

History 225

Re: Notes w/ Emancipation Proclamation

Source: Howard Jones, Union in Peril

Make the point that the possibilities of British mediation-cum-recognition of the Confederacy did not die with Antietam. They simply were postponed and Whitehall still watched with great intensity the course of the Civil War in her former colonies.

In actual fact the declaration of the Emancipation Proclamation only encouraged talk of intervention because of the widespread fear of slave revolts and a bloody race war. The Palmerston Government viewed these possible contingencies as a dire threat to the civilized order. *(An example to non-White peoples held in colonial bondage by Britain all over the world)*
[Foreign secretary Lord Earl Russell was the most consistent advocate for intervention on humanitarian grounds after Lincoln launched the EP].

BCF chpt. 18 notes the Bulloch Rams in its opening pages, Especially the British conclusion w/ Confederate agents to allow the CSA Alabama to escape. The Alabama's record as a highseas raider against Federal merchant shipping was spectacular (destroyed 63/64 vessels during its military career.)

Point: That after the war the Union made claims against the British for the destruction levelled on her merchant fleet by the Alabama and other Bulloch rams. The high court of Geneva awarded the US \$15 million in damage claims in 1871. Still strong feelings in the US against the Palmerston Government that she prolonged the war with this kind of assistance to the Confederacy.

After Fredericksburg (Dec. 1862) Napoleon III made a unilateral and informal offer to mediate which the Union promptly rejected. So the game was still afoot among the European capitals.

The events that seemed to seal off for good any British move to mediate came with Gettysburg and Vicksburg Federal victories in July 1863.

Add to this the weight of consequences. It was clear to Palmerston, how could it not be, that mediation would lead to recognition of the Confederacy and certain war with the Union. Britain realized that Canada was indefensible. The British would have to see Canada fall to Union armies.

There was also the fact that Whitehall did not really trust Napoleon III and his imperial ambitions. In BCF Chpt. 18 there is some discussion of Napoleon III's mucking about in Mexico. Was this just the beginning of a French effort to restore her old North American empire (remembering that she lost Canada during the Seven Years War ending in 1763; and w/ Napoleon's surrender of Louisiana

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page two, Source H. Jones

to Jefferson in 1803). The old animosity and suspicions between these two European powers going back centuries had not been smoother over.

Then there was the recognition that pro-Union Russia would not join in any concert of European powers to try and force the Lincoln government to stop the war and accept the independence of the Confederacy.

The irreducible point that was made incandescently clear by Washington was that from the European side that the only remedy to stop the war (on humanitarian grounds) was the use of force.

Fortunately for history Britain clearly saw the writing on the wall and refrained from taking the desperate and almost certainly catastrophic gamble of initiating mediation.

Why catastrophic? Because such a course would have had the most upsetting repercussions reaching well into the 20th century.

Is it too much to say that the future of the world was at stake in the fall of 1862 and into the summer of 1863. I think not.

Ask the class WHY?

Read pertinent paragraphy from Allan Nevins, War for the Union, Volume II, p. 242.

Allan Nevins - Use for the Union (vol. II)

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Britain, France, and the War Issues

AMERICANS hardly watched more closely than Britons the fighting at Second Manassas and Antietam, nor did New York newspapers report it with much more accurate detail than London journals. For Europe as well as the United States the war had critical meaning. Consequences of the greatest magnitude hung upon the deepening tension of European-American and especially Anglo-American relations in the late summer of 1862. It is hardly too much to say that the future of the world as we know it was at stake.

A conflict between Great Britain and America would have crushed all hope of the mutual understanding and growing collaboration which led up to the practical alliance of 1917-18, and the outright alliance which began in 1941. It would have made vastly more difficult if not impossible the coalition which defeated the Central Powers in the First World War, struck down Nazi tyranny in the Second World War, and established the unbreakable front of Western freedom against Communism. Anglo-French intervention in the American conflict would probably have confirmed the splitting and consequent weakening of the United States; might have given French power in Mexico a long lease, with the ruin of the Monroe Doctrine; and would perhaps have led to the Northern conquest of Canada. The forces of political liberalism in the modern world would have received a disastrous setback. No battle, not Gettysburg, not the Wilderness, was more important than the contest waged in the diplomatic arena and the forum of public opinion.

