

experience" and the "feeble bucrum of self importance."³⁰ It is significant that Nuttall, who was wont to comment appreciatively on his friends and acquaintances whenever occasion permitted, expressed neither warmth of feeling nor formal gratitude toward his earliest patron in any of his publications. For this omission some writers have deemed Nuttall ungrateful, a quality not characteristic of him. More reflective and informed judgment would explain the omission differently.³¹

New York

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³⁰ The phrases quoted are in Nuttall's letter to George Putnam, Aug. 30, 1823, in which he bitterly expresses extreme distaste for these human foibles. Letter owned by the Putnam family.

³¹ Francis W. Pennell criticized Nuttall for failing to dedicate his *Genera of North American Plants* (1818) to Barton, and even for omitting acknowledgment of his assistance. "Travels and Scientific Collections of Thomas Nuttall," *Bartonia*, XVIII (1936), 26. Nuttall has been unfortunate in that his biographers have shown peculiar lack of understanding of his temperament and philosophy.

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Radical Republicanism in Pennsylvania, 1866-1873

FOR many years it has been customary to regard the Radical Republicans of the post-Civil War era as rather more conservative than their party name would suggest. A generally accepted notion of Reconstruction would identify the Radicals as spokesmen for northern economic interests, heirs to the program of the former Whigs, and proponents of radical social policies only so far as the southern states were concerned. The late Howard K. Beale contended that "on the great economic questions of the day, the 'Radicals' were in general conservative, and the opponents of their reconstruction policy tended toward radicalism of an agrarian type."¹ Others have agreed that the Reconstruction measures of Congress were undertaken, in whole or in part, in order to safeguard the interests of "northeastern business" against the threat of a coalition of southern and western forces which were antagonistic to a high tariff, a return to hard currency, and northern economic penetration of the South.²

Quite recently, this conventional interpretation of Reconstruction has been challenged. Serious doubt has been cast on the unity of "northeastern business" with regard to the major issues of the period.³ A comprehensive study of the money question argues that the most adamant of the Radical leaders tended to be supporters of the greenback policy and actually blended "soft-money" and tariff

¹ Howard K. Beale, *The Critical Year: A Study of Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction* (New York, 1958), 7. Beale's work was first published in 1930.

² See Charles A. and Mary R. Beard, *The Rise of American Civilization* (New York, 1938), II, 105-110, 266-267, 287-294; Vernon L. Parrington, *Main Currents in American Thought* (New York, 1930), III, 20-30; Allan Nevins and Henry S. Commager, *The Pocket History of the United States* (New York, 1956), 236, 257; W. E. Burghardt Du Bois, *Black Reconstruction in America, 1860-1880* (New York, 1935), 210-214.

³ Stanley Coben, "Northeastern Business and Radical Reconstruction: A Re-examination," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XLVI (1959), 67-90; Irwin Unger, "Business Men and Specie Resumption," *Political Science Quarterly*, LXXIV (1959), 46-70.

between the producers and the national market,¹³ the heads of the railroad and shipping corporations, the metropolitan bankers and realtors, or, in short, with the members of the elite Saturday Evening Club of Philadelphia who scorned the manufacturing *arrivistes* and their diamond-bedecked wives.¹⁴ The captains of commerce, unlike their counterparts in industry, were the bulwark of conservatism in both political parties. The identification of Radicalism with "north-eastern business" fails precisely because it ignores the sharp conflict of interest and origin between these two sectors of business.

Similarly misleading is the customary equating of Republican with former Whig.¹⁵ Many of the leading Pennsylvania Republicans, including John White Geary, Simon Cameron, John Hickman, William D. Kelley, and John W. Forney, had been Democrats before the Kansas crisis. The stronghold of Republican strength throughout the sixties lay in the farm counties to the north and west of the great arch of the Appalachians, counties which had stood consistently by Jackson in the 1830's.¹⁶ David Wilmot might lie in the graveyard of a Towanda village church, but the spirit of his Proviso and of the Independent Democrats of 1854 still prevailed among the farmers and country businessmen who considered the Republican Party their own creation.¹⁷

The hard-fought political contests of the Reconstruction era were centered in that broad wedge of heavily populated counties which runs northward out of Philadelphia between the Delaware and Schuylkill rivers to the New York line in the north and the Susque-

¹³ John R. Commons, ed., *History of Labour in the United States* (New York, 1918), II, 3-6; Fred Mitchell Jones, *Middlemen in the Domestic Trade of the United States, 1800-1860* (Urbana, Ill., 1937), 13-32.

