

Michael Perman, Reunion Without Compromise: The South and Reconstruction 1865-1868 [Cambridge at the University Press, 1973]

Int. Reconstruction as Reconciliation

Perman begins with the examination of the North's attitude toward the defeated South. . . . The conservative and moderate Republicans, press, and other elements of political influence opted for a policy of reconciliation with the Old Confederacy. . . . Their basic assumption was that a real reunion demanded reconciliation at the expense of reconstruction. But the programs they offered waited upon the acceptance of the South; waited upon the acceptance of a southern leadership that would have been replaced had these programs been accepted. . . . It left all up in the air. . . . Nothing definite. . . . a policy without ends. . . . without firm terms.

The best policy would have been the Radical policy of setting forth the terms and what the North expected from the South. Whether it was suffrage, military rule, restriction of Confederate power, and some kind of land reform. At least the South would have known where it stood. But reconciliation was the policy of Lincoln and Johnson and the Republican majority for at least three years after the war.

Perman wants to take exception with the revisionists like McKittrick, Cozmes, and Stamp. . . . Who question why a moderate and just policy was not forthcoming. Then find out that it was possible except for the political and administrative leadership in the North. . . .

Perman argues it was the policy and not the leadership that was at fault. . . . It was the goal and the formulation of the program that assured its failure to produce a more compliant South; Johnson's shortcomings merely aggravated the difficulty.

Perman challenges those who see pragmatism and consensus politics as the guiding genius of American politics. . . . He means McKittrick and the revisionists. They tend to blame Johnson for the failure of reconciliation politics. Perman argues that they make the same mistake as the politicians of the Reconstruction period in believing that the very fabric of the political union was not ripped apart by the war. . . . That the war was something of a political dispute and now that it was over (the nation) could return to business as usual.

Perman sees the problems deeper than individual. . . . institutional and societal. . . . After 4 years of bloody war and fifty years of sectional discord prior to the war the American political system had broken down and something more dramatic and forceful than reconciliation politics was necessary to restore a reunion of the various parts. . . .

Perman's book is the first to look in a detailed way into the policies of the old Confederate politicians and their programs for staying in power through the years 1865-1868. Perman's view that there was no possibility of compromise to suit the needs of the North. The reconciliation policy was a false start that was not workable with these old set of southern leaders. . . . In fact, Perman argues that the confusion and dilemmas that attended Reconstruction was largely the responsibility of the Northern moderates. They should have followed the advice of the Radicals--firm and direct. . . .

1. Defiant Optimism

The North was constrained to find out the mood of the defeated south. This is defined in the chapter title as defiant optimism . . .

Perman speculates that the best policy for the North to have followed would have been to treat the South like a conquered province. As a defeated nation. This would have entailed the exclusion from power of the old Confederate leaders for a long period of time; suffrage for the freedmen; the division and confiscation of the planters former holdings; and other measures necessary to enforce the South to accept a policy of occupation. This was possible in 1865 with the south defeated, her troops surrendering, her economy in waste and its labor force free and uprooted; and her peoples exhausted by war. This was the policy espoused by a handful of Republicans. . . .

The reports out of the South from moderates and radicals was that in the first days after Appomattox and Durham Station the South was beaten and knew she was defeated. She was ready to see what the North had in mind in terms of a policy leading toward reunion. The South was submissive on the surface. But the actual feelings of the South was that she was defeated but not repentant. Might had overcome right. . . .The South was not ready to drop her distaste for the North and distrust of the Yankee. . . .She would wait. This attitude, Perman contends, would have been present regardless of what policy initiated out of the North.

But after Johnson enunciated his Presidential Reconstruction program with its moderate proposals the Southern attitudes of defiance came forward. . . They doubtlessly would have surfaced regardless of what policy the North enunciated. . .

South reviews its situation:

Scanning the southern press and the statesmen of the Old Confederacy in the immediate days after surrender the gist of the southern reaction was this: Acquiescence and reciprocity but not defeatism and pessimism. Southerners were ready to accept their fate from the victorious North. But the old establishment as represented in the Press was to try and preserve the old leadership. . . .To prevent the defeated southern peoples from an internal blowout that would rupture the old political front and bring in its wake dissension and internal upheaval . . .This would allow the North a certain leverage to face a disunited South and work its will through dissidents and might easily topple the old ~~Confederate~~ Confederate leadership . . .Unity in the face of defeat was the initial Southern position . . .

