

History 25

Re: Notes & Ideas from Wm. Freehling, Reintegration of American History

Note about the war in east and west. Using the Davis essay in Cause Lost to reflect the element of horror in the West that was not present in the east theatre.

Chpt. 10 Divided South: Causes of Southern Defeat

F alludes to the division between the military explanations and the new social history as it impacts on the causes of the Confederacy's demise.

He supports the view that greater weight should be given to internal or home front explanations for the South's defeat.

- Useful here he pushes side the arguments about contingencies of Confederate victory as a part of military narrative emphasis. See his dismissal of the so-called near-rescue scenerio of British intervention w/ the possibility that Lee might have won at Antietam, etc. Or that Antietam discouraged Palmerson govt. from intervention on the side of Richmond (see pp. 224-225)

F next examines that old chestnut about Lincoln losing the 1864 election to McClellan based on a stalemated Union effort in the field, especially Sherman's failure to take Atlanta w/ the crushing morale implications for the North, etc. (see pp. 225ff). This is worth looking at.

Also how to integrate this w/ the Mitchell essay in Boritt?

He Mentions as does Davis Lincoln's "blind memo" of August 1864. This is indication of AL's thinking if he did lose and how he would use his lame-duck period to prosecute the war full-bore during his remaining months. Davis is good on this.

Does Donald deal w/ this "blind memo" at some length. Or is it is Bassler's collected works of Lincoln?

F dismisses the stated arguments about military contingency a la McPherson. He refuses to acknowledge that militarily the South had ever an opportunity of winning her independence. Neither by intervention from abroad or by victories on the battlefield. Therefore he looks to internal explanations. The Confederacy's vulnerabilities at home and the Union's recognition of how to exploit these flaws or social weaknesses.

History 225

Re: Notes from Freehling, "Divided South," in Reintegrating American History, p. 2

More on the importance of the border states to the Union cause of the Confederate defeat. F uses the epitaph of "Here Lies the Confederacy Buried First in the Border Lands."

See notes in Social History folder about the loss of manpower and resources that the Border South deprived the Confederacy when they remained loyal to the Union.

Suggested here that lecture material about Lincoln diplomacy re; Kentucky, Maryland, and Missouri (and West Virginia) be used w/ BCF readings.

See reference to Neely 's Fate of Liberty for Lincoln's actions in Maryland.

Section 5 of essay (pp. 237ff) on the manpower additions to Union from the borderlands and from southern Unionists. \*\*\* Note if I do not have these copy from p. 237. They deal with black man power that was mostly in the slave service of q. of the Confederacy until the Emancipation Proclamation.

See for reserves in the Union. 2 million white males who had not served but were of military draft age in 1864 plus black males who were a potential reserve manpower pool as opposed to the only 200, 000 Johnny Rebs under arms in 1864 facing over 1.5 million Billy Yanks in uniform.

In addition to Border South defections F adds the defections of blacks not only in terms of recruitment for soldiering but in other aspects as well. Denial of their land for food production. Their presence forced the South to take measures like the Twenty Slave Rule keeping men in the rear to guard against slave revolts of massive fleeing of the plantations when Union troops were in the area. Southerners generally moved their slave properties into the interior to avoid any contact with Union armies and this disrupted the economy.

The final defection came from the hordes of white southerners in the army who were nonslaveholders and saw the war as a planters' war and a poor man's fight. He cites the examples of the melting away of Lee's troops in 1864/5 and the letters from home.

\*\*\* Note see F pp. 244ff on the self-fulfilling fears of the deep South of their suspicions of the fragility of slavery in Border South. Why the Confederacy feared a Lincoln presidency. F's point is that in rushing to secession these fearsome consequences were no longer fanciful but became the dreaded reality the deep secessionist South most feared. Use notes from these pages w/ the Sumter crisis.