

Notes from Hal's Ex Sess

*[Handwritten signatures]*

p. 4 Fewer than 1/6 of all Commission hearings had more than one WC Member present.

April 30<sup>th</sup> mtg. The decision to publish in hardback. Break from the normal practice of publishing commission reports in paperback. The 26 volumes had to be ordered from the Government Printing Office only and at the price of \$76.00. A lot of money back in 1964.

p. 7 FBI leaking, Refers to 12/5 the first Commission ex sess. In temporary quarters at the Conference Room at the National Archives, , , , waiting for the General Services Administration to find it a permanent location.

*Chapter 4*

June 4<sup>th</sup> session deals with leaks. . . . These may have come from inside the WC itself or from the staff. P. 16 how to stop leaking if you want to; this leaking serve the WC's purposes. . . Hal thinks that this was a sham session written or rehearsed solely for the record. This leads into the whole matter of leaking from the Commission. Check and figure out how it benefited the WC prior to the release of the Report in September. Ford went through the sham of having the FBI clear him on any leaking charge. Charade per excellence.

Hal cites the whole trumped up thing in Commission File No. 3431. I may have this in the Ford file. He has a good summation on p. 17. No other WC members were interviewed by the FBI. How about the staff? I think they were questioned.

12/16 Rankin talking about need for an independent investigative staff since the FBI report was so skeletal. . . and McLoy's 12/5 comments about possible culpability of the agencies the WC was depending upon to do the evidentiary investigation---FBI, SS and CIA.

Rankin backs away because of expense. . . p.19/20 of ms. But Hal points out how the WC staff and additional staff members grew to the tune of 84 employees.

1/21 McCloy on the confusion about JFK's wounds. . . His suggestion to call in the WC shrink to help them with the wounds. . . The one thing the WC never did was to seek the services of a forensic pathologist. Make a larger point that this was true of the autopsy itself at Bethesda. . . Was this a matter of Rankin's penny-pinching concerns.

Hal's conclusion is that they would not dare call on experts and ruin their predetermined conclusions. He notes they never asked the right questions when they had the prosecutors on the stand. They never questioned Siebert & O'Neill whose report they contended was inconsistent with the FBI's CD 1 of the assassination. P. 20 ms.

Point here: All Ford's talk about Olney being too close to government did not apply apparently when it came to selecting the staff. Look at their government backgrounds. Especially Howard Willens. . . .