71. What obvious and incredible error did Hoover make in his WC testimony, which had actually been edited by FBI HQ and Rankin before it was published in the *Hearings and Exhibits of the WC*? (pp. 148-149)

In response to a question about why Oswald did not shoot the President as the motorcade came down Houston St., Hoover said that there were some trees which blocked his view. This is absolutely not true. And Hoover even had the benefit of the impressive scale model of Dealey Plaza done by the FBI's Exhibits Section.

72. How was the FBI and CIA testimony that there was no conspiracy in the assassination of President Kennedy belied by each agency's analysis of the Zapruder film? (pp. 150-151)

Both the FBI and CIA's analysis of the Zapruder film had established a conspiracy – not all of the shots came from the TSBD's "sniper's nest." The FBI determined that the first shot came around frame 170; the CIA's NPIC said before frame 210 – both of which are incompatible with LHO as the sole assassin.

Chapter 7: The JFK Autopsy

- 73. McKnight opens this chapter by reviewing some of the gross deficiencies in the autopsy of President Kennedy, which the WC did nothing to address or correct. He charges that this massive corruption of the autopsy records was undertaken with one purpose, which was? (p. 153)
- "... to ensure that the medical evidence in the Kennedy assassination was consistent with the official government version of the lone assassin."
- 74. Fifteen years later, a panel of nine forensic experts examined the autopsy for the HSCA and basically concluded what? (153)
- "... that his (JFK's) autopsy had been incompetently conducted, full of gross errors and failures to carry out standard forensic procedures..." Yet, after noting several deficiencies, this did not stop the panel from concluding that they did not invalidate the official conclusion that LHO was the sole assassin.
- 75. In what sense did Navy autopsy photographer, John T. Stringer, Jr., describe the autopsy room as a "three ring circus?" And what did Adm. David Osborne recall about the autopsy? (pp. 154-155)

"three ring circus": there were over two dozen high-ranking military men, FBI and Secret Service representatives constantly on the phone. Osborne stressed there was tremendous pressure on the pathologists to perform a quick autopsy and get out of there. Seems all they were interested in was recovering bullets and/or fragments that could be traced to the murder weapon.

76. News from Parkland hospital in Dallas that they had recovered a bullet on a stretcher had what effect on the autopsy, and led the commanding officer, Adm. C.B. Galloway, to do what? (p. 156)

It effectively brought the autopsy to an end. Seemed to solve the big mystery of what had happened to the bullet which struck Pres. Kennedy in the back. It led Galloway to prohibit "... the autopsy team from dissecting the bullet track in the president's back, an essential and basic requirement in any investigation into an unnatural death by gunshot."

77. What is significant about radiologist, John H. Ebersole's, comment to the HSCA medical panel that the next time a president is assassinated that we should have a team of forensic pathologists conduct the autopsy? (pp. 156-157)

Fact is, Humes, et. al., were <u>not</u> qualified as forensic pathologists. Humes had <u>never</u> conducted a gunshot autopsy. But there were several highly qualified forensic pathologists in the area who could have been called upon, but weren't. (Perhaps because they were not military men and therefore not subject to taking orders.)

78. During the course of Dr. Humes' testimony before the WC on Mar. 16, 1964, what startling admission did he make to assistant counsel Arlen Specter? And what was the WC's response? (p. 158)

That he had burned the first draft of the autopsy in his recreation room fireplace. "Not a single commissioner was moved to ask Humes what right he had to destroy these papers or even why..."

(a) Why was this admission by Humes not so startling to assistant counsel Specter?

Because Humes had met many times, some 8-10 times by Humes' recollection, with Specter before he appeared before the WC.

79. In either the civilian or military medical worlds, was there any justification for what Humes admitted doing? (p. 159)

"In the civilian medical world there are severe penalties for altering, tampering with, or destroying medical records – suspension of license, possible criminal charges or perjury or obstruction of justice, and charges of fraudulent misrepresentation. Moreover, the U.S. Armed Forces' own manual that sets standards for military autopsies is very clear about the importance of keeping complete records."

80. On what basis does McKnight argue that Humes' contention that CE397 was the documentary basis for the official autposy report obviously false? (pp. 159-162)

Because CE397 autopsy notes consists of just four brief notations and five measurements on Boswell's autopsy descriptive sheet and a single sheet of paper with a few

brief notes from his phone call to Dr. Perry at Parkland hospital. But the official autopsy report is 6 single-spaced typewritten pages.