¹⁴ McClure, II, 244-254; Sharkey, 238-267. Sharkey, p. 293, identifies the conflicting groups as "industrial and financial capital." This classification leads him to conclude that Radicalism died in 1868 with the death of Thaddeus Stevens and with the emergence of clear party alignments on the money question. My view goes beyond that based solely on the green-back question and sees Radicalism as an effective social ideology until the coming of the depression in 1873.

¹⁵ Beard, II, 287-288; Beale, 8-9; Parrington, III, 20, 30.

¹⁶ See Sullivan, 231-233, for a tabulation of voting in the 1830's. Of the counties Sullivan records as most staunchly Democratic in 1832, nineteen were Republican in 1866, and seventeen, all eastern counties, remained Democratic. Seven Whig counties of 1832 were Republican in 1866 and two Democratic. This count unfortunately cannot analyze the many counties which were divided or consolidated between the two elections.

¹⁷ See McClure, I, 331 ff., on "The People's Party."

hanna River on the west. Here powerful Democratic machines were entrenched, as in Philadelphia's notorious Fourth Ward along the Delaware, and in Luzerne, Schuylkill, and Lackawanna counties where the secret "Molly Maguires" wielded great political power.¹⁸ Of crucial importance is the fact that anti-Negro sentiment was institutionalized in the Democratic Party of Pennsylvania, which sought to bolster its opposition to the Republicans by incessantly fanning the flames of bigotry.¹⁹ Just as the Republicans had a vested interest in "the bloody shirt," so the Democrats had one in the concept of a "white man's country."

Labor in this period did not constitute an effective political bloc. Democratic strength cannot be equated with labor strength. The votes of the workingmen seem to have been determined far less by labor questions as such than by loyalties to local party groupings, religious and nationality questions, and the issues posed by the major parties.²⁰ Most of the new labor organizations, at least in the politically decisive eastern part of the state, followed the course advocated by Jonathan Fincher, the machinists' leader from Philadelphia, and avoided all party politics. Although the young National Labor Union advocated quick restoration of the southern states, it sought to bring about a political realignment in the nation on the basis of the green-back question.²¹ Only twice did the N.L.U. make a significant impact on state politics. First, in the wake of a long and bitter series of strikes by iron puddlers, molders, and heaters in Pittsburgh in 1867, the unions launched a Labor Reform Party in Allegheny County. Its candidates for the state legislature claimed to have won 3,500 votes

¹⁸ See W. E. Burghardt Du Bois, *The Philadelphia Negro* (Philadelphia, 1899), 40-42; McClure, II, 431-434; Walter J. Coleman, *The Molly Maguire Riots* (Richmond, Va., 1936), 61-69. In 1866, the Fourth Ward vote was 2,268 Democrat to 946 Republican. *Philadelphia Public Ledger*, Oct. 10, 1866.

¹⁹ See the accounts of Democratic Party meetings in Philadelphia during the campaign of 1868, *Public Ledger*, Sept. 3, 24, 25, 26, and 29, 1868.

²⁰ James D. Burn, *Three Years among the Working Classes in the United States during the War* (London, 1865), 247-248; Sharkey, 218.

²¹ Commons, *History of Labour in the United States*, II, 93-94. Delegate Krepps from Pittsburgh made a strong appeal to the National Labor Union convention against involvement in party politics. *Chicago Daily Tribune*, Aug. 21, 1867. On the N.L.U. stand toward the South, see John R. Commons, ed., *A Documentary History of American Industrial Society* (New York, 1958), IX, 126 ff., 138-139, hereinafter cited as *Documentary History*. Note also the stand of the N.L.U. in favor of co-operation with Negro workers which distinguished its position from that of the Democrats. *Ibid.*, IX, 157.

and small majorities in nine precincts, but none were elected.²² It is quite possible that this labor effort spurred the passage of some of the Radical and prolabor legislation which was enacted during the Assembly session of 1868.²³ Secondly, in 1872 the N.L.U. joined forces with the Republicans in Schuylkill County to elect as judge Cyrus Pershing, who was to use his office to break the power of both the Democratic Party and the "Molly Maguires" in that area.²⁴

