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398. I do not suggest that these men, FBI assistant directors, inspectors and supervisors, enjoyed groveling and making indecent spectacles of themselves, even when they expected perpetual secrecy. The real situation is that, if they did not crawl and live false pretenses, they would not survive in Hoover's FBI. Survival and all it means, including respected careers and comfortable retirement, also figure in the false, misleading and deceptive representations and the stonewallings in this instant cause. After Hoover died the FBI still had to face its record under him, a record that, as I have presented it to the Court, is without even pro forma denial.

399. There is no reason to expect the FBI to change on this. The FBI did not depart from this position in this instant cause. It did not change it in the processing of the general FBIHQ JFK assassination releases. It is not changed in the continuing Dallas and New Orleans field office cases, now consolidated in O.A. 78-322. It did not change with regard to my other FOIA requests, some of which remain ignored after more than a decade - under a ten-day law.

400. One of the many flaps the FBI is always able to downplay and eventually stifle occurred by accident, during Clarence Kelley's directorship. This flap had its antecedents in two other flaps over which SA James P. Hosty, the Oswald case agent in Dallas, was disciplined. As a result of the 1975 flap, Kelley was surprised to learn that none of the 18 motorcycle cops who escorted the President had been interviewed by the FBI, with the exception of one to whom it later was sent by the Commission for other reasons.

401. For 12 years the FBI had gotten away with this cover-up, with not interviewing the Dallas policemen who had first-hand knowledge. Then Dallas Police Lieutenant Jack Revill made passing reference to what Policeman James Chaney had said. (Revill caused one of the earlier Hosty flaps with an affidavit quoting Hosty as saying that the FBI knew Oswald had a proclivity toward violence. The written threat that Oswald left for Hosty, leaked after the retirement of the Dallas special agent in charge was safe and secure, was destroyed by Hosty, causing the other serious flap.) On September 4, 1975, Revill told an FBI agent that Chaney had never been interviewed and the agent included this in his report.

WTF never

FBI failure to interview the Dallas

Bike lockies

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This resulted in the generation of many more records than I attach. Even for the up-from-the-ranks Director, getting information was like pulling teeth. The FBI hierarchy stonewalled Kelley as much as it could, and in the end it prevailed. It did not, even after he directed that an inquiry be made, inform him fully or accurately. When finally an explanation was required for the FBI's avoidance of so many first-rate witnesses, it was consistent with the Little Rock memo quoted above: The FBI cared only about Oswald's guilt and did not conduct other investigations. Inspector Malley, who had himself and his own record to protect, "said that, generally, only those persons the FBI knew had information, or were brought to our attention as having information, were interviewed" (Exhibit 81). In fact, as with those policemen and many others, the FBI did ignore "persons the FBI knew had information" because the FBI did not want that information.

402. Dallas recommended interviewing only one of these 18 police witnesses. The General Investigative Division concurred. It recommended this one interview only "in the interest of thoroughness." Orwell could not have put it better, as the following illustrations make clear.

403. Officers James M. Chaney and D. L. Jackson were assigned to guard the right side of the President's limousine. Of all the people in the world, to the FBI's knowledge, they were the closest witnesses on that side, the side of the car in which the President sat. The FBI's claim that it did interview those called to its attention is false, and Chaney illustrates this. Marion Baker, the one motorcycle policeman the Commission had the FBI see, did say that Chaney had made interesting observations. Chaney was so close to the President, as Exhibit 81 states and many pictures show, that at the time he was shot Chaney was only four to six feet away.

404. Chaney told the FBI that its 1975 interview "was the first time he had ever been interviewed officially by anyone regarding the assassination." Chaney also "advised that officer Jackson had never been interviewed, but has retained notes he made following the assassination regarding his observations." (Exhibit 81, page 2, paragraph 1) The recommendation that Jackson be interviewed was "in view of the fact that he has retained his notes regarding his observations during the assassination." (Exhibit 81, page 3, last sentence)

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Is this in the CA 75-1?

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405. What Chaney said he saw was not secret because it was broadcast and discussed publicly in Dallas. It also is included in a record produced by a radio station that interviewed him (KLIF, "The Fateful Hours"). KLIF reporters taped a contemporaneous interview with Chaney in which he said that he had seen the President struck from the front. The FBI just did not want this kind of eyewitness evidence of Jackson's.

406. Chaney also told the FBI that the Dallas chief of police at the time of the assassination, Jesse Curry, "still has the impression that two men were involved in the shooting." One of Curry's reasons for this belief is "a statement made by one of the motorcycle officers at the scene of the crime." (Dallas 89-43-9614; FBIHQ, the facsimile copy rushed to it by wire, 62-109060-7257)

407. Curry is not alone among the top Dallas law enforcement officials of the time of the crime in believing that there was a conspiracy. District Attorney Henry Wade, a former FBI special agent and a crack shot, has always believed this and that the shooting was beyond the capacity of any one man. Chief Criminal Deputy Sheriff Allan Sweatt, who held these beliefs, spent much of a day criticizing and ridiculing the FBI's performance to me. Sweatt, too, was never interviewed by the FBI although the assassination was right outside his office, many of his deputies were eyewitnesses and he collected the first witness statements and the first photographs known to exist.