There are 88 autopsy facts in the official report, and 64 of these facts (75%) cannot be found in the published notes, CE397 (and 15 of these involve measurements).

The crux of the matter is this – How could Humes have written this report mostly from memory with so many precise measurements, not to mention the fact that he did not have access to the autopsy photographs and X rays?

81. After almost four decades, what question regarding the autopsy report still begs an answer? (p. 163)

What was in those suppressed notes (which all evidence indicates did exist when the final autopsy report was written) and the first autopsy draft that Humes swore he committed to the flames."

- 82. What substantive changes of fact were made on Humes' revised handwritten autopsy draft by Adm. Galloway? (pp. 163-164)
 - speed of presidential limousine changed from 20mph to "a slow rate of speed."
 - puncture wound was changed to lacerated wound, regarding JFK's head wound.
 - front neck wound puncture replaced by "presumably of exit."
 - back wound described as "presumably of entrance."
- 83. What "major snag" in the official solution surfaced in Dallas that required immediate attention? (p. 166)

Dr. Perry, who had worked on Pres. Kennedy when he came into Parkland hospital, stated matter-of-factly on 3 occasions in a press conference that the neck wound to the President was an entrance wound. Dr. Kemp Clark concurred.

84. When did Dr. Humes claim he first learned of the wound to President Kennedy's neck? What evidence contradicts this claim? (pp. 167-168)

Humes claims he first learned of this wound the morning after the autopsy. McKnight argues that they had to know about his neck wound before or during the autopsy. The news of the events in Dallas had been on TV and radio for 6 hours before the autopsy began. Experienced forensic pathologists would have immediately called Parkland to speak to the doctors who had worked on JFK.

Footnote, p. 411: Dr. Robert B. Livingston swore under oath in a 1993 lawsuit against JAMA that he called Bethesda and spoke to Humes before the autopsy began and stressed the importance of dissecting that entrance wound on the President's throat.

Adm. George G. Burkley, the President's personal physician, was with JFK at Parkland and he was also present in Bethesda when the autopsy was performed.

Radiologist, Dr. Ebersole, testified to the HSCA Medical Panel that Humes made a phone call to Dallas on the night of the autopsy.

85. Later, Dr. Humes and Dr. Finck, as well as Arlen Specter and WC member McCloy, blamed who for not having access to the autopsy photographs and X rays during the hearings? Is there any truth to this? (pp. 170-172)

They blamed the Kennedy family, and Robert Kennedy in particular.

Specter knew this story was bogus.

Rankin and the WC did have access to the X rays and photographs.

Even Hoover noted that if the Kennedy family had asked them to withhold this evidence "we should have disregarded it."

86. How significant is the question of the trajectory of the non-fatal through-and-through neck wound to the WR? (p. 172)

"If the autopsy statement about this wound was a fabrication, then the Warren report is nothing more than official mythology."

87. What did FBI agents Sibert and O'Neill report about the location of JFK's rear wound? And what did O'Neill tell the HSCA years later about this wound? (p. 172)

They stated it was clearly a <u>back</u> wound. Years later O'Neill told the HSCA the same thing. He added that he thought it odd that Specter did not call him to testify before the WC. And in an affidavit he executed along with his HSCA interview, O'Neill remarked, "I do not see how the bullet that entered below the shoulder blade in the back could have come out the front of the throat."

88. What is the significance of President Kennedy's shirt and suit coat to this controversy over the location of his back wound? (p. 173)

"The bullet holes in Kennedy's coat and shirt were in almost perfect alignment, indicating that the same missile had made them. They were about six inches below the top of the collar line and almost two inches to the right of the midline."

- 99. What amendment had WC member Gerald Ford made to the initial draft of the WR regarding JFK's nonfatal rear wound? (p. 174)
 - "... Ford moved the wound in Kennedy's back from 'a point slightly below the shoulder to the right of the spine' to 'the back of his neck slightly to the right of the spine."
 - 90. What crucial procedure did the autopsy doctors admittedly fail to do regarding this rear wound? Why was this not done, as Dr. Finck testified in the 1969 trial of Clay Shaw in New Orleans? (p. 175)

They did not dissect the wound in the neck to trace the track of that bullet. Finck testified that he was <u>ordered not</u> to do this by Adm. Galloway.

