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But Hoover's position was much improved by the appointment of the Commission for he was then no longer in the position of reaching and assuming responsibility for the final, official conclusions while he reamined able to and, in fact, did dominate those conclusions by controlling what the Commission could and did know and could not know.

These things were well known to the Commission, especially to its respected staff. As with all such bodies, the members are largely figureheads, the staff doing the real work. Members are always selected because of their national stature. They are always too busy to learn and fully comprehend what is going on.

A few of the top-secret executive sessions of the Warren Commission - so ultra secret even its staff was excluded and members were assured they would never even see the stenographic transcripts - read like the ramblings of elderly gentlewomen gathered at a kaffee klatch. They meandered about such things as what their wives had heard, gossiped about federal agencies, sometimes speculated in childish ways about what was outside their understanding.

This Commission, rather than being an exception, was composed of the very busiest of men, men already overcommitted to the public service, except for the two with past intelligence connections, Allen W. Dulles, who presided over the Central Intelligence Agency during the period of its greatest growth and more spectacular disasters, of which the Bay of Pigs is merely the one that led to his forced retirement; and the well-known international banker, John J. McCloy, whose delayed investigation in Dallas, already postponed for six months, was interrupted the first day by his urgent need to fly to Mexico for a hunting expedition.

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As a matter of fact, it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to select an acceptable Commission with members on friendlier terms with the government's intelligence community except, possibly, for the chairman, then Chief Justice Earl Warren, and Kentucky's Republican Senator, John Sherman Cooper. The late Senator Richard B. Russell of Georgia presided over the three-monkey legislative supervision of the CIA, a fictional control allegedly exercised but never a reality. House of Representatives Republican Leader Gerald R. Ford, gung ho for the CIA, was and remains one of Hoover's most vocal admirers. Until intrustions into his personal life became intolerable for Louisiana Congressman Hale Boggs in the late spring of 1971, when he was Ford's Democratic counterpart, he, too, was Hoover's staunch supporter. Then, when Boggs finally made complaint about the FBI, he still felt compelled to praise Hoover, saying of him no more than that Hoover had grown too old in his 47 year control of the FBI, which he had headed since its creation, then appointed to the job by a liberal Attorney General, Harlan Fiske Stone, later to become a Justice of the Supreme Court.

An overwhelming majority, five of the seven members appointed by the Democratic President, were from the minority Republican Party. This is exceptional, if not entirely unprecedented, in our political history. Intelligence and conservative interests were dispropertionately represented. Neither of the two Democrats, both Southerners, Russell and Boggs, was a political disciple of the victim-President. In fact, the one perspective lacking in the Commission was the country's majority, Kennedy philosophy.

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The Commission inherited its first crises, of the accused assassin's and his assassin's FBI connections. Its solution was traditional, not invented by modern American bureaucracy: evasion, semantics, lies and the destruction of evidence.

What it could not get around any other way, it burned, something never until this moment reported.

It took me five years of diligent digging in the suppressed Commission files to get the shocking proof of this, and then it was hidden where one would never think to look for it.

The Commission's Report, 912 pages long and three pounds heavy, was delayed from the first of June until the end of September 1964 by the need to get around this complication in official life - that both the accused assessin and his assassin had been FBI informants. Two having months later, the laboring mouse/brought forth this mountain of words, it birthed an enormity of seemingly persuasive documentation, 26 more enormous volumes of "evidence", an entire range of verbal mountains, ll equal in size to the Report itself. They occupy three feet on my bookshelves.

Only an obfuscated fragment of this, the vital evidence and the embarrassing official secret, is anywhere in these estimated 10,000,000 words that to this day have not satisfied most Americans. Not until page 325 of the Report did the Commission get around to its entirely false representation of the hidden fact that both Ruby and Oswald had been FBI informants. Most of the Report is the irrelevant, background and biographical data on Oswald and Ruby. The final substantive chapter, entitled to betoken something there never was, "Investigation of Possible Conspiracy", again in biography, has a