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The 1968 Memphis Sanitation Strike and the FBI: A Case Study in Urban Surveillance

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On 11 February 1968, the eve of Lincoln's birthday, several hundred black sanitation workers proclaimed by a show of hands that emancipation was still a hope that could stir action. The following day the city of Memphis, Tennessee, was hit with a garbage strike. What started as a "wild cat" strike soon escalated into a racial confrontation, then into a compelling civil rights struggle of national importance, and two months later culminated in an assassination that triggered a storm of racial violence that stunned white America. For one dark moment this southern riverfront city served as a microcosmic reflection of the domestic forces in conflict during this traumatic decade.

The 1968 Memphis sanitation strike attracted little national attention until local blacks persuaded Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., to enlist his moral prestige and international reputation on the side of the striking garbage workers. Weeks before local black leaders had succeeded in entreating King to come to Memphis, J. Edgar Hoover, the director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), had approved the launching of a domestic surveillance program against the strikers and their allies in the black community. The scope and intensity of this political intelligence-gathering operation constitute an untold story of outrageous and unwarranted abuse of power by Director Hoover and his national security police. For King, it was the cry of the powerless and oppressed that brought him to Memphis. For Hoover, Memphis became another front in the director's stepped-up campaign to contain the rising tide of black militancy and eventually to carry forward his secret war against the black civil rights leader.¹

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1. This paper is based largely on the examination of more than 2000 FBI documents in a file entitled "Memphis Sanitation Workers' Strike." The author also found it necessary to use a companion file entitled "Invaders" in preparing this paper. This paper represents

From the outset, the FBI characterized the dispute as a "racial matter" with potential internal security ramifications. Armed with the assumption that the nation's security was endangered, the FBI set in motion a massive political intelligence operation that covered nearly every organizational aspect of black community life in Memphis associated with the strike. Unhampered by respect for the rights of labor to organize, the First Amendment, and a citizen's right to privacy, the FBI intruded into lawful political activities of citizens without any indication that specific crimes in violation of the federal law were imminent. The methods the Bureau employed in this comprehensive urban surveillance were suggestive of the tactics of a police state.²

For the first five decades of the century Memphis and "Boss" Edward H. Crump were synonymous. During this period of heavy-handed machine rule, race leaders gained small concessions for the black community by way of reward for keeping a lid on racial dissent. White Memphians came to expect that blacks would deal and not act in the tidy political universe presided over by the powerful Boss Crump. During the early 1960's the long shadow of Crumpism still influenced white racial attitudes. Taking pride in the orderliness of relations between the races, Memphis had experienced no major racial troubles since the days of Reconstruction; most whites were convinced that the past would continue to serve as a guide to the future.³

Despite white expectations, Memphis was fast becoming a candidate for racial confrontation. All the conditions for racial unrest delineated by President Lyndon B. Johnson's Commission of Civil Disorders were present in Memphis. By the mid-1960's black civil rights leaders in the Bluff City were critically aware that the new federal laws and court decisions had accomplished little to improve the conditions of the city's black poor. Equally disquieting for black leaders was the realization that the easy battles against Jim Crow in public accommodations had left most whites determined to resist any further pressures for social change. Increasingly,

perhaps the first comprehensive scholarly use of these files. It throws new light on an important event in contemporary American history and public affairs that would doubtlessly have escaped public scrutiny except for the passage of the Freedom of Information Act. Historian David J. Garrow, in his recent work *The FBI and Martin Luther King, Jr.: From "Solo" to Memphis* (New York, 1981), cites these files, but very sparingly because the sanitation strike was not central to his story. The writer wants to thank Harold Weisberg of Frederick, Maryland, who obtained these documents from the federal government in civil action suit 75-1996, and generously permitted the author to reproduce the Memphis Sanitation Strike and Invaders files for his own research purposes.

2. For an operational definition of "security police" as it applies to the methods the FBI employed in the Memphis operation see Otto Kirchheimer, *Political Justice: The Use of Legal Procedure for Political Ends* (Princeton, 1961), pp. 202-4.

3. William D. Miller, *Mr. Crump of Memphis* (Baton Rouge, 1964), pp. 102-4, 207.

prominent local black leaders gravitated toward nonviolent, direct action and the politics of racial assertiveness in confronting racial repression. Thus, on the eve of the sanitation workers' strike the racial climate in the Bluff City was becoming increasingly polarized.⁴

Memphis had never been a strong union town. A city dominated by the white population, white workers never regarded themselves as part of the working class. That was a role relegated to blacks. As late as 1967, Memphis, the twenty-second largest city in the nation, had never signed a contract with any union. One black Memphian, Thomas Oliver Jones, a man obviously unimpressed with tradition, was determined to make unionism the key to racial advancement. Jones focused his considerable energies on organizing the Memphis sanitation workers, the most oppressed work force in the city.⁵

"Carrying the Man's garbage," was such a low-paying, uncertain, and dangerous job that black Memphians left the work to displaced rural migrants who flocked to the city after World War II as farm mechanization pushed them off the land. The Memphis Sanitation Department actively recruited Fayette County blacks because they were industrious, tractable, and eager to work. By the 1960's most of the 1300 sanitation department employees were black and unclassified city workers. "Unclassified" was the city's euphemism for "raw exploitation"—it meant that the workers had little job security and were not covered by workmen's compensation.

A short and feisty man, T. O. Jones had learned unionization in a West Coast shipyard before the recession in 1958 forced him to return to Memphis, where he took a job as a garbage collector. For the next ten years he doggedly tried to organize his fellow black workers. In 1963 Jones and more than thirty of his union converts were dismissed for their organizational activities. A year later Jones surfaced again, as president and chief organizer for Local 1733 of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), one of the fastest growing unions in the country. The AFL-CIO union was chartered in 1964 by the state, but the city of Memphis refused to extend recognition to the local chapter. In 1966 Local 1733, reflecting the rising level of black militancy within the community, organized a strike in response to poor working conditions and low wages, only to have the city respond with a court-ordered injunction forbidding any strike by municipal employees. The strike folded, forcing the indefatigable Jones to bide his time until the intolerable job conditions

4. National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. *Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders* (New York, 1968), Bantam edition, pp. 226-36; the best account of this escalating black militancy in Memphis prior to the strike can be found in David M. Tucker's two works: *Memphis Since Crump: Bossism, Blacks, and Civil Reformers, 1948-1968* (Knoxville, 1980), and *Black Pastors and Leaders: Memphis, 1819-1972* (Memphis, 1975).