The election campaign of 1866 was fought over national issues. The Republicans placed themselves squarely behind the proposed Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution and declared in their state platform that "the most imperative duty of the present is to gather the legitimate fruits of the war, in order that our Constitution may come out of the rebellion purified, our institutions strengthened, and our national life prolonged."²⁵ The commercial interests of the state were largely sympathetic to Andrew Johnson's program of immediate restoration of the former Confederate states.²⁶ The most powerful Republican leader, Simon Cameron, who in the spring of 1866 was still hoping to be the dispenser of Johnson's patronage in the state, prevented the party convention from taking an anti-Johnson stand.²⁷ Only a Radical threat to bolt the party brought about a compromise plank which commended Johnson's wartime position, but appealed to him "to stand firmly by the side . . . of the loyal masses," who would support all measures by which "the freedom, stability, and unity of the National Union [could be] restored."²⁸

The Democratic candidate for governor was Hiester Clymer, a lawyer from "one of the oldest Pennsylvania families."²⁹ The Demo-

²² Chicago *Workingman's Advocate*, Oct. 12 and Nov. 23, 1867; Boston *Daily Evening Voice*, Oct. 15, 1867. The same Krepps who had denounced party politics in August was himself a labor candidate for the legislature. *Workingman's Advocate*, Sept. 21, 1867.

²³ Three points from the Labor Reform platform were enacted during the legislative session of 1868: a state eight-hour-day law, repeal of the "Tioga County Law," and a free railroad incorporation law. The platform of the party was printed in the *Workingman's Advocate*, Sept. 28, 1867.

²⁴ McClure, II, 434; Coleman, 67.

²⁵ Edward McPherson, *Handbook of Politics for 1868* (Washington, D. C., 1868), 123.

²⁶ See the *Public Ledger* editorial "Business and Politics," Jan. 23, 1866, and the editorials of Jan. 27 and Aug. 9, 1866.

²⁷ McClure, II, 193-195.

²⁸ McPherson, 123.

²⁹ *Public Ledger*, Mar. 3, 1866.

crats praised Republican Senator Edgar Cowan, who had backed Johnson's vetoes, and proclaimed that "the white race alone is entitled to control of the government of the Republic, and we are unwilling to grant the negroes the right to vote."³⁰ The high point of their campaign was the National Union Convention called in support of Johnson in Philadelphia at which the Massachusetts delegates, led by such men as Robert Winthrop, General Darius N. Couch, Leverett Saltonstall, and John Quincy Adams, grandson of the former President, entered the hall arm in arm with the delegates from South Carolina while the band played "Dixie."³¹

When Johnson arrived in Philadelphia on his "swing round the circle," he was greeted by a committee of businessmen headed by Anthony J. Drexel, one of the leading bankers of the city.³² George W. Childs's influential *Public Ledger*, the leading commercial paper of the city, gave a coverage to the "swing" that was favorable to the President, although its ardor cooled perceptibly after Johnson's angry performance in the face of hecklers in Cleveland.³³

As far as Pennsylvania is concerned, it is difficult to picture Johnson and his supporters as defenders of agrarian America. Johnson never opposed the financial policies of Secretary of the Treasury Hugh McCulloch until after the election of 1868. The high tariffs which those who have depicted Johnson as an agrarian radical think he should have vetoed, were, in fact, signed.³⁴ Indeed, at a great rally in Reading opening the Democratic campaign, the featured speaker, Montgomery Blair, castigated the New England Republicans, especially Senators Sumner and Wilson, for failing to support Pennsylvania's high tariff needs.³⁵

The Republican candidate, John White Geary, was a former Democratic leader of California, the onetime territorial governor of Kansas appointed by President Pierce, and a military hero with an

³⁰ McPherson, 123.

³¹ *Public Ledger*, Aug. 15, 1866. On the Massachusetts delegation, see *ibid.*, Aug. 9, 1866.

³² *Ibid.*, Aug. 29, 1866. The foremost banker of the city, Jay Cooke, in 1866 endorsed the financial policies of the administration, but not Johnson's campaign for a conservative Congress. In the following years, Cooke lent his support even to the Radical views on currency expansion. Unger, 60-61.

³³ *Public Ledger*, Sept. 19, 1866.

³⁴ Beale, 235-236, 272. On Beale's view of Johnson's policies as "agrarian," see *ibid.*, 28-29, 115, 244, 299.

