

“Honorable Men,” Chpt. 6 “Impossible to Believe”

p. 76 goes into the FBI’s exaltation re: the FBI’s discovery of Oswald’s pubic hairs on his blanket found in Paine’s garage. . .the FBI found Oswald’s hairs on this blanket. . .

Mindlessness of the press. He cites on p. 78 some examples. The AP reported on Sept. 18, 1964 that both LBJ and Russell did not agree with the single-bullet theory. . .w/no indication of what that meant in fact. . .That the President and WC member Russell were agreeing that the ultimate political solution to the official account of the JFK assassination was impossible. . .that the single-bullet theory was a nonsequiterThat two members of the same commission disagreed with the conclusions of that committee that should have made the news. . .The AP did report on September 18, 1964, without mentioning the significance of the fact that both LBJ and Russell disagreed with the s/b argument. That neither agreed with that theory was not treated as news that should have made major headlines. (p.78). The only significance of this story at it appeared in the April 16, 1964, “if the same bullet could not have wounded both men, there had to have been a second bullet---therefore a second gunmen, according to those who believe in a conspiracy.” The vitiation of the press on this most important issue of the 20th Century [my words.] There is a little more on point but I did not cite. . . Might be worth to review. . .

Hal notes that the staff produced the Report. . . pp. 82

Circle Lone Man

Of all of *The New York Times* whose proud boast long has been that it publishes "all the news fit to print" published, uncritically, this AP language:

Many people who see a conspiracy contend that if the same bullet could not have wounded both men, there had to have been a second bullet, and therefore a second gunman.

The Warren Commission said Lee Harvey Oswald was the lone gunman.

All the media have, for years, sought to put down all critics of what I regard as the official assassination mythology as conspiracy theorists. But it is not only those "many people who see a conspiracy" who hold this belief. It is the need of the official theory that one bullet inflicted all seven non-fatal injuries on both men.

That is the absolute requirement of the lone-assassin theory of the official "solution" itself.

The official evidence, with no question at all possible, says that if that one so magical bullet did not inflict all those seven non-fatal injuries on both victims, there was a conspiracy to kill JFK. When nobody could duplicate that three-shot-only William Tell performance attributed to Oswald within the time permitted, there certainly was no question about the impossibility of his firing four shots in that time.

The significance of the date of Russell's call to Johnson, September 18, is that he reported to Johnson that he had just demurred from the single-bullet theory and that his refusal to agree was being expressed in the Report to be issued the next week. Russell then did not know it had been memory-holed even before he read his statement of disagreement to his fellow commissioners.

Likewise unreported is the fact that also is beyond question, in addition to the Commission Member who did not and would not ever agree with this, its most basic conclusion, the President of the United States also did not agree with it. That is to say that the President was saying, along with Russell, that there had been a conspiracy.

President himself did not agree w/ 9/18 - lone gunman theory of the official Report. His disagreement meant we supported theory of 2 bullets

(over)

all of this seemed to be dismissed - ludicrous not at all

Melvin Eisenberg wrote a series of memos on the effort to determine when each of the three admitted shots are seen to hit one of the victims are shown in the Abraham Zapruder and Orville Nix films. His April 23, 1964 memo commences reporting that this effort was "over the last several months." In it he names those present when the effort was limited to the fatal shot. Copies of this memo, as of the others, were given to Rankin, Willens, Redlich, Ball, Belin, Specter and Eisenberg. Aside from other means of knowing, half of the assistant counsels plus the chief counsel got copies of these memos. Eisenberg's memos on these conferences of April 14 and 21 are largely word-for-word the same.

These two memos deal with the "impact of the first and second bullets." His memo of the next day is limited to the impact of the third bullet.

At all these conferences all those present agree that all three bullets did impact on the President and the Governor.

And at both these conferences the experts told the staff that the single-bullet contrivance was impossible.