5. *Commercial Appeal* (Memphis), 17 Feb. 1968.

precipitated an incident that would force a showdown with Memphis city officials.⁶

In January, 1968, Jones found his incident, when twenty-one sewer and drain workers were sent home because heavy rains made it impossible to work in the sewers. While the black workers were sent home with only two hours' "show up" pay, their white co-workers and supervisors remained "on the clock" until the rains stopped, when they were put to work and paid for a full day. Since Memphis sanitation workers earned less than \$70 for a full week of work, any reduction in take-home pay turned normally hard times into a calamity for a worker with a large family. Responding to black rank-and-file anger, Jones ordered all the sewer and drain crews to strike the following day and notified the city that he was prepared to negotiate a more equitable system to protect black workers against the policy of "show up" time on rainy days.

While Jones and city officials entered into informal discussions, the desperate plight of garbage collectors was dramatized by the sickening news that two of their black co-workers were crushed to death on the job. The two men, trapped by a torrential rain, took shelter in the barrel of their truck because city policy forbade black employees from seeking refuge from the elements on the porches of white patrons along the collection route. A freak accident triggered a defective automatic bailer, and they were ground up like garbage. Horrible as the tragedy was, it was compounded by the disclosure that their families were not entitled to any benefits because they were unclassified workers. Subsequent to these events, Local 1733 held a strike meeting on Sunday evening, 11 February, where Jones reported to the more than 400 workers present that the city refused to come forward with any meaningful concessions on wages and working conditions. The next day fewer than 200 sanitation employees showed up for work.⁷

The "wild cat" strike on 12 February caught Memphis officials by surprise, but once the initial shock dissipated they assumed a rigidly uncompromising stance. Mayor Henry Loeb, III, the city's newly elected chief executive, declared the strike in violation of the 1966 injunction, therefore illegal, and ordered the striking city employees back to work. While Loeb adamantly refused to treat with the black officials of Local 1733, he did consent to talk with the national officers of AFSCME who were in Memphis to assist the local organization. Their first session in the mayor's office was staged to provide good theater but not much mutual trust. Loeb conducted the session with bonhomie and polite conversation until the tele-

6. Robert E. Bailey, "The 1968 Memphis Sanitation Strike," (M.A. thesis, Memphis State University, 1974), pp. 18-19; Tucker, *Memphis Since Crump*, pp. 152-53.

7. Bailey, "The 1968 Memphis Sanitation Strike," pp. 20-27; *Tri-State Defender* (Memphis), 10 Feb. 1968.

vision cameras started filming the exchange, then he stood up at his desk, a commanding presence—Loeb was six-feet-five with the build of an All-American linebacker—and spoke into the camera about the strike's illegality and its danger to the public well-being. These tactics infuriated the union officials, and the session ended in a shouting match.⁸

The mayor's theatrics were only exceeded by his old-fashioned southern paternalism when dealing with the striking black city employees. Throughout the duration of the strike, the one union demand that unflinchingly left Loeb shaking his head in sullen opposition was the check-off. In a city like Memphis, known for its low wages, the check-off was essential in order to build a stable base for a local union; otherwise, men would be reluctant to pay union dues out of their pockets on payday. Loeb stubbornly maintained, however, that unions were evil and characterized the check-off system as a swindle concocted by a scheming few to enrich themselves at the expense of the innocent rank-and-file workers. Echoing his own plantation theory of racial noblesse oblige, the mayor insisted that he had been elected to be the garbage men's "keeper," and he would never abandon his "moral obligation" to protect them from the machinations of the union. Whatever his motives, most of the black community regarded Mayor Loeb as a segregationist determined to break the strike, defeat the union, and use his office to stem the tide of black democracy.⁹

Initially, this mid-winter "wild cat" strike of 1000 blacks drew only scant national attention. From the outset of the strike, however, the FBI characterized Local 1733's "work stoppage" as a racial matter with potential implications for national security. On 16 February 1968, the Bureau's field office in Memphis alerted Director Hoover, in a teletype assigned an "urgent" priority, that, because the local branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) had entered the lists on the side of the striking workers, the strike could no longer be regarded as a local labor dispute.¹⁰ Hoover concurred with this assessment. From this point on, all administrative memoranda from Memphis to FBI headquarters in Washington were routed to William C. Sullivan, the assistant

8. Bailey, "The 1968 Memphis Sanitation Strike," pp. 29–34; Gerold Frank, *An American Death: The True Story of the Assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Greatest Manhunt of Our Time* (New York, 1972), pp. 11–12.

9. Quoted in Tucker, *Memphis Since Crump*, p. 156.

10. FBI teletype from Memphis to Director, 16 Feb. 1968, Memphis Sanitation Workers' Strike (hereafter cited as MSWS), Field Office file (hereafter cited as FO), serial number 157-1092-2. Beginning in 1965, the FBI intensified its efforts to find evidence of communist influence within the NAACP. Despite a fruitless marathon probe targeted against the organization since 1941, Hoover alerted all FBI field offices to re-examine their files, step up investigations, and confirm the director's suspicions. This relentless pressure from Hoover explains the early classification of the strike as an internal security matter. For background see especially Frank J. Donner, *Age of Surveillance: The Aims and Methods of America's Political Intelligence System* (New York, 1980), p. 144.

director in charge of the Domestic Intelligence Division, and Carla D. DeLoach, the FBI's senior liaison officer with the Johnson White House and Capitol Hill. Moreover, having classified the strike as a security-related matter fraught with possible racial unrest, the Bureau saw the need to alert elements of the regional network of military intelligence and keep them posted on events as they unfolded in Memphis.¹¹

"NO INDICATION TO DATE OF ANY BLACK NATIONALIST INFILTRATION. THIS WILL BE CLOSELY FOLLOWED THROUGH RACIAL SOURCES AND POLICE DEPARTMENT LIAISON. U.S. ATTORNEY, U.S. SECRET SERVICE, ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND POLICE DEPARTMENT, ALL MEMPHIS, HAVE BEEN ALERTED." The abbreviated plaintext language of the Bureau teletype advised the director that a full-scale domestic political intelligence operation was under way. In the following weeks FBI agents and their sources monitored all public demonstrations supporting the sanitation workers—church prayer meetings, fund-raising rallies, daily marches, and picketing of downtown stores. Public grievance sessions involving workers and representatives from City Hall were subjected to agency surveillance.¹² During the course of the nine-week strike some of the closed strategy sessions conducted by Local 1733 and its supporters were penetrated by FBI informants. The same was true of the executive sessions of the city council given over to strike-related business.¹³ From the outset of the strike these intelligence-gathering activities and intrusive techniques placed the FBI mainstream into the politics of a local labor dispute.