91. In addition to Dr. Finck's testimony, what other crucial document pushes "the argument to the point of cold conviction that the Warren report is a conscious, knowing, and deliberate falsification of our history?" And how was this document treated by the WC? (p. 175)

That crucial document is the official death certificate of President Kennedy, signed by the President's personal physician, Adm. George G. Burkley, which locates that back wound at the level of the 3rd thoracic vertebra. This death certificate was <u>suppressed</u> from the official record. (Dr. Burkley was not even called to testify.)

92. Why does McKnight contend that Dr. Burkley, the President's personal physician, should have been at the top of the WC's list of witnesses? p. 177)

He convinced Jackie Kennedy to have the autopsy done at Bethesda. He observed the President's wounds in Dallas, where he signed the official death certificate. And he was in the autopsy room in Bethesda.

Chapter 8: Birth of the "Single-Bullet" Fabrication

93. Basically, what is the "single-bullet theory," and why was it absolutely essential to the WC's conclusion that LHO was the sole assassin of President Kennedy? (pp. 181-182)

That one bullet (CE399 found on a stretcher at Parkland Hospital) caused all the nonfatal wounds to both Kennedy and Connally – seven wounds altogether. The time constraints and the mechanical features of the alleged murder rifle required that CE399 was the bullet which inflicted all of these wounds. Another shot to explain these wounds would have required another gunman.

94. For much of the life of the WC, and according to the FBI and Secret Service reports, how ν were the three shots allegedly fired by LHO accounted for? (p. 183)

That JFK had been hit by two bullets – the first and the third shots, and Connally had been struck by the second shot. (i.e., no single-bullet theory.)

- 95. Why was the five months the WC worked with the FBI's elaborate model of Dealey Plaza bogus from its inception? (p. 184)
- "... because the Commission lawyers agreed to ignore the bullet that had struck a curbstone and slightly wounded a bystander (Jim Tague). The Tague bullet, or the 'missed shot,' was not accounted for in the FBI model of 3 shots and 3 hits."
- 96. Who was Dr. Joseph R. Dolce, and how was he treated by the WC and assistant counsel Specter in particular? (pp. 186-187)

"When the Commission asked the army for its top ballistics man, it sent Dolce. He was regarded so highly as an expert on wounds from high velocity weapons that it was 'army rules,' Dolce's words, that in the event of a serious injury to any VIP in Congress or the administration, he was to 'be called to go over the case.' "But he never received a call from Bethesda, and according to Dolce, the Commission lawyers were up front about what they wanted from him (support for the single-bullet scenario), Specter in particular. When he failed to comply, he was ignored in favor of his less qualified colleagues — Drs. Dziemian and Light. Differ

97. What were Dolce and Light in firm agreement on regarding CE399? And how did Specter deal with this? (p. 189)

That it was not possible that that bullet, in virtually pristine condition, could have struck the radius bone in Connally's wrist and emerged in such condition. He and Dolce had demonstrated this with tests on human cadavers.

- "... Specter never asked any of these witnesses a single question about the results of the Dolce-Light tests on human cadavers."
- 98. What was Hoover's response to pressure from the WC staff for the FBI to do a reenactment of the assassination at the scene of the crime? (p. 190)

He regarded this as "unadulterated poppycock." Hoover was satisfied that the WC had the definitive answer to Dallas in the scale model of the crime scene they had provided.

99. What issue did the WC, and Chairman Warren in particular, have to confront in preparing for the Dallas reenactment? (p. 191)

That the staff have access to the autopsy photographs, especially pictures of JFK's back wound, so the angle of the shot may be calculated. Warren was insistent that the photographs not be made part of the official record because they were so gruesome. But apparently Warren permitted some limited ("unofficial") access to key staff members only during the reenactment. Specter apparently saw a picture of the back wound, which he later said "was not technically authenticated." (But the WC maintained its public party line that it never saw or used the autopsy photographs or X rays.)

(a) And where was JFK's back wound located during the reenactment, and what is the significance of this for the single-bullet theory? (p. 192)

the stand-in for JFK had a chalk mark on his back at roughly the level of the third thoracic vertebra. And the President's coat was not "riding up." And again – "A bullet entering Kennedy's back at the level of the 3rd thoracic vertebra at a downward angle, not striking bone, could not possibly have exited his throat."

