

SEP-64

THE MINORITY OF ONE

INDEPENDENT MONTHLY FOR AN AMERICAN ALTERNATIVE - DEDICATED TO THE ERADICATION OF ALL RESTRICTIONS ON THOUGHT

Assassins for the Presidency

HOW STRONG IS THE JUNTA?

The United States is the site of a titanic power struggle, which has already cost it the life of one President, constantly endangers the life and Constitutional powers of a second, the incumbent, President, and may deliver the country to the whims of a military-industrial cabal, whose effective power even now brings to naught many a Constitutional provision. Concealed as this struggle remains from public view, it nonetheless involves a constant danger of civil war, in which various services and units of the U.S. military would combat each other. This is not a struggle between "ins" and "outs"; the two competing camps are integral parts of the United States power structure. Their competition is for hegemony and as long as it is not resolved, each of the two contenders has to reckon with the existence and the factual veto power of the other. This state of affairs accounts for the fact that at the present juncture the United States Government lacks the effective power to make decisive moves in world diplomacy.

The challengers of the Constitutional government are an aggregate of powerful forces within the executive and legislative branches as well as in private industry. Specifically, they include such organizations as the Central Intelligence Agency, the U.S. Air Force and identifiable defense contractors. In Congress, the insurrectionists are so strong that on many important issues, and especially on arms procurement, the Government has repeatedly lost out to them. The cabal made concentrated efforts to influence the Presidential elections in 1960; in 1964, it is actually presenting its own candidate, Barry M. Goldwater, and hopes with him to capture the rest of the government as well as the cloak of Constitutional legality.

The junta controlling the insurrectionist forces is so power-entrenched that for years it has been blackmailing the White House and other echelons of the Constitutional power hierarchy into silence concerning the life-and-death struggle behind the scenes. President Johnson, even while offering determined resistance to the junta, does not dare openly to complain about its existence and activities. The U.S. Chief Justice, while investigating the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, does not dare to tell the truth about it to this generation. Congress does not dare to turn down procurement requests of the junta even when they are made over the heads and against the explicit recommendations of the Administration. The Administration's reorganization plans for the armed services and for the intelligence agencies have been repeatedly overruled by the junta. Both the Administration and the armed forces are dangerously infiltrated by the insurrectionists. In most instances, the Administration's effective power does not suffice for the removal of these infiltrators, General Curtis E. LeMay, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, being the most notable and frustrating case in point. In fact, General LeMay is one of the principal leaders of the rebellious junta.

Even though the allegations made here

are the result of conjecture and speculation, the margin of error seems to be limited to detail, the specific composition of the junta and its specific undertakings; the actual existence of a wide rebellion in the ranks of the Administration and outside its immediate framework is presented as evident fact. Then too, it is probable that in this conjecture there are more errors of omission than errors of statement.

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The warning of the "military-industrial complex," which President Dwight D. Eisenhower sounded in his farewell address, remained something of a solitary voice in the maze of official U.S. pronouncements, but the concern which prompted it was more than shared by John F. Kennedy. Even before he had taken office, he had a study conducted with the view of asserting civilian authority over the military. The panel was headed by Senator Stuart Symington and included Clark M. Clifford, Kennedy's liaison aide with the retiring Eisenhower Administration, Thomas Finletter, one-time Air Force Secretary, Roswell Gilpatric, one-time Air Force Under Secretary and attorneys Fowler Hamilton and Marx Leva. The report of that study group was published around the middle of December, 1960, and made the following main recommendations:

* All defense funds would be appropriated directly to the Secretary of Defense, who

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would have authority to spend them as he saw fit.

- Service chiefs would report directly to the Secretary of Defense; the separate departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force, with their various Secretaries, Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries, would be abolished.

- The Joint Chiefs of Staff would be replaced by a Military Advisory Council made up of senior officers who would be permanently separated from their respective services. The council would be headed by a Joint Staff Chairman, who would be principal military adviser to the President and the Secretary of Defense.

- Individual services would maintain their identity but would be subordinate to three separate commands: a Strategic Command, responsible for the strategic missions of all-out nuclear war; a Tactical Command, responsible for all limited war operations; a Defense Command, responsible for all continental defense missions. (*Time* magazine, December 19, 1960.)