But acquiescence in being "Whipped" by the Yankees did not mean full acceptance of terms. . . .It did not mean that the South was defeated and beaten in the political arena. Perman argues that this acquiescence was more tactical than anything else. What it intended to achieve was to get the North to then respond with moderate or "honorable" peace terms. . . .In short, to get things back to normal with a little alteration in Southern ways as possible. Any stringent terms along the lines of the Radical policies would have been resented and resisted. . .

The point here is the Southern acquiescence was conditional. If the North pursued a policy of restraint and moderation then reunion could occur swiftly and painlessly. But if the North insisted on a harsh reconstruction policy there would be no need to look for cooperation from the South.

The North had to jettison all feelings of hostility toward the South and all its disputes of interests. The South cautioned the North to present terms which were satisfactory to the South as she saw her interests if the North wanted a cooperative defeated south

Southern leaders absolved themselves of all consequences if the North resorted to a hard line policy . . . What the south meant by an "unreasonable" dictation of terms was : If the Northern Government was to interfere in the South's internal affairs and stipulate some of the ways things now should be run. Freeing the labor force was one of these areas of Southern concerns. . . Freeing the blacks would mean that the North would be responsible for the consequences.

The same kind of defiance was visible when Johnson removed from command the Confederate Governors. All of them argued that their continued exercise of power was necessary to provide against the incipient anarchy and economic disorder which surrender and defeat would bring.

The position in the South that a conciliatory policy would produce a harmonious nation and a cooperative south did have some impact on northern thinking. . . . But Perman believes that Johnson's Reconstruction policy was already in tow and not really influenced by the soundings coming from the South.

The South's cooperativeness or acquiescence was induced by the military occupation of the south and the realization that social and political order at home and political advantages in the nation might best be obtained by a strategy that shunned both diehard noncooperation and listless passivity. But it was a strategy nonetheless, since acquiescence and cooperation were conditional and were limited exclusively by those policies which would recognize the autonomy of, and the status quo in, the defeated South, that is to say, only those policies that the South wanted.

The North under Southern scrutiny:

The main point is that even before Johnson announced his Reconstruction policy in the North Carolina Plan (May 29, 1865) the deep South was convinced that it had nothing to worry about.

The Johnson program, of course, was not a finalized program. It could be amended if it need to be. . . This was always the implication in executive reconstruction. It was true with Lincoln and was true with Johnson despite Johnson's own ideas. . . This "experimental" quality was one of the reasons that radical Republicans desisted from criticism. They wanted to wait and see . . . But Southerners were convinced that leniency of the Lincoln program would be followed by Johnson. For the Old Confederates there simply was no other workable alternative. . . They were operating under what can be called a self-fulfilling prophecy. . . But they believed that there were indications that this was to be the Northern position . . .

They could point to the conciliatory policy of the Union Army in the South . . . Its retaining former Confederates in power to maintain law and order; its cooperation in rebuilding the necessities of the Southern system like railroads and education, etc. . . The Union Army's firm policy with the freed blacks--cautioned them to find employment with Ole Master and not expect "handouts", etc. . . To get them back into a laboring situation with their old masters. . .

There was Lincoln's conciliatoriness. . . And in Johnson himself they expected this policy to continue. . . Lincoln's Cabinet still intact under Johnson, etc. .

Encouraging Southern Loyalty, 1865

2. The Provisional Governors

Perman begins with a look at the political careers of the men Johnson appointed as Provisional Governors of the southern states which were not included under the Lincoln 10% plan. . .

There is one thread of continuity~~h~~ running through all these appointments: they were in lockstep with the President's approach to Reconstruction. Johnson wanted to bring the South back into the Union as quickly and painlessly as possible. Therefore his appointees were men who had not precipitated secession, or who intended, now that war had ended, to inaugurate any social transformation in their given states. They were men who favored union between the sections before the war and union within their respective states after the war. They were men Johnson hoped who were moderates but would be acceptable to the former diehard secessionists and the remnant Unionists in their states. . . They were not extremists from either end of the political spectrum . . .

