

EX SESS Book Files
BKF--1

John Casey
Hal's
Ex Sess

Establishing the Commission

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LBJ: nature of appointments; none were disciples of JFK.

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Of course Hoover did not investigate his own agency.

See pp. 148ff on possible need for independent investigators. Raised by Rankin and then dropped. This was the 12/16 session.

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EX SESS
bkf-1
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But opts for staying with fed. agencies (FBI) to save money. Hal points out that nevertheless the Commission staff grew like topsy. See pp. 149-150 for the numbers. Check appendix for the numbers of staffers. Total number was at least 84, but there are some names in Appendix without designations. So could have been larger.

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The Final Report concludes he was not but that was based on a non-investigation, or by asking the agencies to investigate themselves on this matter.

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EX SESS
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EX SESS
BKF-1 *Four*
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Make point that WC (Cooper's request) did not go ahead and call in Murray Kempton, Dudman, or Wicker.

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EX SESS 5
BKF-1
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Margaret Shannon piece in the Atlanta Journal & Constitution for November 20, 1966. Hal draws on this.

Hal discusses the phoned up transcript for the September 18th EX SESS.