Undoubtedly, the enforcement of these recommendations would suffice to bring an end to the virtually sovereign status which the military had gained and to reestablish its subordination to civilian authority. But it was precisely this potential effect which doomed the plan from the outset. President-elect Kennedy knew how strong Congressional support of the military was and had no illusions about his chances to have curtailing legislation approved. Even Eisenhower's reorganization plan for the Pentagon, nowhere nearly as radical and sweeping as that of the Symington panel, remained unrealized despite the fact that Congress had approved it as far back as 1958. With Carl Vinson, the traditional defender of the war industry interests, as chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Symington's recommendations would not stand a chance; the Congressman thought even Eisenhower's reorganization plan to be much too extreme.

Aware that a frontal attack on the usurped position of the military establishment could not be successfully undertaken, John F. Kennedy, upon becoming President, tried to curtail the military by gradual measures. By the middle of 1961, the controversy over the open participation of the brass in right-wing political activities had reached its point of culmination. President Kennedy gave his unqualified support to Senator J. W. Fulbright's campaign against the military sponsoring radical right-wing speakers, conducting "freedom" and Cold War seminars and otherwise participating in political propaganda directed to the armed forces as well as the civilian population. During a press conference on August 10, 1961, President Kennedy stated:

The United States military, due to one of the wisest actions of our Constitutional founders, have been kept out of politics, and they continue their responsibilities, regardless of the changes of Administration.

The problem always is how can the military remain removed from political life and how can civilian control of the military be effectively maintained. . . . (*The New York Times*, August 11, 1961.)

What on the surface appeared as a controversy over political speech-making by the brass was in actuality the much more serious problem of the military consolidating around itself ultra-rightist civilian organiza-

tions. It was not merely what kind of speeches Generals Walker, Van Fleet or Admiral Goldthwaite could or could not deliver, but how instrumental they and their colleagues would be allowed to be in promoting the John Birch Society and other fascist organizations. The problem was basically created by the junta's attempt to establish organizational frameworks for political grass-root support.

The brass fought back with the tongues of its Congressional backers led by Senators Strom Thurmond, Barry Goldwater, and Karl E. Mundt and Representative Dale Alford. Their chorus was indefatigable in complaining against the "muzzling" of military men. Impressed by the furor, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara modified instructions he had prepared for the military and finally issued them in a compromised version, which did not forbid political activity of military men altogether. But this compromise hardly appeased the military and its Congressional supporters, who retaliated by having the Senate Armed Services Committee investigate charges that the administration was "muzzling" high military officers.

Even though officers are now required to clear their speeches in advance with the proper channels in the Pentagon, the controversy over the degree to which they may actively participate in the political life of the country has never been resolved. The civilian Government proved incapable of overcoming the resistance of the military brass and has never succeeded in imposing its judgment in this area.

The Bay of Pigs fiasco had dramatized to President Kennedy the dangers inherent in a too powerful clandestine organization such as the Central Intelligence Agency. He, therefore, appointed two study groups, one headed by General Maxwell Taylor, the other by James R. Killian, Jr., the president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, not only to investigate the Bay of Pigs fiasco, but also to recommend a reorganization of the intelligence services. Killian's group, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, had permanent status.

All suggestions that the CIA's powers be curtailed and limited to intelligence gathering and that clandestine foreign operations not fall within its discretion ran into determined opposition on the part of the CIA itself, an opposition which proved to be too formidable for both the Taylor committee and the President. The CIA survived the compromising Bay of Pigs fiasco as a governmental organization over which the Government does not exercise full control.



The controversies over the proposed reorganization of the military and intelligence services and over political speech-making by the brass were accompanied by yet another controversy, whose furiousness was in direct proportion to the billions of dollars it involved: the future of manned bombers.

