the new Czechoslovak Foreign Minister should have favoured the revision of 'absolute strategic conceptions' and have suggested the withdrawal of both Soviet and American troops from Europe. It was logical for the new Polish non-Communist Prime Minister to suggest that Soviet troops should remain in Poland to provide protection. It was logical that Wales should have declared that he wanted a Communist as Poland's President or, later, as a potential candidate himself to that high office, should have said: 'We want to cooperate constructively with the Communist authorities.'

It was quite logical that he should have urged Solidarity workers to support 'liberal' Communist leaders like General Kiszczak who, in collusion with General Jaruzelski, had imposed martial law in December 1981, placing Wales under house arrest and forcing Solidarity underground. It was logical that it should have been General Kiszczak who negotiated the agreement providing for the free elections that subsequently enabled the anti-Communist Solidarity to enter parliament as the 'democratic' opposition.

Furthermore, it is logical that, despite the dramatic changes in the leadership of Eastern Europe, there should have been

GOLITSYN PREDICTED THE TREATY NETWORK

Anatoly Golitsyn is usually commended for his remarkable predictions that the West would open Communist apparatuses would be dismantled, the Berlin Wall would fall, and the Soviet Union would be a leading power in the world by the year 2000. He is usually commended for his political figures. No doubt these predictions were correct. It is his been mentioned because we have indeed experienced these developments. It is his been mentioned predictions before they have come to pass. Re-reading the book, the following predictions and observations are especially interesting (see pages 1 and 21):

□ A broad-scale "liberalisation" in the Soviet Union and elsewhere could have an even more profound effect... Pressure could well grow for the Soviet Union to combine with neutralisation of the whole and a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union, France and Italy... would throw in their lot with Germany and the Soviet Union. Britain would then be confronted with a choice between a neutral Europe and the United States.

□ The development of an effective political, economic, diplomatic and military sub-structure under which Communists can continue to coordinate their policies and actions on a bilateral basis through a system of friendship treaties. This sub-structure would not be affected by the formal dissolution of the Warsaw Pact.

no significant revelations about the secret agents of the security services among the former 'clients' who have become leading figures in the 'democratic', 'non-Communist' and 'nationalist' structures.

The explanation is that the new leaders have a common interest with the Communist strategists and their security services in keeping the files secret. So long as these secrets are not revealed, and they will not be, the Communist parties will retain their monopoly of real power. As John Lenczowski put it in the *Los Angeles Times*:

*The exception being a colossal cache of approximately 25,000 documents, filling seven truckloads, which was discovered on a German military installation within hours of formal withdrawal of East German troops from the area. The documents revealed extremely detailed plans for an intended Western blitzkrieg throughout continental Northwestern Europe. Although a vast proportion of the East German archive was deliberately destroyed before formal unity, while other documents were destroyed in Eastern Germany, within Soviet bases close to Western Europe, the documents have indeed confirmed the blitzkrieg scenario. Why were such documents removed before Western forces could seize them? Two explanations seem to appear. First, the 'release' of sufficient paperwork to enable Western analysts to piece together the 'former' Warsaw Pact's blitzkrieg intentions, has created a false sense of security among the NATO partners. Speaking recently in the British House of Commons, Mr Tom King, the British Minister of Defence, reiterated his theme of the 'much longer lead-time' which now prevailed, given Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe, and the break-up of all the 'evidence' of the collapse of Communism and of the disintegration of the Soviet Empire. The dubious assumption has been made, within the framework of all the 'evidence' of the collapse of Communism and of the disintegration of the Soviet Empire, even if they possessed the will to do so, which it is assumed they do not. In any case, since the West had 'discovered their plans', the game was now up. But the likelihood must be that this 'release' of redundant blitzkrieg plans is a ploy, modelled after classic strategic deception principles originally announced by the ancient Chinese military strategist Sun-Tzu to lure the West into believing that the main danger of invasion from the east has been consigned to history's scrapheap. This explains why Douglas Hurd welcomed the Russian President's provocative suggestion that Russia should join NATO, with a serious response, and his observations to the effect that events like the Cuban missile crisis, can never happen again in 'our lifetime'. The second benefit derived by the Communists as a result of the West's 'discovery' of the 25,000 blitzkrieg Warsaw Pact documents, was that, while NATO officials had for many years insisted that the Warsaw Pact had indeed been preparing precisely such a blitzkrieg, no proof of such an intention had ever been available. Now that it was forthcoming, Western agencies were forced to recognise how sparse their hard information about the 'former' enemy's intentions had been. Such realisations are invariably demoralising for intelligence services. ■