In a word Johnson was trying an ambitious realignment of the moderate political forces in the Union--in both sections. Since the political bonds of Union were broken in the 1850s, Johnson was trying to repair this break by building the potential for a new inter-sectional party based on southern and northern moderation. In overall tone the policy was conservative, and it was intended to forestall the revolutionary possibilities which were becoming patent as a result of the emancipation of the slaves and the military victory achieved on behalf of a set of values and a national vision dramatically opposed to those which had prevailed in the southern states. Johnson was striking out after restoration . . . and not reconstruction. In attempting to defuse sectional animosities and realign parties, Johnson was bound therefore to confront these institutional and ideological obstacles, Perman believes he was trying the impossible. . . That political reality was pointing in another direction. But Johnson was carrying forward the long tried policy of compromise and reconciliation towards southern planters which had been the stock-in-trade of American leaders since 1787.

3. Strategies for Readmission

It was Johnson's desire that under the moderate rule of his provisional Governors the southern states would make concessions to their defeated status and show signs of repentance and readiness to return into the family of the Union. He hoped all could go smoothly and quickly. There were to be no Presidential demands. . . flexibility and good sense was the order of the day.

~~1865~~ J expected the southern provisional legislatures to make the right moves--repudiate the Confederate debt, repeal the ordinances of secession, and incorporate the 13th Amendment into their new state constitutions. Then they would be ready to be readmitted into the Union. There were other expectations from the President. . . He wanted these southern states to establish codes for the blacks spelling out their rights and protections under the new govts. He also hoped that some of the states (Mississippi was to take the lead) would grant restricted suffrage to blacks who qualified in their states. This was largely tokenism. . . But AJ was hopeful this minimal action would deter the radicals in the Republican party and Northern "extremists". . . .

All these expectations did not take place. . . The southern provisional legislatures did not always take the clues. . . Perman writes that one of the reasons was due to the realization that the South had to make it known to the Administration and the North that it could not be driven along. . . That southern politicians were not to be puppets of the North, . . . Accordingly the South contested all the demands made by the North. They would make some concessions to prevent the North from thinking that a policy of modest lines and basically conciliatory was not wasted on the South. At the same time too quick acquiescence and truckling might only lead the North to assume they could lay more demands on the South. . . The South had few assets and resources, but what she had she was determined to play to full power.

In this context the South was actually bargaining with the Administration and playing with the North as well. . . Making concessions to the Presidential wishes was not certainly to terminate the demands on the South. AJ could not give categorical assurance to this. . . After all the Congress had yet to sit on the restoration process. . . So in the fall of 1865 what the South attempted to do was to try and find a basic minimal set of requirements that would lead to her reuniting into the Union on the grounds that the South wanted--no govt interference, the end of the military regimes, the end of the Freedman's Bureau, and reinstatement into the political life of the nation. . . She had to find what were the limits of acceptance. What was irreducible--had to be accepted. And what terms were negotiable or even avoidable. . .

In this set of rules that the South was trying to define for herself the radical Republicans were regarded as too extreme and too uncompromisable to bother with. . . They were simply ignored. The same was true of the South's assessment of the GOP moderates. They believed that these moderates would go along with AJ because of patronage, etc. . . So that AJ was the man they thought they had to please. . .

In general the southern strategy was to postpone as many issues as possible until the South was back in the Union with full political powers restored. Then the old Confederacy and the Democrats in the North could exercise sufficient political power in the Congress to hold back more demands or ameliorate others, etc. . . . It was to the advantage of the south, as these elements argued, to minimize the concessions made by the ~~South~~ southern conventions and wait until their legislatures were formed and in office. . . .

There was even some talk that the Emancipation Proclamation might be declared inoperative. . . . Dismissed as a war emergency act or something, by the Supreme Court, . . . This was the flighty reasoning of the dominant elements in the southern political seats of power in the fall of 1865.