With the advent of the intercontinental ballistic missile, it was a foregone conclusion that the elimination of the manned bomber as a strategic delivery system was only a matter of time. While radar and ground-to-air missiles were diminishing the penetration prospects of manned bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles of greater accuracy were being developed. This radical development in military technology ran counter to the interests of airplane manufacturers. They stood to lose billions of dollars in governmental contracts. Not only would the production of missiles not replace lost business, but the change in the Government's procurement pattern would have a most adverse impact on the civilian production branch of the companies involved. The airplane manufacturers show either an annual loss or minimal profits in their commercial sales, a state of affairs happily offset by Federal defense purchases. Anyway, the aerospace industry, its uniformed procurement agents in the Pentagon and its Congressional spokesmen did propose to continue the production of manned bombers not in replacement of, but in addition to, missiles.

The first one to suffer procurement cut-backs was to be the manufacturer of the B-52 bombers and the Dyna-soar space-glider developer, the Boeing Aircraft Company. Against the explicit recommendations of President Kennedy and the Defense Department, Congress appropriated in 1961, \$780,300,000 for the production of B-52 planes and for the development of the B-70 bomber and the Dyna-soar. This started a fight for the future of manned bombers with a Congressional majority and the Air Force brass lined up against the Administration, a fight which was only intensified with the passage of time and which today continues unabated. When Secretary McNamara did not make use of the unrequested Congressional appropriations,

Air Force officials have made no secret of their disappointment in the decision on the B-52 bomber as well as in the refusal to spend extra money appropriated by Congress for the B-70 bomber development and the Dyna-soar. (*NYT*, November 6, 1961.)

The fight for governmental contracts was raging behind arguments of national security. Senator Henry M. Jackson of Washington, the home-state of Boeing's headquarters thought that "we are taking an unnecessary risk. I do not have sufficient confidence in the accuracy of missiles." The Senator must have learned from some salesmen's manual that one of the most potent sales arguments capitalizes on the natural fear of death.

What Boeing had at stake was indicated in statistics which a staff accountant, Thomas E. Nunnally, submitted to John L. McClellan's Senate Investigations subcommittee on May 22, 1962. The staff accountant

testified that Boeing's Government contracts for work on the Bomarc, B-52 and B-54 bombers, KC-135 tanker and other projects had totaled \$11,818,900,000 since 1951. . . .

He said a year-by-year measurement of the profits against the company's net investment (net worth plus all borrowed capital) showed profit percentages ranging from 108.6 per cent in 1953 to 36 per cent in 1951 and 1960.

Mr. Nunnally said Boeing's profit as measured by the company's net worth averaged 74.38 per cent before payment of taxes and 35.68 per cent after taxes on its Government

contracts and 19.05 per cent after taxes on its combined Government and commercial business.

He said this was "almost double" the 10.73 per cent average net profit for all manufacturing industries in the United States computed by Government regulatory agencies against net worth in the same years. (NYT, May 23, 1962.)

With strong competition from British and French commercial aircraft manufacturers, Boeing, like other American aerospace firms, if anything, was growing ever more dependent upon the U.S. Government for business and profits and for what has in effect become a government subsidy for its commercial production. Certainly, no commercial orders could provide the fantastic bonanza of the LeMay-Congress generosity.

Congressional appropriations for manned bombers over and above Administration requests have since become an annual ritual. On March 1, 1962, the House Armed Services Committee voted unanimously \$491 million more than the Administration asked for production of B-70's. LeMay obtained from the Committee precisely that which two weeks earlier President Kennedy had refused to grant him. The House Committee went so far as to usurp for itself policy-making authority vested in the Executive Branch: not only did it appropriate the funds in the absence of an Administration request, but it also "directed" the Pentagon to actually go ahead with the B-70 program.

The fight between President Kennedy and Secretary McNamara, on the one hand, and General LeMay, on the other hand, was now coming out into the open. On March 15, 1962, Mr. McNamara released a statement, in which he not only challenged the merits of the B-70, but also publicly admitted the schism with the Air Force Chief of Staff:

Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara said today that the proposed B-70 bomber project had serious technical shortcomings, even if the plane could be developed.

The Secretary also argued that, even if the shortcomings could be overcome, the 2,000-mile-an-hour, high-altitude airplane would not be needed by the time it could be introduced as a weapons system at least five years from now.

Mr. McNamara occasioned surprise at the Pentagon with the final paragraph in his statement:

"I have just recently reviewed this entire problem with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and again, except for the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, they all support the B-70 development program recommended by President Kennedy," he said.