of January 11, 1988, 'for all the increased openness in these countries, a great deal remains secret. And where there is secrecy, there is, perforce, uncertainty.'

FAKE 'INDEPENDENCE'

Contemporary Communist strategists are concealing that it is they who are now establishing newly 'independent' republics, repeating on a far broader scale Lenin's experience with the Far Eastern and Georgian Republics and also Stalin's deceptive 1943 dissolution

of the Comintern. The strategists are concealing the top-secret coordination that exists and will continue between Moscow and the 'nationalist' leaders of these new, 'independent' republics. There has been ample time and every opportunity to prepare this coordination in advance. Because of its existence, the fragmentation of the Soviet Empire will not be real but only fictional. This is not true self-determination but the use of 'national' forms in the execution of a common Communist strategy.

The central purpose of the strategy and its final phase of *perestroika* is to renew the régime in the USSR and other Communist countries and convert them into states of 'nature socialism with a human face'. But the strategy goes beyond domestic restructuring, and is aimed at the peaceful and non-peaceful conquest of the United States and Western Europe from within.

The essence of the special manoeuvre within this strategy is the creation of secretly controlled opposition movements and the use of them in a transition to new 'democratic', 'non-Communist' and 'nationalist' power structures which will remain in essence Communist-controlled. It is these new régimes which are intended to achieve the world victory of Communism through the convergence on Communist terms of the Communist and non-Communist systems.

The West has failed to understand the deceptive, controlled nature of the new 'democratic' and the 'non-Communist' structures which have been introduced in the USSR and Eastern Europe. The West is jubilant that former 'dissidents', the members of the 'persecuted political opposition', have recently become presidents, premiers, key members of governments and parliament members in these new structures. The Communists have succeeded in concealing from the West that this so-called 'political opposition' of 'dissidents' has been created, brought up and guided by the bloc's parties and security services during the long period of preparation for *perestroika*. This is, in part, the deployment of the bloc's political and security potential in the interests of the strategy.

Gorbachev, his strategists and all the other easily identifiable activists are not true democrats and never will be. They

remain committed to socialism and Communism, as Gorbachev *et al* never cease to emphasise. They are a new generation of dedicated, fanatical revolutionaries who are using 'democratic' reforms as a new way to achieve final supremacy.

The Communist strategists appreciated that they could not implement their strategy of convergence using the old, obsolete, Stalinist, Communist Party structure and dormant institutions like the old Soviet parliament. But they do believe that they can carry it out using new, revitalised, 'democratic' structures. They have therefore reorganised the party system, the presidency and the legislature to give them more power and prestige and at the same time a greater likeness to their American equivalents. Meanwhile, the Communist Party is apparently relegated to the shadows, even abolished.

MASSIVE MASKIROVKA

The Communist Party, however, has not surrendered its real monopoly of power. In fact, it has broadened it by giving power to its members in the Presidency and Congress to execute the strategy of *perestroika* and convergence. Greater presidential powers are needed to carry out the strategy throughout the world. This is not a transfer of power from the Party to the President. The President remains a member and an instrument of the Party, the executor of its strategy, even if the Party has become more or less wholly invisible. He is not the Pope or Luther. He does not impose his will on the Party, he is fulfilling the Party's will. Moreover, his identity might change. The ultimate decision-making power rests with the Politburo or its successors, the invisible or visible Party apparatus and their strategists.