11. For the duration of the strike it was the FBI's practice to circulate summaries of its intelligence-gathering efforts throughout the regional military intelligence community by Letterhead Memoranda (hereafter cited as LHM). Single copies of LHMs were routinely sent to U.S. Army Intelligence, Third Army, Memphis and Nashville Districts; G-2 at Ft. McPherson, Georgia; Sixth Naval District, Charleston, South Carolina; and Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. LHMs were also routed to Lieutenant E. H. Arkin of the Inspectional Bureau, Memphis Police Department.

12. FBI teletype from Memphis Director, 16 Feb. 1968, MSWS, FO file, 157-1092-1; see also LHMs for 27, 28 Feb. 1968 and 1, 4, 6, 7, 9, Mar. 1968, MSWS, FO file, 157-1092-30, 157-1092-32, 157-1092-34A, 157-1092-52, 157-1092-70, 157-1092-72, and 157-1092-74, respectively. On 15 March, 1968, Hoover cautioned the Memphis office to call off all high-profile monitoring by FBI agents of public demonstrations in support of the strike. Hoover's directive implied that this kind of surveillance was best handled by FBI sources and the Memphis police department. See FBI memorandum from Director to SAC (Special Agent in Chicago) Memphis, 15 Mar. 1968, MSWS, FO file, 157-1092-89; LHM, 27 Feb. 1968, MSWS, FO file, 157-1092-30; LHM, 13 Mar., 1968, MSWS, FO file, 157-1092-76.

13. FBI teletype from Memphis to Director, 12 Mar. 1968, MSWS, FO file, 157-1092-75A; FBI teletype from Memphis to Director, 25 Mar. 1968, MSWS, FO file, 157-1092-147; FBI teletype from Memphis to Director, 26 Mar. 1968, MSWS, FO file, 157-1092-149; FBI teletype from Memphis to Director, 3 Apr. 1968, MSWS, FO file, 157-1092-233; and LHM, 4 Apr. 1968, FO file, 157-1092-256. For the monitoring of the city council's executive sessions see FBI teletype from Memphis to Director, 12 Mar. 1968, MSWS, FO file, 157-1092-75A; FBI teletype from Memphis to Director, 20 Mar. 1968, MSWS, FO file, 157-1092-106; LHM, 11 Apr. 1968, MSWS, FO file, 157-1092-301; LHM, 13 Apr. 1968, MSWS, FO file, 157-1092-317.

Circulation pattern

During the last week in February events took a dramatic turn. Propelled by a series of weekend events the strike suddenly was transformed into a civil rights struggle. On Friday, 23 February, Mayor Loeb dashed all hopes that the negotiations in progress might find a solution to the dispute when he ordered the city attorney to prepare an injunction against the strike. Growing increasingly obdurate, Loeb opted to fight the union in the courts rather than negotiate. Moreover, before the end of the month Loeb had garbage trucks back on the streets. This skeleton force was manned by white supervisors, nonstrikers, and replacement workers and was convoyed through the city neighborhoods by police escorts. The mayor was confident that his office would escape any unfavorable political repercussions from the garbage pile-up and get the city through the remainder of the winter without threat of a crisis in public health. Content that he held all the high cards, the new mayor sat back and waited for the union to fold.¹⁴

Loeb had hardly finished applying the final touches to his strategy when Memphis experienced its first strike-related violence. Incensed by the mayor's actions, union leaders and black ministers responded that same Friday with a protest march through downtown Memphis. The march route was cleared through the fire and police director's office and approved by Loeb with the proviso that the demonstrators would walk in an orderly fashion in lines eight abreast and would agree to a police escort. Trouble broke out after the march covered about six city blocks when the police escort cars began herding the marchers to the curb, ordering them all the while to keep no more than four abreast. When some of the demonstrators reacted defiantly and began to rock one of the squad cars, blue-helmeted riot police poured out of the escort cars and began to club and mace the marchers. During the melee nearly all of the black pastors and international officers of AFSCME identified with the sanitation workers' cause were maced or clubbed by the police. Bureau agents were on the scene, monitored the violence, and reported back to FBI headquarters in Washington. The Bureau's Letterhead Memorandum (LHM) sent to Washington and to the regional military network approved the type of force used "to disperse the recalcitrant and obstructive crowd . . ." while noting that "the mace worked most satisfactorily."¹⁵

Loeb's union-busting tactics and the macing forged a unity and militancy in the black community conspicuously absent since the racial and political struggles of Reconstruction days. On the day following the march, about 150 angry black leaders founded an organization called Community on the

14. Bailey, "The 1968 Memphis Sanitation Strike," pp. 43-59.

15. *Ibid.*, pp. 59-60; LHM, 24 Feb. 1968, MSWS, FO file, 157-1092-18. For a chilling account of alleged police brutality connected with the 23 February violence see the black Memphis weekly *Tri-State Defender*, 29 Mar. 1968; LHM, 24 Feb. 1968, MSWS, FO file, 157-1092-18.

Move for Equality (COME). The new organization included among its members elderly pastors and onetime racial accommodators, converts to nonviolence direct action, and angry militant youth. One of the black ministers maced by the police, the Reverend H. Ralph Jackson, was elected to chair the organization. The Reverend James M. Lawson, headed up the strategy committee, the action arm of COME, a post he shared with other black pastors, community leaders, and the president of the local branch of the Memphis NAACP. AFSCME officials, rendered helpless by the mayor's temporary injunction, were forced to step aside but gave their blessings to the new organization.¹⁶

For the duration of the strike COME took over the direction of the protest movement, mobilizing the black community behind the strike and the broader civil rights struggle. COME's strategy was to pressure the white establishment into meeting the union's demands with an economic boycott of downtown stores and the city's two Scripps-Howard newspapers which, blacks maintained, consistently gave the strike a bad press. Downtown Memphis became the scene of almost daily marches dramatizing the boycott and calling for the city to meet the demands of the striking sanitation workers. Workers, college and high school students, and other members of the black community filled nightly prayer meetings and morale-building sessions in the churches and in less than a week raised \$15,000 for the strikers' relief fund. Meanwhile downtown merchants reported that sales were off significantly.¹⁷ While Mayor Loeb worried about a possible garbage build-up, COME was using the garbage strike to build up black unity.

