

criticism of state and Confederate leadership. Following the Confederate surrender in the late spring of 1865, Holden was appointed provisional governor of the state by President Andrew Johnson. In this role he guided the presidential reconstruction process in the state only to suffer a crushing political defeat when he ran for governor in the fall of 1865.

Disappointed at the return to power of the old Confederates, Holden endorsed the congressional plan for reconstruction. In spite of previous repudiation at the polls and "his self-righteous combativeness," Holden emerged as the leader of the state's new Republican party. In 1868 he was elected governor and set about to reform the state. He gradually warmed to support black suffrage and civil rights, but like most southern Unionists, he opposed racial integration of public facilities. He was keenly interested in railroad development and educational improvements but became involved in controversy in both areas.

Holden's political downfall came when he dispatched state military forces into Alamance and Caswell counties to suppress the activities of the Ku Klux Klan. His appointment of the controversial George W. Kirk to command state military forces in the Piedmont area was a serious error in judgment and led to a conservative reaction in the state. The Conservative (Democratic) party swept the next elections, and the new state assembly filed impeachment charges against Holden. In March 1871 the state senate found the governor guilty on several counts relating to wrongful arrest and raising an illegal military force, thus giving Holden the dubious distinction of being the first governor in American history to be removed from office.

William C. Harris, the author of several earlier Confederate and Reconstruction volumes, has presented a balanced, judicious account of William W. Holden and his role in southern political affairs. Eschewing both the Claude Bowers view of Holden as an unscrupulous southern scalawag and more recent interpretations of Holden as a champion of the common man, Harris sees him as "a product of the diverse interplay of political rivalries and events, too much a man shaped by the common political culture of all classes and the trauma of the Civil War ordeal, to be so easily classified." Through his account of this important figure,

the author provides significant insight into the complexities of state and local politics of the time. The volume is a fine addition to the Southern Biography series published by the Louisiana State University Press and edited by William J. Cooper, Jr.

Ralph A. Wooster  
Lamar University

*Embattled Courage: The Experience of Combat in the American Civil War.* By Gerald F. Linderman. (New York: Free Press, 1987. x + 357 pp. \$22.50.)

Many Civil War historians have marched away from the traditional drums-and-bugles, battles-and-leaders, tactics-and-strategy pattern. Now we are engaged in another kind of war: a struggle to explore the inner springs of thought and action, to analyze not only what actually happened but also to explain why it happened and what the men and women who made (or let) it happen thought it was or wanted it to be. Michael C. C. Adams's *Our Masters the Rebels* (1978) is a good example; another is Grady McWhiney and Perry D. Jamieson's *Attack and Die* (1982). More encyclopedic are Herman Hat-taway and Archer Jones, *How the North Won* (1983) and Richard R. Beringer, Herman Hat-taway, Archer Jones, and William N. Still, Jr., *Why the South Lost* (1986). *Embattled Courage* belongs to this genre. It goes beyond fighting to the perceptions of the fighters; it is an inside look at the changing nature of the war and how its participants adjusted to those changes.

"Every war begins as one war and becomes two, that watched by civilians and that fought by soldiers." This important volume examines the separation between those two wars, beginning at First Bull Run and continuing inexorably to Appomattox and beyond. Gerald F. Linderman bases his examination of that duality—the experiences of the young men who marched off "with an air, as if they went to a ball" and the perceptions of those who remained at home—on careful reading of contemporary sources. The result is a brilliant dissection of this most American war, a disturbing illumination of the disillusionment of both blue and gray soldiers as they met the realities of frontal

assaults, hospital shooters, and the soldier's cardinal virtue. The key word that sensitively and rigorously role in the ratio to every aspect

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assaults, hospital horrors, prison camps, sharpshooters, and trench warfare. Courage, the soldier's cardinal virtue and talisman, is naturally the key word throughout the book. Linderman sensitively and meticulously explores its primary role in the rationale of the war and relates it to every aspect of the soldiers' experience.

Dividing the book into two parts, "Courage's War" and "A Perilous Education," Linderman builds logically and convincingly, showing the multiple uses of courage. He concludes with a revealing epilogue in two parts: "Hibernation" (1865-1880), reviewing veterans' postwar revulsion, and "Revival" (after 1880), tracing how recollections mellowed and alienation and bitterness gradually disappeared. A helpful "Dramatis Personae" provides the reader with biographical sketches of fifty-seven of the men and women Linderman has quoted.

Students of the war will meet many familiar names as Linderman shrewdly analyzes the records of John Beatty of Ohio; Rice Bull of New York; John O. Casler of the Stonewall Brigade; Joshua L. Chamberlain of the 20th Maine; John DeForest of Connecticut; Edwin Fay of Louisiana; William Poague, Stonewall's gunner; and platoons of other articulate and sensitive participants. Linderman's bibliography is a superb selection of the best eyewitness accounts and reminiscences.

The book, the History Book Club's Editor's Choice, has been hailed by Russell Weigley as the "best account in American historical literature of what it is like to experience battle." Agreed. That puts it ahead of both Bruce Catton and Stephen Crane. Indeed, *Embattled Courage* deserves a place on the shelf with John Keegan's *The Face of Battle* (1976) and *The Mask of Command* (1987) and other classics of cerebral military history.

Dudley T. Cornish  
Pittsburgh State University

*Gettysburg: The Second Day.* By Harry W. Pfanz. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1987. xxi + 601 pp. \$34.95.)

An old anecdote tells of a doctoral candidate writing a dissertation on the Battle of Seven Pines, about which a critic tartly inquired, "Which pine?" Although this book's title may

suggest a similar exercise in meaningless overspecialization, such is not the case. The book's focus is both broader and narrower than its title suggests. About one-eighth of its text deals with events before the battle's second day, and the treatment of that day's action is deliberately confined mainly to combat on the Confederate right/Union left and mostly to three hours in late afternoon. Harry W. Pfanz presents that fighting as the decisive heart of the Civil War's greatest battle. Even if one considers the Confederates' failure to exploit their advantage on the previous evening to have been the turning point, Pfanz's argument is formidable.

The book's solid foundation in research strengthens Pfanz's case. A decade's service with the National Park Service at Gettysburg has given the author an admirably thorough mastery of the battlefield's terrain. He has studied an extraordinarily wide range of evidence to determine what happened on that field. He has drawn on many obscure witnesses (though oddly he does not cite the readily available account by Franklin A. Haskell). Unfortunately, the publisher has disobliterated readers by relegating to the back of the book the copious notes on those sources. On the other hand, Pfanz and the University of North Carolina Press have blessed their audience with excellent, detailed maps and many fine illustrations. Pfanz uses his great mass of information (more plentiful on the Union side) as the basis for a narrative history of his selected part of the battle that reaches down to the regimental, company, and even individual level. Although he devotes much attention to clarifying confusion over when and where specific incidents occurred, he does not omit the human touch. He describes and characterizes many men, recalling striking quotations and fragments of battlefield poetry. In other hands the abundant detailing might be dull; in Pfanz's it is ultimately gripping.

Pfanz wisely subordinates the familiar controversies concerning the battle to a supporting role in his treatment. That neither admirers nor detractors of the Confederate general James Longstreet are likely to be wholly satisfied testifies to Pfanz's evenhanded analysis of Longstreet's proposed and actual troop movements. Similarly balanced is Pfanz's discussion of the unauthorized advance of the corps of the truly unbelievable Union general Daniel E. Sickles.