There is nothing to indicate that this was conveyed to Russell, Cooper, Boggs or any other Member but the memos establish it as fact: the staff knew.

Those present at the April 14 conference are given by Eisenberg in his second paragraph as:

Present were: Commander James J. Humes, Director of Laboratories of the Naval Medical School, Bethesda, Maryland; Commander J. Thornton Boswell, Chief Pathologist, Naval Medical School, Bethesda; Lt. Col. Pierre A. Finck, Chief of Wound Ballistics Pathology Branch, Armed Forces Institute of Pathology; Dr. F. W. Light, Jr. Deputy Chief of the Biophysics Division at Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland, and Chief of the Wound Assessment Branch of the Biophysics Division; Dr. Olivier, Chief of the Wound Ballistics Branch of the Biophysics Division at Edgewood Arsenal; Mssrs, Malley, Gauthier, Shaneyfelt, and two other unidentified agents of the FBI; Mssrs, Kelley and Howlett of the Secret Service; and Mssrs, Redlich, Specter, and Eisenberg of the Commission staff.

The assumption, contrary to the only actual evidence, is that the shots were all from the back, which is where it was conjectured Oswald was.

Without going into all the conjectures in the eight paragraphs identified by letters of the alphabet, two are quoted:

(e) The velocity of the first bullet would have been little diminished by its passage through the President. There fore, if Governor Connally was in the path of the bullet it would have struck him and (probably) caused the wounds he sustained in his chest cavity. Strong indications that this occurred are provided by the facts that (1) the bullet recovered from Governor Connally's stretcher does not appear to have penetrated a wrist and (2) if the first bullet did not hit Governor Connally, it should have ripped up the car, but apparently did not. Since the bullet recovered from the Governor's stretcher does not appear to have penetrated a wrist, if he was hit by this (the first) bullet, he was probably also hit by the second bullet.

It is assured that the "found" bullet came from the Connally stretcher but the man who found that bullet refused absolutely to testify to that. As I brought to light in *Whitewash* (pages 161-162, 171), hospital engineer Daryl Tomlinson actually testified that if he said that "I can't lay down and sloop at night."

There were "strong indications" that the "found" bullet "does not appear to have penetrated the wrist." This is repeated.

The assumption that if the bullet did not hit Connally it "should have ripped up the car" is based on the assumption contrary to the evidence, that it was fired from the back.

Eisenberg does not include the autopsy prosectors as present at the April 21 conference. He does include others not at the earlier conference:

Present were: Dr. F. W. Light, Jr. Deputy Chief of the Biophysics Division and Chief of the Wound Assessment Branch of the Biophysics Division at Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland; Dr. Olivier, Chief of the Wound Ballistics Branch of the Biophysics Division at Edgewood Arsenal; Dr. Joseph Dolce, Consultant to the Biophysics Division at Edgewood Arsenal; Dr. Charles F. Gregory and Dr. Robert Shaw of Parkland Hospital, Dallas, Texas; Mssrs, Gauthier, Shaneyfelt, and one other unidentified agents of the FBI; and Mssrs, Redlich, Specter, Belin and Eisenberg. Later in the proceedings, Governor and Mrs. Connally, Mr. Rankin and Mr. McCloy joined the conference.

With Dr. Dolce not present at the earlier conference, the consensus then, which Eisenberg repeated, was that Bullet 399 did not cause the wounds to Connally's wrist. This is how Eisenberg's second memo concludes:

In a discussion after the conference Drs. Light and Dolce expressed themselves as being strongly of the opinion that Connally had been hit by two different bullets, principally on the ground that the bullet recovered from Connally's stretcher could not have broken his radius without having suffered from more distortion. Dr. Olivier withheld a conclusion until he has had the opportunity to make tests on animal tissue and bone with the actual rifle.

Dolce was not asked to return to the Commission for any other conferences and he was not a Commission witness.

Dolce was so firm in his belief that, with the evidence going back to the Civil War era, any bullet striking the wrist that way would be deformed, Specter asked him to return to Aberdeen and do the tests Dolce said would confirm him.

