

the *entree* of the quartermaster's office and the ear of all officials at any hour of the twenty-four. He had no salary from the government for bringing charters to the feet of the quartermaster, but like so many others the committee have had occasion to expose, his compensation came in the shape of commission upon the charter money thereafter to be earned.


As for Captain George, he was charged with "gross abuse of trust. The efforts of the quartermaster . . . did not seem to the committee to be directed at any time so much to the securing of vessels best adapted to the service at the least cost as constantly to the patronage of political and personal favorites."<sup>16</sup> As in the case of Andrew J. Butler, the Senate declined to approve George's commission.

During this carnival of corruption and incompetence, Butler became embroiled in a bitter feud with Governor Andrew of Massachusetts, who complained futilely to Washington about the general's doings. Perhaps it is only fair to let him have the last word. "I am compelled to declare with great reluctance and regret," he wrote Senators Charles Sumner and Henry Wilson, "that the whole course of proceeding under Major General Butler in this Commonwealth seems to have been designed and adapted simply to afford means to persons of bad character to make money unscrupulously, and to encourage men whose unfitness had excluded them from any appointment by me. . . ."<sup>17</sup>

But the Lincoln administration continued to handle the general with great tenderness, and before long he was off to New Orleans. There he found even finer opportunities to exercise those venal talents which an indulgent Providence had so liberally bestowed upon him.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, vi-vii, 1141, 1283, 1288; *Butler Correspondence*, I, 392, 398. Fisher Hildreth blamed George's removal on Vice Pres. Hannibal Hamlin, Sen. William P. Fessenden of Maine, and Rep. Justin S. Morrill of Vermont, who went to the Secy. of War and accused George of employing disloyal men (John Babson and Benjamin Wiggin), and on Sen. Henry Wilson of Massachusetts, who accused George of being corrupt. *Ibid.*, I, 392.

<sup>17</sup> *OR*, Ser. III, I, 865.



## WHO WERE THE SENATE RADICALS?

*Edward L. Gambill*

HISTORIANS' ATTEMPTS to deal coherently with congressional Radical Republicans during the "Critical Year"—1866—illustrate the inadequacies often produced by traditional historical analysis of American political behavior. Specifically, they reveal the lack of attention devoted by political historians to systematic classification, and how this inattention can, in turn, produce misleading generalizations. They also point up the opportunities for applying research techniques developed by other disciplines.

Scholarly investigation of Radical Republicanism in 1866 dates from the turn of the century and the work of James Ford Rhodes.<sup>1</sup> For Rhodes, the Radicals were a handful of men, typified by Charles Sumner in the Senate and Thaddeus Stevens in the House, who stood well in advance of northern opinion in their demands for political reconstruction of the South. Rhodes did not endow these men with the cohesion of a cabal. While they essentially sought the same basic goal of Negro suffrage, he said, they displayed marked differences at the outset of the Thirty-ninth Congress about the extent to which this goal might be realized and how it might best be achieved. That the majority of northerners eventually endorsed the Radical goal was not the result of a highly disciplined political offensive but rather stemmed from the blunders of President Andrew Johnson and southern leaders.

With the publication in 1930 of Howard K. Beale's *The Critical Year*,<sup>2</sup> interpretation of the Radicals received a new emphasis which was to remain dominant for over two decades. The germ of Professor Beale's thesis was a concept of reality owed to the influence of Charles Beard. For Beale, as for other Beardians, historical reality was "hard," "hidden," and in the last analysis, economic. The factor which had

<sup>1</sup> James Ford Rhodes, *History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850 to . . . 1887*, V-VI (New York, 1909, 1915).

<sup>2</sup> Howard K. Beale, *The Critical Year: A Study of Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction* (New York, 1930).

brought the Radicals together was their common position as advance agents for an incipient industrial order. Their basic goals were the securing of tax benefits and protective tariffs for industry, the maintenance of the new national banking system, refunding of the federal debt in hard money, and the commercial exploitation of southern and western economic resources.