There were contrary views . . . Those who held that the best policy was full out conciliation to the Northern demands. . . . Pointing out that Congress would have a say. . . . That the Republican party rank and file could not be ignored, etc. . . . But they themselves were ignored. . . .

To summarize:

The advice the the "Uriah Heeps" --that the South make every effort to meet the President's demands and wishes was best policy for ~~it~~ it would assure the North that the South was indeed repentant and could be trusted with self-government. This was ignored in all the Southern states in 1865. Instead, the prevailing attitude was manifested by every southern convention and legislature to argue with every Presidential recommendation. . . . They considered it was the political wisdom to preserve and extend the autonomy that they already enjoyed and push for more rather than to make concessions that might please the radicals but call for concessions that were anathema to them . . . The best example was the refusal to grant limited suffrage to qualified blacks and ~~to~~ to take AJ recommendation that blacks be allowed to testify in all jury trials. . . .

The uncompromising majority--the "Rip Van Winkles" were content to allow the question to be settled by Northern politics. They were almost certain that the moderates and party conservatives would control the Republican party and accept them back into the Union on virtually their own terms. . . . If the radicals did prevail . . . Then the South would be prostrate but then so would the Union. They were counting on a position of strength growing out of their own weakness. . . . Counting on the greater Northern opinion to sustain the Johnson program so as to assure the political reconciliation necessary to bring the Union back together and get on with the business of the Republic's business. . . .

The President's plan implemented:

AJ had the tools to coerce the South or persuade her to make more concessions in line with the Executive wishes--the military occupation was still in the South; he could or could not continue the Freedman's Bureau; there was the pardon power, etc. . . . But Perman shows that Johnson wanted the southern govts back into the Union and not to frustrate their emergence. . . . While AJ had the tools . . . he wanted smoothly functioning southern govts and ~~felt~~ felt compelled to get them by conciliation and stressing of harmony and even appeasement. . . . He had the tools for pressuring. . . . But he wanted

these govts and he felt the best way was through reconciliation that would breed southern loyalty.

The southerners knew this was the drift of their relationship . . . That AJ might not like their actions but he was "hooked" on a policy of reconciliation rather than inducement and threatened pressures. The selection of men to office who could not take the test oath was an indication of Southern defiance. . .

Perman makes the interesting point that Johnson did not believe that these Southern Govts would seat their representatives in Congress and be reunited into the Union with the sitting of Congress. . . Apparently the southern leadership did not expect it also . . . But rather than make concessions on black suffrage, etc. . . The Old Confeds were satisfied with their gaged autonomy (near autonomy) and felt that it was only a matter of time when the North would acquiesce and accept them back into the Union on the South's own terms. AJ apparently felt this also . . . The south's strategic assumption was that the Radicals and opponents of these new southern govts, would in time be accused of being disunionists by the Northern political majorities who wanted reunion and restoration, etc. . .

4. Discretion Decentralized

Chapt has an interesting and new interpretation of the pardoning power and how AJ jettisoned it in the summer of 1865. Actually the pardoning of those not amnesties was really the work of the Provisional Governors. These Johnson appointees had inordinate power in their respective states--thusm--the title of the Chapter.

Governors were anxious to pardon (1) to build up a political following among state elements (2) a rash of those taking the test oath and getting pardoned was index of the newfound Southern loyalty (3) pardoning of those in the exemption category--those with \$20,000 of property--was to release their funds for rebuilding of the state--to enlist their entrepreneurial talents in the economic and political reconstruction of their respective states. . .

Perman notes that the pardoning was usually upon the recommendation of the Governors. That AJ hardly ever refused a pardon request from his appointed Governors. . . When he did they reacted testily. . . In fact, it was not Johnson who directly surrendered this weapon. . . He merely allowed it power to slip from his fingers and into the hands of the Provisional Governors. AJ's grip on this leverage was so uncertain and so ambiguous that it failed to hold back the election of men who were still under the cloud of exemption from the loyalty oath--who were still under the cloud of treason. The pattern became that the best way to achieve the restitution of full political and economic rights was to get elected to office. Usually this led to a pardon from the Executive.

One of the components of the south's drive toward full autonomy in the year 1865 was the question of military rule in the South.

