Suppose either Lee Harvey Oswald, the man accused of assassinating President John F. Kennedy, or Jack Ruby, history's most public murderer, the man who did Mill Oswald, had been FBI informants?

Can it be imagined what kind of problems and crises the government vould then have had?

In those days the great number of informants the FBI has was not generally known. People were unwilling to believe it and the FBI steadiastly denied it, as does every secret-police force everywhere. But the FBI did - and does - have a vast number of informants broken into two broad categories: "C", for criminal, and "S", representing what to the FBI is "security" but in reality is political. Any one of these, in the preveiling official view, can be more valuable than 1,000 real agents.

Well, the government's problem was even greater, for both Oswald and Ruby were FBI informents!

The FBI, of course, denies it.

Thus, when President Lyndon B. Johnson immediately put J. Edgar Hoover in charge of the official investigation, even though there was no federal jurisdiction, it then not being a federal crime to kill the President, Hoover was put in the position of investigating himself (something he may not have known when the job was given him). This became even more true when, a week later, the Warren Commission was appointed and the FBI became its major investigative arm.

But Hoober's position was much improved by the appointment of the Commission for he was then no longer in the position of reaching and assuming responsibility for the final, official conclusions while he resmined able to and, in fact, did dominate those conclusions by controlling what the Commission could and did know and could not know.

These things were well known to the Commission, especially to its respected staff. As with all such bodies, the members are largely figure heads, the staff doing the real work. Members are always selected because of their national stature. They are always too busy to learn and fully comprehend what is going on.

A few of the top-secret executive sessions of the Warren Commission - so ultra secret even its staff was excluded and members were sesured they would never even see the stenographic transcripts - read like the remblings of elderly gentlewomen gathered at a kaffee klatch. They seendered about such things as what their wives had heard, gossiped about federal agencies, sometimes speculated in childish ways about what was outside their understanding.

This Commission, rather than being an exception, was composed of the very busiest of men, men already overcommitted to the public service, except for the two with past intelligence connections, Allen W. Dulles, who presided over the Central Intelligence Agency during the period of its greatest growth and more spectacular disasters, of which the Bey of Pigs is merely the one that led to his forced retirement; and the well-known international banker, John J. McCloy, whose delayed investigation in Dallas, already postponed for six menths, was interrupted the first day by his urgent need to fly to Mexico for a hunting expedition.

As a matter of fact, it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to select an acceptable Commission with members on friendlier terms with the government's intelligence community except, possibly, for the chairman, then Chief Justice Earl Warren, and Kentucky's Republican Senstor, John Sherman Cooper. The late Senator Richard B. Russell of Georgia presided over the three-monkey legislative supervision of the GTA, a fictional control allegedly exercised but never a reality. House of Representatives Republican Leader Gerald R. Ford, gung he for the CIA, was and remains one of Hoover's most vocal admirers. Until intrustions into his personal life became intolerable for Louisiana Congressman Hale Bongs in the late spring of 1971, when he was Ford's Democratic counterpart, he, too, was Hoover's staunch support r. Then, when Boggs finally made complaint about the FBI, he still felt compelled to praise Hoover, saying of him no more than that Hoover hed grown too old in his 47 year control of the FBI, which he had headed since its creation, than appointed to the job by a liberal Attorney General, Harlan Fiske Stone, later to become a Justice of the Sureme Court.

An evershelming majority, five of the seven members appointed by the Democratic President, were from the minority Republican Party. This is exceptional, if not entirely unprecedented, in our political history. Intelligence and conservative interests were disproportionately represented. Neither of the two Democrats, both Southerners, Russell and Boggs, was a political disciple of the victim-President. In fact, the one perspective lacking in the Commission was the country's majority, Kannady philosophy.

The Commission inherited its first crises, of the accused assausin's and his assausin's FBI connections. Its solution was traditional, not invented by modern American bureaucracy: evasion, semantics, lies and the destruction of evidence.

what it could not get around any other way, it burned, something never until this moment reported.

Commiss on files to get the shocking proof of this, and then it was hidden where one would never think to look for it.