Although the end of the Party's monopoly is proclaimed *followed later by the formal abolition of the Party - Euf!*, the Party apparatus remains in being and is still being run by the same old-timers (the recognisable form of the Party having been disclosed for public consumption purposes only, while the Party lies on its other guests, see pages 7-10 of this issue).

The Party apparatus, though less visible, will continue to provide guidance to party members in the reform institutions. The 'Party' not only has a vast organisation but also extensive experience, including periods of illegal operation under the Tsarist régime and in

those territories which fell under German occupation in the Second World War. It will have no difficulty in adjusting to the environment of a fictional 'multi-party system' which in practice it will control.

All the reforms - the strong Presidency, the new and healthier Congress, the talk of a national security council and 'oversight' of the KGB and the creation of a 'loyal opposition' - have been carried out with an emphasis on their similarity to the American system: they should all be seen in the context of the strategy of convergence. This explains the introduction of the presence of 'opposition', the calculated arguments between old-style conformists and Western-style members of Congress like Yeltsin on the subject of the KGB and the nationalist and other issues. It also explains the emergence of groups of Russian nationalists, inheritors of the Slavophile tradition, Stalinists and even anti-Semites represented by Primakov (*memory*): all are controlled by the Party and the KGB (and their 'successors') and are being used in the interests of strategy to play on Western hopes and fears. The Party and its heirs will continue to exercise their leading strategic role through its members in the Presidency, governments, Congress, the political groups and parties and national fronts. Even those 'reform Communists' who called for a reduction in the Party's role and the introduction of a 'multi-party system', are in fact fulfilling the instructions of the Party strategists. This is the essence of the Party's 'surround' of a monopoly of power, and of the associated far-reaching reforms, including the final dismantling of the Party itself.

The implementation of the strategy of *perestroika* and convergence is not governed by any laws or rules. It is a skilled application of the Soviet strategic posture in its totality. The strategists no doubt realise that they cannot march to victory under Lenin's banner, or even use the word 'convergence' while Vladimir Lenin still remains unburied. They may therefore finally bury him with full honours while in practice they follow his ideas in their final assault on the capitalist West.

The crucial period, when the gap in Western strategic intelligence opened up were the years 1958 to 1960. At that time, western intelligence services were unable to acquire reliable information on the adoption of the long-range strategy

and the programme of strategic disinformation because they were deeply penetrated by the KGB, and their principle sources in the USSR and China were compromised. KGB penetration in the United States did not begin with the Walker espionage ring. By 1958, the CIA was already penetrated by both the KGB and by Chinese intelligence. In 1958 the Agency lost its most important source, Colonel Popov, of Soviet military intelligence (GRU), who could have provided strategic information had he not been compromised by KGB penetration and arrested and executed by the KGB.

PERCEPTION INERTIA

As these misconceptions have accumulated inside Western foreign ministries, external intelligence services and 'think-tanks', they have created a vicious circle of bureaucratic vested interests which makes the correction of the misconceptions difficult, if not impossible. The confusion induced by Soviet strategic disinformation and by 'Active Measures', the vested interests of many bureaucrats in their long-accepted misconceptions and the lack of proper strategic criteria have done serious damage to the assessment of Communist developments.

Western experts fail to see the strategic continuity behind them. They accumulate facts, but are unable to see that strategic interaction and often cannot build them into a strategic picture. They continue to analyse events in terms of outdated, inapplicable Stalinist concepts such as continuing power struggles. This was notably the case in respect of the interpretation of Gorbachev's rise to power, the removal of his alleged rivals and his assumption of the presidency. *Perestroika* was and is seen as a purely domestic effort to overcome the economic and political difficulties facing the Soviet Union, so that its broader, anti-Western strategic design was overlooked.