As the circle of support for the sanitation workers widened, drawing from all elements of the black community, the FBI stepped up its surveillance program. As the Memphis field office caseload expanded to meet the new challenge, the Bureau's intelligence capabilities floundered under the weight of the new assignment. The challenge was more than an operational one—monitoring the activities of the civil rights activists and racial militants—and included linking these activists with the potential criminal or subversive conspiracies in violation of the federal law which would have justified the FBI's sweeping surveillance program in the first place. In the Memphis operation the Bureau uncritically resorted to outmoded techniques and political notions ("subversion," "overthrow," "sedition," etc.) to establish links between the old "Communist Menace" and the new racial unrest of the 1960's. Inevitably, the effort proved fruitless; but as the racial confrontation progressed the FBI, desperate to prove the director's pet

16. Tucker, *Black Pastors and Leaders*, pp. 133-34; Bailey, "The 1968 Memphis Sanitation Strike," p. 64.

17. *Commercial Appeal*, 3 Mar. 1968; *Tri-State Defender*, 2 Mar. 1968.

thesis of communist infiltration and control of the civil rights movement, indiscriminately targeted for surveillance all individuals and groups connected in any way with the protest movement.¹⁸

One leader the FBI concentrated attention upon was the young, able, energetic chairman of COME's strategy committee, the Reverend James Lawson, pastor of the Centenary Methodist Church. His emergence as the most influential local leader in the sanitation workers' cause seemed natural considering Lawson's career or "calling" as an activist dedicated to combating war, racism, and poverty. During his undergraduate days at Baldwin-Wallace College, Berea, Ohio, Lawson joined the Fellowship of Reconciliation, the oldest pacifist organization in the country. Later Lawson's attachment to pacifism took on greater scope when he became a convert to A. J. Muste's variety of revolutionary pacifism. In 1951 Lawson refused to cooperate with the Korean war draft, although as a Methodist minister he was eligible for ministerial deferment, and was sentenced to three years in prison. After serving thirteen months in a federal prison, followed by a three-year stint as a missionary in India, Lawson returned to the United States just as the civil rights movement was cresting in the South.

Before coming to Memphis in 1962, Lawson plunged into "Movement" politics where he became an eloquent teacher of nonviolent direct action and a keen tactician of confrontation politics. As a divinity student at Vanderbilt University in 1960, he organized one of the first "sit in" protests in the downtown Nashville business district. Later, while finishing his divinity degree at Boston University, Lawson helped to organize a new direct action group, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC). In 1962 he accepted the chairmanship of the Memphis Area Project—an arm of the federal government's war on poverty. Lawson's deeply held principles of nonviolent direct action, broadened and given organizational expression during his years in the civil rights movement, convinced him that only the shock of boycotts and demonstrations would move aside white resistance to social change in Memphis.¹⁹

Pastor Lawson's central role in black democracy's struggle in Memphis made him a prime candidate for FBI surveillance. The FBI's investigative

18. In brief Hoover's thesis was that the civil rights movement of the 1960's was controlled by communists. He insisted, even when it meant overriding the informed judgment of top FBI officials, that the black movement was directed by foreign influence and posed an internal security threat. He mercilessly badgered dissenting senior FBI officials for their failure to see the old communist principle at work in the civil rights movement: "Communism must be built with non-Communist hands." See Donner, *Age of Surveillance*, pp. 138-44. For a view from one of the dissenting officials within the FBI hierarchy see William C. Sullivan, *The Bureau: My Thirty Years in Hoover's FBI* (New York, 1979), pp. 135-39.

19. For an excellent account of Lawson's activist pacifist views and early involvement in "Movement" politics see Tucker, *Black Pastors and Leaders*, especially chap. 9.

file on Lawson failed to conclude whether he was a fellow-traveller or not, but the negative bias of the file strained to find clues of subversive intent. Excluding any reference to his conspicuous pacifist antecedents, the file noted that he organized vigils in downtown Memphis protesting the American presence in Vietnam. These weekend antiwar demonstrations in 1967 were attended, according to a source within the Memphis Police Department, by a handful of students and community activists. Several of the participants were identified by the FBI as "card carrying" members of the W. E. B. Du Bois clubs of America, a youth organization characterized by the FBI as a Marxist-oriented creature of the American Communist party whose "primary emphasis" was to develop "mass resistance to the draft."²⁰

The inferential link between Lawson's strike-related activities and the Bureau's perceived security threat centered on the black pastor's successful efforts in mobilizing the black youth of Memphis behind COME's protest movement. Involvement of the young blacks in social action was only a preliminary stage, the Bureau asserted, of a larger strategy: to prepare cadres for the massive demonstration against the Vietnam war scheduled for late April by the National Student Mobilization which, the Bureau carefully noted, "has many Communists and Communist sympathizers in its organizational staff." All the pieces seemed to come together, vindicating Hoover's suspicions, when a local source informed the Bureau that Lawson planned a trip behind "The Iron Curtain" at the end of March to attend a peace conference in Prague, Czechoslovakia. With this revelation Lawson's investigative file was upgraded from "Racial Matter" to "SM—C" (Security Matter—Communism).²¹

Other pastors, especially the more militant members of COME—variously referred to in the FBI files as "incipient interlopers" and "rabble rousers"—also came under Bureau scrutiny. The FBI's interest in the Reverends Ezekiel Bell, Malcolm Blackburn, and Harold Middlebrook, for example, was mainly to build a domestic intelligence file on these younger civil rights activists within the Memphis black community. Intelligence-gathering in their cases took on a heightened intensity when sources reported that the sanitation strike was only a forerunner of other planned job

20. LHM, 20 Feb. 1968, MSWS, FO file, 157-1092-24; LHM, 29 Feb. 1968, MSWS, FO file, 157-1092-324. Despite repeated references to Lawson's imprisonment for failure to cooperate with the draft, the FBI's file failed to mention his refusal, on principle, to claim a ministerial deferment to avoid jail. The Bureau's record-keeping transformed an act of moral conviction into a case of attempted draft evasion.