Beale's interpretation led him to view the Radicals as a conspiratorial group. As they could not and did not openly avow their "real" aims in demands for political reconstruction of the South, they were necessarily evolving their program in secrecy behind the scenes. This, in turn, implied a high degree of cohesion and group discipline. Thus, Beale maintained, the dynamics of the Critical Year lay in a "strongly organized Radical minority hard at work to covert a passive but unconvinced majority—a minority fully aware of the difficulties of the task, but determined to win if indefatigable labor and earnestness of purpose could bring victory."<sup>3</sup>

Beale's thesis has recently undergone searching criticism from a number of historians. Professors Irwin Unger, Robert Sharkey, Stanley Coben, and Eric McKittrick have all argued that the Radicals could not have been united by common economic bonds.<sup>4</sup> There were sharp conflicts, these scholars observed, in economic interests among Radical legislators and northern businessmen alike. High protectionist manufacturing interests in Pennsylvania and Ohio tended inevitably toward a soft-money philosophy. New England proponents of hard money, conversely, generally supported a low tariff program. Moreover, few northern businessmen were interested in southern investments in the early postwar years, and these few were hostile to Radical Republicanism.

With the attack on Beale's interpretation came renewed emphasis on the political demands of the Radicals as the essential element distinguishing them from their northern colleagues. "The only common denominator of 1866 that united the Radicals," asserted John and LaWanda Cox, ". . . was their determination that the South should not be reinstated into the Union until there were adequate guarantees that the slaves liberated by the nation should enjoy the rights of free men."<sup>5</sup> McKittrick, in turn, found the Radicals of early 1866 distin-

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. vii.

<sup>4</sup> Irwin Unger, "Businessmen and Specie Resumption," *Political Science Quarterly*, LXVI (1959), 46-70; Robert Sharkey, *Money, Class and Party: An Economic Study of Civil War and Reconstruction* (Baltimore, 1959); Stanley Coben, "Northern Business and Radical Reconstruction: A Re-examination," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XLVI (1959), 67-90; Eric McKittrick, *Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction* (Chicago, 1960).

<sup>5</sup> John and LaWanda Cox, *Politics, Principle and Prejudice, 1865-1866: Dilemma of Reconstruction America* (New York, 1963), pp. 209-210.

guished by the promotion of Negro suffrage, their demands for the exclusion of the southern states, and their political opposition to Andrew Johnson.

The accent on Radical cohesion went the way of the economic interpretation. For McKittrick, "they were radical for different objects and for different reasons; they should not be endowed," he declared, "with too much retroactive solidarity or group purpose. We find no program, no unity, no 'grim confidence,' and certainly no 'fierce joy.' For anything more than a kind of irritable confusion the evidence is extremely sketchy."<sup>6</sup>

With this deemphasis came a downgrading of the Radicals as primary causal agents in the political drama of the Critical Year. Under the pens of McKittrick and the Coxes, President Johnson once again assumed a position at the center of the historical stage. Unlike Rhodes, however, McKittrick also elevated northern Democrats to a crucial role in undermining Moderate Republican proposals for the South. Implicit in McKittrick's idea of a Democratic offensive is a high degree of cohesion in that party.

With McKittrick's study, historiography on the Critical Year came full circle. Despite the profusion of old and new literature, however, meager attention has been devoted to several problems which appear crucial to the interpretations advanced. In the first place, emphasis has been given to explaining *what* the Radicals were, at the expense of determining *who* they were. Yet it would seem reasonably clear that these two matters are so closely interrelated that neglect of one raises serious doubts about conclusions regarding the other. Second, generalizations about the cohesion of various political groups in 1866 often appear to be postulated in a vacuum. Meaningful statements about supposedly tightly knit political units can hardly be made when the frame of reference is some abstract standard rather than the specific attitudes of the individuals involved.

To determine who the Radicals were—and only then their cohesiveness relative to other groups—requires the construction of some form of attitude scale against which the various degrees of political opinion can be measured. Speeches, reminiscences, editorials, and private correspondence are materials ill-suited for this task, since the distribution of such records among the persons under study is at best uneven. Furthermore, the difficulties involved in determining group relationships from these conventional sources are practically insurmountable.

