History 225

Re: Notes/Outline w/ "Politics of War"

- I. Wartime Economies -- North and South

A. Union --"The Second American Revolution" Codument A. B. Some Views about Confederacy Major thrust: a comparative overview of both sections.

Class: both chpts. deal w/ political discontent in the South/and with economic discontent. (Part of the directed research/ but any questions).

- II. Northern Manpower Needs/Draft Riots
- A. Who Fought? (see McPherson text) Myth of rich man';s war and poor man's fight.
 - Sty B. Recruiting Black troops (deal w/ more on Thursday)
 - C. Resistance to the Draft: The NYC Draft Riot

III. Medical Issues

D. Electrons of 1863 - of Turning fart

A. Sex in the Civil War (Union only)

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Re: Notes w/ Union Economy (Source: McPherson, L &2nd AR)

For the Northern economy you can rely on Current's essay in Why the North Won. This gives you a basic overview.

Make a couple of points here. When the war turned into a total war waged against all the South's material assests. The war, in short, prostrated the economy of the South. It destroyed 60% of the South's wealth. The output of Southern industry was cut in half. The value of Southern agriculture was cut by 75%. The South lost 25% of its white male population of military age were killed. This one-quarter is a higher proportion than suffered by any European nation in WW I (The Great War).

The point--that while the South was going through the wringer, the Northern economy grew stronger as the war progressed.

Look at this comparison in more deatil when we come to the postwar Reconstruction.

Not only did the Northern economy "zoom" or tmaks off as a result of the war in general terms. The North also experienced what has been called a "Second Revolution."

"Second Revolution"

Point out that secession and war ended southern domination of the national government and transferred control over politics and the economy. With the southern bloc no longer around to block legislative measures that favored Northern industrial capitalism the party of Lincoln was able to pass a host of measures that consolidated the power of northern entrepreneurial capitalism in the North.

- 1. Passed a high tariff to protect domestic industry against foreign competition;
- 2. Introduced a centralized and regulated banking system;
- 3. Government support for land-grant colleges/advancing higher education;

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Re: Notes w/ Union Economy

- 4. A Homestead act that provided farmers w/ access to cheap land in the western territories.
- 5. A Pacific railroad act providing governmental loans and land grants for a transcontinental railroad;
- 6. Revenue Act which established the first federal taxing power, including a progressive income tax.

This astonishing blitz of laws, most of them passed within a span of one year, did more to reshape the relation of government to the economy than any other comparable effort except perhaps FDR's First Hundred Days in 1933 when he was forced to deal with the Great depression.

Point here: All this was accomplished while the greatest war of the 19th century was raging. . .

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Covid how (1312 — 1872).

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Re: Notes w/ Rise/Fall of CSA

Counterarguments to Epitaph of State rights:

 $\underline{\textit{[Some}}$ scholarship since the 1970s has changed views about the Confederacy.

Paul Escott, After Secession(1978)
Emory Thomas, The Confederate Nation(1979)
R. Luraghi, The Rise and Fall of the Plantation South(1978)

Show that the record of the CSA was not so slip-shod and incompetent as one might think from earlier studies.

These works make it pretty clear that any state rights argument about the death of the CSA is vastly overexaggerated. Actually, that s/rs opposition to Davis and Richmond was no real brake or obstacle to the Confederacy's war effort.

The reason is that, at least in terms of war materials, the CSA was able to transform itself from an agrarian to an industrial economy in an incredible short period of time.

The CSA nationalized the whole productive power of existing industry in the South. Almost every exisiting industry was placed under Richmond's control. The Central government created new industry to feed its war effort. For example, the Augusta Works in Augusta, Georgia. This was the largest government/owned factory system in the world. It employed thousands of workers and turned out nitre, lead, rifles, shoes, buttons, and other war-related items.

CSA expanded the industrial basis for a navy. By 1865 the CSA had 30 new installations outfitted to take care of naval wartime needs: shipyards, ordinance plants, machine shops, and powder mills.

Cities like Richmond, Augusta, Columbus(SC), Atlanta, Macon, and Selma became large industrial centers during the war.

<u>basic point</u>: No Confederate army lost a major engagement due to lack of arms, munitions, or other essential supplies during the course of the war.