The Commission's Report, 912 pages long and three pounds heavy, was delayed from the first of June until the end of September 1964 by the need to get around this complication in official life - that both the accused assessin and his assassin had been FBI informants. Two having months later, the laboring mouse/brought forth this mountain of words, it birthed an enormity of seemingly persuasive documentation, 26 more enormous volumes of "evidence", an entire range of verbal mountains, li equal in size to the Report Itself. They occupy three feet on my wookshulves.

Unly an obfuscated fragment of this, the vital evidence and the emparrassing official secret, is anywhere in these estimated 10,000,000 words that to this day have not satisfied most Americans. Not until page 325 of the Report did the Commission get around to its entirely false representation of the hidden fact that both Ruby and Oswald had been FBI informants. Most of the Report is the irrelevant, background and bicgraphical data on Oswald and Ruby. The final substant we chapter, entitled to betoken something there never was, "Investigation of Possible Conspiracy", again in bicgraphy, has a

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minute subsection of slightly more than two of its 50 pages. This is headed, deceptively, "Oswald Was Not An Agent for the U. S. Government." I add amphasis to underscore the deception.

Oswald, certainly, was not an "agent" of either the FBI or the CIA. Fut, without doubt, on June 26, 1962, outside his home in Fort Worth, Texas, sitting in the car of FBI Agent John W. Fain, by Fain's own later admission, Oswald did agree to become an FBI informant.

And Ruby, although you will not find it in either the Roport or its yard-long, 26-volume appendage, had been a "criminal" informant of the FBI. This is established, to the degree it can today be learned, in the estimated 300 cubic feet of Commission files now stored in the National Archives. In them, the FBI's representation is that Ruby's services were valueless.

The hidden fact is that, long before his 1962 agreement with the FBI, while still in the Soviet Union, to which he had pretended to defeat but never did, Oswald laid claim to serving the government. He did this in writing to John B. Connelly, who Oswald thought was still Secretary of the Navy. Connally was about to become governor of Texa. In 1971, although a Democrat, Connelly headed the Treasury Department in the Republican Nixon administration.

In preconditioning the public to accept an unacceptable "solution" to the assessination of the popular President, government used "loaks" to the press with consummate skill. But for all the fabled skill of the FBI, no one leak was ever traced to its source, Perhaps one of the reasons is that the most significant, if not, indeed, also the greatest in number, were by the FBI. Again, it was investigating itself. The results were predictable.

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Income of their early private sessions, the transcripts of which were classified "TOP SECRET" and from which all of the staff except the general counsel were excluded, the Commission, frustrated after repeatedly reading in the papers what should keve been the closest secrets - and the tailored release of which predetermined and delimited what the Commission might do - questioned Micholas Katzenbach about this. Katzenbach was then Deputy Attorney General, second to Robert Kennedy alone in the Department of Justice. This is the verbatim transcript:

Sen. Russell: General, I see occasionally in the press articles that purport to have come from the F.B.I. as to bits of evidence and things of that kind. How much of their findings does the F.B.I. propose to release to the press before we present the findings of this Commission?

Mr. Katzenbach: Well Senator, I know the story to which

you are referring - -

Sen. Russell: It's been in the papers.
Mr. Katzenbach: Yes. And I know that the Director and
Mr. Belmont, who is the men in charge of this particular invertigation, are utterly furious at the information that got into the press. I talked with both of them on this subject. They say they are confident it could not have come from the F.H.I., and I say with candor to this committee, I can;t think of anybody else it could have come from ...

If it was courageous of Katzenbach to speak so candidly about Hoover and the FBI, it may also account for his short career as Attornay General when he was appointed to that post upon Kennedy's resignation to run for the Senate.

One of the tidbits fed the complement and largely unquestioning press is this letter. It was then played as in the Report (R386-7) to infor an Oswald proclivity toward violence.

After a dubious and probably fraudulent "hardship" discharge from the Marine Corps, allegedly to support his supposedly destitute mother granted days before his enlistment expired, instead of caring

for her, 0s wald chiseled a few bucks from her and went to the USSR.

There he promptly and publicly pretended to surrender his citizenship, all the while being careful not to. The Navy, taking a dim view of what appeared in the papers, changed his honorable discharge. This was Oswald's letter of protest and appeal. It is printed in full in the part of his biography that is in Appendix XIII (R710).