21. LHM, 28 Feb. 1968, MSWS, FO file, 157-1092-32; LHM, 29 Feb. 1968, MSWS, FO file, 157-1092-324. The sinister overtones imparted to Lawson's Prague trip appeared overblown when the *Tri-State Defender* reported that the popular black pastor would attend the third All-Christian Peace Assembly in Czechoslovakia at the end of the month. See *Tri-State Defender*, 30 Mar. 1968; LHM, 29 Feb. 1968, MSWS, FO file, 157-1092-324. For a useful summary of Lawson's political file see FBI memorandum from SAC, Memphis, to SAC, Cleveland, 28 Mar. 1968, MSWS, FO file, 157-1092-180.

actions and racial activities for Memphis in the months ahead. All rumors, allegations, and observations from informants and tipsters about the subjects' personal habits, political views, and associations fell into the widespread surveillance net cast by Hoover's security police and were transmitted to the Memphis police and regional military intelligence.²²

As the strike continued the scope of the FBI's political intelligence program against individuals and groups became so sweeping as to verge on the Orwellian. On 7 March, for example, Mayor Loeb held his usual Thursday afternoon "open house" to discuss the city's problems and the common concerns of its citizenry. On this particular Thursday the session turned argumentative. Eighteen fashionably dressed women, whom the press described as representing a "fairly broad cross-section of business and professions," crowded around the mayor and accused him of inflaming racial tensions by needlessly protracting the strike through his inflexible opposition to the check-off system. These good Memphians, venting their civic concerns at the invitation of the mayor, attracted the attention of the Memphis field office. All of the eighteen names appearing in the story in the *Commercial Appeal* of the encounter were indexed by the Bureau.²³ This practice simply meant that their names were fed into the Bureau field office's files, checked against any previously compiled FBI file, and ultimately "warehoused" as part of the permanent record of this domestic intelligence operation.

Actually, the FBI file on the Memphis operation revealed that any name connected with the strike or related activities was routinely indexed in this fashion. Frequently a summary of the data related to indexed individuals or organizations was disseminated through the intelligence community. In one instance, a Bureau LHM recorded the arrests by the Memphis police of five black youths who skipped school to participate in one of COME's downtown demonstrations. The truants, ranging in age from thirteen to sixteen, were indexed and their names and the circumstances surrounding their arrest were distributed to the Memphis branch of the Secret Service and to Army, Navy, and Air Force regional intelligence services.²⁴

Of all the activist elements in the Memphis black community coming under the FBI's scrutiny, youth was a special concern. Well before the outbreak of the sanitation strike, Hoover alerted the Memphis field office to keep headquarters informed about an incipient black power group calling

22. LHM, 29 Feb. 1968, MSWS, FO file, 157-1092-324; FBI memorandum from SA William H. Lawrence to SAC [Memphis], 25 Mar. 1968, FO file, 157-1092-138A; LHM, 28 Feb. 1968, MSWS, FO file, 157-1092-32.

23. The original story appears in the *Commercial Appeal*, 8 Mar. 1968. A xeroxed copy of the account with the names bracketed for indexing can be found in MSWS for 18 Mar. 1968, FO file, 157-1092-110A.

24. LHM, 16 Mar. 1968, MSWS, FO file, 157-1092-86. A spot check of just the Memphis field office files reveals that at least 175 individuals and 20 organizations were indexed during the course of the FBI's Memphis operation.

themselves the "Invaders," after a popular television program. The Invaders got their start in late 1967 when a number of college-age blacks, conditioned by the Vietnam war, the civil rights struggle, and the bleak economic prospects confronting ghetto youth, created what they envisioned would be a loose coalition of groups to challenge the Memphis white community. The Invaders were part of this coalition that took the name Black Organizing Project (BOP). The combined strength of BOP, according to FBI estimates, never exceeded one hundred members. The Invaders boasted only fifteen full-fledged members, most of whom were high school drop-outs. Most of the executive officers of BOP were young men and women enrolled in the area's colleges and universities. Charles L. Cabbage, the recognized leader of BOP, was a recent graduate of Morehouse College in Atlanta before he returned home to Memphis to work for an antipoverty organization headed by the Reverend Mr. Lawson. Despite the fact that BOP was little more than a paper organization, its black power goals, extremist rhetoric, and active efforts to recruit high school and college students made it a high-priority target for surveillance.²⁵

During the course of the nine-week strike, the Invaders became the most intensely infiltrated and "surveilled" black organization in Memphis. An undercover police officer assigned to the Memphis police department's (MPD) "red squad" infiltrated the youth group shortly after the strike began. Marrell McCullough, code name "Max," was a Vietnam veteran with experience in military police work. A native of Mississippi and a recent graduate of the MPD training academy, "Max" evidently took to his undercover assignment with considerable flair, quickly becoming a trusted member of the Invaders and later a confidant of some of the younger ministers on COME's strike strategy committee. The MPD alerted the Memphis FBI about McCullough and the nature of his assignment and routinely turned over to the FBI summaries of "Max's" intelligence reports.²⁶

25. FBI memorandum from Director to SAC, Memphis, 15 Jan. 1968, Invaders, HQ file, 157-8460-1. This voluminous FBI "Invaders" file contains a handy digest of the Bureau's political surveillance of the BOP during the period of the sanitation strike. This compendium, or file-within-a-file, was based on information from at least twenty-one different Bureau informants. See FBI airtel from SAC, Memphis, to Director, 6 May 1968, HQ file, 157-8460-3.

26. FBI memorandum from William H. Lawrence to SAC, Memphis, 3 Apr. 1968, MSWS, FO file, 157-1092-232; FBI memorandum from William H. Lawrence to SAC, Memphis, 13 Apr. 1968, MSWS, Marrell McCullough file, 157-1092-326. The Memphis field office learned about McCullough, at least as early as 27 March 1968, from Captain Jewell G. Ray of the MPD. See FBI memorandum from William H. Lawrence to SAC, Memphis, 3 April 1968, MSWS, FO file, 157-1092-232. According to the Bureau's count there were fifteen full-fledged members of the Invaders. In addition to the police spy, Marrell McCullough, the record reveals that at least one of these members was an FBI informant. See *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations U. S. House of Representatives*, "The Final Assassination Report," (New York, 1979), Bantam edition, pp. 539-40.