The phraseology in which Gen. Curtis E. LeMay was thus singled out was considered unusual. Usually, when dissents are identified, uniformed leaders are credited with "supporting" the President but offering proposals of their own. (NYT, March 16, 1962.)

Since, as far as General LeMay is concerned, all good things happen at the right time, he could produce an additional argument in behalf of manned bombers. On April 1, 1962, in a manner more serious than the date might suggest, the Strategic Air Command at its Omaha, Neb., headquarters announced that

a false signal at the height of the Berlin crisis last fall indicated that the United States might be under attack.

The statement, by Maj. John J. Oswald of the public relations staff, confirmed . . . that

. . . planes loaded with hydrogen bombs had rushed to the runways of S.A.C. bases all over the world.

Since the Air Force is not known for eagerness to confirm news of its mishaps, the timing of this belated confirmation of the nuclear alert seems to have been calculated to remind the public that the use of manned bombers would give S.A.C. sufficient time to correct a mistake in communication, which time would not necessarily be available once ballistic missiles, instead of manned vehicles, had been launched.

The Air Force was not merely shedding civilian authority in raising demands for Congressional appropriations; it was also attempting to increase its power and jurisdiction at the expense of the other military services. Neither the Navy nor the Army were safe from attempted encroachments by Gen. LeMay. Wherever they could, President Kennedy and Secretary McNamara protected the other services against the insatiability of the Air Force brass:

In terms of United States basic military policy, the Navy recently won a difficult struggle to retain command of the Polaris submarines. The Air Force had sought to bring them under control of the Strategic Air Command. (NYT, June 23, 1962.)

As for the Army which sought funds for the establishment of an "air assault division" with many aircraft and helicopters of its own, the Air Force abortively crusaded for the inclusion of that division under its jurisdiction.

In the meantime, the Defense Department was so annoyed with the Boeing Aircraft Co., because of its massive lobbying in behalf of the B-52 and the Dyna-soar, that Secretary McNamara rationalized that a more expensive bid for an inferior TFX fighter plane offered by General Dynamics was preferable to a less expensive and superior TFX plane offered by Boeing.

The furious struggle of the aerospace industry to retain the U.S. Government as a customer of aircraft continued with unceasing constancy. So did the resistance the Air Force offered to the President's and the Pentagon's labors to bring it under civilian control. No one was more conscious of the need to deal with the insubordination of the Air Force than President Kennedy. He was fully aware that in his rebelliousness, General LeMay had the support of the C.I.A. and many Senators and Representatives. He was also aware that behind LeMay was the multi-billion dollar aerospace industry as well as the darkest political forces in the country, ranging from Senator Barry Goldwater to Maj. Gen. Edwin A. Walker.

The insurrection was too power-entrenched, however, for the President to make a radical move. He had to proceed with caution and plan gradual moves against the junta. A reflection of this predicament can be found in the fact that when General LeMay's term of office expired on June 30, 1963, the President, instead of sighing with relief upon "losing" the "service" of this insubordinate, reappointed him for another year. True, in this reappointment for less than a two-year period, the President broke a precedent and showed his reluctance, but the mere fact that he consented to seeing

LeMay even one additional day in his post is the strongest possible indication that the President acted involuntarily, that he must have been forced to retain LeMay, that the junta posed this as its uncompromising demand.

Whatever were John F. Kennedy's plans to defeat the junta and its industrial and Congressional backers, his enemies too were engaged in planning. They were planning to protect their continued sales of aircraft to the U.S. Government, to retain their tremendous military and political power and to broaden it and to remove anyone who seriously threatened their interests and ambitions.



The straw which broke the junta's patience with the Kennedy Administration was the partial nuclear test ban treaty. The American signature on that document may well have also signed the personal fate of John F. Kennedy. The fact that the execution of the junta's verdict was not immediate may have come to avert a public appreciation of the link between the two events. Thus Kennedy was allowed to go on living for a while longer, but as far as the junta was concerned, he was a living corpse.