Only what is deliberately misinterpreted as a threat is quoted in the text of the Report, "that he would 'employ all means to right this gross mistake or injustice'." That - and no more.

But what Oswald actually wrote is that "The story was blown up into another 'turncost' sensation ... "To this he added a concluding paragraph, entirely ignored by the press as by the Commission. It begins:

I have and allways (sic) had the full sanction of the U.S. Embass, Moscow USSR, and honce the U.S. Government.

And it concludes by giving the Embassy as reference:

For information I would direct you to consult the American Embassy, Chikovski St. 19/21, Moscow, USSR.

This is neither Oswald's only nor his strongest claim that he served intelligence interests in the U.S.S.R. The others, rather than being merely distorted, were entirely suppressed. I select this one precisely because it was made public and was twisted. Oswald, without rejutation, claimed government sanction for his phony "defection'.

All gations that he served the FBI were printed right after the assass nation. They attracted little attention then and were soon entirely forgotten. These stories were ignored by the Commission until it dared do so no longer. Then it moved fast, decisively, igsgination and originality mixed with its uninhibited use of raw power.

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The Socret Service was first and more honest in transmitting reports that Oswald had been an FBI informant. Of all government investigative agencies used by the Commission, the best if still inedequate record is that of the Secret Service. It was the only federal agency with legal jurisdiction when the President was assessinated. But it iss immediately frozen out of all crucial areas by the omnipotent FBI. If the Secret Service, subject to bureaucratic pressures as it was, with careers on all levels dependent upon conformity with official policy, did become part of what in an earlier work I described as the "cover-up" of the evidence and the possible solution of the prime, it nonetheless immediately and without deviation presented the Warren Commission with solid proofs that the Commission's prodetermined conclusions were untenable. When this happened, tha FBI came to the Commission's rescue and the Secret Service remained silent. The FBI began preempting and excluding the Secret Service less than 2h hours after those shots changed the history of the world at 12:30 p.m. Dallas time, November 22, 1963.

The Commission designated its numbered files "Commission

Documents" (CDs or CRs). The one numbered 320 contains a report from

Secret formal

Special Agent in Cherge (SAIC) Lane Bertram of the Houston office.

Its syropsis reads:

Interview with Houston Post reporter Alonso (sic) H. Hudkins III. He states Oswald reported to be on FBI pay-(roll as an informant, and other information.

This "other information" includes unsubstantiated belief that Ruby was part of a conspiracy. The paragraph about Oswald as an FBI informant reads:

On December 17, Mr. Hudkins advised that he had just returned from a weekend in Dallas, during which time he talked

to Allen Sweatt, Chief Criminal Division, Sheriff's Office, Ds. las; Chief Sweatt mentioned that it was his opinion that Lee Harvey Oswald was being paid \$200 s month by the FBI as informant in connection with their subversive investigations. He furnished the alleged informant number assigned to Oswald by the FBI as "S172".

Sweatt was one of the key figures in the immediately corrupted invest igstion. The assessination was committed a few hundred feet from his office, which was immediately converted into a command post. Among the unique functions served there was the confiscation and, to the degree it could be, the suppression of as many as possible of the pictures of the assessination.)

Suppressed Kennedy Assassination Pictures. In the ensuing four years, there was been no complaint from any official on any level in any government, from the Dallas police and sheriff's offices up to the FBI, nor one from a single member or member of the staff of the warren Commission. There has been no complaint because there is no question about the facts - and because this book represents the first thorough resurraction from official oblivion of the suppressed evidence, of which 150 pages, largely relevant FBI reports and Commission memorands, are reproduced in facsimile.)

When Bertram's report reached the Warren Commission, File 320 turned out to be one of its many "circular files".

The FBI knew about this before the Secret Service report got from Houston to Washington, and began working on it - and Hudkins.

The Secret Service kept in touch with Hudkins, as he did with it. Ditifully, when he got bits and pieces of information from sources of unknown dependability, he passed them on to the Secret Service. He apparently did not trust the FBI. I have the Secret

Service reports. Later, when the government was in a bind on the question of whether or not Oswald was an agent or informant, Hudkins was defined as "not very reliable" because he had told federal investigator; only what he had himself been told, so they could investigate these tips. This was, after all, their function, not his.

