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LIT. EVANS

Min. Rusin er. Sullian

ir. Lee Kankin called from New York to check in with me on the matter of the Coumission. He wasted to work out an arrangement with the which he thought might be satisfactory. He said be understood ris. Beliacot nepolos the investigation. Belyon in Charge of

infestigation I told hir. Renkin that hir. Delmont, hir. Rosen and I handled the preparation of the report and will bandle additional leads as they come in.

tir. Earlin asked how he should harkly engihing that comes up, things the Commission will want developed further, in regard to the FEI whether they should be handled directly with me or somebody I would designate.

I replied that I will designate concons. I explained that I sent Mr. Malley down to Dallas to handle all of our angles downatione; that he was on the ground there; and that I think he probably would be the man who would be more familiar with things Wir. Hankin should further en lore. I stated Mr. Mulley is in Dallaz at the present time but will be erdered back tomorrow; that he will be available; and that we will be glad to run out any editional matters ho may want. 1 44-24016-5

I adviced Mr. Sankin of the difficulty RECORDED about the recordment's decire to issue certain conclusions 18 191327 within to lesuo a statement before the report went to the Commission reaching conclusions. Defald was the necessin, no foreign or subversive the product, and subenstein and Oswald had no connection; that I flully disagreed; they took 50 DED 191963 (2016)

Memorandum for Mesors. Tolson, Belmont, Mohr. December

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it ab with the White House and the Fresident agreed with me that we should reach no conclusion; nevertheless the report does reach two conclusions in substance.

I said I personally believe Cavald was the assacsin; that the second aspect as to whether he was the only man gives me great concern; that we have several letters, not in the report because we were not able to prove it, written to him from Cuba referring to the job he was going to do, his good marksmanship, and stating when it was all over he would be brought back to Cuba and presented to the chief; that we do not know if the chief was operation in Cuba; that I did not put this in the report because we did not have proof of it and didn't want to put speculation in the report; that this was the reason I urged strongly that we not reach conclusion Cawald was the only man.

As to Rubenstein, I said I did not want a statement about Rubenstein and Cswald; that we have no proof they were ever together. I stated Rubenstein is a shady character from the hoodlum element of Chicago, has a poor background, runs a nightclub in Dallas, and is what would be called a police buff; that the police officers in that precinct have been able to get food and liquor from him at any time they drop in; that while I think there was no connection between him and Oswald, I did not want the report

Fourth, I stated I did not believe any conclusions concerning Rubonstein should be reached at this time because he has not been tried; that was why I suggested to the Attorney Ceneral of Texas - and understeed the Chief Justice did too - that his court of special inquiry be held in abeyance until after the Commission makes its findings. I said I thought they would should name merely the facts we have established.

want to have run out further; that there may be letters written to members of the Commission; that we have letters from people who chief to have seen Oswald; that up to the time we submitted the report we had cleared up all that the informer recented and blow that angle out of the window; that some of thing may be popping up all the time. I advised hir. Rankin if he wanted any leads followed out or any implementation of what we have already done we will give him 100% cooperation.

establish liaison; that he does not want to bother me until property

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ertablishing it as a matter I should know. I told him not to hesitate to call mot that I will designate hir. Malley and he will advice me at once of anything. hir. Rankin then said he would get in touch with me if he thinks there is anything which should be taken up on that level.

I mentioned to him the actions of the Soviet Embassy, the Communist Party in New York, and John Abt in making available to us their information on Oswald.

I also discussed the operations of the Dailas Police Department in the case which led to the murder of Capald.

I told Mr. Rankin the Department held the report about five days and then began to look items from the Department on it, items such as the shooting of General Walker, things not known in Delias; that I kept pressing them to get the report to the Commission; that a debate was going on between the Department and me; that I did not want any conclusion drawn but I thought a conclusion had been made in the letter of transmission to the Commission; that there would have been no purpose in appointing a Presidential Commission except to evaluate the facts; that It was the duty of the FBI to get the facts and let the Commission reach a conclusion.

I told Mr. Rankin we would want to do anything we can here to make his job casier. He said he has always had complete confidence in that and in me.

that the films would be preserved and available for the Commission. I answered that we have them ourselves; that we have films taken by private individuals; that the President was not being covered by a car with television people as they do here in Washington; that there was not a prefessional photographer where this took place; that the Secret Service car immediately in back had already passed the building, which was at an angle, with the result they couldn't tell where the shots were coming from. I mentioned the comment by fermer Chief of Secret Bervice Baughman that he could not understand why the Secret Bervice men did not open fire with machine guns at the window. I said the Secret Bervice men did not see where the shots came Ifon and would have killed a lot of innocent people if they had done

In connection with stories indicating Oswald could not have done this alone, I stated he was a marksman and it wasn't anything he





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could not do; that we have tested it on our rifle range and were able to get shots off even faster than he did; that there is no question in my mind about it; that we also found the fingerprints and the bullets so conclusively fired from the gun; that we have all this and we have all the photographs.

Mr. Rankin inquired if we also have the television film run off of the shooting of Oswald, and I told him we have this.

Mr. Pankin said Mr. Malone delivered to him a copy of the report and also effered to help in any way possible; this was very kind of Minlone; but he will not deal with Minlone in anything unless it is some emergency and he has to handle it locally. I told hir. Rankin this was all right and if he should need to call upon Malone, Malone would be available.

I also told Mr. Rankin there is a direct wire between the New York Citics and here; that he can always place any calls to here over our wire; and that I will arrange for this.

I told Mr. Rankin to let us know if there is anything we can do.

Very truly gours,

John Edgar Hoover Director

> SENT FROM D. O. TIME 10:45 PM DATE 12-13-63