Hoover's directive on the Invaders reflected a larger concern, namely, the Bureau's nationwide intelligence program against designated "Black Nationalist-Hate Groups." The director's justification for launching this sweeping and costly domestic operation was to provide the FBI with preventive intelligence. Presumably, the FBI would use this intelligence in thwarting potential or planned domestic unrest by violence-prone individuals or organizations. Approved in August, 1967, the program was comprehensively directed against an entire movement, including groups that eschewed violence but fell under the label of "Black Hate" groups because they militantly opposed institutional racism. Some of these targeted organizations and movements were the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, Black Student Unions, Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), and the Poor People's Campaign. One of the FBI's goals under this program was to prevent any "long-range growth of militant nationalist organizations, especially among youth."²⁷

The BOP came closest to approximating a black nationalist or black power movement in Memphis. At best it was a fledgling movement with worthy goals but exercising only tenuous influence among the upcoming generation of Memphis blacks. Furthermore, it had no organizational links to any of the "Black Hate" groups receiving special attention from Hoover's FBI. The BOP's professed purpose was to create a comprehensive community program to reach the hard-core, bitter young adults isolated from the larger society and facing the daily choices of passive acceptance or self-destructive rebellion. The range of programs envisioned by the coalition included an activities center, neighborhood cooperatives, liberation schools for the teaching of Black History and Black Arts, and a work training program to improve the employment opportunities of ghetto youth. In concept the project was no more subversive or un-American than "Pride, Inc.," a community action program already in place in the nation's capital.²⁸

Stymied for lack of funds, community support, and active membership, the BOP leadership hoped to exploit the garbage strike to gain leverage and prestige within the Memphis community. While the organization's goals spoke to legitimate needs, the skewed tactics its leaders employed to press their case only intensified racial mistrust, making a troubled situation even more explosive. Senior BOP officers consciously set out to shock

27. John T. Elliff, *The Reform of the FBI Intelligence Operations* (Princeton, 1979), pp. 21-24. FBI airtel from Director to SAC, Albany, 4 Mar. 1968, Hoover's Official and Confidential file, 100-44806-17. Copies of this six-page directive were sent to agency field offices in forty-four cities, including the Bureau's Memphis field office. For a useful account of how the FBI implemented this program see Donner, *Age of Surveillance*, pp. 212-32; and Garrow, *The FBI and Martin Luther King, Jr.*, *passim*.

28. The BOP's stated goals can be found in a thirteen-page proposal prepared for circulation among funding agencies of the federal government. See LHM, 6 May 1968, Invaders, HQ file, 157-8460-3, 59-71. See also LHM, 6 June 1968, Invaders, HQ file, 157-8460-(illegible).

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Memphians, white and black, into supporting their program by raising the specter of racial violence. Whenever possible they used the public rallies supporting the strike as ready-made forums to harangue, insisting that capitalism and black liberation were incompatible and that Memphis "should be burned" or purged by a "good race riot." Cabbage, the group's leader, and John Burrell Smith, a close associate, gained a certain notoriety by poking fun at the "Tom" ministers on the COME strategy committee and urging blacks to "get guns" instead of marching and praying. In this calculated campaign to attract black youth with racial bravado and inflate their own credibility, Cabbage and Smith cultivated the impression that their coalition was actually a formal unit of SNCC. The main purpose behind this posturing was to work a subtle kind of blackmail: either the BOP received recognition and financial support or Memphis might experience a ghetto uprising. The implication that only the BOP could keep the racial lid on the city alarmed the NAACP-COME leadership. In early March, mostly at the insistence of the Reverend Mr. Lawson, the BOP leadership was invited to join COME, in part because of their limited influence with high school and college youth, but largely to effect better control over Cabbage and his cohorts.²⁹

On all counts, superficially at least—extremist rhetoric, intransigent racial militancy, and self-proclaimed formal links with SNCC, one of Hoover's designated "Black Hate" groups—the BOP met all the criteria for an FBI intelligence-gathering operation. Moreover, since the BOP executive officers became part of the coalition directing the strike and civil rights struggle, the monitoring of their activities provided the FBI with new and prized intelligence conduits into the black community. While the BOP was the group most intensely under surveillance in Memphis the Bureau was in the end forced to conclude that Cabbage's organization was really a "local group led and operated by Memphians" with only a "possible fraternal relationship" with SNCC. Ultimately the Bureau's intelligence "audit" of the BOP was slated for possible release, through FBI liaison sources, to those agencies in the federal government responsible for funding local community programs like that envisioned by the Black Organizing Project.³⁰

29. LHM, 6 May 1968, HQ file, 157-8460-3, 3-10. Cabbage evidently delighted in confiding that he owned a "Russian-type gun" and would use it for self-protection if circumstances warranted. See FBI memorandum from William H. Lawrence to SAC, Memphis, 1 Apr. 1968, MSWS, FO file, 157-1092-227. Whether Cabbage ever owned such a weapon is uncertain, but the Bureau took its source seriously enough to set up a special subfile under the superior classification of 157 to read: (Extremist Matters; Civil Unrest: Stockpiling of Arms and Ammunition). See *Ibid.* LHM, 6 May 1968, HQ file, 157-08460-3, 14, 48, 51, 53-54, and 56.

30. FBI airtel from SAC, Memphis, to Director, 6 May 1968, Invaders, HQ file, 157-8460-3. The FBI's political intelligence operation in Memphis did not end with the settlement of the sanitation strike. The Bureau continued, without interruption, its domestic

Since the BOP's broadest support originated among the area's college youth, this created an operationally convenient justification for the Bureau to probe the centers of higher learning in Memphis. The FBI's intelligence operation went to college in the guise of casual informants and tipsters, mostly bona fide students who reported occasionally to a Bureau agent; college administrators and staff personnel; campus security police; and racial and security informants who had regular contact with a Bureau case officer. During the course of this campus surveillance the Bureau failed to uncover any groups influenced or controlled by violence-prone extremists. Actually, the campus probe had trouble detecting even the faintest pulse of any political life at all.³¹

Memphis State University, with a student body of about 15,000, was more energized by the sanitation workers' strike than any of her sister institutions. Campus activism at MSU centered around the Black Student Association and the predominately white Liberal Club. This biracial coalition staged a campus rally in support of the strike in early March, but fewer than fifty students participated. Nonetheless, the rally was monitored by the campus police, and the University's director of security passed the names of some of the participants to the FBI which, in turn, informed the Memphis police authorities. The Liberal Club and the BOP-affiliated Black Student Association continued their on-campus efforts to drum up support for the strike among their fellow students.³²

The ensuing surveillance of the Liberal Club demonstrated that the intelligence Leviathan operating in Memphis was unhampered by respect for academic freedom. At the inception of the strike the Liberal Club was all but moribund. It revived when a coterie of campus activists, galvanized by the strike and the downtown demonstrations, took control of the campus organization in a disputed election. The club became something of a campus beachhead for a handful of community antiwar activists, BOP-affili-

surveillance program against the BOP-Invaders coalition until 1971. See FBI memorandum from SAC, Memphis, to Director, 1 July 1971, Invaders, FO file, 157-1067-2052 (the Invader file number was changed during the course of this urban surveillance).