3ix pages from two unpublished files, four from 320 and two from 349 (Secret Service Control Nos. 705 and 782), illustrate Hudkins' "unreliability" and the "reliability" of the Secret Service and its source. One example is the report that reached Hudkins "that citizens of the United States had entered into an agreement or plot to assessinate Premier Castro of Cuba," one inference being that this could have inspired Oswald to assessinate Kennedy.

lodey there is nothing new in this. It is beyond question. It might have been then to any government intelligence agency of any kind, for some, like the CIA, were involved. Others, like the FBI, had the obligation of enforcing such laws as the neutrality act. A sister agency of the Secret Service, the customs service, conducted raids to frustrate these adventures once President Kennedy forbade them as one result of the Cuba Missile Crisis. A number of the mercenaries involved in this and similar plots had no reluctance im describing them in detail to me. They gave me pictures of their companions, described their preparations, identified those from whom they received assistance, and explained how they failed. In one case, a real DIA sgent, also a Bay of Pigs prisoner, told me of a plot against Castro that failed only because, on a last-minute whim, Castro shifted from the jeep in which he had been riding when his convoy stopped. The one he abandoned sustained a direct hit by a bazooka shell - American-supplied. Its occupants were killed.

Hudkins at first believed his source was his paper's Washington representative, Felton West, who later said he knew nothing about it.

Bertram's December 12 report to "Protective Research" in Washington, which is the White House security detail, urged that "a member of the Houstor Post Washington Bureau by the name of O'Leary not be contacted or in any way be permitted to obtain this information in this report."

Hudkins, learning from West that West claimed not to have been the source, Immediately told Bertzam of the apparent error and said he would check his notes to learn the identity of his source (File 349).

West had been city editor of the Houston paper before becoming its Washington representative. He was called to the White House and interviewed by the chief of Protective Research and an inspector of the Secret Service. West then identified this O'Leary as "formerly Science Editor of the Houston Pest" but said he "had died in New Zeeland while accompanying an Antarctic expedition and that Mr. O'Leary was buyied in Dallas some few days before the assassination of President Kennedy." (File 320, Control 705)

This o'Leary is the well-known Jeremish O'Leary of the Weshington Star who no doubt would have been surprised to learn of his buriel in Dallas as a prelude to the "crime of the century", which he covered. (File 349)

Another of Hudkins' tips is that Lieutenent George Butler, correctly identified as the head of the Delles Police Juvenile Bureau (although his chief function seems to have been "internel security", seeing to it that there was no Communist subversion in the Dellas Police:), had said of the President in Hudkins' presence, "I'm glad the sout-of-a-bitch is dead, but I wish it had not happened in Dellas."

Butler with exactness beyond question, is described as a "rightist".

Considering the extremist groups of the extreme right fringe he addressed and praised, the description is hardly an exaggeration. Nor is it less interesting that it is Butler who reportedly gave the all-clear signal to move Oswald, signifying that the car in which he was to have been spirited away was in place when, in fact, it was not. Had it been, it would have been impossible for Ruby to shoot Oswald, for the one clear spot, the one from which he did shoot, is precisely where the car was supposed to have been.

Butler, when last I heard of him, had quietly been shifted to administration of the jeil.

With these reports attributed to Hudkins accurate, not inaccurate, we have a means of comparing his "unreliability" with official "reliability". His unofficial fryingpan seems less black than the official kettle.

But on the subject of the December 17 information, "that Lee Hervey Osweld was being paid \$200 a month by the FBI as an informant in connection with their subversive investigations," the Secret Service was more circumspect. It was handled by telephone - h6 days later.

Typically, that is filed in still another of those round files in which it is so easy to lose things, the mere depositing in different files being enough to make retrieval difficult.

Bertram's January 24, 1964, report to "Chief", James J. Rowley, is Secret Service Control Number 1011. It is in the Commission's File 3'2, not 320 or 349. It is brief. It reports other forthcoming storie: saying Oswald had been an FBI informant and has two other short paragraphs. The first begings, "This will acknowledge receipt of long distance call from Inspector Elliott Thacker on January 23,

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requesting information contained" in the first report. The last sentence reads, "This was furnished," that is, by phone.

