

New

Harold M. Hayman, Frontiers of the American Reconstruction (1966)
(ed)

G. Vann Woodward, Seeds of Failure in Radical Race Policy/

Radicals could agree that the great issues of Reconstruction--who should reconstruct the South and who should control the national politics--depended on the Negro and his rights and status.

But the radical politicians came from Northern societies that were as race-conscious and as opposed to Negro rights as were southern whites.

See Litwack, North of Slavery for these opinions. . . he shows that before and during the Civil War there were already a systematic "Jim Crow" system in Northern states--especially true of the MW states of the Mississippi Valley. . . Woodward quotes Du Bois statement at the beginning of the War not one American in 100 believed that the Black man was capable of sharing in the democratic process. . .

*See P. Du Bois
Reconstruction*

Point this against Franklin's statistical statements in same volume. . .

As the war progressed. . . . the heartland of GOP party, and the region where many Radicals came from--the MW--was in a deep fear of mass Negro migration up the valley away from slavery. . . . How strong was the colonization movement in these states and among future MW radicals. . . . etc.

Woodward concludes/ That it is clear that as the war drew to an end the party that emerged triumphant in the crusade to save the Union and free the slave was not in the best political and moral position to expand the rights and assure the equality of the freedmen. . .

They could oppose the Johnson reconstruction white supremacist govts ~~was~~ this was not the same as a moral commitment to the Negro. . . .

On the issue of Negro equality the party remained divided, hesitant, and unsure of its purpose. (this is W latest view)

*Against two of
Dunbar
The Spectrum of Radical
Views on the
Negro - for
letter to
Lester K. Born*

The radicals ambivalence/ W points to the Civil Rights Act of 1866. It was in response to the Black Codes to be sure. . . but motives were not exclusively humanitarian. He cites Conkling's reasoning--that Negroes protected in their Civil Rights would not have to deluge the Northern states in search for freedom. . . . this was the more politic motive in this action. . . .

The 14th Amendment that followed was just as ambiguous on racial Question and the freedman's rights. It did not include Sumner's plea for a guarantee of Negro suffrage. . . instead its provisions allowed continued state disenfranchisement--both north and south. The kicker was that it provided for the penalization of the South if it did not count Negroes and allow them to vote. . . . it was a piece of policy that allowed the North to have its cake and eat it too.

Woodward believes that the amendment had much merit. . . he believes it held out to the South the best terms they could expect to get. . . but it was at the same time not a measure for the enfranchisement of the Negro.

{ But the statesmanship of the amendment was poor and feeble. . . he uses Brock's argument on the measure: That it should have been forced on the South and not left to their discretion whether to accept or not. They clearly were not in any position to exercise discerning statesmanship. . . .

ing of the Reconstruction Act too was an example of poor statesmanship on the radicals part. . .

The franchise was extended to the Negro to get vote for the passage of the 14th amendment and the setting up of the new constitutional conventions and govts. But there were no measures ascribed for the guaranteeing of Negro equality on an economic basis and a full opportunity in education and in homesteads and full civil rights.

The amendment left open disenfranchisement by property and educational qualifications--this was optional--

The crucial period for Radical Reconstruction came in the last 7 months of ~~1866~~ 1867 when the South now waited to see the nation's verdict on radical reconstruction and Negro suffrage. . . . the northern states in which a referendum was included in the voting for Negro suffrage turned it down. The double standard was blatantly evident. . . . cries of hypocrisy. . . the responsibility of the northern states for the failure in Negro reconstruction is manifest.

THE GOP sustained a general political set back in the North in 1867. . . the South had not lost the significance of this. . . . Every attempt in 1867 to get the vote for the Negro except in small Negro-populated states in the MW and West (about 4) was the measure defeated. . . .

This showing in the GOP north and the heartland of the GOP sectional party meant that in the framing of the 15th amendment the moderates and the conservatives would have the greater voice in the matter. }

Moderates wanted an amendment that was limited and negative--that is, it did not guarantee the vote outright--but only denied its being withheld on reasons of race of past condition of servitude. *Here was the opening of loopholes*

The radicals wanted a firm statement on the vote--federal guarantees, and national control of suffrage that would take it out of the states hands. They predicted what would happen if the moderate version of the bill were to be passed and become an amendment. . . it left open loopholds for vote denial on all kinds of grounds without violating the language of the amendment. This prophecy was fulfilled by the southerners. . . with their property and literacy tests, poll taxes and grand father clauses. . . . Some of these measures were already in effect in Massachusetts at this time. . . *See Massachusetts*

Woodward concludes that to see the 15th amendment as a firm reminded that the North was serious about Reconstruction, etc is to misunderstand or over-exaggerate its so-called firmness. Actually the measure was more devious than not, more timid than bold. This was not lost on the discerning leaders of the south. . . .