Not that anyone exaggerated the significance of the test ban treaty itself. But more important than its specific provisions were the unstated but very real implications. In effect, the treaty amounted to a joint acknowledgment by the United States and the Soviet Union that neither could conquer the other and that, therefore, political conclusions must be drawn from the nuclear stalemate. This was a fundamental decision, one which, as far as the United States was concerned, constituted a complete turn-about from a political premise as old as the Bolshevik revolution.

The junta did not agree with the Administration's assessment of relative American-Soviet military strength. It continued to believe that a surprise nuclear attack on the Soviet Union would sufficiently neutralize the Soviet nuclear arsenal for a merely acceptable degree of retaliation to be possible. Anyway, their thinking being a phase of the Cold War mentality, the junta members were not the only people in America who thought it perfectly reasonable that Americans' "freedom" be preserved, even if not their lives.

While the Thurmonds and Goldwaters were openly and vehemently agitating against Congressional ratification of the treaty, rumors kept circulating that the military brass was divided on this issue. Finally, on August 19, 1963, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee—with the Armed Services Committee and the Senate members of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy attending by invitation—took testimony from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The two-hour session provided an unbelievable spectacle: the commanding officer of the U.S. Air Force not only was openly opposing his Government, but in effect was also challenging its veracity, competence, patriotism and reliability. Questions hostile to the Administra-

tion elicited answers, which, too, were hostile to the Administration, and the smooth interplay strongly suggested that both questions and answers had been coordinated. So embarrassing was General LeMay's testimony, not only to the Administration but even to the other Joint Chiefs of Staff, that they were left with no choice but to contradict their colleague directly and unreservedly. Typical was the report that

There was some confusion over the amount of consultation with the joint chiefs on the treaty. Last week General Taylor [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs] said they had been kept abreast of developments at all times, particularly from the moment when Premier Khrushchev, in a speech in East Berlin on July 2, indicated his readiness to discuss a limited ban.

General LeMay said at first today that Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara "hadn't discussed it with me personally or the other chiefs but with General Taylor."

Later, however, General Wheeler [Army Chief of Staff] said that as early as June 15 the chiefs were asked to submit views on a limited test ban treaty; that they were aware of the deliberations prior to Under Secretary W. Averell Harriman's departure for Moscow, and that General Taylor briefed them on cables going back and forth between Mr. Harriman and Washington. (NYT, August 20, 1964.)

So cunning was LeMay that he had attempted to create the impression that merely the absence of *personal* conversations between the Secretary of Defense and each of the Joint Chiefs was tantamount to their not having been consulted by the Administration.

Then came the crucial exchange between two politico-military friends and oppositionist collaborators:

Mr. Goldwater asked General Curtis E. LeMay, Air Force Chief of Staff:

"If the treaty had not been initiated or signed and was not now before the Senate, would you be for it?"

... "I would think that I would have been against it," (*Ibid.*)
was Gen. LeMay's reply. When he said to the Senators, "I am more pessimistic than the other Joint Chiefs," he was merely stating the obvious.

Of course, the junta, so amply represented on that occasion, was fully aware that the test ban treaty was an accomplished fact and that no amount of criticism was going to prevent its ratification. To make the best of what it considered a bad situation, General LeMay used the Senatorial hearings as an occasion to press the Administration for increasing its nuclear test program. The General demanded a most vigorous implementation of "safeguards;"

These safeguards are a comprehensive and aggressive program of underground tests, the maintenance of laboratories and test sites that could resume atmosphere tests if the Soviet Union abrogated the treaty, and the improvement of detection capabilities to monitor any violations.

"We must have a testing program up to the legal limits of the treaty," General LeMay said. (*Ibid.*)

Coming from one of the commanding U.S. military officers, these recommendations sounded reasonable and "innocent" enough, until a subsequent exchange revealed what they were leading up to:

Senator Richard B. Russell of Georgia, chairman of the Armed Services Committee, asked what assurances had been given to the Joint

Chiefs that the safeguards would be carried out.