Once again the Executive wanted to avoid clashed with his restoration govts and wanted to see that full and independent govt was set in motion in the south.

In areas where the civil power (Provisional Governors and court systems) ~~it~~ overlapped AJ was disposed to shift decision making power to the civil forces. . . The South was not totally opposed to having federal troops in her states. By December 1865 there were still about 110,000 federal troops in the South. They ~~was~~ were not regarded uniformly as an occupying force. . . They served to protect property and life in those areas where the state militia and civil authority was understaffed, etc. . . . But in those areas where the South wanted to exercise a state force or sovereignty without interference from the military AJ was amenable to this. . . He cites the case of Gov. Sharkey and General Slocum in Mississippi as a precedent. . .

It was particularly the case with the Freedman's Bureau . . . The south wanted control over her labor force under her own control and not in the hands of the military governments or the Freedman's bureau . . .

5. Misrepresentation

Discussion of the North's distrust of the South . . . Who won the Civil War? The South was not responding to the political and military events of the last 4 years. . . The South argument was that she could not satisfy northern radical opinion in any case so why try . . .

He discusses why the South refused to honor the provision of the iron-clad oath. . . In some detail. In general the old Confeds never for a moment entertained the prospects of sending men who did not support the Confederacy in the years of war to the US Congress. . . What they wanted was a united front. They were not going to send men to Congress who would support the radicals. . . Men who could not be trusted to serve the interest of their native states. To send men who could take the oath without perjuring themselves to fulfill the North's standards of loyalty would be to commit political suicide. It would be a repudiation of the Confederacy, of the South's war efforts. It would tip off the North that they could expect more concessions from the South, etc. . .

Perman argues that there were men who were capable and were able to take the oath in good conscience. But these were not the men the old Confeds wanted to represent their states in the national Congress. . .

What sort of men did run for Congress in 1865?

They were men who were featured prominently in the Confederacy--the VP, four generals, five colonels, six cabinet officials, and fifty-eight State and Confederate representatives. They were at the same time none of the famous fire-eaters. . . Most were men who opposed secession. Many were men who were Whigs and opponents of secession or cooperationists until the break had been made.

So from the southerners view these were men who were moderates. . . They were neither iron-clad oath takers nor were the fire-eaters who drove the South into ^Rebellion. To the southern mind they represented a concession. They were certainly the moderates that AJ was interested in bringing into the political fold for future reconstruction

The south's self-interested argument that the men she sent were the best qualified, were men who held the trust and confidence of their constituents, were, in fact, the men best qualified to Represent their section, was in part self-serving. There were others who were capable of governing. . . . But because they were distrusted, because they might play into the hands of the radicals, because their politics were other than those of the old ruling class in the South, they were not sent. . .

The old Confeds were not about to sent to Congress 80 representatives who might swell the radical ranks. . . They would rather not be admitted immediately than to make these concessions. . . The south wanted to countenance no possibility of a social reconstruction or a political rearrangement of the power structure in the Old South. . . They wanted to make no real concessions as far as their labor force was concerned. . . . No extension of real political rights to Blacks. No extension of equality to former ~~free~~ bondmen, etc. . . . Better no representation than misrepresentation argued the South. . . . And this was what happened. Secession was a fait accompli the Union remained severed, and the traditional politics of the South were in power. The iron clad oath had failed to divide the South.

The South believed, because it needed to believe, that AJ and the moderates in the North would control the radicals. Johnson got great press in the South. . . He was God's own creative statesman, etc. But all southerners were not so immediately optimistic. If the radicals prevailed and AJ had to make concessions, etc., still the south would triumph in the end once the North realized that conciliation (on the South's terms) was the only way to restore the Union.

But Perman points out that South had misrepresented the Northern sentiment. The conservative and moderate Republicans, while they did not want to battle with Johnson, still would not standby and watch their party be ushered aside. To standby and watch a new coalition between southern and Cooperhaed Democrats emerge political atop the national political pyramid. . . . Moderate and radical Republicans had one thing that bound them--the preservation of their party. . .

Seeking Southern Cooperation, 1866

6. Anticipation

The South waits for a showdown between the President and the Radicals. . . .

