

## Chapter Four

### Endnotes

B. J.  
New York  
1942  
Belmont  
also

1. Foreshadowed in earlier Commission executive sessions, this recognition was the dominating topic of the Warren Commission's 22 January 1964 executive session transcript, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland (hereafter cited as NARA.)
2. Warren Commission, 5 December 1963, executive session, NARA, 1-2, 35. Despite not having any independent classifying authority Rankin went ahead to classify Commission documents as "Top Secret." See Rosen to Belmont, 12/18/1963, FBI HQ JFK Assassination File, 62-109060-NR; James B. Rhodes, Archivist of the United States, comments to U.S. Representative and chairperson Bella Abzug colloquy with Rhodes in House of Representatives, Committee of Agriculture, Subcommittee on Government Information and Individual Rights, November 11, 1975. See also the Washington Post, 11/12/1975 for the story on these hearings and Rhodes' admission that Rankin overstepped his authority in classifying Commission documents as "Top Secret."
3. Kai Bird, The Chairman: John J. McCloy The Making of the American Establishment (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992).
4. Warren Commission, December 5, 1963, executive session transcript, NARA, 36-38; Bird, The Chairman, 549. Russell, on the other hand, suspected a foreign conspiracy.
5. Warren Commission, 5 December 1963, executive session transcript, NARA, 38, 41.
6. Gilbert C. Fite, Richard A. Russell, Jr., Senator From Georgia [Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991], 423; Warren Commission, 5 December 1963, executive session transcript, NARA, 36; LBJ call to Russell, 11/28/1963 (8:55 p.m.), LBJ phone transcripts, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas (hereafter cited as LBJ Library); the Washington Post, 11/12/1975, A-1 & A-4; Peter Grose, Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1994), 544-545.
7. Warren Commission, 5 December 1963, executive session transcript, NARA, 11; Katzenbach to the Chief Justice, 12/9/1963, a copy found in FBI Headquarters FBI Liaison with Commission File, 62-109090-15, 2 (hereafter cited as HQ).
8. Warren Commission, 16 December 1963, executive session transcript, NARA, 11, 42, and 43

9. Rosen to Belmont, 11/26/1963, HQ JFK Assassination File, 62-109060-426. For a detailed treatment of the Kennedy autopsy see Chapter 8.
10. Warren Commission, 16 December 1963, executive session transcript, NARA, 12; Francis X. O'Neill and James W. Sibert, FBI Report, 11/26/1963, JFK 4-1 File, National Archives, Washington D.C., 2-3 or SAC, Baltimore to Director and SAC, Dallas, 11/23/1963, HQ JFK Assassination File, 62-109060-459. A copy of the official autopsy report can be found in The Warren Commission Report: Report on the President's Commission on the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964, 538-543 (hereafter cited as WCR).
11. Warren Commission, 16 December 1963, executive session transcript, NARA, 33, 48-49, 54-55; Warren Commission, 21 January 1964, executive session transcript, NARA, 5, 20.
12. For more on McCloy and the Commission's suppression of the medical evidence see Chapter 8.
13. Warren Commission, 16 December 1963, executive session transcript, NARA, 43-44 and 48-49.
14. Warren Commission, 16 December 1963, executive session transcript, NARA, 51-52; Bird, The Chairman, 549; Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., memo for Honorable Robert Kennedy, 9 December 1963, Department of Justice, Criminal Division, 129-11 File. See Staughton Lynd and Jack Minnis, "Seeds of Doubt: Some Questions About the President's Assassination," The New Republic, December 21, 1963.
15. Warren Commission, 16 December 1963, executive session transcript, NARA, 35.
16. Edward Jay Epstein, Deception: The Invisible War Between the KGB and the CIA (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989), 14; Rosen to Belmont, 12/17/1963, HQ FBI Liaison with Commission File, 62-109090-20.
17. There are some grounds for suspecting that the FBI may have wiretapped Commission members. Historian Kenneth O'Reilly, whose work on the FBI has received scholarly acclaim, was quoted that wiretapping during the Hoover years was so pervasive that "virtually everyone was overheard" who the FBI deemed important in Washington politics. See "FBI Kept A File on Supreme Court," in *New York Times*, August 21, 1988.
18. Hoover memo, 12/12/1963, HQ FBI Liaison with Commission File, 62-109090-14.
19. For a detailed development of this question see Chapter 11; Bird, The Chairman, 554-555.