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Re: Notes w/ Rise/Fall of CSA

This is not to say that the South was not progressivly facing hard times and was free of wartime suffering. Unlike the North, which was largely prospering at a result of the war and the economic take-off called the Second American Revoultion(discused earlier):

By end of 1863 inflation was rampant;

There were food shortages--largely because of the increasing degredation of the southern transport system--so food was not getting to all the southern civilian population, especially in the larger cities.

Cities.

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NMorale was declining because of the scarcity of CSA military
victories and the general failure of President Davis and his adminis
tration to raise moral by propaganda. Appeal to Souther Nathrelen

The Union blockade increasingly cut into needed export products. But it was not mirtight.

For example, during the last three months of 1864 the South recived through the blockade from Europe:

Controller

500,000 pair of shoes
800,000 pounds of bacon
2,000,000 tens of Saltpeter
316,000 blankets
69,000 rifles/and other supplies

The emphasis on Confederate leaders who were notorious state righters and critics of Davis ignore other aspects of this question.

For example, David Potter makes a point that Davis never tried to prevent the re-election of governor Joe Brown to the state house in Georgia. Maybe there were good reasons:

Brown was Governor of one state(along w/ Vance in No. Carolina)that furnished 42% of all conscripts and volunteers east of the Mississippi to the Confederacy.

Brown also clamped down on planters in his state who tried to continue planting cotton for the short-term cash advantage. Brown insisted that they stop this practice and use their land for production of foodstuffs to feed the civilian population in his state. Actually, Georgia under Brown's leadership, had one of the most effective welfare system catering to the needs of the civilian population.

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Re: Notes on Rise/Fall of CSA [Source: Hattaway/Jones, How The North Won)

Both Potter and Donald directly or indirectly in their arguments argue that either "too much democracy"(state rights) or poor military leadership by Davis had negative impact on the military fortunes of the Confederacy.

 \underline{Point} \underline{here} : that state rights or Davis' micromanagement of the CSA's military effort did not interfer with conscription and the mobilization of manpower during the war.

Souther opposition to conscription was basically about the form it took and not the principle of the right of the government to draft. Davis administration overcame much of this rancor when it agreed to integrate drafted southerners into state units from where the draftees came from that were already on line. That is, North Carolinian went into already existing Tar Hell units in the field not into Geogia or Alabama units, etc.

This arrangement strengthened Southern military power because it integrated green troops with battle-wise and seasoned veterans. The North's approach was just the opposition--organize new units with every call-up. This left many Northern units in the field filled with green troops, except perhaps for officers, who had to learn everything about survival by getting bloodied. It also meant that many Northern units in the field were never at full strength. [pant: CA wasgeneally more combat effective]

Moreover, Southern boys when they were conscripted were to serve for life or as long as the war continued. In the North they had limited terms of service. The 1861 Northern volunteers who signed up were committed to a three year enlistment, not the duration of the war. [Note: Linderman wrote about the North's desperation about the spring of 1864 when these enlistments were up. There were so many short-timers that the Union's planned spring/summer campaigns were in jeopardy if the great bulk of these men decided to stack arms.

As far as manpower was concered we have to remember that the South (with 40% of its population slave) had to draw on a manpower pool that was only 40% of what was available for the Union. Yet during most of the war the CSA was able to bring its combat forces up to about 78% of Union strength.

South put Call on

Carry the

16 Company Line

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Re: Notes on Rise/Fall of CSA

The answer for the superior CSA mobilization or the ability of the CSA to bring a greater pecentage of her manpower into compat than the North rested on several factors:

- (1) Employed more of the marginally fit and more of those with only lukewarm or even hostile feelings about the war. [We are talking about the South's ability to mobilize about 87% of its male population between the ages of 17 and 45].
 - (2) The advantage of interior lines
- (3) The fact that the invading Union had to use a significant number of men to guard their entended lines of communications form guarrillas and calvalry raiders.

So the Federals had 2.5 times the Southern population but possessed battle strength scarcely 25% greater than the CSA.

South has to be credited with superior mobilization. Greater combat effectiveness and better mobilization of available manpower would help keep the South in the war for four years.