The second paragraph begins, "Later the return call was made to Inspector Thacker advising that additional information had been received." The barest possible reference is made to that phoned-in information.

The reason for this January 23 phone call will soon become apparent. It was part of a crisis, the Commission's first big one and perhaps its most serious.

A week to the day prior to Hudkins' report to Bertram of what he had been told by Chief Criminal Deputy Sheriff Swestt, Joseph C. Goulder, then a reporter for the Philadelphia Inquirer, had a story in its Sunday, December 8, issue. Two of its five paragraphs on this subject say:

The FBI attempt to recruit Oswald as an informant, an informed law enforcement source said, was made in September, just after he had moved to Dallas from New Orleans.

(Actually, when Oswald left New Orleans in September, he went to Mexico, thence to Dallas, arriving in October. His wife and daughter had moved to Dallas in September.)

The source said he did not know if the FBI succeeded in hiring Oswald; and the federal agency would not discuss the matter.

An earlier paragraph identifies Oswald's function as "an undercover informant in Castro groups."

But the headline on Goulden's story, consistent with its "lead", is "Ruby Posed as TV Cameraman's Helper to Get at Oswald." This gave the FBI a perfect opening for the use of one of its lesser-known but highly developed skills, obfuscation. So anxious was the FBI to lay

to rest these rumors, that the man it said killed the President was one of its own, that it waited until the minth day after appearance of Goulden's story to question him. And so penetratingly did they plan to interrogate him that they did it - by telephone!

This was neither the first nor the last time the FBI used the phone to svoid emberrassing confrontation with uncongenial evidence, especially about Oswald's official connections. It was done extensively in New Orleans, to avoid direct contact with those who had knowledge of the assessinated assassin's CIA connections.

In still another of those Commission files, this one No. 391, there is the December 16, 1963, report of Philadelphia Special Agent John R. Wineberg's interview with Gouldon. It is from the FBI's Philadelphia File 44-767.

It may help the reader's understanding to know that there was no need for this scattering of these reports on a single subject through so many different Commission files. Many of the more than 1500 m mbered ones are greater than book-length. All these larger files contain reports of different dates on varied subjects from different sources. Some are so large that, in binding, one file becomes three volumes. However, the Wineberg reporting is the only thing in

Commission File 391.

Its single paragraph tells the entire story:

JOSEPH GOULDEN, Reporter, "Philadelphia Inquirer," telephonically advised that he had contacted the unidentified
law enforcement officer in Dellas, Texas, over the week end
by telephone, who had previously told GOULDEN in Dellas that
JACK LEON RUBY had gained entrance to the besement of the
Dellas Police Department by posing as a TV cameraman's helper
on the day that LEE HARVEY OSWALD was shot and who had also
told him that LEE HARVEY OSWALD at one time had been contacted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to become an
informant. GOULDEN declined to identify the law enforcement

to low

officer after having talked to him on the telephone. He did say, however, that the officer told him that the matter was being "handled through proper channels." GOULDEN said he did not question the officer further as to what these channels were.

Thus, in its pretended investigation of reports that Osweld had been its man, the FBI, in this report, almost escapes mention of it, glossing it over in a clause. But this meager report served a purpose: to fall back upon, if later asked, to support the opinion that "there is nothing to it." The FBI could then say it had interviewed Goulden, who had nothing of value.

But, as with Hudkins, the FBI had to go back to Goulden, again not until after the same crisis, not until February 12. Wineberg's= report is in yet another Commission file, No. 463. Consistently, there is nothing else in that file, either. In this case, the FBI Philadelphia Field Office file number is also different, 105-9958. The Headquarters file, in Washington, is 105-3255. The scent, two-paragraph report/required a paragraph of synopsis, each on separate pages.

This is neither as pointless nor as foolish as it seems for the syr opsis, intended to save the time of busy officials, succeeds in conveying three deceptions:

HUDKINS in Philadelphia covering National Council of Churches Convention early 12/63, which was before GOULDEN wert to Dellas to write assassination story. GOULDEN aware of essassination matter only from what he learned in Philadelphia from news media and recalls no conversation with HULKINS in Philadelphia in which GOULDEN said OSWALD was FBI informant.