The popular conception of this contest is at some points erroneous, and at a few grossly fallacious. The framework of the received story is that the British aristocracy and "upper class" were bitterly hostile to the North; that by social pressure and the thunder of the London *Times* they controlled the Ministry, itself naturally unfriendly; that Lord John Russell, the Foreign Secretary, was ready to follow the eager Napoleon III in breaking the Union blockade and recognizing the Confederacy; that the heroic Lancashire cotton workers, starving but devoted to freedom, followed their champion John Bright in resisting intervention; and that Antietam and the emancipation proclamation came in

BRITAIN, FRAN

the nick of time to prevent Eu story has all the fascination of footlights blazing up, the orches liberal-minded Britons applaudi prepare to pass the second Refor

This story has elements of tru it we must remember several cor telligent middle class in Britain; i more to the Prime Minister, Palm overstates the role of the Lancas ultimate, impact of emancipation; too much of British governmenta his Ministers were in fact actuato terests in common-sense ways, k suing this policy they were acuto broilment in Europe, of the weal their Canadian defenses. They w specting the right of blockade, fo poleonic times, and might direly

If the diplomatic scene had an wary, and doggedly devoted to th He disclosed a fundamental attitu love of quarrelling and fighting is i is to impose restraints on natural jects, but it is an infringement on tions."¹ In brief, Great Britain d they did, her true policy was not

Americans were acutely sensiti Great Britain was the one count States. Old ties of kinship, two ce universal influence of British liter Britain, all counted strongly. "Wh many Englishmen asked H. W. Be plied, "we in our deepest hearts ca

¹ Max Beloff, "Great Britain and th (Feb., 1952), 47.

² Brooklyn speech, Nov. 25, 1863, N. 1

ALLAN NEVINS
War for the Union (U.S. II)

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History 225
Re: Outline w/ Emancipation Proclamation

1. Overview of the BCF Chpt. 18
2. Outline for my comments/lecture notes
 - A. Old Notes w. Emancipation Proclamation including
 - (1) Points about the scope of the EP
 - (2) Summary remarks:

Add here: That the EP was the crux of Federal resolve to smash the slaveholding aristocracy that had spawned secession and the war. It sounded unmistakably the message that the Lincoln administration would crush the rebellion by any means necessary. The relentless, violent, remorseless war that Lincoln hoped to avoid during the first 15 months of the fighting he was now ready to unleash to preserve the Union.

B. I want to elaborate on the Emancipation Proclamation in two areas.

To dispell the assertion ("myth") that Antietam ended the threat of European intervention. It is more involved than this.

Want to deal with this period of fall of 1862 to the summer of 1863 in a larger context. That is, the future of the world, not just the Union, was at stake during this hypercritical period.

(Use notes from Howard Jones Union in Peril and end with Allan Nevins remarks from Union at War (Vol, II), p, 242.

C. Moral crisis w/ Union troops (winter/spring of 1862/3) from McPheson's What They Fought For, 1861-1865)

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Re: Notes w/ Emancipation Proclamation

I. Slavery--A Disappearing Institution

A. Emancipation in the Air

1. See old notes

II. Slavery Caught in the Vortex of War

A. Original Northern War Aim

1. Limited war to restore the Union. At the opening of the war the struggle was to end secession and bring the South back into the Union,. Nothing more, nothing less.

This aim implied in Lincoln's Inaugural Address when he promised that he would use the federal army to suppress the insurrection while "avoid[ing] any destruction of or interference w/ property or any disturbance of peaceful citizens."

2. Congress in July 1861 passed a resolution *Crutenden Johnson* that said "this war is not waged . . . for the purpose of overthrowing or interfering with the . . . established institutions of those States, but to maintain the states unimpaired; and that as soon as these objectives are accomplished the war ought to cease."

The expression of the Union war aim was so circumspect and cautious it would seem that this was not a full-scale war the North was undertaking but a limited police action to quell a large scale riot.

III. Pressures for Change

A. The problem of the "contrabands"