20. Shanklin to File, 2/28/1964, Main Dallas Oswald File, 100-10461-3863. Rankin to Hoover, 2/25/1964, HQ FBI Liaison with Commission File, 62-109090-Not Recorded (hereafter cited as NR); Hoover to Rankin, 2/28/1964, FBI Liaison with Commission File-NR.
21. Hoover memo, 12/16/1963, HQ FBI Liaison with Commission File, 62-109090-13. For Warren's statement see (Washington) *The Evening News*, 12/17/1963. For Hoover's comment see HQ FBI Liaison with Commission File, 62-109090-49.
22. See Chapter 5.
23. Rosen to Belmont, 12/18/1963, HQ FBI Liaison with Commission File, 62-109090-NR.
24. The quote is from hard-line Reagan loyalist and judicial appointee, Judge Lawrence H. Silberman. See "Strange Tale of Judge and Hoover Files," "Washington Brief," The National Law Journal, June 8, 1998, A-10.
25. See Chapter 8 for evidence of the Commission's fear of Hoover.
26. Hoover memo to Tolson, 12/26/1963, HQ FBI Liaison with Commission File, 62-109090-50; Rosen to Belmont, 1/23/1964, HQ JFK Assassination File, 62-109060-2275. Had Hoover wanted to go to extremes and send the Commission all the FBI's "nut" files he could have brought the work of the Commission to a standstill. The FBI had over 500,000 "nut" files; the New York field office alone kept over 25,000 names on file. See Hoover memo. 12/14/1963, HQ FBI Liaison with Commission File, 62-109090-NR.
27. Brennan to Sullivan, 12/19/1963, HQ FBI Liaison with Commission File, 62-109090-73; Branigan to Sullivan, 12/26/1963, HQ JFK Assassination File, 62-109060-2096; Staughton Lynd and Thomas Hayden, The Other Side (New York: New American Library, 1966), 118-119.
28. Brennan to Sullivan, 12/19/1963, HQ FBI Liaison with Commission File, 62-109090-73. For Hoover's longstanding dislike of Yarmolinsky see Frank J. Donner, The Age of Surveillance: The Aims and Methods of America's Political Intelligence System (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980), 119, 249n, and Robert Dallek, Flawed Giant: Lyndon Johnson and His Times, 1961-1973 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 110-111.
29. L. J. Gauthier to Belmont, 12/1/1963, HQ JFK Assassination File, 62-109060-991; Curt Gentry, J. Edgar Hoover: The Man and His Secrets (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1991), pp. 725-726, 743-744; Gauthier to Callahan, 12/9/1963, HQ JFK Assassination File, 62-109060-2049; Gauthier to Callahan, 6/23/1964, HQ JFK Assassination File, 62-109060-3468; Hoover to Rankin, 1/20/1964, HQ JFK Assassination File, 62-109060-2294. In 1978 the Justice Department issued a 40-page

report detailing Hoover's abuse of FBI services and personnel agents to do special favors in his house and property. See the *Washington Post*, 1/12/1978.

30. Gauthier to Callahan, 1/14/1964, HQ JFK Assassination File, 62-109060-2313; Gauthier to Callahan, 1/2/1964, HQ FBI Liaison with Commission File, 62-109090-55; Gauthier to Callahan, 1/28/1964, HQ FBI Liaison with Commission File, 62-109090-NR; Gauthier to Callahan, 1/28/1964, HQ JFK Assassination File, 62-109060-2366.