31. FBI memorandum from William H. Lawrence to SAC, Memphis 1 April 1968, MSWS, FO file, 157-1092-196; FBI memorandum from William H. Lawrence to SAC, Memphis, 4 Apr. 1968, MSWS, FO file, 157-1092-248; FBI memorandum from William H. Lawrence to SAC, Memphis, 13 Mar. 1968, MSWS, FO file, 157-1092-78; and FBI memorandum from William H. Lawrence to SAC, Memphis, 18 Mar. 1968, MSWS, FO file, 157-1092-115. For FBI reports on campus political activity as it related to the BOP at Owen and Southwestern colleges, respectively, see FBI memorandum from William H. Lawrence to SAC, Memphis, 25 Mar. 1968, MSWS, FO file, 157-1092-145; FBI memorandum from William H. Lawrence to SAC, Memphis, 4 April 1968, MSWS, FO file, 157-1092-248; FBI memorandum from William H. Lawrence to SAC, Memphis, 1 Apr. 1968, MSWS, FO file, 157-1092-196.

32. FBI memorandum from William H. Lawrence to SAC, Memphis, 13 Mar. 1968, MSWS, FO file, 157-1092-78; LHM, 1 Mar. 1968, MSWS, FO file, 157-1092-34A; LHM, 15 Mar. 1968, MSWS, FO file, 157-1092-82.

ated campus blacks, and some white middle-class students who, probably out of the desperation of boredom, wanted to adrenalize political life on the campus. From the intelligence perspective, operationally habituated to the style of excess, the Liberal Club loomed as a center of campus radicalism and possible subversion. All information relating to the group was classified with "IS—C" (Internal Security—Communism), which presumably justified the full range of coordinated surveillance that club members were subjected to by the campus constabulary, the intelligence division of the Memphis police, and the FBI. As with other targeted campuses, MSU—and the Liberal Club in particular—provided the Bureau with no evidence of any planned violence or civil disturbances. The last pieces of intelligence in the Liberal Club investigative file noted that the group planned to sponsor a "Students for Eugene McCarthy" rally and join in the COME-organized picketing of stores in downtown Memphis.³³

Convinced that time was no ally and that their cause needed national attention, COME leaders invited nationally prominent black figures to come to Memphis. On 14 March the NAACP's Roy Wilkins and Bayard Rustin of the A. Philip Randolph Institute spoke to 9000 strike supporters at the Mason Temple. Four days later, at the entreaty of the Reverend Mr. Lawson, Dr. King came to Memphis.³⁴

The call from Memphis caught King and the SCLC in full-swing preparation for the Poor People's Campaign or Washington Spring Project. Scheduled for late April, 1968, this project, in retrospect, was a last-ditch effort by King to pressure Washington into carrying forward the promises and programs of social transformation that the Democratic presidents of the 1960's had placed on the national agenda. "To move the conscience of Congress," King proposed a new device for social action: a mass "camp-in" of the nation's poor on the federal government's doorstep. King's speech on 18 March at the Mason Temple was a fitting text underscoring this transformation of the civil rights movement from marching and praying to massive, nonviolent civil disobedience. He urged all black Memphians to "unite beyond class lines" in supporting the strike and close the city down for a day with a massive work stoppage. "Escalate pressure," King exhorted the delighted overflow crowd of 13,000, and force Mayor Loeb to say "yes" when he would rather say "no." Before the evening was over King promised to return to Memphis and lead the protest demonstration that would turn the mayor and his administration around. Thus a local labor dispute was spontaneously grafted onto the SCLC's Washington Spring Project be-

33. FBI memorandum from William H. Lawrence to SAC, Memphis, 13 Mar. 1968, MSWS, FO file, 157-1092-78; FBI memorandum from William H. Lawrence to SAC, Memphis, 18 Mar. 1968, MSWS, FO file, 157-1092-115; FBI memorandum from William H. Lawrence to SAC, Memphis, 1 Apr. 1968, MSWS, FO file, 157-1092-191.

34. *Commercial Appeal*, 15 Mar. 1968.

cause King could not flinch in the face of human needs; and because, after all, the plight of the black sanitation workers was, in microcosm, the Poor People's Campaign itself.³⁵

Meanwhile as the strike dragged on well into March, tempers shortened and the odds favoring serious racial violence shot upward. Pent-up grievances gave way to unorganized incidents of vandalism, trashings, and firebombings. Community strike leaders trying to hold the line against the erosion of black patience and restraint were losing the battle. A freak winter blizzard forced King to postpone his return to Memphis to lead the protest demonstration until 28 March. For those Memphians eager to resume negotiations and bring the strike to a close before King returned, the snowstorm came as a welcome reprieve. Even before the first visit of the civil rights leader to Memphis, a concerted effort was under way to reopen the stalled talks between union and city officials. On 26 March, union, COME, and city officials, meeting at the Claridge Hotel in downtown Memphis, had hammered out the form of a possible final settlement through a memorandum of understanding. Had Mayor Loeb favorably intervened at this point in the mediation process, he could have ended the strike and lifted the tension-ridden atmosphere blanketing the Bluff City. But Loeb hung back, refusing words of encouragement or timely concessions on the key interrelated issues of union recognition and the check-off system.³⁶ Loeb's obduracy assured that 28 March would be cast as a protest demonstration instead of a victory parade or a general celebration of release from a racial dispute that threatened the social peace of Memphis.