Alternatively, Western experts went to the opposite extreme of interpreting the dramatic Gorbachev period and *perestroika* in Western terms as spontaneous, positive developments pushing the Soviet regime towards capitalism and Western-style democracy. They saw Gorbachev as an independent innovator facing genuine resistance from the Party bureaucracy and the military. Ignorant of the roots

and origin of *perestroika*, they failed to see that it is the planned and cumulative phase of Communist strategy; they cannot understand its essence, its objectives or its dangers as part of the design for world Communist hegemony. They are impressed by the drama of *perestroika* and its sequel, but cannot appreciate its dialectical logic or dynamics, or its revolutionary potential. Faulty in their assessments of the situation, Western experts failed to warn policymakers - ex-President Ronald Reagan and the former Prime Minister Mrs Margaret Thatcher, in particular - about the implications and dangers of unthinking Western support for Gorbachev and *perestroika*.

The conservative leaders (ex-President Reagan, the ex-British Prime Minister Mrs Thatcher and West German Chancellor Kohl) have failed to understand the essence of *perestroika*; have delivered a wrong direction to their supporters and have led them into a crisis by their support for Gorbachev. Conservatives are confused about Gorbachev and his *perestroika*, and about the myriad of other prominent actors they can identify on the Soviet stage. Their old assumptions are upset. They are out of ideas. They have lost perspective. The Soviet strategists, however, are sure that the conservative crisis and all this confusion are temporary phenomena. They will recover and resist being 'restructured' in accordance with the Communist dialectical terms formulated when the long-range strategy was developed back in 1958-60. For this reason, the strategic objectives of Soviet political warfare are:

- First, to neutralise all anti-Communist influence, especially the conservative parties, as an important factor in the political life of the leading Western countries - the United States, Germany, France, Great Britain and Italy.
- Secondly, to secure the victory of the radical left in the next presidential election in 1992 in the United States and the victory of the socialist and Labour parties in the national elections in Germany and Britain in the 1990s. [France is proving exceptionally helpful, thanks to the community of interests between the ruling French Socialists and Moscow, but their continuation in power later in the decade would also be desirable.

American policymakers, and particularly

the conservatives in both the Republican and Democratic parties, despite their long experience with Communist treachery, were unable to grasp the new manoeuvres of the Communist strategists and refused to commit the West to helping *perestroika* which is contrary to their interests. It has been said to observe the recent jubilation of American and West European conservatives who have been cheering *perestroika*, on, without realising that it is intended to bring about their own political demise. Liberal support for *perestroika* can be understood, but conservative support came as a surprise to me.

Two kinds of response can be made to this aggressive Communist strategy. One is that of Kennedy and Vice-President Wallace, which was to ignore it and court disaster; the other is that of Churchill and Truman, which was to recognise it and face it down. Reagan and Thatcher displayed the mixture of Wallace and Kennedy. It is vital that their strategic blunder should be corrected. The current American leader, who has shown no signs at all of changing course and of recognising the need to correct this mistake, will face responsibility for the *de jure* loss of Western Europe to 'neo-Communists' and, ultimately, for the end of the great American experiment with democracy.

NEED FOR A BRAVE RESPONSE

The moral grounds for a reversal of the American response and for a rejection of the Soviet strategy of *perestroika* are very simple. A system which has killed 20 million of its people, (50 million if the Chinese are included), has openly raped its intellectuals and has brought suffering and misery to the peoples of the Soviet Empire, does not deserve to be renewed. The American and other Western peoples are under no moral obligation to help with the reconstruction of such a system.

The pragmatic basis for a new American response to *perestroika* is the need to protect and preserve the Western systems from 'restructuring' and convergence with the Soviet system, and to save the American people from the bloodbaths and re-education camps which such convergence will ultimately bring. These prospects may still seem remote, but they represent the logical consequences of convergence on Communist terms.

The active engagement of the Administration of President Bush in support of

Gorbachëv and 'perestroika' reveals that the Administration has failed to comprehend the strategy behind 'perestroika' and is blind to hostile Communist intentions and to the dangers they entail. This failure of comprehension has resulted from the US Administration's reassessment of 'perestroika'. The mountain gave birth to a mouse. Instead of correcting the errors of former President Ronald Reagan's naïve, euphoric embrace of Gorbachëv and 'perestroika', it has compounded his errors and gone further by fully adopting the scenario of Brzezinski and Genscher for the Western response to the changes in the USSR and Eastern Europe. By so doing, it has set a disastrously wrong direction for the West to follow.