³⁵ *Public Ledger*, July 19, 1866.

almost legendary record.³⁶ He was nominated as a compromise candidate with strong popular appeal, acceptable to both wings of the party.³⁷ Republican campaign advertisements consisted of a serialized life of Geary and explanations of the Fourteenth Amendment, described as a measure which would protect the rights of Pennsylvania citizens in all states, prevent one white southerner from having the voting power of two northerners, keep traitors out of office, and end all possibility of compensation for slaves or repayment of Confederate debts.³⁸ The Democrats, for their part, sought to split off conservative Republicans by indicating possible acceptance of the last two sections of the Amendment while attacking the first two,³⁹ and by using Johnson's patronage powers to have Radical postmasters fired.⁴⁰

In the October elections, the largest vote ever polled in the state returned a more than 17,000 majority for Geary, and gave the Republicans two additional Congressmen and a clear majority in the state legislature.⁴¹ The results established the Republican Party in full control, an advantage which was retained for the remainder of the decade and which improved the ability of the Radicals to operate within that party. As governor, Geary became increasingly a spokesman for the Radical outlook. To demonstrate how this strength was used we might examine the Radicals' image of themselves and their position on the tariff, currency, public education, Negro rights, labor, and the railroads.

The Radicals viewed themselves as part—even as leaders—of a world-wide upsurge of democracy. Throughout their speeches one finds the theme that was expressed in Geary's message to the Assembly in 1869. The governor pointed to England's new law broadening the suffrage, the expulsion of the Bourbons from Spain,

³⁶ William E. Armor, *Lives of the Governors of Pennsylvania, 1609-1873* (Philadelphia, 1873), 466-490; Harry M. Tinkcom, *John White Geary, Soldier-Statesman, 1819-1873* (Philadelphia, 1940).

³⁷ *Public Ledger*, Mar. 8, 1866; McClure, II, 192-195.

³⁸ *Public Ledger*, Sept. 24, 1866, and subsequent issues.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, Sept. 27, 1866.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, Sept. 22 and 24, 1866. Within six months, Johnson's administration discharged 446 Federal officeholders, of whom 120 were postmasters removed expressly for patronage reasons. *Ibid.*, Jan. 17, 1867.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, Oct. 11, 22, and 31, 1866. The total vote was more than 597,000.

and the liberal concessions in France and Prussia, and asked: "What are these but echoes of the dire catastrophe that has overwhelmed aristocracy in the United States?"⁴²

The fact that democracy had successfully weathered "The Rebellion" had, for the Radicals, confirmed its superiority over all other political forms. Pointing to every new increase in American production, they challenged "monarchic England" for world supremacy. Their foremost economist, Henry Carey, declared that the overthrow of slavery had ended America's former condition of economic vassalage in which all her railroads had simply moved agricultural products and raw materials to the workshops of England. Now, behind the sheltering wall of the tariff and bolstered by an abundant legal tender and bank note currency, the manufacturing of the United States was outstripping that of the Old World.⁴³ The twin levers of this success were seen to be the protective tariff and political democracy.

So intimately were the tariff and the ideal of democracy intertwined in the thinking of Pennsylvania's Radicals that Congressman William D. Kelley argued:

The theory that labor—the productive exercise of the skill and muscular power of men who are responsible for the faithful and intelligent performance of civic and other duties—is merely a raw material, and that that nation which pays least for it is wisest and best governed, is inadmissible in a democracy; and when we shall determine to starve the bodies and minds of our operatives in order that we may successfully compete in common markets with the productions of the under-paid and poorly-fed peasants of Europe and the paupers of England, we shall assail the foundations of a government which rests upon the intelligence and integrity of its people.⁴⁴

Although to many historians of this century the protective tariff has appeared to be inherently reactionary legislation on behalf of special vested interests, to the Radicals it was not only necessary for

⁴² "Papers of the Governors," *Pennsylvania Archives, Fourth Series* (Harrisburg, Pa., 1902), VIII, 957, hereinafter cited "Papers of the Governors."

⁴³ Henry Carey, "Report for the Committee on Industrial Interests and Labor," *Debates of the Convention to Amend the Constitution of Pennsylvania* (Harrisburg, Pa., 1873), V, 470-481; and *Reconstruction: Industrial, Financial, and Political. Letters to the Hon. Henry Wilson* (Philadelphia, 1867).