The events surrounding King's return to Memphis on 28 March 1968 to lead a peaceful demonstration is a much-told story.³⁷ The march had hardly covered more than four city blocks when the familiar "We Shall Overcome" welling up from the lines of demonstrators was suddenly interrupted by the sounds of shattering glass. Scores of black youth armed with iron pipes, bricks, and long wooden sticks used to carry placards were smashing windows and looting stores all along the Beale Street march corridor. Phase one of the Poor People's Campaign had turned into a riot. Exactly who sparked the violence on that day is still unclear. The FBI, however, seized upon the violence-marred march as a way to undercut

35. David L. Lewis, *King: A Critical Biography* (Baltimore, 1971), pp. 379–81; *Commercial Appeal*, 19 Mar. 1968 and the *Tri-State Defender*, 23 Mar. 1968.

36. Bureau sources representing the extremes of Memphis's black society—local NAACP officials and criminal tipsters from the ghetto—all reported that, barring a settlement of the strike, racial violence was a real possibility. See LHM, 9 Mar. 1968, MSWS, FO file, 157-1092-72; FBI memorandum from SA Andrew Sloan to SAC, Memphis, 19 Mar. 1968, MSWS, FO file, 157-1092-114. For the abortive Claridge Hotel negotiations see Bailey, "The 1968 Memphis Sanitation Strike," pp. 84–91.

37. The best accounts can be found in Lewis, *King*, pp. 379–82; Frank, *An American Death*, pp. 22–28; and Garrow, *The FBI and Martin Luther King, Jr.*, pp. 188–93.

King's credibility as a man of peace and as an exponent of the doctrine of nonviolence. Bureau agents in Washington and Memphis orchestrated a campaign aimed at saddling King with the blame for the violence on 28 March. By manipulation of "cooperative media sources" and artfully managing their own intelligence reports channeled to the White House, congressional leaders, and other top-government officials, the Hoover FBI was able to influence opinion about King and the Memphis violence among the public and at the highest reaches of national politics.³⁸

A leader of more ordinary stature might have abandoned the Memphis campaign and attempted to ride out the wave of unfavorable publicity. But King began immediately to lay plans for a new demonstration. Shaken and despondent over the violence on 28 March, the civil rights leader felt compelled to re-establish his reputation for nonviolence by leading a peaceful march in that troubled riverfront city. The politics of the moment compressed all other considerations into one stark relationship: "No Memphis, No Poor People's Campaign." It was while preparing for the second Memphis march that King was struck down by an assassin's bullet.³⁹

The news of King's murder incited a wave of arson, looting, and sniping in Memphis and in more than sixty other American cities, producing a groundswell of pressure that Mayor Loeb could no longer resist. The day after the assassination, President Johnson dispatched the undersecretary of labor, James J. Reynolds, to Memphis with instructions to impress upon the local white leadership that a quick settlement of the strike was in the national interest. As Reynolds flew out of Washington, buildings near the White House were still burning. Tennessee's Governor Buford Ellington urged that the city and the union spokesmen reopen talks and arrange for a quick settlement of the strike. Prominent elements of the white business

38. The post-Watergate investigations of the Hoover FBI have dredged up a mountain of details about the agency's "no holds barred" campaign to destroy Dr. King's effectiveness as a civil rights leader. The 28 March violence in Memphis provided Hoover with another front for his aggressive secret war to discredit King and diminish his cause. For the origin, scope, and techniques of the FBI's counterintelligence program (COINTELPRO) against King see the *Final Report of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities*, Senate Report, 94-755, 94th Congress, 2nd session (1976), 3:81-183. For evidence that at least one FBI-authored editorial against King was confidentially planted with a "cooperative" news source see *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations U.S. House of Representatives*, "The Final Assassination Report," pp. 574-78. For a full appreciation of how the FBI's intelligence selection process produced the desired *ad hominem* account (Hooverized version) of a hypocritical, demagogic, and fainthearted King who fled the scene of a riot he inspired by his own irresponsible actions see the following FBI teletypes: FBI teletype (sent 4:13 P.M.) from Memphis to Director (att: William C. Sullivan), 29 Mar. 1968, MSWS, HQ file, 157-9146-47; FBI teletype (sent 7:22 P.M.) from Memphis to Director and WFO (Washington Field Office), 28 Mar. 1968, MSWS, HQ file, 157-9146-41; and FBI teletype (sent 8:13 P.M.) from Memphis to Director, 28 Mar. 1968, MSWS, HQ file, 157-9146-34.

39. Lewis, *King*, pp. 383-89; Frank, *An American Death*, pp. 34-113.

community, who had consistently opposed all compromise with the union, now insisted that Loeb work for an expeditious end to the strike. The realization that the black community was prepared to continue boycotting and demonstrations well into the summer partially explained the volte-face of the mayor's former supporters. Many businessmen were also fearful that Memphis would invite derisive treatment by the national press as a "southern backwater" and "decaying river city" unless this dark chapter in the city's history was ended amicably and without further delay.⁴⁰

All these converging pressures set in motion the negotiating process that ultimately settled on a set of agreements ending the sanitation workers' strike. On 6 April 1968, Loeb, Reynolds, and Jerry Wurf, the international president of AFSCME, met in the undersecretary's room at the Peabody Hotel in downtown Memphis. This was the first face-to-face meeting between Loeb and the union president since the abortive televised session on 21 February in the mayor's office. The negotiations proceeded in a business-like atmosphere with Reynolds playing the role of umpire and constant reminder that Memphis's future share of federal funds hinged upon a quick and successful denouement. Ten days later Loeb and the union representatives agreed on the final terms of a settlement that met virtually all the union demands. Ironically, the final agreement employed virtually the same language as that contained in the earlier Claridge Hotel "memorandum of understanding" submitted to Loeb on 26 March. That evening the jubilant strikers and their supporters gathered at the Clayborn Temple where the union membership voted unanimously to accept the agreement and end the sixty-five day strike.⁴¹

40. FBI teletype from Memphis to Director, 5 Apr. 1968, MSWS, FO file, 157-1092-262; FBI teletype from Memphis to Director, 6 Apr. 1968, MSWS, FO file, 157-1092-269; *Memphis Press-Scimitar*, 6 Apr. 1968; Bailey, "The 1968 Memphis Sanitation Strike," pp. 114-18; Tucker, *Memphis Since Crump*, p. 160.

41. Bailey, "The 1968 Memphis Sanitation Strike," pp. 117-24. For the entire agreement see the *Commercial Appeal*, 17 Apr. 1968.