This was precipitated by the refusal of Congress to seat the dekedgated representatives from the South.

AJ responded with a veto of the Freedmans' Bureau bill two weeks after the Congressial rejection. The fat was in the fire. . . The South was jubilant over AJ's actions.

But AJ went further. . . He vetoed the Civil Rights bill of 1866. This measure was a bill that had full Republican party support, It was not narrowly partisan--that is, merely the work of the party radicals. . . . Perman notes that had AJ restrained his party warfre with opposing only the franchise to blacks and supported the civil rights bill he would have been in a good political position. But vetoing the civil rights bill he had gone too far. . . This revealed inthe rapid overriding of his veto . . . With this Johnson had broken not with the radicals alone but the whole Republician party.

7. The South Courted

The rationale behind the formation of a National Union Party. . . .

For southerners the defeat of the civil rights veto and AJ's war with his party were ominoius harbingers for the future. It appeared that the radicals would never permit these southern states to enter the Union unless they made cpncessions that were unthinkable or unless the political control in the south was transferred to a new leadership in keeping with the radical demands. Both were unacceptable--permanent isolation and/or surrender to radical Republician conditions.

The only other method--once accommodation was ruled out--was to fight. Sputhern opinion leaders started talking about the prospects of a conservative coalition embracing both the old Confeds or current leaders in the South and the conservative northern elements--Northern Democrats and the conservatibes withon the Republician party.

This was the modertate-cpnervative basis behind the AJ restoration policy of 1865 . . .

This coalition would come to AJ's support, mobilize the silent majority in the North and bring about reunion.

The announced purposes of the National Union Convention to be held in Philadelphia in the summer of 1866 according to Aj was to build up support for the President's Restoration policy. To urge the voters in 1866 to return men to the Congress who would support the readmission of the southern candidates for congressional office. Reunion and the Constitution, etc. . . .

Johnson gave no intent that he was going to merge with the Democrats in the North, etc. . . . It seemed that the tactic was to isolate the radicals in the Republican party. To reveal to them that the northern electorate stood behind the President. . . .

Perman then discusses why the south hesitated to become part of the National Union Convention. Assumed the stance of watchful Waiting. . . . Ultimately the South did attend the Convention in August 1866. . . . Still the ultimate testing was the elections in 1866. Would Andrew Johnson get the support of a "silent majority" in the North who supported his policy? This would be the ultimate test for which way Restoration would go or would it be Reconstruction

8. Masterly Inactivity

The South watched while AJ made his disastrous Swing Around the Circle. . . . The election returns in November were a rejection of Johnson, his restoration policy, and an implied vindication of the Radicals

The South could do nothing but hold on There was no remodeling of southern attitudes. The South held to the strategy that the North would have to come to its senses in time otherwise the Union would be ruined. Without reunion there could be no economic and political future for the Republic, etc. . . .

Then came the Republican alternative to the Presidential Program in the Fourteenth Amendment. Even without AJ's advice the Southern Press attacked the 14th Amendment as something unclean, unimaginable. the low point in the political life of the nation, etc. . . .

Perman examines the four provisions of the Howard Amendment (after the 14th Amendment). He notes the South's reasons for refusal to ratify. The third provision that would strip the old Confeds of their political power was a major reason Without AJ's advice the South was too distrustful of the Republican North to entertain any ratification. They did not believe that demands would end with the 14 Amendment. Rather, once again, that this would be just the Camel's Nose. . . .

While the South was realistic enough to realize that Johnson had lost to the Republicans and was not to be counted on to save the South. . . At least not decidedly. The south still held to its strategy of not giving an inch. Southern resistance and defiance did not flag. . . They still hoped that by resistance and courageous defiance the Republican party might breakup over what kind of policies to administer. . . There might be a Northern backlash against the disunionists in the Republican party, etc. . .

In any case, by rejecting the 14th Amendment the old Confeds were still in power. . . and they felt that a policy of watchful waiting was the best course.

Perman notes there was hope that sustenance might come from other quarters than the Executive Branch. They looked to the Supreme Court as a possible way out. Citing the Ex Parte Mulligan decision, southern conservatives hoped the Court would come to their assistance. . .

