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Copy of Pedro Charles letter attached. — JFO. Ludy Ecucli

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That an investigation into an event of this magnitude "cannot be investigated fully in a week's time." See H marginalia and Tolson who write "It seems to me we have the basic facts now."

- 25. Belmont to Tolson 11/27/1963 62-109060-1492 (section 19) This is follow up to doc. # 24. Belmont promises report in hands of SOG by 11/29
- 26. Belmont to Director 12/4/1963 Ditto to above #8. See attachment where Belmont quotes Katz's response to CD1 as "sensational."
- 27. Baumgardner to Sullivan 11/26/1963 62-109060-1696 (sect. 21)). Look at Hoover's marginalia. The doc. notes criticism of the FBI in "The Worker." Irony here: Hoover hoped to use the assassination (by Marxist Oswald) as part of his campaign to destroy the CPUSA. Now the CP was turning the tables. See his marginalia where he bemoans the fact that he wanted a "early" and "thorough" report. . . was not "meeting with any success within the Bureau." Pressure on the entire agency
 - 28. Rosen to Belmont 12/6/1963 62-109060-1868 (section 25) Outlines what CD 1 covered
- 29. Belmont to Tolson 12/7/1963 62-109060-1703 (section 22) Notes that Katz advised that CIA saw report on 12/6 and concurred fully with report. Then back to question of public release of statement to public. Katz did not favor one (agreeing with Hoover now) but LBJ wanted a statement. Belmont and DeL said Hoover wanted only the first Para as all was necessary. In one of above docs there is a copy of the statement. Or I will need to check w. NY Times for 12/6 or 12/7 or 12/8.

 ***** What is clever here is position of DeL and Belmont on appearing to oppose any statement that it too comprehensive---Oswald acted alone; no conspiracy w/ foreign govt., etc. When all the time the FBI had leaked this version to the press but without attribution.
 - 30. Malley to the File 11/24/1963 89-43-440

 **** Learns from Belmont that LBJ approved the "idea that we make a report showing the evidence conclusively tying Oswald in as the assailant of Pres.

 Kennedy." This was after Ruby killed Oswald There would be no trial.

Last doc from Larry Keenan's ms. Notes Tolson's mini-stroke. Also that Hoovber and Tolson went to the track on Saturday, where T suffered a stroke. Was this covered in the press? Check. Raises some other pts. Re: why LBJ may have lost confidence in FBI's ability to hold things together without outside aide.

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