100. What did Norman Redlich, Rankin's "top gun" among the assistant counsels, write in a memo about the FBI and Secret Service accounts of the shooting? (p. 194)

Wasiek's

with the FBI model of the shooti

"... the FBI model of the shooting was a rock tied around the Commission's neck." He urged Rankin to abandon the FBI and Secret Service accounts which had $\mathcal V$ Connally struck by a separate bullet.

"He told Rankin that the FBI and Secret Service reports 'were totally incorrect, and if left uncorrected, will present a completely misleading picture."

101. What happened when, years later, Dr. Joseph Dolce contacted the HSCA requesting that he appear to try to set the record straight on the Edgewood Arsenal tests? (p. 197)

the HSCA was not interested (which, in my view, speaks volumes about what the HSCA was basically all about.)

102. As of the 3rd anniversary of the assassination, what comment did Hoover make in a memo which reported on an interview that Connally had given to *Life* magazine? And what is the implication of this with respect to the WC's conclusions? (p. 198)

Hoover — "We don't agree with the Commission when it says one shot missed entirely and we contend that all 3 shots hit." (Hoover underlined "it" twice, venting his exasperation with the Commission.) The fact that the WC and the FBI, the Commission's investigative arm, never arrived at consensus on this crucial aspect of the assassination means that the government's investigation cannot stand up to doubt.

103. What did FBI firearms identification expert Robert Frazier testify to regarding the condition of Oswald's rifle? (p. 199)

that it had "aspects of wear and corrosion" and a defective scope, but he still said it had "very adequate killing power." And he even claimed that the defective scope favored the marksman.

104. After testifying that CE399 had been fired from Oswald's rifle to the exclusion of all other rifles and confirming its near pristine condition, what did Frazier admit had been done to this bullet, which WC lawyer Eisenberg showed no interest in? (pp. 199-200)

That CE399 had been wiped clean, so there was no possibility of obtaining tissue or blood samples, which he later admitted may have been on the bullet but were not tested.

105. What did Frazier say about the two bullet fragments (CE 567 & CE569) that were recovered in the limousine, which McCloy and Eisenberg did not follow up on? (p. 201)

that these fragments may have come from one or two bullets.

106. Pursuing the above line of questioning with Frazier (which the WC did not, of course), would have led to the admission of at least how many shots? (p. 202)

5 shots (CE 567, 569, 399, head shot to JFK, missed Tague shot)

What was the purpose of Specter's May 13th questioning of Frazier? (p.202)

To establish for the record that all of the recovered bullet fragments in evidence, CE399, and the lead residue on the inside of the car's windshield had all originated from a common source.

108. What does McKnight conclude about Specter's questioning of Frazier regarding his second-hand testimony about the spectrographic analysis of bullet fragments? (p. 204)

"As a lawyer and a big-city prosecutor in his own right, Specter knew that Frazier's testimony verged on the meaningless. All the FBI witness was really saying was that all the samples he had examined were of lead composition. Specter was certainly aware, as was Frazier, that there are hundreds of different compositions of lead in manufactured bullets. Any probative scientific test results that would have stood up in a court of law,... would have had to show that the lead in the bullet fragments came from the same batch of lead and that the composition, beginning with the lead, was therefore the same – identical! Not similar!"

109. If the WC had truth as its only goal, who should they have heard from immediately after Frazier had completed his testimony? And, in this context, what should the WR have contained? (pp. 204-205)

Spectrographer John F. Gallagher who conducted the spectrographic analysis, which was recognized as a refined scientific technique capable of proving whether tested substances could or could not have a common origin.

Neither the spectrographic analysis report (nor the more precise neutron activation analysis or NAA) can be found in the WR or the 26 volumes of Hearings and Exhibits. "It was incumbent on the Commission,... to include in its report a complete and lucid presentation of these scientific tests."

110. When the WC finally did call FBI spectrographer Gallagher, they asked him nothing about his spectrographic analysis of bullet fragments, but about what other tests, and what is the significance of these tests? (pp. 206-208)

They asked him about testing the paraffin casts that were made of LHO's right cheek and hands. His hands tested positive, which could mean he fired his revolver but other substances such as printed matter can leave nitrates, and he handled books as part of his job. The negative nitrate test on his right cheek was <u>exculpatory</u>. NAAs much more sensitive. Means he did not fire a rifle or contaminate it with other substances.

What "additional factor" forced the Commission to get FBI spectrographic expert Gallagher to testify as the very last witness? (p. 209)

Senator Russell's insistence on a special executive session of the WC in which he wanted to explain his reasons for dissenting from the single-bullet theory.

