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Jmaes Kegel, North with Lee and Jackson (1996)

Kegel's thesis is that the Confederacy's plans for the East, which ultimately led to Gettysburg, was all part of an integrated strategy that was apparent in the Shenandoah Valley campaigns of 1862, Second Manassas, incursion into Maryland in 1862, and finally the invasion of Pennsylvania a year later.

Planning for an invasion and waging of economic warfare against the North Kegel attributed to Stonewall Jackson. Encouraged after Manassas or First Bull Run and mindful of the morale problems in the North, Jackson came up with the idea that the time was ripe for an incursion into the North. To take the war to the Union and not wait for the next Union invasion of the southland.

In mid-October 1861 Jackson proposed to General Smith the following:

- Destroy industrial establishments wherever they were found
- break up the lines of communication between large commercial centers in the North
- Close the coal mines
- Take hold of the narrow neck between Pittsburgh and Lake Erie.

Kegel insists that Jackson pushed these ideas with Lee when Lee became commander of Eastern troops.

After the Shenandoah Campaign he proposed a more detailed plan of two great columns of forces to invade the North. One column would move on Pittsburgh and destroy the Union arsenal there. The other column would cross into Pennsylvania and move and take Harrisburg and winter over until the spring and then move on Philadelphia.

4. King Coal vs. King Cotton

Kegel makes interesting case for the vital need for coal for the Union. For the Union navy that was expanded to enforce the blockade, etc. And for railroads to ship war materials, troops, and the commerce of the Union.

He notes that most of the coal production was in Pennsylvania and, more importantly, most of this anthracite coal was mined in Pennsylvania. All was in striking distance of a Confederate invasion.

Jackson's plan based on economic warfare. Cripple the coal production of the Union and her economic infrastructure and Lincoln would have to sue for peace. Kegel presents an interesting analogue between King Cotton and King Coal.

CHAPTER SHOULD BE REVIEW FOR SPECIFICS

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Kegel, p. 2

Point here is the geography that favored the South with the Shenandoah Valley running from SW to NE.

Spring of 1862 the fortunes of war seemed to favor the Union. McClellan was posed to take Richmond. Victories in the West at Shiloh, taking of island No. 10 (when did New Orleans fall?) all pointed to an imminent Union victory in the war.

Note that the Peninsula Campaign preoccupied the course of the war.

With McClellan's defeat in Virginia the Confederacy was now posed to respond with its own counteroffensive. Richmond, Kegel argues, was now ready to unleash Jackson's invasion plans. More importantly, Lee was now head of the Army of Northern Virginia (not Johnston).

[Note might want to see Royster's Destructive War for his analysis of Jackson's idea of "total war".)

Kegel has a series of chapters dealing with the Peninsular Campaign. This placed a hold on any Southern incursion or invasion into the North.

Kegel presents Second Manassas as the beginning of the move north.

Chapter 14 The Invasion Begins

This is the Maryland campaign that ends with Antietam. In just three months Lee had reversed the situation on the ground. Now the initiative was with the Rebs. Forcing McClellan out of Virginia and defeat of Pope raised the hopes of Richmond.

Kegel has copy of Special Orders No. 191 on pp. 168/9

With this Lee had to scramble to concentrate his forces at Sharpsburg. It was Lee's plan to pick the time to attack McClellan when the situation best suited his plans. When he had all his army concentrated on the Maryland side of the Potomac. But w/ the lost orders the initiative passed to Mac.

Lee was counting on Mac's slowness to give him plenty of lead time. He knew the mind of McClellan and was confident that the Union's general's cautiousness would play into his hands.

Kegel, p. 3

Lee at G' burg w/ 60,000 troops was in a position to carry out Jackson's plans of 1862.

Ewell had divisions at Carlisle within striking distance of Harrisburg and the complex of railroad lines connecting Penna, with New York and w/ Pittsburgh to the west.

The anthracite coal mines in Pa. were to the northeast (See the diagram in Chpt. 4.

A victory at Gettysburg would have opened countless targets of opportunity for Lee during the summer and fall months. Harrisburg, Philadelphia, Washington, industry, railroads, coal fields in Penna. Lee could have foraged at will across the countryside if he had beaten Meade at G'burg.

Bring the hard hand of the war to the Yankees; stir up the peace parties in the North preparatory to the 1864 elections; possibly restir interest in Anglo-French recognition. There were countless opportunities available to Lee.