Now, it happens that Hudkins and Goulden were old friends, having both, earlier, covered the Dallas courthouse when Goulden worked there. They remained friends, and when Hudkins was in Philahia, on a day easily established and entirely unreported, as wines put it, "HUDKINS was at the GOULDEN residence for dinner evening."

That "Up to this time, GOULDEN had no direct, first-hand knowledge of the assassination and was aware of the assassination only from news media in Philadelphia" is so irrelevant to what Goulden wrote and was published December 8 it amounts to a deliberate misrepresentation, a conscious effort to deceive those who might read Wineberg's report.

The second, shorter paragraph is worth repeating in full:

HUDKINS had covered the assessination story in Dallas for his paper, the "Houston Post," and they did discuss the assination. GOULDEN said he did not recall that they discussed the possibility of OSWALD's having been an informant of the FBI; however, they did discuss many phases of the case. He also pointed out that anything he (GOULDEN) might have said about the matter would have been based on what he heard or read in Philadelphia.

One possible, and I think intended, interpretation of the second sentence is to cest doubt on Hudkins' dependability, for had he not failed to tell his good friend of this big story? And who in the FBI was going to ask the Secret Service about its later Hudkins report. Had the Warren Commission had any sincere interest in getting at the truth, it would not have been easy. These Hudkins reports were all in different files - each in a different file - and there are yet others.

The concluding sentence seems pretty clearly designed to convey the not kon that, regardless of what he had written, Goulden "had no direct, first-hand knowledge" and "that anything he (GOULDEN) might have said about the matter would have been based on what he had heard or read in Philadelphia."

The FBI was careful to avoid embarrassment either to itself or to the Commission. It went out of its way not to provide copies of the Huckins or Goulden reporting on Oswald as its "subversive" informant. When, after diligent personal search in the Archives, I

could find no copies there, I wrote the Archivist that the copies of "these reports, as supplied me, have no copies of the pertinent stories writter by these reporters. If they are in the files, I would like copies." For six years I have maintained a deposit account at the National Archives. I pay the cost of all such requests in advance. The Xeroxing, in fact, was at a rate three to four times greater than those prevailing commercially. And, no copy of either story was provided.

Thus, any Commission official reading this Wineberg report or its surmary would not readily understand that the "investigation" was supposed to be about whether Oswald had been an FBI informant.

In this same letter to the Archivist, I asked for a page from still another file, No. 385. It had not been supplied me. There are five that are relevant, pages 104-108. No doubt by seeident, 106 had been omitted.

That page is another deception that cannot be accidental. It is a summary report dealing with what a secondhand source is alleged to have said so elliptically and indefinitely that the actual source of what is attributed to Hudkins cannot be identified from it. The story is too simple, too well-known to have been balled up by accident.

Hudkins had spoken by telephone to Mrs. Ruth Paine, with whom the Unity of the Paine home in subthe Ostalds lived near Dallas, Lee returning to the Paine home in suburbab rving on weekends. They made an appointment for Hudkins to
visit her later in the day. During the conversation, Hudkins had mentioned that Marguerite Oswald, Lee's mother, a practical nurse, had
told a "socially prominent" woman for whom she had worked that "her
son was doing important anti-subversive work." These are the words of
FBI Dallas Agent Ivan D. Lee to whom Mrs. Paine had spoken when she

"telephonically advised that she had just talked with" Hudkins by phone. This was, according to Lee's report, FBI Dalass File DL 100-10461 (page 104), on Demember 28. Lee did not bother dictating his exhausting 1001ine report until December 31. It was not typed until January 3, 1964, such was the interest of the FBI.