In contrast, congressional voting records offer a fund of material readily adaptable to the problem. Even members of Congress who seldom gave speeches demonstrated their attitudes toward issues by

<sup>6</sup> McKittrick, *Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction*, p. 54.

their votes. Thus, a series of roll call votes is the most complete source available on the range of congressional attitudes. Such statements of opinion are also in a form amenable to systematic investigation.

The problem then resolves itself into how a variety of roll calls can be sorted out with respect to the issues and how they can then be ordered to delineate degrees of opinion on each issue. The "Guttman scalogram" method now commonly used by political scientists provides a solution. With this technique, related roll calls can be grouped and when the respective votes are arranged in a scale the variation of opinion on a given issue become clear. The positions of individual congressmen, in relation to their colleagues, can thereby be easily observed.<sup>7</sup>

Before applying the Guttman scale to this problem, however, some criterion must be established to isolate the issues which separated Radicals from other congressmen. The criterion adopted here is the traditionally used as a test of Radicalism: political reconstruction. It might be noted that even Beale worked within the context of political issues and only assumed the economic base; thus he also defined Radicalism by the "ephemeral" reconstruction controversy.

To determine the attitude spectrum of senators on reconstruction during the Thirty-ninth Congress, roll call votes recorded in the *Senate Journal* were employed. These votes, in turn, produced nine "scales" covering such issues as southern representation, Negro rights, the Freedman's Bureau, civil law, control over political appointments and the Reconstruction Act of March 2, 1867.<sup>8</sup> The "scores" of individual senators on each scale were then added and the total divided by the highest possible Radical response. The end result, as depicted in the table below, is a single attitude index which gives average percentage ratings for those senators who appeared on more than half the scales. Extreme Radicals appear at the beginning of the list; Republican Conservatives and Democrats are at the end; Republican Moderates are in the center.<sup>9</sup>

As the index indicates, there is no clear breaking point which separates Radical and Moderate Republican "blocs." The picture is somewhat clearer, however, as one moves toward the other end of the list. There is a steady progression away from Radicalism through the cen-

<sup>7</sup> For a full discussion of the Guttman scale technique see George M. Beale, "A Method for Analyzing Legislative Behavior," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, II (1958), 377-402.

<sup>8</sup> Further technical information on these scales is included in the appendix to this article.

<sup>9</sup> Thirteen senators, who appeared on less than half of the scales, are not included in the index. These are Cattell, Collamer, Edmunds, Fogg, Foot, Fowler, Frelinghuysen, Patterson (Dem.), Ross, Stockton (Dem.), Thayer, Tipton, and Wright (Dem.).

TABLE I

Senator	N°	%	Party	Senator	N°	%	Party
Wade	9	.967	R	Clark	7	.725	R
Sumner	9	.950	R	Crimes	8	.722	R
Chandler	9	.900	R	Creswell	5	.706	R
Pomeroy	9	.883	R	Foster	8	.701	R
Yates	9	.867	R	Sherman	9	.683	R
Morrill	8	.852	R	Lane (Kans.)	5	.649	R
Wilson	9	.850	R	Morgan	9	.633	R
Anthony	9	.833	R	Henderson	9	.617	R
Howard	9	.833	R	Wiley	9	.567	R
Ramsey	9	.833	R	Van Winkle	9	.467	R
Furness	9	.817	R	Dixon	6	.465	R
Howe	9	.817	R	Doolittle	9	.317	R
Sprague	8	.807	R	Norton	7	.267	R
Fessenden	7	.804	R	McDougall	8	.204	D
Poland	9	.800	R	Hendricks	9	.100	D
Brown	6	.789	R	Johnson	5	.077	D
Nye	7	.784	R	Guthrie	8	.059	D
Comess	9	.783	R	Buckalew	9	.050	D
Lane (Ind.)	9	.783	R	Nesmith	7	.043	D
Cragin	7	.761	R	Riddle	7	.039	D
Stewart	9	.750	R	Davis	9	.017	D
Harris	7	.745	R	Cowan	5	.000	R
Kirkwood	7	.739	R	Saulsbury	8	.000	D
Williams	9	.733	R				

\* The number of scales on which the individual's name appears.

ter of the index until Waitman T. Willey of West Virginia is reached. Below Willey there are two points which serve as possible divisions between Moderate and Conservative Republicans. It might also be noted here that James McDougall, a Democrat, was close to the Conservative Republicans while Edgar Cowan, a Republican, was at the extreme conservative end of the index.

