

~~#2~~ ~~#1~~ ~~CD-1~~

per Katz memo

Katzenbach's second numbered paragraph reads like a serious proposal but in fact, it is among other things, both improper and propaganda:

~~Katzenbach~~ Folder B

Foley
Katz
memo
#2

2. Speculation about Oswald's motivation ought to be cut off, and we should have some basis for rebutting thought that this was a Communist conspiracy or (as the Iron Curtain press is saying) a right-wing conspiracy to blame it on the Communists. Unfortunately the facts on Oswald seen about too pat - too obvious (Marxist, Cuba, Russian wife, etc.). The Dallas police have put out statements on the Communist conspiracy theory, and it was they who were in charge, when he was shot and thus silenced.

In a real investigation, particularly of a crime of this unprecedented magnitude, nothing that has any reason to it can safely be ignored. That there may have been a conspiracy in particular. Not only is this true as a general statement of the correct approach. On the basis of the relatively little that then was known. there was ample reason to believe that there was such a conspiracy. There certainly has not been any investigation in less than two weekend days that could justify what the memo says and in fact, there never was any investigation to determine whether there had been a conspiracy. Or who the assassins were.

As Johnson should have known.

As the actual official evidence later left without doubt, there had been a conspiracy.

If that evidence had not been withheld from the people, the propaganda part of this memo could not have become, in effect, national policy. It was the official government statement that, if the government had had to, it could not defend, leave alone validate.

Nothing true or proven in it, not even after the great magnitude of paper supposedly on it, was available.

The memo's last proposal, it's next to the last paragraph, did become the reality, despite Johnson's initial opposition to it and J. Edgar Hoover never-ended opposition to it:

The only other step would be the appointment of a Presidential Commission of unimpeachable personnel to review and examine the evidence and announce its conclusions. This has both advantages and disadvantages. I think it can await publication of the FBI report and public reaction to it here and abroad.

Improving
Katz really
thought the
CD-1 was
#2

See McNaughton
thought an CD-1


Director
Hoover
desperately

Despite this immediate and strong Presidential opposition to such a commission and Hoover's unending opposition, each for his own and not identical reasons, on the seventh day after the assassination Johnson created that commission and named its members.

(I think this is important enough for both the typed and the handwritten copies to be included at the end of Chapter 9, in facsimile. But in the event there may come other interests with no such desire, I include the Department of Justice identification of that copy as Willens' and the dates that show that he kept it out of the files for a year and a half. He got it before he went to the Commission, before the Commission existed. So, aside from any special instructions Katzenbach may have given him, this spelled out for him what became his national policy.

Notes
↓

See Attached files on Willens



File
HPW

There is no mention of any investigation in the memo. Not even a mention of the FBI except in terms of the Report it was to make and would be made public, to quiet rumors and resolve discrepancies.

In fact it was first made public by the Archives as part of the Commission's papers, until at least a year after the Report was out. I first saw it at the archives in the first half of 1966.

Once public, it "quieted" no rumors and resolved no "discrepancies." It was the cause of more of both because it was, as a government statement, a farce, a ludicrous self-defeating spectacular failure.

In his first numbered paragraph, Katzenbach actually says that the investigation is over because, he says, they then had enough "evidence" that Oswald "would have been convicted at trial."

His memo also states there was not any conspiracy.

And that Oswald was alone had no "confederates."

So, what was there to investigate? Nothing, really.

With this and more like it that memo sought to close the whole thing down.

The only thing that he really left was persuading people that they "must be satisfied that "Oswald was the assassin." And that there was no conspiracy. In this he is talking about propaganda. Not about any real investigation. Or, he is closing off any investigation, saying that no real investigation is needed.

What we had when his proposal resulted in the creation of what came to be known as the Warren Commission is what he spent most time on in his memo, propaganda.

Nobody in the government would read this and not believe that there had been an investigation, the fruit of which would have convicted Oswald if he had lived to be tried.

And if Katzenbach and any others for whom he spoke did not mean that he would not have said it.

However, people high up in the government should have known that this could not be so, that in the few hours since the President was assassinated nothing like a real investigation could have been conducted and have yielded what Katzenbach said it had. (As, it should be repeated, it never did.)

It was obviously more certain that the FBI did not have anything like a case it would dare to take to court, leave alone get a conviction.

Yet when that FBI report, which it leaked with enough effectiveness that nobody dared challenge it, was available within the government, anyone who read it knew immediately that the FBI had nothing at all. That report, which earlier we referred to it as it is filed in the Commission's record as CD1, is so shallow, so superficial, it does not even mention the cause of death and in its skimpy references to the crime itself, less than two sentences in five volumes, it does not even mention all the shooting!

No sophisticated person, especially not any lawyer, not anyone suitable for a high government post, could believe that the FBI had anything real at all to take to court in any prosecution of Oswald.

It is not a report on a case to go to court, to trial. It is no more than a diatribe against Oswald.