Dolce did. The tests did confirm him. But all of that, that great danger to the deliberate fraud on which the Report is based, was avoided by not having Dolce return to the Commission.

These memos are not new. Although before then they were unknown. I published them in *Post Mortem* in 1975. Leading into them I also use an excerpt from, a memo by Belin of January 30. He also accounts for all the bullets, however, the shootings conjectured, hitting both men. As I explained this:

In determining the accuracy of Oswald, we have three major possibilities: Oswald was shooting at Connally and missed two of the three shots, the two misses striking Kennedy; Oswald was shooting at both Kennedy and Connally and all three shots struck their intended targets; Oswald was shooting only at Kennedy and the second bullet missed its intended target and hit Connally instead. [*Editor's note:* January 30, 1964, Belin Memo to General Counsel J. Lee Rankin]

Expediently, Belin ignored the "Missed" shot, of which everyone in government knew, for spray from it caused James T. Tague to bleed (WHITEWASH 158). It was

immediately reported by the police. However [as] he explained it, Belin had each shot hitting -- none missing. He used up three shots without accounting for all the shooting.

Of course, to the government Oswald was already the lone assassin. But with the second shot striking Connally alone, as this memo also has it, that was not possible. The only thing that later "changed" the facts, apparent to the Commission at the very beginning, was its need to account for the "missed" shot without acknowledging an additional shot. To admit a fourth shot was the same as acknowledging an additional assassin, which it would not do for that, in turn, was proof of a conspiracy to kill the President.

Almost three months later, on April 22, the Commission was still satisfied that each of the three shots struck a man. It was still ignoring the "missed" shot (*Post Mortem*, page 55).

This quotation from the Belin January memo is in accord with the later memos in having each of the three shots impact on one or both victims.

My quotations from Eisenberg follow in *Post Mortem*. I reproduce the entire Eisenberg memo quoting, Dolce in facsimile on Pages 503-4. I appended this note:

If the conference of April 14 was destructive of the case being fabricated against Oswald, the conference on April 21 was worse, as Eisenberg's memo reveals. See p. 56. Of course, it was nothing new that wound ballistics experts could not accept as fact that 399 had struck a wrist; it is common knowledge and experience that even jacketed bullets do not cause such substantial bone damage and suffer no distortion. All the expert testimony before the Commission was to this effect. But consider what this conference says of the Commission's investigation:

-- Dr. Dolce, who "was very strongly of the opinion" that 399 "could not have" caused the wrist wound was never called to testify before the Commission. The Report and the published evidence are silent about his strong dissent from this finding essential to the government's case;

-- Dr. Light, who agreed with Dr. Dolce, did testify before the Commission but was never asked why he felt 399 could not have wounded the wrist. In response to Specter's hypothetical question, Dr. Light indicated that the passage of a single bullet through the two victims was a possibility based on the circumstances outlined by Specter (e. g. that 399 was found on Connally's stretcher!). Specter even had the audacity to ask Light, "And what about that whole bullet (399) leads you to believe that the one bullet caused the President's neck wound and all of the wounds on Governor Connally?" Light's reply was polite but firm: "Nothing about that bullet. Mainly the position in which they were seated in the automobile." (5H95). Thus Dr. Light's expert opinion was kept carefully kept out of the record;

-- Dr. Olivier's tests, in anticipation of which he withheld an opinion at this conference, produced nothing but mangled, distorted bullets (CE's 853, 856, 857). Specter never asked Olivier if 399 could have done what the official theory demands and emerged in such perfect condition;

-- Nothing was done to investigate the suggestion of the wound ballistics experts that Connally might have been hit by 2 separate bullets, a possibility incompatible with the lone assassin finding. Particularly helpful in this area might have been the spectrographic and NAA tests so carefully kept out of the record.