31. The FBI produced an impressive manual with a step-by-step narrative account of the shooting. The manual also contained photographs of the Dealey Plaza model. See The Assassination of President John F. Kennedy, November 22, 1963 and the Killing of Lee H. Oswald, November 24, 1963. Visual Aids, Rankin Papers, "Investigation and Evidence," 1963-1964, box 8, folder 7, NARA. For the Secret Service's views on the shooting see Gauthier to Callahan, 1/28/1964, HQ JFK Assassination File, 62-109060-2366 and Warren Commission Document 5 for Secret Service SA John J. Howlett's agreement on three shots and three hits.

32. Walther's report can be found in the Waggoner Carr Collection, National Archives, Washington, D.C. See also James T. Tague affidavit in Harold Weisberg's civil action suit, no. 75-226, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia; *The Dallas Morning News*, 11/23/1963 and 12/13/1963. See also Dallas to Bureau, 6/19/1964, HQ Oswald File, 105-82555-4149.

33. The FBI report of Tague interview, 12/14/1963, was a standard FBI FD 302 interview form by agents Henry J. Oliver and Louis M. Kelley, Main Dallas Oswald File, 100-10461-NR; FBI report, 12/14/1963, Exhibit C from civil action suit no. 75-226; Gemberling report, 7/2/1964, HQ Oswald File, 105-82555-4584, 27-39; Rosen to Belmont, 6/8/1964, HQ JFK Assassination File, 62-190960-NR.

34. For a full development of the implications of the "missed shot" see Chapter 9. See FBI Manual, Rankin Papers, "Investigation and Evidence," Record Group 12, box 8, folder 7, NARA, 14-15.

35. See FBI Manual, Rankin Papers, "Investigation and Evidence," record group 12, box 8, folder 7, NARA, 14-15.

36. W. D. Griffith to Conrad, 1/28/1964, HQ JFK Assassination File, 62-109060-2405; Rosen to Belmont, 1/29/1964, HQ JFK Assassination File, 62-109060-2367; Rosen to Belmont, May 11, 1964, HQ FBI Liaison with Commission File, 62-109090-NR.

37. Dulles, McCloy, Rankin, and the Commission staff held what could be called a "rump" session on 9 July 1964 with three psychiatrists to plumb the reasons behind Oswald's motives and actions. The meeting lasted the entire day and ended to no one's satisfaction. Oswald had a reading problem (dyslexia was one psychiatrist's diagnosis) that was proved, according to the good doctor, by his extensive reading. Another ventured that Oswald shot JFK to prove his manhood. So the motive behind Dallas was to

prove something to Marina, his emasculating wife. At one point in the daylong session all of the staff disagreed, sometimes strongly, with the trio of doctors. After 245 pages of transcript this analytical marathon discussion ended without agreement. The July 8 session was so explicit about Lee and Marina's marital relations that the National Archives suppressed it rather than violate the Oswalds' privacy; at least that was the rationale offered. The author does not count this July 8 meeting as one of the 13 Commission executive sessions. See Jack Anderson and Les Whitten, "The Washington Merry-Go-Round," *Washington Post*, 11/8/1975.

38. See Warren Commission, 21 January 1964, executive session transcript for Rankin's decision to classify all the Commission sessions as "Top Secret," NARA.

39. See Warren Commission, 4 June 1964, executive session transcript, NARA.

40. Melvin A. Eisenberg to Files, 2/13/1964, Rankin Papers, box 34, folder 443, NARA.

41. Eisenberg to Files, 2/13/1964, Rankin Papers, box 34, folder 443, NARA; Samuel Stern interview with Mike Ewing, *Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy*, Select Committee on Assassinations, U.S. House of Representatives, 59<sup>th</sup> Congress, 2<sup>nd</sup> session, JFK Collection, (Record Group) RG 233, 4, ibid. (hereafter cited as HSCA).