Whereupon the bee knew to press its sting with full force into the sensitive body of the Administration:

"No one has said they would be," General LeMay answered. (*Ibid.*)

This, however, did not exhaust the scenario. Soon enough General LeMay was called upon to serve as a Constitutional counsel for the U.S. Senate. This time, Boeing's protector and enthusiast, Senator Henry M. Jackson

asked whether Congress did not have the right to ask the Executive branch for concrete assurances on a program of safeguards. A less self-assured individual might have referred the curious Senator to Constitutional lawyers, but the General who was lecturing America on her foreign policy saw no reason why not also enlighten his countrymen on the U. S. Constitution:

"I think that would be a reasonable request," the general replied (*Ibid.*), thereby attempting to establish a proper division of powers between the Legislature and the Executive, with himself this time serving as the Judiciary.

On the very day during which General LeMay managed to discharge the duties of all the three branches of government, his alter ego, General Thomas S. Power, commander of the Strategic Air Command, expressed outright opposition to the ratification of the treaty, in the Senate Preparedness subcommittee:

Testifying in closed session, General Power urged Senators not to ratify the treaty, on the ground that it was not in the best interests of the nation. (*Ibid.*)

And to complete the junta's productive day, Senator Goldwater himself stated on the floor of the Senate

that the treaty did not provide inspection and that consequently there was no way of checking whether the Soviet Union might encourage, or participate in, any future tests by Communist China. (*Ibid.*)

And in the White House, little did John F. Kennedy know that he was signing the partial nuclear test ban treaty with his own blood.



Whether President Kennedy was felled on the highest authority of the junta or merely on the say-so of a supporting fringe group, if Chief Justice Earl Warren ever changes his mind and decides truly to investigate the assassination, he would find it indispensable to subpoena as witnesses prominent members of the junta whose very existence was threatened by President Kennedy. If ever Earl Warren decides so to conduct his investigation, we shall pray for his longevity.

One cannot possibly doubt Chief Justice Warren's dedication to Constitutional Government. Nor is he one of those people who are too naive to assume that the usurpation of power by the military is a phenomenon possible elsewhere, but not in America. In fact, at least on one occasion, "in a lecture on 'The Bill of Rights and the Military' at the New York University School of Law, he declared that the historic

American subordination of military to civil authority had to be preserved." He "urged the public to heed former President Dwight D. Eisenhower's admonition, on leaving the White House, to 'guard against unwarranted influence . . . by the military-industrial complex.'" (NYT, February 2, 1962.) Obviously, in the Chief Justice's opinion, there existed cause for concern.

If, nonetheless, now the Chief Justice so obviously behaves not like an investigator but rather like a captive of the forces which need to be investigated, this is not necessarily because he fears for his life. He may be patriotically motivated. Aware of the probable repercussions if an attempt should be made to uncover the plot which felled John F. Kennedy, the Chief Justice may think it more important to avert an overt coup by the junta than to publicize the truth about Kennedy's death.

If so, the Chief Justice has joined the ranks of high officials in Washington whose nominal authority is in fact greatly circumscribed by the junta. Mr. Warren seems to be no more the master of his investigation than Secretary McNamara is the master of the Pentagon or indeed the President the master of his entire Administration.

Something did not go according to plan, for whatever moves against the junta were prevented by eliminating John F. Kennedy, his successor is not much friendlier to General LeMay, the aerospace industry and their Congressional backers than was the slain President.

The hidden insurrection continues and so does the Administration's resistance. On January 27, 1964, while presenting the Administration's \$51.2 billion military spending program to the House Armed Services Committee, Secretary McNamara announced what purported to be a new strategic doctrine: his "damage limiting strategy." The Secretary's testimony was obviously intended to provide a basic theoretical premise in opposition to his rebellious chief of the Air Force.

The statement included a lengthy discussion of the dependability of strategic weapons. It thus supported an earlier denial of allegations that ballistic missiles were not dependable.

On the contrary, Secretary McNamara testified, "we can predict the results of a missile attack with greater confidence than those of a bomber attack."

The Secretary did not mention by name Senator Barry Goldwater, Republican of Arizona, who has asserted during his campaign for his party's Presidential nomination that ICBM's are not dependable.

Mr. McNamara, justifying a \$2 billion reduction this year in planned spending for strategic retaliatory forces, devoted considerable attention to the United States basic military strategy.

