

Wm. Davis, *The Cause Lost*

5. A Different Kind of War: Fighting in the West

Essay deals w/ warfare in Kansas, Missouri, Texas, Arkansas

This is a good antidote or sharp comparison w/ Linderman's *Embattled Courage*.

Davis makes vivid contrast between the more traditionalized and romanticized war in the east and west w/ these campaigns. Contrast largely w/ men on horseback. . . . Much of the warfare was hit and run. . . . forces included Mexicans and Indians fighting on both Confederate and Federal side. Warfare included guerilla and irregulars in wars of rapine, wanton bloodshed, massacre, revenge, and savagery that was commonplace.

It was the killing fields for the likes of Quantrill, Anderson, George Todd, and unspeakable events like the attack on Lawrence, Kansas, Centralia, Baxter Springs

Use Davis essay along with the Linderman book . Place on Library Reserve.

7. Lost Will Lost Causes

Begins by looking at the war in 1862 and comparing with 1863. 1862 was a high for the Confederacy w/ victories in the Peninsula, followed by Fredericksburg in December in the East. Antietam was a loss but not a disaster for the South. In the West the Rebs were still holding Vicksburg and Sherman's efforts to move waterborne against Vicksburg was frustrated.

1863 was a different story, a year of crushing defeats for the South.

Davis examines the echoes of these as they reflected off both sections. Useful indicators for 1863 are the volunteering in both armies. It expands in the North and falls off in the South. The same pattern can be seen with the increase of desertions in the Rebel ranks.

Toward the end of 1863 Richmond estimated that 33 to 50% of all soldiers officially in the service were missing from their commands. Suggests that for a growing number of Johnny Rebs there was a strong feeling that the war was lost. As one Georgia boy wrote home "There is no use fighting any longer no how, for we are done gon up the Spout."

It did not help when Richmond extended the enlistments of 12 -month regiments for the duration. This sparked some small-scale mutinies in some regiments and long-lasting resentment in others. Voluntary enlistments fell off and the South's resort to conscription was not very successful in making up the difference. By Nov. 1863

Davis, p. 2

Davis continues with comparisons of the economics of war in the North and the South. The comparisons especially by 1863 reveal a North superior and strengthened in many respects by the wartime economy as compared to a South that was sinking into economic travail w/ inflation at 300% .

Davis concludes by challenging the view that the South lost because of a loss of will to pursue a war for independence. Davis argues that will or the morale needd to carry on in the South was in retreat because of the conditions on the battlefield. This was evidencing itself in 1863 and save for a turn around it continued for the remainder of the war. It was battlefield losses, reverses layed on the South by Union forces in the field that brought Southern will power low.

Davis, *The Cause Lost*
Page three

11 Myths and Realities of the Confederacy

Davis has a useful discussion on what should be the name we give to the Civil War in this essay. Its the kind of exercise that I could use for the first class session.

Alternatives: Civil War; Lincoln's War; War of Northern Aggression; The War Between the States.

He notes that during Truman Presidency that Congress passed an act to satisfy the Dixiecrats that henceforth the true title should be "The War Between the States." His reflecting the diehard Southern view that it was not a Civil War.

Key here is whether or not the South or Confederacy ever was a legitimate country. Davis provides the test for this in three criteria: On to of the three he argues persuasively that the Confederacy was never a "country." He maintains that Civil War is a historically correct nomenclature for the events of 1861-1865.

Other myths addressed. Key one is what brought on the Civil War. Davis looks at the myth of state rights. He argues that there was not one single issue that could be dignified with the argument that Northern majorities threatened the South and thereby forced her to lavete Union except that of slavery. The issue of slavery and the right to take slaves into the territories was the issue on which secession hung.

Complimenting this is the understanding of what led Southerners to fight for four years. In this case it was not slavery but defense of the homeland. 90% of those who worn the butternut served not to defend the institution of slavery but to]defend their homeland against Yankee invaders.

Connecting myths. Davis looks at the argument by the South that it had the right under the Constitution to exercise its movement toward independence. He counters this argument with the proposition that secession was not a right in the sense that in 1860 there was nothing that the North or the Republican party was doing or threatened to do by way of denying the South her rights that could be viewed as just cause for breaking the contract of the Constitution. Standing against the expansion of slavery into the territories was the result of a majority decision as reflected in the laws of the land. That is, it was passed legally by northern majorities in Congress. Congress had the right over the territories. The right of secession is neither denied nor] affirmed in the Constitution. It order to make it a right it was up to the South to establish this precedent on the battlefield as it turned out. This the South failed to achieve.

Davis, *The Cause Lost*

Page our

The next myth is the ancient assertion that Lincoln started the war over the Sumter expedition.

Davis' point here is that the Southern insurrection or treason began first with South Carolina's seizing of the federal forts. This practice was copied by the other 6 seceding states. They were as indictable for treason and insurrection as John Brown when he seized the federal armory at Harpers Ferry.

The conclusion he draws is that the first act of aggression then was clearly on the part of the Confederacy and not Lincoln who was doing what he pledged: protect] and recover federal property.

8. The Turning Point That Wasn't: Confederates and Election of 1864

Davis begins this essay w/ the prerequisites that the Con. needed to fall into place to impact on the 1864 election that would prevent Lincoln's reelection. See the listings on pp 228-229.

Implementations: Deals with the raids in force by the South prior to the election. Sterling Price's raid into Missouri and Jubal Early's threat to the Washington were to take pressure off of Lee in the East and pressure off of Sherman's march thru Georgia. None of these were successful. General Johnston's role was key here if he could have prevented Sherman from taking Atlanta. But asking Johnston to lead an offensive was the same as asking him to walk on air. His whole mode of fighting was to retreat and he was faithful to his light in Georgia. By the time Hood took over the fall of Atlanta was pretty close to a foregone conclusion. Another example of Davis' failure to find a commander in the West who could match up with Grant and Sherman.

Mentioned w/ the above was Morgan's unauthorized and counterproductive raid into Kentucky.

Lee's only option, since he could not maneuver, was to hold the Richmond-Petersburg line against Grant and the Army of the Potomac.

Davis pretty much pooh-poohs the idea of the South expecting much by way of help from Copperheads, peace democrats, and what can only be called "terrorists" behind Northern lines like Knights and other secret anti-Republican societies. Pick up more on this from *Secret War for the Union* by Fishel.