

Origins of CD-1
BATCH C

1. Beschloss, The Crisis Years. Notes that Pentagon went on worldwide alert after news of the assassination.
2. Letter from DoD 9/21/1967 Relates to McNaughton 's mild criticism of CD-1. In this respect I need to refer to the McNaughton file which is separate and attached to CD-1 files
- 2A. Larry Kennen's notes that adds more to Tolson's condition. And to Hoover/LBJ connection and how they worked together to seal up the case. Also suggests that LBJ decided on a commission when Hoover could not guarantee that the case was indeed closed.
3. e: See "Brothers" pp. 285-286 for LBJ's decision to move quickly on Oswald as lone assassin rather than accept Oswald as "Red" and follow up with a CIA (DoD) ploy to attack Cuba. The same point made by Peter Dale Scott in "Deep Politics II."
4. Hal note to Charns He notes in here that he was convinced that Hoover had nothing to do with the leaking of CD-1. He believes it was done behind Hoover's back by DeLoach and no. two man in Crime Records, R.E. Wick. Perhaps. This should be considered when I get to the writing.
5. B. Hersh More on Tolson's stroke. . . .and Hoover's own slowing down. Notes he took long naps in the afternoon, etc. Supported by Larry Kennan. Hoover also facing compulsory retirement in 1964. Notes from DeLoach that Hoover might have been having small strokes. . . .
Note Hal's comments that Hoover may not have ordered the leaking of CD 1. It may have been handled by DeLoach with directions from Mohr, etc. .
6. DeLoach to Mohr 11/27/1963 notes a call from Richard E. Berlin, President of the Hearst Corporation. . . .Berlin suggested that FBI should release report asap to head off speculations, etc. He called to talk to Hoover. Clearly he knew Hoover on basis that he would expect to be put through to the director. DeLoach/Mohr took the hint or advice to get the word out asap. This was just another incentive to leak.
7. Talbot's argument that LBJ knew he was being hustled by the CIA and the "Red Plot" to push LBJ in an invasion of Cuba. LBJ resisted. . . Same idea as Peter Dale Scott argument in "Deep Politics II."
8. Peter Dale Scott's Phase I and Phase II argument (Deep Politics II).
9. Max Holland's Presidential recordings. . . .11/23-11/26
10. Holland 11/29 when LBJ met with Glenn Seaborg of AEC and heard from him expected US casualties in event of a nuclear war (with Russia). This is where LBJ got the number of 40 million dead Americans. . . .
11. Chapter from book taken from Hal's S.I. pp. 415-416 good stuff on how LBJ gave Warren the "treatment" to get him to chair the commission. LBJ used the figure of 60,000,000 dead Americans and the CIA's Alvarado story.

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- On December 29th LBJ had his little talk with Warren. . . Good stuff for the entire episode of Warren's reasons for refusal and his ultimate capitulation.
- p. 430 statement from WC staff of complaints about the 25,400 pages of FBI reports based on 2,300 documents. . . Questions that should have been asked were not. . . "a lot of inaccuracies, a lot of inconsistencies" etc in the documents. Other unhappy responses. . . .*****Could be useful . . .
- p. 431 Hoover refused to allow WC counsels to have informal access to FBI agents and BULAB specialists. . . .They all had to go before the Commission where their testimony would be available to him. (And presumably to be "corrected" or amended.
- p. 422 Clear that Warren had no grip on the facts of the case. . . He had no idea of the broken chain of possession of the evidence for example. . .
12. NY Times Story 1/9/1972 warren quoted that LBJ told him 60,000,000 American lives at stake, etc.
 13. Interview of Warren 12/11/'72 at Brandeis University. P. of interview when he gets into meeting with LBJ to take on chairmanship of commission.
 14. Interview of Warren with Alfred Goldberg 4/26/'74 Warren talks about interview with LBJ. P. 3 How the facts of the case convinced Warren. From this interview it is clear that Warren grasp of the facts of the case was no better than any average American who got his facts from the newspapers. He rejected any idea of conspiracy.
Attached is a letter from Warren's secretary (Margaret McHugh) to Goldberg in which he passes on Warren's wishes that Goldberg take out any references to differences of opinion of commission members—Russell, Ford, Dulles, etc. as though they were unanimous through and through. These sections are marked by a line or big cross (p. 6, 7,)
 15. kzenback letter to Warren 12/9/1963 This is the classic Katz letter covering the distribution of CD-1. Katz makes clear that he was concerned about talk of conspiracy and hoped Warren would have Commission release a statement supporting the official story—no conspiracy, foreign or domestic, etc. . .
 15. Record of LBJ phone logs for November 24, 1964
 16. THIS IS THE MCNAUGHTON FOLDER. Especially useful is McN's response to CD 1. He picks out the major flaws---absence of information (like results of the paraffin tests) and other omissions of CD 1.
 17. Hoover secret conversation with Walter Jenkins (?) 11/24/'63
 18. Rex Bradford's response to Bugliosi's treatment of Oswald in Mexico. Especially note that on 11/28 LBJ used the impending Commission to head

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off the threat of an Eastland Committee investigation into the assassination with almost certain findings that Castro/Moscow were behind the assassination.