This memo takes criticism of Specter's Commission work out of the realm of "Monday morning quarterbacking." Specter knew the fatal flaws in his theory at the very time he was trying to build a record in support of that theory; he knew what scientific tests had to be done, which experts had to be called. He ignored the flaws, ignored the tests and ignored the experts and devised a solution to the crime he had to know was impossible.

And can it be regarded as anything less than culpable that, with a record like this, especially a suppressed memo of a secret conference like this, the authors of the Report could write: "All the evidence indicated that the bullet found on the Governor's stretcher could have caused all his wounds"? (R95) (*Post Mortem*, page 504).

This comment was obvious and accurate in 1975 and it remains unrefuted, really undenied.

Even the FBI agreed with those Commission lawyers, and the Secret Service agreed with the FBI, as I next reported two decades ago:

These Commission staff and Secret Service conclusions, that all three bullets hit the two men, are amply supported by the investigations and conclusions by the FBI and the Secret Service. The very first Commission file, No. 1, is the FBI summary report of December 9, 1963, made by order of the President (see above; WHITEWASH 192-5). It says, ". . . three shots rang out. Two bullets struck President Kennedy, and one wounded Governor Connally".

The FBI amplified this report with another on January 13, 1964 (Commission File 107). If, as government defenders, including J. Edgar Hoover, argues the first report was written without benefit of the autopsy report (and there is no reason why it should have been), this can not be said of the second report, whose second paragraph contains reference to its findings. The FBI did not retract or withdrew what it said in the first report, that each of the three shots struck home.

Until the official position changed, the FBI's representation and reporting fact did not change. After the first shock wore off and it got to work, it prepared elaborate scale models of the entire area, with care and infinite accuracy. It then prepared, with customary FBI neatness and trim plastic binding, a booklet of explanation. This is File 258. It is not, you may be certain, in the Report or printed evidence, which carefully culled out all proofs of more than two impacting shots.

Section 12 begins on page 14. It is headed, "What was the [t]iming pattern of the assassin's target?" It could not be more explicit than it is in the first words of each of the first four subdivisions of this section:

- a. SHOT ONE hit the target from a distance of 167 feet . . .
- b. SHOT TWO hit the target from a distance of 262 feet . . .

c. SHOT THREE hit the target from a distance of 307 feet, measured downward along a 15-degree angle from the horizontal . . .

There are no ifs or buts here. The FBI, like the Secret Service, told the Commission that each of the three shots it says were fired hit the target. It placed the target at the time each shot was fired, with precision. It also specified the time that elapsed between each of the shots hitting the target. There is no reference here to the "missed" shot, no reference to it that can be read in. That shot was defined out of this listing by the FBI (WHITEWASH 156-60), which knew of it.

In short, well after the beginning of the investigation, at a time when simple error could not be claimed (and could either the FBI or the Secret Service be of such unequalled incompetence -- each separately and both together -- that they could make such "errors"?), the FBI told the Commission that each of the three shots hit one of the men.

There is no evasion, no qualification. No conditions are stipulated. This, like the others cited, is a direct, straightforward statement: The President and the Governor were hit by all three bullets said to have been fired.

The problem is not one of fact but of integrity. There never was any doubt of the missed bullet. That James Tague was injured by it and bled from the slight injury was immediately known to the police, who, also, immediately broadcast it (WHITEWASH 158). The Report acknowledges this (R116). The broadcast was by Patrolman L. L. Hill, who told the dispatcher, "I have one guy that was possibly hit by a ricochet from the bullet off the concrete." Even before this close-to-simultaneous police broadcast, Tague's wounding was known to Deputy Sheriff Eddy R. Walthers, who had gone to that area, several hundred feet from where the assassination was perpetrated -- because witnesses reported bullets striking in that area *Post Mortem*, 56-57)

This is only some of what was public published -- I published -- that proved their single-bullet invention to have been impossible long before those who invented it and foisted it off on the nation proclaimed their honorability. In their earlier version, "Truth was our only client."