Additional light is shed on the problem of the Republican Radicals when this index is compared with subjective conclusions derived from secondary material. The following are the names of senators assumed to be Radicals by several leading historians of the period:

Beale	Randall and Donald <sup>10</sup>	McKittrick
Wade	Wade	Wade
Sumner	Sumner	Sumner
Chandler	Chandler	Chandler
Wilson	Wilson	Wilson
Howard	Howe	Howard
Fessenden	Brown	Brown
Brown		

The number of discrepancies is substantial. If B. Gratz Brown, for example, can be classified as a Radical, then so can eight of his colleagues not mentioned by these historians. A partial explanation for the large proportion of omissions lies with the nature of the source material employed. There seems to be a definite tendency for these historians to cite those "Radicals" who frequently occupied the Senate floor while ignoring others who spoke infrequently. This is demonstrated by the number of pages in the *Congressional Globe* (first session) in which the senators appeared as speakers on reconstruction issues.<sup>11</sup>

TABLE 2

Senator	pages	Senator	pages
*Wade	120	*Howard	137
*Sumner	192	Ramsey	15
*Chandler	8	Trumbull	488
Pomeroy	72	*Howe	119
Yates	46	Sprague	2
Morrill	30	*Fessenden	268
*Wilson	234	Poland	16
Anthony	20	*Brown	12

\* Designated as Radicals by Beale, Randall and Donald, and/or McKittrick.

Omissions, moreover, were not confined to the Radical end of the spectrum. Professor McKittrick, for example, overlooked two senators in identifying the Conservative Republicans. "In the Senate," he asserted, "of all the Republicans who might have held such a position only three actually did: James R. Doolittle of Wisconsin, Edgar Cowan of Pennsylvania, and James Dixon of Connecticut."<sup>12</sup> There is little reason to dispute the names cited, but the index indicates that Daniel Norton of Minnesota and Peter Van Winkle of West Virginia would then also have to be cited.

There are also several cases of overlapping classifications. Profes-

<sup>10</sup> James G. Randall and David Donald, *The Civil War and Reconstruction* (Boston, 1961).

<sup>11</sup> Debates on the admission of western territories to statehood are excluded.

<sup>12</sup> McKittrick, *Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction*, p. 81.

sors Beale, Randall and Donald, and McKittrick all depicted Lyman Trumbull as a Republican Moderate, and yet the Illinois senator occupies a more extreme position on the spectrum than B. Gratz Brown, who all four historians consider a Radical. The inclusion by Randall and Donald of Lot M. Morrill and William P. Fessenden in the Moderate camp provides additional conflicts with their list of Radicals. McKittrick also designated Fessenden as a Moderate but failed to cite Morrill.

What then can be said about where the dividing line between Radical and Moderate Republicans might be drawn? In the first place, any such decision would have to consider the commonly accepted assumption that the bulk of Republican senators were Moderates. If this assumption is correct, then Brown of Missouri would be a poor choice. Alexander Ramsey, on the other hand, meets the requirement while providing a minimal amount of conflict with senators historians have cited as Moderates. The breakdown of the groups would then be as follows:

TABLE 3

Radical Republicans	Moderate Republicans	Conservative Republicans	Democrats
Wade	Trumbull	Kirkwood	Van Winkle
Sumner	Howe	Williams	Dixon
Chandler	Sprague	Clark	Doolittle
Pomeroy	Fessenden	Grimes	Norton
Yates	Poland	Creswell	Cowan
Morrill	Brown	Foster	
Wilson	Nye	Sherman	
Anthony	Conness	Lane (Kans.)	
Howard	Lane (Ind.)	Morgan	
Ramsey	Cragin	Henderson	
	Stewart	Willey	
	Harris		
			McDougall
			Hendricks
			Johnson
			Guthrie
			Buckalew
			Nesmith
			Riddle
			Davis
			Saulsbury