An aside that indicates the reality of being in government and not fawning over the FBI when it demands that is what happened to the one man in government who said that inadequate report was

CD-1
5 vols

inadequate. He was a lawyer and the general counsel of the Defense Department, John McMaughton. The FBI denounced him and referred to him as one refers to an enemy. (My separate file on that was also stolen but in its denunciation of him the FBI pretended that its report was the best thing ever. Even if it did not, in five volumes, account for all the shooting that was reported in all the media and even if it did not give the cause of death!

Others in the government aware that a reaction like that could be expected if that meaningless "report" were not praised, avoided denunciation and a future of being regarded as an enemy of the FBI.

Page 141 of original manuscript is missing here.

and they permeate every FBI record from that file, at headquarters and at the field offices. In not a single one that I have seen, and I've seen an enormous volume of them, particularly from headquarters, Dallas and New Orleans, all of which sued I for and supposedly got, I do not recall a single piece of paper that reflects any investigation of the crime itself. They all seek to make a case against Oswald and, except as propaganda, they all failed.

There was a large propaganda part of that operation to make Oswald look bad but it did not make out a case that could be taken as a case of his guilt, dared be taken to court.

In that disclosed transcript of the Johnson phone call to Senator Russell, the most conservative Member of the Warren Commission, when Russell said he did not agree with Specter's single-bullet impossibility, he was actually saying, as he did in a separate talking memo he presented that same day, at the September 18 executive session at which he was double-crossed, that he believed there was a conspiracy, as without that Specter manufacture the conclusion would have been that there had to have been.

Johnson's concern is reflected by the trouble he went to track Russell down. Russell's concern is clear in what he says and in the fact that as soon as that executive session was over he fled Washington, not even taking his emphysema medicine or even a shirt or toothbrush.

FC CD-1

But this conspiracy, which the conspirators probably did not regard it as what it was, began with the agreement that meant the crime would not and could not be investigated.

I obtained and I examined a great mass of FBI records relating to the assassination. I do not recall a single reference to making a real investigation. It began with the preconception of Oswald's lone guilt, as we have seen.

Some of these facts may be hard for most people to believe, but very few people have examined the enormous mass of relevant government records that I have and have examined but it is without any real question that Oswald was not the assassin and that there was a conspiracy the end result of which was to make it seem that there had been no conspiracy when without question there had been, and that Oswald was not part of it.

Specter kept it all from coming apart

Keeping the Commission proceedings secret when, had there been a trial, there could have been no secrecy, made the massive government propaganda campaign possible and it succeeded at least initially. And that is what counted.

People could not and did not believe that their government could lie to them on anything as important as the sanctity of their society, which a coup d'etat does destroy, as also does anything that made it possible and the government's untruthfulness about it.

The government put in power by a coup d'etat.

The success of that propaganda campaign at first got the Warren Report initially accepted. Which got the new government off the hook.

The media seems to have feared government retaliation if it did not agree with the Report when in fact that Report does not survive a careful reading, without any of the withheld secret records. Which it doesn't as we see in this book and as we saw in a few earlier books.

When in 1992 CBS-TV made a big deal of the Gerald Posner assassination fiction, *Case Closed*, which it was not, and was helped by the CIA, a CBS poll disclosed that even after all the propaganda of years and that big propaganda deal in particular, nine out of ten Americans did not believe the official

DT. to consider
How quick
FBI
dropped
the
will
4/23
point
up a
summary of
FBI's
records

file CD-1
C. W. ...

But what is significant is what Warren said and Willens omits. Instead he uses general language that does not include what Willens went out of his way to omit yet he could, if questioned about this later, say it was included in his general language.

Which nobody in the world would have known in reading this Willens version of what he and his sponsors did not want known, believed or recorded.

There was another version of that session. It is published on the facing page in *Whitewash IV*. Staff counsel Melvin Eisenberg included in the title of his memo that it was the first such conference and that it was with Warren is in his first sentence. He included in his text what neither Willens nor those who sent him to the Commission wanted known or believed.

MEMORANDUM
TO: Files
FROM: Melvin A. Eisenberg
SUBJECT: First Staff Conference (January 20, 1964)

check for my source

February 17, 1964

On January 20, 1964, Chief Justice Warren met with the staff. After brief introductions, the Chief Justice discussed the circumstances under which he had accepted the chairmanship of the Commission.

When the position had first been offered to him he declined it, on the principle that Supreme Court Justices should not take this kind of role. His associate justices concurred in this decision. At this point, however, President Johnson called him. The President stated that rumors of the most exaggerated kind were circulating in this country and overseas. Some rumors went as far as attributing the assassination to a faction within the Government wishing to see the Presidency assumed by President Johnson. Others, if not quenched, could conceivably lead the country into a war that could cost 40 million lives. No one could refuse to do something that might help to prevent such a possibility. The President convinced him that this was an occasion on which actual conditions had to override general principles.

The Chief Justice then discussed the role of the Commission. He placed emphasis on the importance of quenching rumors, and precluding future speculation such as that which has surrounded the death of Lincoln. He emphasized that the Commission had to determine the truth, whatever that might be.

Aside from the other "rumors" which have their own significance, what the new President; feared, "if not quenched could conceivably lead the country into a war which could cost 40 million lives."

Willens leaves this out.