The Secretary said that he had been prompted to such length because current arguments "indicate that we have failed to convey, at least to certain important sections of the American public, the basic fundamentals of the strategic problems confronting our nation in the nuclear age."

On one extreme, Mr. McNamara said, are proponents of a so-called "overkill" theory who believe that the United States already has enough nuclear weapons to destroy all the major cities of the Soviet Union several times

over. Thus, according to these theorists, the United States can safely cut its military forces and military budget. . . .

On the other extreme, Mr. McNamara identified those who, he said, favor a "full first strike" theory. They advocate creating a military force that could, even if the United States were struck first, reduce Soviet capacity for a second strike and its other retaliatory power to a level that could be "acceptable" by the United States. Thus, the United States would have less reason to fear a nuclear war.

. . . A "full first strike" capability, Mr. McNamara said, would not only be very expensive, it would be "simply unattainable" in view of the growing Soviet nuclear strike forces.

Citing his similar testimony last year, the Defense Secretary said:

"Although we could have an effective capability to sink enemy submarines in a protracted war of attrition at sea, we could not have any realistic prospect of being able to destroy the major part of a Soviet submarine missile force in one quick first strike.

"Neither could we count, with any reasonable degree of assurance, on destroying all or almost all of the Soviet's hardened missile sites, even if we were to double or triple our forces."

A "full first strike" capability, the Secretary went on, would have to be accompanied by vast programs of antimissile, antibomber and civil defense programs. Fatalities would "run into tens of millions," and therefore:

"The paramount conclusion supported by all our studies is that for any level of force we might practically build, and even under the most favorable circumstances to us, a nuclear exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union would do enormous damage to both sides." (NYT, January 28, 1964.)

This was just about the most candid discussion of some of the issues which divide LeMay's junta and the Administration. Not only did McNamara publicly admit the existence of fundamental differences between the Administration and "certain important sections of the American public," undoubtedly an allusion to sections which include his own insubordinate subordinates, but he properly presented the advocacy of his opponents. For reasons of propaganda, McNamara spoke of his opponents' advocacy as applying "even if the United States were struck first," but both, in naming their strategy and in speaking of "the most favorable circumstances to us" he clearly expressed his awareness that that strategy was not intended as a response to a Soviet attack against the United States but as an American nuclear first strike against the Soviet Union. Thus McNamara was debating the advocates of a preemptive war, and thus he in effect identified General LeMay, his colleagues and supporters as advocates of a preemptive war. This is extremely important if we bear in mind not only LeMay's Congressional support but also the fact that a co-member of his junta is running for the Presidency of the United States.

In essence, McNamara says that a preemptive nuclear war against the Soviet Union would not be profitable because no matter how hard the United States would hit, sufficient quantities of Soviet nuclear bombs would survive to cause an unacceptable degree of damage in a retaliatory attack. When McNamara says that "a nuclear exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union would do enormous damage

to both sides," he is in effect stating that all-out nuclear war with the Soviet Union can no longer be an American objective.

Secretary McNamara's offensive against the junta was not limited to his bold criticism of its strategic doctrine. On January 23, 1964, it became known that the Secretary was once more trying to curtail the uncontrolled functioning of the separate public relations departments of the various armed services: Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara plans to turn over certain public relations duties of the military services to his Assistant of Defense for Public Affairs.

The plan is intended to improve efficiency, eliminate duplication and forestall inter-service battles such as the latest one between the Army and Air Force over the Army's experimental air assault division at Fort Benning, Georgia. . . .

The public information chiefs of the services know what is coming, however. They have already raised objections to the pending unification measures. (NYT, January 24, 1964.)

In fact, not only have the public information chiefs of the military services raised objections, but the junta's response to the Johnson Administration's challenges was massive. Goldwater's assaults against McNamara were ever more in the worst tradition of the unlamented Senator Joe McCarthy; LeMay was not only lobbying for bomber projects which have been opposed by the Administration, but added to his list several new aircraft projects. On February 5, 1964, the Air Force chief appeared before the House Armed Services Committee and

indirectly criticized the termination of the Dynasor space glider program. He also expressed concern over the economy wave at the Pentagon, saying he thought it might be "going too far." . . .