112. What significant report, which Dr. Vincent P. Guinn made to Gallagher at the end of Feb. '64, was also <u>not</u> referred to in Gallagher's brief testimony before the WC? (pp. 211-212)

"The triple firing of the rifle, Guinn advised, 'leaves unambiguous positive tests every time on the paraffin casts.' Because of the inferior construction of the Mannlicher-Carcano,... Guinn noted that the blowback from one or three shots deposited residue 'on both cheeks' of the shooter." And because the NAA test is so sensitive, it is virtually impossible for LHO to have cleaned his cheeks well enough. So, "... the negative results on the paraffin cast of his right cheek argue strongly for his exculpation."

Chapter 9: Politics of the "Single-Bullet" Fabrication

Once the WC committed to the "single-bullet" theory, it faced what staggering evidence problem? (p. 213)

"All the physical and scientific evidence confuted the career the Warren report attributed to CE399, the 'magic bullet.'"

114. In order to make the case for CE399, one evidentiary hurdle the WC had to clear was proving this bullet came from Gov. Connally's stretcher. State the WC's account of where and how this bullet was found. (pp. 213-214)

"At some point, ... the 'stretcher bullet' came out of Connally's thigh wound and tucked itself under the stretcher mattress.... the bullet remained hidden under the mattress until Darrell C. Tomlinson, a Parkland Hospital senior engineer, pushed the stretcher up against the wall to clear a path to the elevator and the bullet came tumbling out." McKnight also recounts the chain of possession.

In what sense was the discovery of CE399 at Parkland Hospital a godsend for the autopsy doctors? (p. 214)

It gave them a way of explaining JFK's back wound, believing the bullet had fallen out of that wound during cardiac massage. It also provided the medical admirals in charge, Galloway and Kinney, with a ready excuse for not dissecting the back wound in violation of standard textbook forensic procedure.

116. Basically, what was dishonest about the way the WR linked CE399 with Connally's stretcher? (pp. 215-216)

Darrell Tomlinson had actually identified another "mysterious" stretcher near Connally's as the source of CE399. Under pressure from Specter, Tomlinson refused to make a definite statement about which stretcher – but that was after four months had passed. Also,

a nurse and orderly who described Connally's stretcher confirmed that Tomlinson had found it on a different one.

117. In what sense does the WR's misrepresentation of the facts of the "stretcher bullet" leave the WC open to the allegation that it chose to ignore evidence of a conspiracy in the assassination of JFK? (p. 217)

Because if CE399 did not come from Connally's stretcher (or Kennedy's for that matter), what explanation is left other than that it was planted to incriminate Oswald and divert attention from the real assassins.

118. Regarding the WC's treatment of the damage to President Kennedy's clothes, what did it claim caused the damage to JFK's shirt collar and tie? And why does McKnight regard the WC's description of this damage "shameless spin-doctoring?" (pp. 218-219)

The WR suppressed results of the FBI's spectrographic and fiber analysis, which found no copper residue and was inclusive in determining the direction of the missile.

But they knew perfectly well that these "slits" (not bullet holes) were made by nurses at Parkland before emergency procedures were started.

Pictures of the front of JFK's shirt (which were not included in their report) shows slits, one of which is much longer than the other.

Dr. Carrico (a Parkland doctor who worked on the President) had indicated that this wound was <u>above</u> the shirt collar anyway.

- In the so-called "single-bullet wars" that pervade the JFK assassination literature, Commission critics usually aim their sharpest blows at what? (p. 221)
- "... the virtually unscathed condition of the 'stretcher bullet' or CE399." Despite its path of destruction through two bodies, it lost only a miniscule percentage of its weight.
- What did one of the surgeons, Dr. Gregory, who operated on Governor Connally, observe about bullet fragments in his wrist wound? (pp. 221-222)

He noted that post-operative X rays showed seven or eight fragments in the governor's wrist, of which he was only able to recover two or three of the larger fragments. Moreover, testifying before the WC on Connally's wrist wound, Gergory made a rather startling statement. After noting that he had recovered two or three of the wrist fragments, he added, almost out of the blue, "the major one or ones now being missing." Specter just went on with his questioning.

121. In the (Ramsey) Clark Panel, which reviewed Kennedy's autopsy photographs, X ray files and documents in 1968, what <u>two</u> disclosures were made relevant to the single-bullet theory? (p. 223)