The "socially prominent" woman was located without difficulty (page 107). She is Mrs. Lowell N. Rosenthal. The summery report of this interview, bearing the initials of one of the agents in charge of correlating the Dallas investigation, Robert P. Gemberling, also only 10 lines long, says that the December 29 interview with Mrs. Rosenthal had "previously been reported". This paraphrase of what that report says is:

In this interview Mrs. ROSENTHAL stated that from conversetion with Mrs. MARGUERITE OSWALD that her son who was in Russia was working for the U. S. Government in Russia ... (sic)

There was nothing new in this. Mrs. Oswald had so charged directly to the government before her son's repatriation. She had repeated it on every possible occasion. Time after time, when she was later to say it on radio and TV shows, the FBI got tapes of them, clandes timely, and they were thereafter suppressed by the National Archives on direct order of the FBI. Only the existence of an entirely inadequate summary of the Commission's numbered files disclosed that what the FBI was suppressing was public - had been aired on radio and TV! This was contrary to the expressed desire of Commission Chairman warren and then-Attorney General Robert Kennedy, both of whom desired everything possible be made available for research. They had so directed.

But nobody directs Hoover, who refused to talk to his theoretical boss, the Attorney General, beginning not long after the Attorney

General's brother was assessinated.

On December 29, the day after Hudkins visited Mrs. Paine, the FBI sent Agent Kenneth C. Howe to see her. His report (page 105) quotes her as having "furnished the following information concerning this contect by HUDKINS":

HUDKINS referred to an article which he stated had appeared in the New York Times, either December 26 or 27, 193, which article conjectimed that LEE HARVEY OSWALD probably made a deal with the U. S. Government to work in its behalf in anti-subversive endeavors in return for being granted permission to return to the United States. She stated that the article reportedly goes on to bring out that OS VALD probably was not being watched any more closely than he was by the FBI because OSWALD was working for or on behalf of the government.

After a third paragraph dealing with what Hudkins had quite correctly attributed to Mrs. Rosenthal, Howe wrote,

Mrs. PAINE stated that HUDKINS' primary purpose of (sic) seeing her was in an effort to get some confirmation, if possible, of the possibility OSWALD was actually working on behalf of the U.S. Government prior to the assessination.

This, Mrs. Paine said, she could not confirm.

An entirely different version is given by one of the agents most directly involved, the FBI's Dallas "Osuald expert", James P. Hosty, Jr. He and Agent Berdwell D. Odum interviewed Mrs. Paine January 3, 1964. Their report (page 108) is short, having but nine: lines. The first paragraph reads:

Mrs. RUTH PAINE, 2515 West 5th Street, advised that LOUNIE HUDKINS of the Houston Post Newspaper, in his contact with her on Saturday, December 28, 1963, had stated that the FBI was foolish to deny that Agent JOSEPH HOSTI (reference to SA JAMES P. HOSTY, JR.) had tried to develop LEI HARVEY OSWALD as an informant. Mrs. PAINE stated she made no comment one way or the other to HUDKINS regarding this remark.

And this, not the Howe fiction, is the nitty-gritty: Did Hosty by to "develop" Osweld "as an informant"?

to this paragraph is appended a single sentence that cannot be true

irs. PAINE stated that she knew that SA HOSTY had not interviewed LEE HARVEY OSWALD.

irs. Paine had no way of knowing, one way or the other, whether or not losty had interviewed Oswald. Nor is it merely a question of "interviewing". There is the question of pressuring. Further deception is served in what Hosty omits, that he had interviewed both Mrs. Paine and Marina Oswald before the assassination and, what was carefully hidden, had leaned on Oswald further by making defamatory remarks about his wife in the form of questions to Irving neighbors.

based on these pre-assassination interviews, not all of which are acknowledged in the Warren Report, if Mrs. Paine had been disposed to make a guess about whether or not Hosty had interviewed Oswald, she could not have avoided the possibility Hosty had, for she, personally, had told Hosty how to find Oswald at work.

What better reason for Hosty to quote her as saying "that she knew that SA HOSTY had not interviewed LEE HARVEY OSWALD"?

with the passing of a reasonable amount of time, and without public announcement, Hoover disciplined Hosty and reassigned him to the Karsas City office. Whether the disciplining was for some unspecified transgression or for failing in his mission can only be conjectured; but if it is the former, everyone in the FBI who could do so went out of his way to say the opposite before the Warran Commission.

The effort to make little of varied and needlessly confused accounts of the numerous reports of Oswald as an FBI and/or CIA

inform nt, so complete that not even copies of the published newspaper accounts remain, if they ever were, in the Commission's files (and no single report says a single clipping is attached), was not a disappointment to the Commission. None of the foregoing - and much more - was hidden from it or its staff. This is not conjecture.