⁴⁴ William D. Kelley, *Reasons for Abandoning the Theory of Free Trade, and Adopting the Principle of Protection to American Industry* (Philadelphia, 1872), 3.

national economic progress and independence from England, but also a prerequisite for social harmony and for the preservation of a citizen body capable of taking part in democratic government. Kelley warned that free trade even in England had led to "the disappearance of the small farmer, and of the small workshop," to "the concentration of land and machinery in the hands of a constantly diminishing number of persons," and to "the rapidly increasing destitution . . . and despair of her laboring classes."⁴⁵

Quite in contrast to the thesis that the Radicals favored a contraction of currency, Geary called for an expanded money supply to encourage business.⁴⁶ His administration funded the state debt, or paid it off rapidly in "legal tenders." The House of Rothschild held \$500,000 of the Pennsylvania debt. Through its American agent, August Belmont, it protested vigorously in 1868 against being repaid in greenbacks. State Treasurer William Kemble replied in a brusque note that Belmont's complaint was ridiculous and that the Commonwealth intended to redeem its debt immediately and in legal tender notes. Kemble concluded his reply with an anti-Semitic thrust: "We are willing to give you the pound of flesh, but not one drop of Christian blood."⁴⁷

Beside political democracy and government aid to industrial expansion in the hierarchy of Radical values stood that of universal education. Both developing industry and successful democracy were seen to require an educated population. It may well be that the firm establishment of the state-supported public school system was the most lasting social accomplishment of Reconstruction.⁴⁸ The Pennsylvania common school system had been founded in 1834 largely through the efforts of Thaddeus Stevens; in an interview just before his death, Stevens called the Pennsylvania schools his greatest

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 12.

⁴⁶ "Papers of the Governors," VIII, 1038-1041. Cf. Beale, 278. Geary put far more emphasis on the role of national bank notes in expanding the currency supply than Sharkey's discussion of Radical monetary theories would lead one to expect.

⁴⁷ *Public Ledger*, Feb. 11, 1868. The currency question was hotly debated in the state legislature in 1868 when a bill was introduced to pay a bonus to state banks to compensate them for the difference between the gold and legal tender values involved in the repayment of funds lent to the state in specie in 1863. Party lines were shattered in the vote which defeated the bill 48 to 33. *Daily Legislative Record, 1868*, 798-801 (Mar. 19, 1868).

⁴⁸ Du Bois, *Black Reconstruction*, Chap. 15.

achievement.⁴⁹ For this county-supported system of elementary education, to which the state legislature made contributions, Geary's administration increased the state appropriations from a level of \$340,000 in 1865 to more than \$750,000 in 1871. The new constitution of 1874 contained a proviso that the legislature must appropriate at least one million dollars for the common schools each year.⁵⁰

These state expenditures were used to centralize the system, to enforce higher standards, especially in the rural schools, to increase the number of teachers from 14,646 in 1860 to 19,522 in 1870, and to stimulate a total increase in public appropriations for common schools during that decade from \$2.4 million to \$7.2 million.⁵¹

On the subject of civil rights for Negroes in Pennsylvania the cleavage between the Radicals and conservative Republicans went deep. The conventional view of historians that the Republicans advocated civil rights and Negro suffrage for the South but shunned them for the North may be true of the conservative Republicans, but is not true of the Radicals.⁵² In Pennsylvania, however, the radical position on this issue was weakened within party deliberations by fear of the Democrats. Suffrage had been taken away from the Negro in Pennsylvania by the Constitution of 1838. In schools, streetcars, poorhouses, and employment the 57,000 Negroes of the Commonwealth were segregated.⁵³

The civil rights battle was first joined over streetcars. In 1866, the Republicans in the lower house of the legislature attached to a bill regulating city transit lines a rider prohibiting discrimination against any passenger because of color or nationality, but the measure failed to pass the senate.⁵⁴ During the ensuing election campaign the pro-

⁴⁹ *Public Ledger*, Aug. 19, 1868.

⁵⁰ "Report of the State Treasurer," *Public Ledger*, Jan. 4, 1866; *Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania* (1874), Art. X, Sec. I. For the sharp debates on this section, see *Debates of the Convention to Amend the Constitution of Pennsylvania*, II, 435-437, 470-473; VI, 39-40.

⁵¹ "A Compendium of the Ninth Census," *House Documents*, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess., 487-488, 51.

⁵² Adams Sherman Hill, "The Chicago Convention," *North American Review*, CVII (1868), 177-186; McClure, II, 280-281. Cf. Beale, 173-187, and Du Bois, *Black Reconstruction*, 726. On this point, the views of Beale and Du Bois are diametrically opposed to each other.

⁵³ Du Bois, *Philadelphia Negro*, 25-57. In 1837, the year before the constitutional disenfranchisement of the Negroes, the state Supreme Court, overruling a lower court, had declared Negroes ineligible to vote. *Hobbes v. Fogg*, 6 Watts 553.