The problem now raised is the relative degree of cohesion of the designated groups. The following is a mathematical statement of the average divergence between senators in each congressional "bloc":

TABLE 4

Radical Republicans	.013 per cent
Moderate Republicans	.010 per cent
Conservative Republicans	.093 per cent
Democrats	.023 per cent

As the table indicates, Moderate Republicans were the most cohesive group in the Senate. Radical Republicans were less cohesive than the Moderates but demonstrated more unity than either Conservative Republicans or Democrats. It should be noted, however,

that James McDougall alone accounted for much of the divergence among the Democrats and if he is excluded their cohesion would equal that of the Radical Republicans (.013 per cent). Edgar Cowan's extreme conservative position also exerted a similar effect on the Conservative Republicans, but if Cowan is excluded their degree of diversity (.050 per cent) would still remain much higher than that of the other groups. In any event, the group division suggested in Table 3 holds up well under the test of attitude cohesion.

Guttman scalogram analysis of the Senate's voting record in 1866 would seem to have provided an answer to the question, "Who were the Senate Radicals?" It also suggests the feasibility of a similar analysis of the House, and the technique might conceivably provide a fresh perspective on the relationship of congressional Radicalism to northern economic interests. Certainly the historiography of the Critical Year has reached a point where only such quantitative research may produce effective guidelines for further interpretation.

#### APPENDIX

##### SCALES USED

1. Southern representation, 10 roll calls, 9 scale types, C.R.=.967
2. Negro rights, 12 roll calls, 10 scale types, C.R.=.993
3. Negro rights, 11 roll calls, 9 scale types, C.R.=.994
4. Negro rights, 11 roll calls, 9 scale types, C.R.=.988
5. Freedman's Bureau, 14 roll calls, 7 scale types, C.R.=.991
6. Freedman's Bureau, 11 roll calls, 7 scale types, C.R.=.996
7. Civil law, 6 roll calls, 7 scale types, C.R.=.992
8. Political appointments, 7 roll calls, 7 scale types, C.R.=.992
9. Reconstruction Act of March 2, 1867, 10 roll calls, 4 scale types, C.R.=1.000



## CAPTAIN DANA IN FLORIDA:

### A Narrative of the Seymour Expedition

*Edited by Lester L. Swift*

PRESIDENT LINCOLN ISSUED his Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction on December 8, 1863. By mid-January, 1864, a program of reconstruction to establish loyal state governments had begun in Virginia, Louisiana, Arkansas and Tennessee. It is probable that a man close to the President suggested that Florida should be the fifth southern state to take advantage of the Proclamation. John Hay, one of Lincoln's private secretaries, had visited Florida in April, 1863. On December 28, 1863, Hay received a letter from two prominent Florida citizens asking him to come to Florida and be their Representative in Congress.<sup>1</sup>

About the same time a Union general also decided that Florida deserved attention. Major General Quincy A. Gillmore, commanding the Department of the South, wrote to General Halleck on December 15, 1863, requesting permission to send an expedition to Florida. There had been very little military activity in that state. Florida was included in Gillmore's department but only about two regiments were stationed at Fernandina and St. Augustine to maintain those two ports for the Union blockading squadron.

Gillmore gave four reasons why the occupation of Florida by Union troops would be beneficial. One source of the enemy's commissary supplies, especially beef, would be cut off and a trade in cotton and lumber would be opened. Negro recruits could be enlisted and Union soldiers could protect loyal citizens and aid in establishing a reconstructed government.<sup>2</sup>

Gillmore detailed Brigadier General Truman Seymour to command the expedition. Seymour was a West Pointer with a long record of honorable service. Three brigades were placed under his command, in-

<sup>1</sup> Roy P. Basler *et al.* (eds.), *The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1953-1955), VII, 82, 89, 108, 130; Tyler Dennett (ed.), *Lincoln and the Civil War in the Diaries and Letters of John Hay* (New York, 1939), p. 145.

<sup>2</sup> U.S. War Dept., *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* (Washington, 1880-1901), Ser. I, XVIII, pt. 2, 129. (Cited hereafter as *OR*, with all references to Ser. I.)