Among the hundreds from whom the Commission took testimony, neither Hudkins nor Sweatt nor Goulden nor the author of the New York

Times story was included. The original Dallas source of the story
that O wald had been an FBI informant was not Sweatt but Bill Alexander,
the sort of wild-west assistant district attorney, a rough-looking
and reputedly rough-acting character. Therefore, the Commission also
elected not to take testimony from Alexander (who also had other interesting Involvements tending to link him with Oswald, also ignored
by the Commission).

How better pursue the truth without fear or diversion, diligently and persistently, wherever it led; what better way of learning whether or not the accused Presidential assassin was or was being recruited to be an FBI informant than by refusing to take testimony from a single one of the sources of published reports that he was?

Here, in the context of their busy lives and other public commitments, it is possible to make a kind of defense of the members of the Commission as distinguished from its staff. This is not to say they are innocent, nor is it to say that these men, all with long career: in government, were not thoroughly familiar with the workings of any bureaucracy, especially one with motives of self-interest and self-preservation. They should have known better. One, much later, confessed to me his belief that "we were never told all about Oswald and his connections."

In the context of their many other pressing preoccupations, it is possible to suggest that the members, particularly on this aspect of the investigation, were the creatures of their staff, were boxed in, had their decisions pre-determined for them. They were somewhat like ringed and chained bulls who, should they dare to run, tread on the chain dangling from a steel ring affixed to the soft tissue between the nostrils. One step on any part of that chain and the pain in the nose is excruciating. The bull pulls up short, stops, then welks slowly, if at all.

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The Commission held a number of what are called "executive sessions". These are not uncommon with committees of Congress, commissions and similar bodies. It is a polite way of saying secret sessions. Aside from the members of the Commission, the court reporter and General Counsel J. Lee Rankin, they were alone. Rankin, also a Republican, had been Schicitor General of the United States, the government's lawyer, part of the Department of Justice, where he made and preserved many lesting friendships. Until both realized it was indelicate, his early and suppressed Commission correspondence with Jr. Edgar Hoover began with the salutation, "Dear Edgar".

During one of these sessions, on Monday, February 24, 1964, Chairman Warren, reflecting the lingering concern over whether or not the reports that Oswald had been "an undercover agent for the FBI", raised the question again. What follows is an unedited, verbatim reproduction from pages 1598 and 1599 of the official, TOF SECRET, transcript:

The Chairman. The next item on the agenda is status report on allegation that Lee Harvey Oswald was an undercover agent for the Federal Bureau of Investigation or other Federal investigative agency. Mr. Rankin?

Mr. Rankin. We have enclosed as part of your exhibits here

here what we have in regard to the various affidavits of agents, Mr. Hoover personally, and the interviews that were had with the various Dallas officials and newspaper reporters. We checked out Mr. Hudgkins, as you will recall, who sent me the source of the rumor, and we checked out all other sources, and the reports are here, and they all show negative. There wasn't any disclosure by Mr. Hudgkins. He said he had such information, but he refused to disclose his source, and he did not include that he had anything more than the number that he said and the claim that there was such a relationship. That is all here in these reports.

Rankin, who was to become New York City's law officer as its corporation counsel, did not tell the truth. As the reports already cited show beyond any question, Hudkins not only never "refused to disclose his source," but he made it explicit. Further, federal investigators had traced the information from Swestt to Assistant D. A. Bill Alexander. The sole purpose served by this blatent lie was to persuade the Commissioners that there was no substance to the reports. As the reader has seen by now, it is anything but true that "we have checked out all the sources, and the reports are here, and they all show negative."

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If those, especially of the major media and the eastern intellectual community, particularly those "liberals" who blindly say, in effect, that Earl Warren could make no mistake, forgetting that Jesus trusted Judas, had instead assessed the <u>available</u> evidence alone, they would have known that certainly someone had done wrong. But by their blind, unthinking, irrational and entirely unsupported assault on those who raised questions about the integrity and motives of the official investigation and its conclusions, they may well have made impossible any legitimate defense of the members of the Commission. This one excerpt might open some closed eyes.

This is but the beginning of the story, the tiny particle that can be pieced together from a single aspect of what the Commission