W contends that these clues or signals of wannigg federal strength and determination had to play on the resuregence of Southern recalcitrance and violence of the Klans, etc by 1870. . . . The govts response with the Force and the KKK Act of 1871 did not really end the violence. . . even while it drove the Klan underground. . . .

He cites E. Swinney's "Enforcing the 15th Amendment, 1870-77." JSH (vol. 28, May, 1962) to show that federal enforcement of the amendment was negligible and blocked by a hostile population. It was obvious that the North was flagging in its commitments to the Reconstruction of the South. The only way the provisions of the 15th amendment could have been fulfilled would have been by great federal force and determination. . . .

Then in 1874 the S. Court's ruling in the US vs Cruikshank threw constitutional shadow across the Enforcement Acts. . . .

W even throw

Hyman(ed.) New Frontiers of American Reconstruction

Woodward even questions whether the Enforcement Acts were to be used in the South Federal funds in employing the acts were greater in the North than South. They were enforced against the Democratic urban strongholds-- was this series of measures really cast in the mold of partisan politics with the other pieces of Reconstruction legislation?

R. B. Nye's Comment of Woodward's paper/

Nye asks why the sudden disinterest in the plight of the Negro after the Civil war among his former champions in the antebellum reform movements-- remembering it was in this spirit of reform that the abolitionists were able to grow to such a powerful political and moral force in the nation.

Nye feels that one of the keys to this attitudinal paradox was that the old racists theories that held before the war were never seriously challenged by the abolitionists--they treated the Negro in a patronizing and paternalistic manner. The reformers were really more interested in the institution of slavery than they were in the slave. . . . Given these same racial attitudes toward the Negro now that he was a freedman politics was bound to be influenced. Nye argues that the politics of Reconstruction working within this same racial framework--belief in the inferiority of the black man in the North and among the party leaders--meant that the legislative endeavors of Reconstruction could not be as broad and sweeping in their impact upon the social mores and attitudes as might have been expected. . . . they would inevitable leave the Negro in the state of quasi-slavery. . . . in the south and third-class citizenship in the North.

Another factor is the changing context of the reform movement after the war than it was before the war. In antebellum noth the Negro was a question of morality. After the war he became a problem not in morality but in politics--govt. What was his role in a democratic society predicated upon an alert and informed electorate.

The Mugwump reformers were elitist to be sure. . . . the Negro was the souce of corruption and manipulation by sinister carpetbaggers and the self-serving machine bosses.

Reform before the war was anti-institutional in character and no one was worried about the integrity of the constitution and the govt--state and local. reform was conceived of in an internal reawakening of the individual or society; it was evangelical and ladden with romantic subjectivism. Slavery was to be abolished by appealing to the conscienciousness of the slaveholders. There was a suspicion if not downright antagonism of instiutions and govts. . . in men like Thoreau and Garrison Lowell and Emerson, etc.

The lte 19th century reform was entirely different in emphasis--it was less individualistic, less subjective, and much more institutionally and politically oriented, and much more selective and aimed at narrower targets-- there was no talk of a complete reformation of society as in the 1840s and 1850s with the Transcendentalists. . . . It was less motivated by morality. More concerned with using the govt and legislation as a tool in its arsenal. Their political hero was Cleveland and not a man like Brown . . .

There were at least two factors for explanation of the shift in the native reform movement (1) This was a period of alliance between govt and business and the rights of property and capital were firmly established. . . and for a long time it attracted or

on front opposition against like slavery was able to do in the antebellum period. . . reformers represented a fragmented grouping in this immediate postwar period. There were no successful attempts to combine or solidify among these reform movements. . .the unity was on the other side.

(2)the impact of Social Darwinism on the reformers. . .this was a barrier to radical reform doctrine. . . and its impact on the Negro has yet to be fully determined. . .