ATLANTIC TO VLADIVOSTOCK

The meaning of developments in the Communist world is misunderstood and the intentions behind Communist actions are misinterpreted. **Our enemies are being accepted and treated as though they are almost allies of the West. The West responds euphorically without realising the potential damage to its democratic arrangements. Chronic Western blindness permits the Soviet strategists to turn everything in the West on its head, whereas the West is under the illusion that everything in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is being turned on its head.** This blindness has become a seriously destabilising factor in international relations, in Western diplomacy, trade, economics, military strategy and budgets, ideology, election processes, the media and in society generally.

BACK ISSUE SETS

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American blindness is diminishing the rôle of the United States as the leader of the Western world and is offering the Russians fresh openings to manipulate erroneous Western perceptions of 'perestroika' to the detriment of the Western alliances. **The distinction between the American picture of an enlarged Europe based upon Western values, and the Soviet vision of a neutral socialist Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals [and on to Vladivostok: -Ed] is being lost from sight completely.**

CONCLUSION

To sum up, US and Western blindness in assisting 'perestroika' in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe illustrates that the leading Western powers do not understand the strategic and political implications of such a policy for the free enterprise capitalist democracies. This blindness will end in disillusionment, fuelled by mistaken long-term expectations, and may secure the final supremacy of the Soviet strategy of 'convergence' on Communist terms.

The West's blindness to Soviet strategy, its wholly uncritical acceptance of the authenticity of all this deceptive, controlled pseudo-democracy and its support for 'perestroika' have given the Soviets significant advantages and have worsened the position of the Western democracies.

Until the West abandons its simplistic thinking and penetrates into the complexities of the changes in the Communist world, these Communist strategists will retain the upper hand. This critical situation demands an urgent Western re-think of its response to the strategy of 'perestroika', and a determined exposure of its grave dangers for the West. That is the main priority, and it will take statesmanship of the highest order to embark upon the necessary reappraisals. ■

Note: Given that Golitsyn's new document predates the contemporary spectacle of the 'slicing up' of the 'former' Soviet Union, and its 'abolition', together with the 'death' of the Communist Party, the Editor is preparing a sequel to this commentary, which will apply Golitsyn's well-informed methodology to the unfolding contemporary situation. ■

THE LAST WORD

The following information may or may not be related/significant/worrying:

□ In a lunch address to foreign media correspondents given in Moscow on 12 December, **Yevgeniy Primakov**, the Director of Soviet Central Intelligence (and the top spymaster, so he should know), admitted that 'serious social tensions' could grip the Soviet Union by early 1992 because of the grave economic crisis, but discounted a 'second coup d'état', remarking that 'tanks will not appear in the streets of Moscow again as they did last August'.

□ The appointment of 49-year-old **Colonel-General Boris Gromov** to succeed 60-year-old Army General Anatoliy Betekhtin as First Deputy Commander of Soviet Land Forces, was only announced on 5 December, and did not surface in the Western press until 19th December, although the appointment was actually made on 21st November. Foreign diplomatic analysts were reported to have been 'puzzled' by this long delay, which was certainly unusual. Another interesting fact about this top-level appointment is that Gromov had held the post of First Deputy Interior Minister of the USSR until the 'putsch' [source: TASS].

□ On 2 December, the Vice-President of the RSFSR, **Aleksandr Rutskoi** - who, along with **Gavriil Popov**, the Mayor of Moscow, is among several prominent figures who in recent weeks have been over-indulging in the odd dialectics of resignation - warned that the situation in the armed forces was at boiling point. It was necessary, he said, to 'stop endlessly playing around with people who possess weapons in their hands', since this 'may end very badly'. Rutskoi added that there were about 400,000 military without housing.

□ The very sudden dismissal of **Army General Vladimir Lobov**, following a visit to Britain in early December, was followed by an explanation from the USSR Minister of Defence, **Air Vice-Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov**, of the reasons for this decision, interspersed with references to the 'inflaming of unhealthy passions.' ■

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