⁵⁴ *Legislative Record, 1866*, 532 (Mar. 15, 1866); 772 (Apr. 4, 1866).

posal was furiously attacked by the Democrats. Efforts by Negroes to seat themselves in the cars in violation of old patterns of segregation were met with violence and even with the derailing of some streetcars.⁵⁵ When the Court of Common Pleas in Philadelphia awarded damages to a Negro woman who was evicted from a car by the conductor for refusing a seat in the Jim Crow section, the state Supreme Court overruled the lower court and upheld segregated seating.⁵⁶ While that case was pending in the courts, however, the legislature passed an act prohibiting exclusion or discrimination by any railroad or transit line and making conductors who enforced such practices guilty of a misdemeanor. Despite continued Democratic opposition to integration throughout the campaign of 1868, all efforts to repeal the new law failed.⁵⁷

Most of the Radicals felt that the question of Negro suffrage could be approached most effectively from the Federal level. In Congress, Radical votes from Pennsylvania would be augmented by those from the New England states where Negroes already voted, from the reconstructed South, and from the homestead states of the West which were free of a strong Democratic Party and already calling for manhood suffrage.⁵⁸ Had Negro suffrage, divorced from the other Radical measures, been put to a special popular vote in Pennsylvania, it would probably have been defeated. It was, therefore, in Congress that the effort was made. The Negro suffrage bill of 1866 for the District of Columbia, considered by William D. Kelley as the opening wedge for a national reform, was commended in a resolution by the lower house of the Pennsylvania legislature. But the day after Johnson announced his intention to veto the bill if it passed Congress, the state senate, over vigorous Democratic objections, sent the resolution back to committee to avoid a vote.⁵⁹ Only a handful of

⁵⁵ McClure, I, 595-596.

⁵⁶ *West Chester and Philadelphia Railroad Company v. Miles*, 55 Pennsylvania State Reports 209. The validity of this ruling as a precedent with respect to segregation, as distinct from the general right of railroads to make rules for passengers, was sharply questioned in 1876 in the case of *Mount Moriah Cemetery Association v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ex rel. W. H. Boileau and Margaret Jones*, 81 Pennsylvania State Reports 235.

⁵⁷ Act of Mar. 22, 1867, *Pennsylvania Session Laws* (1867), 38-39; *Legislative Record*, 1868, 228-231 (Jan. 31, 1868); *Public Ledger*, Jan. 29, Feb. 1 and 26, Mar. 20, and Sept. 3, 1868.

⁵⁸ Negro suffrage was advocated by the state Republican parties of Nebraska, Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Iowa in 1866, and Ohio and California in 1867. *Public Ledger*, Mar. 20 and Apr. 26, 1866; McPherson, 352; *Public Ledger*, Apr. 16, 1866, June 20 and July 20, 1867.

⁵⁹ *Legislative Record*, 1866, 93-94 (Jan. 24, 1866); 154 (Feb. 1, 1866); *Public Ledger*, Jan. 24 and Feb. 2, 1866. For Kelley's statement, see *New York Times*, Jan. 22, 1866.

staunch Quakers and Pennsylvania Germans from Lancaster and York counties, led by John Hickman and Adam C. Reinhoehl, refused to be silenced by the party leaders and pressed a Negro suffrage amendment to the state constitution throughout the session of 1868. The measure went down to a final defeat in a 14 to 68 vote, opposed by the Democrats and by Republicans who were afraid to campaign on the issue.⁶⁰ The strong national Republican victory of that year and the fact that Negro votes gave Grant his popular majority⁶¹ brought the Radicals the strength they needed to roll the Fifteenth Amendment through Congress and the state legislatures in 1869. Geary recommended ratification, and the legislature complied by a strict party vote in the session of 1869.⁶² In the election of 1871, the first with substantial Negro voting, violence flared in Philadelphia. Three leading Negroes were killed, but the right of all male citizens to vote was firmly established.⁶³

The Radical ideology, then, placed its faith in political democracy based on universal suffrage and led by a party closely allied to the independent entrepreneurs of the nation. But where in this credo did the growing class of propertyless wage earners fit? Ironically, the extension of suffrage to them had not weakened but rather strengthened the political influence of the commercial interests, because the enormous expense of campaigning for office made candidates increasingly dependent on backers with abundant cash. To be effective, informed, and independent citizens of a political democracy the workers needed leisure time, the strength of organization, and a standard of living at least sufficient to allow personal dignity and political self-reliance.⁶⁴ On the other hand, the achievement of these objectives, so necessary to the political ideals of the Radicals, would at the outset increase labor costs and thus decrease profits for the

⁶⁰ *Legislative Record*, 1868, 585-586 (Mar. 3, 1868). See the even more revealing debates on Lancaster County school board elections, *ibid.*, 458-465 (Feb. 21, 1868).