Before those conferences reported by Eisenberg, the Commission had taken testimony that included this indispensability of their's if they were to support the conclusion with which they began, that Oswald was the lone assassin.

On March 16 the chief autopsy prosector considered it impossible and his two assistants then testified to their agreement with him. For example, he referred to it as "most unlikely" (2H375 and elsewhere) adding immediately that "a most valuable piece of evidence would be an X-ray of the chest of Governor Connally" (2H375).

As we see soon enough, the Commission had those X-rays and there was a reason for not showing them to the prosecutors.

The prosecutors also considered it "extremely unlikely" that Bullet 399 could have caused Connally's thigh wound (2H376). He and they also "can't conceive of where" the thigh and wrist fragments "could have come from this missile," Bullet 399, which he had in his hand.

Finck testified separately to the impossibility from the number of fragments in Connally's wrist alone (2H382).

In Dallas, Specter deposed Dr. Tom Shires, who was in charge of the Connally case.

Although he was the doctor in charge, he was kept away from the Commission in Washington. The reason is obvious. He testified that post-operative X-rays revealed that remaining in Connally's chest was still another fragment (6H111).

Precisely what Humes had testified would be "a most valuable piece of evidence," so it and Shires were kept out of Washington. (I brought this to light on page 174 of *Whitewash*, in 1965.)

Specter prepared letters to all of Connally's doctors for Rankin to sign, asking for the Connally's X-rays. Parkland hospital provided readings that gave the dimensions of the fragment and they, too, end that single-bullet monstrosity (*Post Mortem*, page 83).

Add that chest fragment to the known wrist fragment and then that one that remained in Connally's thigh and then what cannot be calculated, all the fragments washed out of Connally's wrist and their total weight certainly exceeded what is said to have been missing from that by bullets about two grains. A grain in weight is what at one time that was the weight of a grain of wheat. To make a single gram requires 15.432 grains. Or, it takes 480 grains to make an ounce (troy). It is very, very little. Of that a half grain is cut from the jacket as it is impelled through the barrel.

What makes all of this ever more suspicious is that at least all the staff at those conferences knew Dolce was to have been called in an all gunshot wounds to VIPs. But when the most VIP of all American

VIPs suffered gunshot wounds and Dolce could have been at Bethesda before the body was there, he was not called.

When Chip Selby interviewed him on video Dolce went into detail on the impossibility of that bullet having done the damage it did to Connally's wrist. Lengthy excerpts from that transcript are in *NEVER AGAIN!* (pages 291-306).

But its expert of experts was not good enough for the government when the President was assassinated by gunshot. However, that is another story, a cruel story not easy to dismiss or forget.

The point here is the staff, what it knew what it did, what it did not do and what it did and did not tell the Members. How "honorable" it was.

It is impossible to believe that if Russell or Cooper had had the information recalled above he would have agreed to any kind of compromise in his strong opposition to that fraud on which the entire Report is based.

It is impossible to believe that if Alfreda Scobey, the lawyer assigned to help Russell with his Commission work, had any glimmer of it that she would not have told him immediately.

It is impossible to believe that when Chip Selby was working in the Russell archive he could have missed any data or memos at all like these, not the Selby whose first documentary was on that fraud and was so good it won the CINE Golden Eagle award as the best documentary in history for that year.

It is impossible to believe that Professor of law Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., at the University of Georgia at Athens, where the Russell Archives is, who has written me praising my work and encouraging me to continue with it and who has written several articles for the local papers about Russell's determined refusal to agree to that fraud, could have missed any such memos in that archive.

It is a fact that more than half of those honorable men, those Commission counsels, knew of the impossibility of the fraud they perpetrated from these memos alone, and they are far from alone with such knowledge.

We come to function - two members of the
UC (Russell & Cooper) held to the same
belief & same meaning — ~~the~~ JFK was the
Victim of a Conspiracy