42. For the working or tentative outline see Rankin Papers, box 1, folder 5, NARA.

43. For McCloy see Warren Commission, 5 December 1963, executive session transcript, NARA, 37.

44. For Rankin see Warren Commission, 16 December 1963, executive session transcript, NARA, 43. Other negative comments about the FBI are pervasive throughout this session.

45. For Warren's concern see Warren Commission, 6 December 1963, executive session transcript, NARA, 9.

46. Warren Commission, 16 December 1963, executive session transcript, NARA, 43-44. Actually, before the Commission began taking testimony Rankin had at his command a sizeable staff. Counting assistant counsels, staff members, and a small army of lawyers, clerks, and secretaries, the final figure came to 84, including the general counsel himself. See WCR, V and 481-482.

47. Rosen to Belmont, 12/18/1963, HQ FBI Liaison with Commission File, 62-109090-NR.

48. See the FBI Tickler in *Appendix II*.

49. Rankin to Hoover, 3/26/1964, HQ FBI liaison with Commission File, 62-109090-NR; Warren Commission, 16 December 1963, executive session transcript, NARA, 43-44.
50. See Chapter 11.
51. Belmont to Tolson, 3/7/1964, HQ FBI Liaison with Commission File, 62-109090-114, Branigan to Sullivan, 4/3/1964, HQ FBI Liaison with Commission File, 62-109090-NR; Rosen to Belmont. 3/26/1964, HQ FBI Liaison with Commission File, 62-109090-NR.
52. Warren Commission, 16 December 1963, executive session transcript, NARA, 44; Shanklin to File, 3/18/1964, Main Dallas Oswald File, 100-10461-4524; Director, FBI, to SAC, Dallas, 3/18/1964, HQ FBI Liaison with Commission File, 62-109090-121; Joseph J. Loeffler to SAC, Dallas, 3/19/1964, Main Dallas Oswald File, 100-10461-serials 4751 and 4750.
53. SAC, New Orleans to Director, FBI, 4/8/1964, HQ Oswald File, 105-82555-3169; Dallas to Director, 3/20/1964, HQ Oswald File, 105-82555-2762; Rosen to Belmont, 3/24/1964, HQ Oswald File, 105-82555-2761; Hoover to Rankin, 4/7/1964, HQ Oswald File, 105-82555-3026; Rosen to Belmont, 4/4/1964, HQ FBI Liaison with Commission File, 62-109090-124.
54. Epstein, Inquest, 90-95; Samuel Stern interview with Mike Ewing, HSCA, Kennedy Collection, RG 233, NARA, 2. Not all of the Commission's staff lawyers were smitten with the image of an infallible and superhuman Hoover agency. For instance, Burt Griffin had worked with the FBI for two years before he joined the Commission. He later told the House Select Committee on the Assassinations that he never found the bureau "very creative" or "imaginative." His impression of FBI ham handedness coincided with Stern's after-the-fact assessment. Griffin did not have much confidence in the FBI and he volunteered that Rankin did not trust it either. Speaking for himself to the same congressional body, Rankin was not as caustic as Griffin. But Rankin did allow that his personal relationship with Hoover was far from cordial by the time September rolled around and the Commission had finished its work. Rankin stopped short of characterizing the relationship as adversarial. Hoover, on the other hand, came to regard the Commission as an adversary. See HSCA, XI, 273 (Griffin), 366, 372, and 385 (Rankin), and *Appendix A*, p. 3 under heading Bureau Relationship With Warren Commission.
55. Warren Commission, 16 December 1964, executive session transcript, NARA, 44; Stein interview with Ewing, HSCA, Kennedy Collection, RG 233, 2, ibid.
56. SAC, Dallas, to Director, FBI, 4/17/1964, HQ FBI Liaison with Commission File, 2-109090-NR; Brennan to Sullivan, 4/23/1964, HQ Liaison with Commission File, 62-109090-NR.