⁶¹ Charles W. Coleman, *The Election of 1868: The Democratic Effort to Regain Control* (New York, 1933), 369-370.

⁶² "Papers of the Governors," VIII, 975; Edward McPherson, *Political Handbook for 1870* (Washington, D. C., 1870), 470.

⁶³ McClure, II, 284-287; Du Bois, *Philadelphia Negro*, 39-42.

⁶⁴ This was the appeal of the leading eight-hour-day propagandist Ira Steward. See Commons, *Documentary History*, IX, 284-301, especially 292-297. The same arguments were used by Radical leaders John Conness, Henry Wilson, and Cornelius Cole in Congress on behalf of the eight-hour law for Federal employees. *Congressional Globe*, 40th Cong., 1st Sess., 413 (Mar. 28, 1867); 40th Cong., 2nd Sess., 3425-3426 (June 24, 1868).

manufacturers themselves. The Radical approach to the labor question had to be formulated within the context of this dilemma.

Immediately after Appomattox, a new upsurge of labor activity had swept the nation; its efforts were focused on the organization of trade-unions and the shortening of the working day to eight hours. The Pennsylvania Radicals endorsed the eight-hour day, arguing that leisure time was necessary for self-improvement, and passed a law in 1868 establishing eight hours as the legal working day in the state (*provided* no private contract to the contrary was made).⁶⁵ The great vexing question both in the Assembly debates on the bill and in the only major strike conducted to enforce the law (the coal miners' strike of 1868) was not whether hours should be shortened, but rather whether the day's pay should be reduced together with the hours. The law left the question unanswered, and in the strike the eight-hour demand was ultimately abandoned in favor of a wage increase.⁶⁶ To meet other demands of the miners, the Republicans repealed the brutal "Tioga County Law" of 1865 which had permitted the eviction of striking miners from company houses,⁶⁷ enacted the nation's first comprehensive mine safety law in 1870,⁶⁸ and in 1872 specifically exempted unions from the conspiracy laws.⁶⁹ All these acts were stripped of their force by the Radical insistence on "freedom of contract." They stand, nevertheless, in striking contrast to Republican measures of later decades. The extent of subsequent retrogression is indicated by the fact that the eight-hour law of 1868 was repealed by an act of 1913; the latter, a reform for its

⁶⁵ *Pennsylvania Session Laws* (1868), 99.

⁶⁶ In the lower house, an amendment requiring ten hours' pay for eight hours of work was adopted 62-26, but the senate struck out this section. *Legislative Record*, 1868, 1199-1202 (Apr. 9, 1868), 1280 (Apr. 13, 1868). On the "Eight Hours Strike," see Joseph F. Patterson, "Old W.B.A. Days," *Historical Society of Schuylkill County Publications*, II, 357-359; John Maguire, "Early Pennsylvania Coal Mine Legislation," *ibid.*, IV, 337; Chris Evans, *History of the United Mine Workers of America from the Year 1860 to 1890* (Indianapolis, Ind., 1918-1919), I, 17-18.

⁶⁷ Mar. 14, 1865 supplement to 1863 Landlords and Tenants Act, *Pennsylvania Session Laws* (1865), 6. The law was twice repealed in the 1868 legislative session. *Ibid.* (1868), 104, 757.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.* (1870), 3-12. Geary strongly advocated this bill. "Papers of the Governors," VIII, 1024-1027. See also Maguire, 337-338.

⁶⁹ *Pennsylvania Session Laws* (1872), 1175-1176.

time, established a maximum working day (for women only) of ten hours.⁷⁰

The greatest pressure against Radical measures, however, came from the side of commercial capital. The power of the railroads, the extension of the influence of commercial capital within industry itself through the corporate form of organization, and the political activities of this conservative grouping, all exerted a force against the Radicals which mounted as the 1860's drew to a close. To meet the power of the railroads, which was protected by special charters, the Radicals sought the only remedy consistent with their own ideology: more competition. In 1866, the manufacturers of Pittsburgh supported a proposal to extend the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad to their city in an effort to end the monopoly position of the Pennsylvania Railroad.⁷¹ In the same year, Senator Thomas J. Bigham of Allegheny County introduced a group of resolutions designed to promote both the construction of competitive lines to Pittsburgh and the passage of a "free railroad incorporation law" to allow the establishment of new lines without special charters.⁷² The proposed measure became so popular that every legislator felt compelled to endorse it, at least in principle. Geary pressed for the bill in the session of 1868 and, by vetoing an original form which would actually have increased the privileges of existing lines, won the law he desired.⁷³