Note (handwritten)

408. Mysteriously missing from disclosed FBIHQ files is the September 5 follow-up memo to Dallas from the FBI's Inspector General. In Dallas it is 89-43-9508. This is still another indication of the importance of checking field office files, especially those of the Office of Origin, and more particularly when FBIHQ has something to hide. His report coincides with the time Director Kelley ordered that Chaney be interviewed. The Inspector General also said that FBIHQ records indicated that "possibly two other officers ... had never been interviewed." There were 17 others not interviewed.

409. When Director Kelley got the September 16 memo reporting that Jackson had finally been interviewed, he should not have missed the childishness and irrelevancy of the bureaucracy's effort to discourage any further motorcycle police interviews - allegedly because "none have cast any doubts on the

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Jackson's
Statement -
Treatment
by FBI

conclusions of the Warren Commission." Actually this is false and is the opposite of what the FBI's own files say. Kelley wrote on the bottom, "How many such officers are there?" Not until after then was he told or was there any record showing that for more than a decade there were 18 motorcycle police motorcade escorts who were not interviewed by the FBI. (62-109060-7345)

all great stuff

410. The FBI's FD 302 form report of the Jackson interview is in FBIHQ files (62-109060-7369). The two agents, whose names the FBI's FOIA censors were careful to obliterate, also were careful not to report anything that Jackson said that was not in accord with the Hoover solution. It is to cover up those who cover up that the FBI withholds their names, not to protect their privacy.

411. The last statement on page 3 of this report is that Jackson "prepared a detailed written account" of what he had seen "and has maintained it in his possession." But this "detailed written report" is not attached. The FBI did not want it on file or to have to confront it. Jackson says the FBI agents did read it.

412. Jackson, a deeply concerned patriot, would not have denied his report to the FBI - if it had wanted it. But with a copy the FBI could not get away with misrepresenting it, as the FBI did do. I had no trouble getting a copy by mail. This copy is faithfully retyped. I added only the page numbers. (Exhibit 82)

413. Jackson gives an excellent account of the motorcade and of popular reaction to President Kennedy, where a hostile rather than the exceptional friendly response was expected.

414. On page 3 Jackson states that he was looking at Governor Connally, after having heard the first shot, and he saw the second shot hit Connally. This is precisely what Connally and his wife have always insisted. The FBI's avoidance of Jackson also avoided the embarrassment of having additional confirmation of the Connallys and their destruction of the official accounts of the crime.

415. Much else that was not known is included in Jackson's notes. His information also is of considerable historical interest. It is information that would have been significant at the time of the Warren Commission if anyone

had really intended a serious investigation of the crime.

416. Jackson was proud of having escorted his President on an earlier occasion. On the day of the assassination he was with the President from the time his plane landed in Dallas until Air Force 1 took off with the corpse. He and Chaney were the first two policemen to reach the hospital. Chaney rushed in for a stretcher and other assistance while Jackson helped remove the injured. Their observation of the wounds would have been important at the time, if serious investigation had been intended. It is deliberate untruth for the FBI to claim that it did interview those it knew had information. It knew of Chaney and Jackson, at the very least, that they had information about the shooting and the wounds. It is precisely because the FBI did not want that information that these two experienced policemen were not interviewed.

Good point

417. An enormous amount of paper was accumulated and saved by the FBI. It does not have even the usefulness of garbage, which can be fed to pigs or made into fertilizer. There is no other way of explaining the FBI's refusal to get and file the Jackson report, particularly not in 1975, after the Director's interest. There is no other way of explaining away the FBI's continuing and persistent refusal to interview all 18 of those very best eyewitnesses, the experienced policemen who were in the motorcade.

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418. Only the continuing desire to obfuscate, to hide the truth about this terrible crime and to protect the inadequacy and overt dishonesty of the FBI's work can explain these kinds of misfeasances, malfeasances and nonfeasances. Much of the top command of the FBI and its Dallas office were witting.

419. That this and so much else like it could - and did - happen when the FBI was investigating that most subversive of crimes, the assassination of a President, and could thereafter be perpetuated, reflects the need to question any and all representations made by the FBI with regard to its searches under FOIA and its attestations of compliance.

420. Defendant ERDA also has something to hide. It knuckled under to the FBI's prejudices and thus the best expert, Guinn, was not used for the NAAs. It has a partisan and entirely improper record to defend. It subsidized an attack on those citizens who disagree with the official account of the