Generally the Southern legislatures rejected any attempts to reach agreement with the North over the Howard Amendment. . . Some of the more moderate war-time Governors tried to get acceptance under the urgency that if the 14th was not accepted much worse might and probably would follow. But the Southerners rejected this argument. They maintained their policy of masterly inactivity. . . Wait and see what the next move would be. . .

By early 1867 the Republicans had moved beyond the 14th Amendment and were in the process of putting together the first of the Reconstruction Acts. The feeling in the Republican leadership circles was that the South was unresponsive and more coercive measures were necessary.

Demanding Southern Acquiescence

9. Reconstruction Enjoined--March to July, 1867

With the passage of the Reconstruction Act in February 1867 the North's terms to the South became the law of the land. They could no longer be avoided. Unlike the 14th Amendment there was no choice; no option for the South. . . .

The Reconstruction Acts of 1867 Perman holds to have been the most most ambitious and far-reaching pieces of legislation in the history of the US. Its overall purpose was to reorganize the South's electorate by disenfranchising many leading Old Confeds and disqualifying them from holding office, and enfranchising the freemen of the South--thereby producing something of a bloodless political revolution.

Five military districts divided up the Old South; Each command was responsible for the laws and the punishment of offenders. The Acts declared that a convention which would incorporate Negro suffrage and that the new legislature and State and Federal officials had been elected, the 14th amendment ratified and the state constitutions approved by Congress--then the state would be admitted to the Union

The time for active Southern defiance was now over. . .and the south realized this. . .

He notes that many of the old leaders accepted the new legislation largely (1) because they did not want to jeopardize their property holdings. Any further resistance might convince the Radicals and the North that ostracism should be penalized by confiscation, etc. . (2) Because many southerners felt that it might be possible to hang in by controlling the and "guiding" the Negro vote. . .

The bulk of this chapter reveals why these cooperationist schemes failed in the several southern states. . . .

10. Reconstruction Resisted--July to December 1867

Discussion why the Conservatives were unable to mount any sort of concerted and organized opposition to the new reconstruction govts. . .

Perman examines the reasons for the complete failure of leadership among the old Confeds. . .The course finally pursued by default was to do nothing. . .To allow the blacks and their white Republican allies to go ahead and form these new govts. . .

What should have been done from a southern point of view was the massive registration of the southern constituencies and then have them abstain from voting. This would have shown how organized the resistance to the new govts was. . . .

The Irrelevance of the Moderates, 1865-1868

Perman summarizes the thesis of his book in this chapter. . .The gist being that from 1865 through 1868 the moderates in both sections were in control of Reconstruction policy. The result was failure because accommodation and reconciliation were not workable. . .

He discusses the strategy of the antisecessionist (former Whigs) in the South. . .Reviews their efforts to bring sectional harmony without loss to the South in terms of her controls over blacks and political autonomy.

He notes that through the Johnson period the key was moderation. . .Even under the Reconstruction programs of the Republicans beginning in 1867 the key was reconciliation. With the Reconstruction Acts reconciliation grew less and less, but it was still in the policy. . .The option of nonrecognition and noncompliance was always present, . . .Indicative of the fact that the Republican party was controlled by the moderates and not the radicals. . . The radicals did manage to slip in Negro suffrage. . .But only for the South. This was not the case in the North. . .Radicals never got the party to come against racism. . .The seeds of failure were there. . .

Reconciliation was unrealistic. . . .

The fact that the sections had been divided by a civil war should have been read that made reconciliation impossible. Bargains and compromises ran against the past history of the two sections. There was too much bitter history between North and South . . . Harmony could not be achieved by this route. Perman argues that the only way was the radical way--terms laid out and coercion applied when necessary.

By refusing this course the moderates ignored the fact that the Union was ripped by 4 years of bitter warfare and that 4,000,000 black people had fought for and won their freedom from slavery. Therefore the postwar years required a radical policy. . . . Radical solutions were necessary. . . . This was what the fact of war demanded. . . . But the moderate Republicans were afraid or did not have the vision to see this.