Despite these efforts, the power of such "corporation men" as Franklin B. Gowen and Thomas A. Scott, both of whom were lawyers who had risen through corporation channels to railroad leadership, continued to grow. Democrats nominated a railroad executive, Asa Parker, to oppose Geary in 1869. In the face of opposition from many conservatives in his own party Geary won re-election by fewer than 5,000 votes, less than the majority won in Philadelphia where the Republicans had used their 1868 registration law to the utmost. By placing both registration and the counting of ballots in the hands of

⁷⁰ *Ibid.* (1913), 1034.

⁷¹ *Public Ledger*, Jan. 8, 1866.

⁷² *Legislative Record*, 1866, 61-67 (Jan. 16, 1866).

⁷³ "Papers of the Governors," VIII, 869-870; *Legislative Record*, 1868, 252 (Feb. 4, 1868); 404, 412-413 (Feb. 18, 1868); 415-417, 492-500 (Feb. 19, 1868); 756-761 (Mar. 18, 1868); 933-937 (Apr. 1, 1868); 940 (Mar. 31, 1868); 976-977 (Apr. 2, 1868); 1029 (Apr. 2, 1868); Act of Apr. 4, 1868, *Pennsylvania Session Laws* (1868), 62-65.

wartime.⁸¹ The means, often fraudulent and even violent, by which the Radicals had held office and pressed through their reforms, were tending to become ends in themselves, and Geary warned particularly against the dangers inherent in using Federal troops to supervise elections, as had been done not only in the South but even in Philadelphia in October, 1871.⁸²

Ambitious to become President, Geary turned to the newly established Labor Reform Party, in the ranks of which he held considerable popularity. At that party's 1872 convention in Columbus, Ohio, Geary led the field on the first ballot, but on the fourth lost the nomination to Judge David Davis of Illinois.⁸³ The Labor Reform Party collapsed when Judge Davis withdrew from the race after the Democratic convention had been held and threw his support to Horace Greeley.⁸⁴ Geary reluctantly returned to the regular Republican fold and endorsed President Grant for re-election.⁸⁵ The new political alignments of the early seventies thoroughly obscured the earlier delineations of radical and conservative, Republican and Democrat.

Radicalism in Pennsylvania, in short, seems to have been not the effort of a united "northeastern business" to defeat the threat of "agrarian radicalism" by forcing on a prostrate South social reforms which were scorned in the North, but rather the quite consistent ideology of the self-confident manufacturing entrepreneur in the hour of his ascendancy. The reorganization of Pennsylvania's basic industries by emerging corporations eroded the social realities upon which the Radical outlook was founded. The political realignment introduced by the Liberal Republican movement made the identification of Radicalism with a part of the Republican Party anachronistic.

⁸¹ "Papers of the Governors," VIII, 1127-1131, 1156-1162; McClure, II, 274-275. Ross, p. 35, may have overstated Geary's opposition to Grant's southern policies.

⁸² "Papers of the Governors," VIII, 1160-1162.

⁸³ McPherson, *Handbook of Politics for 1872*, 210; Commons, *Documentary History*, IX, 272-273; McClure, II, 276-277.

⁸⁴ Eugene H. Roseboom, *The Civil War Era, 1850-1873* (Columbus, Ohio, 1944), 480. Some members of the Labor Reform Party held a second convention and merged with the "straight" Democrats to support Charles O'Connor for president.

⁸⁵ McClure, II, 277. In his final message to the Assembly in January, 1873, Geary mixed praise of Grant with pleas for reform of the Federal administration. "Papers of the Governors," IX, 137, 181-182.

These new tendencies, already evident by 1872, were swept to the forefront by the great depression which broke in 1873, bringing in its wake the consolidation of the major manufacturers into trusts, and undermining the confidence of the Radicals that they had ushered in an era of economic prosperity and social harmony.⁸⁶

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⁸⁶ For the impact of the depression on Republican ranks, see C. Vann Woodward, *Reunion and Reaction* (New York, 1956) and *Origins of the New South, 1877-1913* (Baton Rouge, La., 1951), especially Chaps. 1 and 2; Du Bois, *Black Reconstruction*, 594-605, 685-693; William B. Hesseltine, "Economic Factors in the Abandonment of Reconstruction," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XXII (1935), 191-210.