General LeMay's testimony was clearly in conflict with current policies under which no new bombers are being built and the future requirements for them are seriously challenged.

General LeMay did not assert, as Senator Barry Goldwater has asserted, that American intercontinental missiles were insufficiently reliable. He argued, however, along the line taken by the Arizona Republican, that total strategic reliance must not be placed on the missile force.

. . . "I am extremely concerned over the lack of a follow-on manned strategic system to replace our aging bomber fleet."

Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, who appeared before the Senate Armed Services Committee in a closed session today, has argued that manned bombers will be rendered virtually ineffective by improved anti-aircraft defenses. (NYT, February 5, 1964.) LeMay did not merely defend his past bomber recommendations, but came up with his new "Project Forecast":

The Air Force is pressing for vigorous research programs that could pave the way for at least four aircraft able to deal with a wide variety of limited conflicts in the nineteen-seventies.

In a report, based on almost a year of study, the Air Force envisages the need for:

- A transport with a range up to 10,000 miles that could carry troops and equipment to the most primitive trouble areas, unload without landing and return home, all on the original load of fuel.

- A strike craft with intercontinental range able to deliver precise nuclear or conventional blows just devastating enough to destroy military targets without inflicting collateral damage that would run the danger of escalating the conflict into a larger war.

- A vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) attack-reconnaissance plane for direct support of troops in the field.

- A limited-range VTOL transport for direct support of front-line operations. (NYT, February 16, 1964.)

While LeMay was undermining Congressional reliance on Secretary McNamara on strategic and military problems, his political colleague, Barry Goldwater, was doing a similar hatchet job in political terms. His attacks on McNamara grew in frequency and venom. Typical was a speech the Senator delivered on March 25, 1964 in Detroit:

Though the audience included many friends of Mr. McNamara, the Senator mentioned him 15 times by name and labeled the former Ford president as follows:

"A one-time loser with the Edsel right here in Michigan, a four-time loser in terms of trips to Vietnam and an all-time loser if his policies and the policies of the Administration that supports and applauds him are not changed in 1964."

Mr. Goldwater criticized the Secretary on several points but the basis of his concern appeared to be his doubts about the reliability of this country's missiles and his belief that manned bombers were necessary for a flexible defense.

He pictured the nation, on entering the nineteen-seventies, as tied to unproved weapons that lacked flexibility and guarded by a Defense Secretary who trusted computers more than generals. (NYT, March 26, 1964.)

In a peculiar tit for tat, McNamara and LeMay kept attacking each other by each compromising the reliability of weapons recommended by the other. On March 5, 1964, the Secretary of Defense formally announced his decision to drop the development of the third of the three B-70 bomber prototypes, for which, over his objections but at LeMay's urgings, Congress had authorized outlays. As a reason for this decision the Secretary pointed to the fact that the program

has been in technical difficulties almost from the start. Mr. McNamara, at his news conference today, cited some of these troubles.

The first flight was scheduled for December, 1962, he pointed out. The program is thus already 18 months behind schedule "and the first aircraft has not yet been completely assembled," he said.

The flight of the first B-70 is now scheduled for "this spring or certainly before mid-year," the Secretary said in response to questions, but even if it does fly it "will probably fly with one tank not usable because of continued [fuel] leak problems."

He said there was also a serious problem in the efforts to connect the wings and fuselage in a manner that would withstand the high temperature problems associated with supersonic speed. (NYT, March 6, 1964.)

If indeed the B-70 prototype is ever ready, one must wonder how, after such a "recommendation," a test-pilot would be found for it.

LeMay retaliated for the insult to his bomber by virtually calling McNamara's missiles junk:

The Air Force said today it had experienced about a dozen failures in operational training missions involving Atlas missiles since 1959. (AP Washington dispatch of April 21, 1964.)

Never before has the Air Force exhibited so long a memory for its own failures.

Utterly amazing is the degree of effectiveness of the junta's attacks on the Admin-

istration. So victorious did it appear in its defiance of the Administration that Senators felt compelled to accommodate its wishes. Even the Administration itself began to waver and to compromise its resistance. Thus the Air Force's "Project Forecast", for example, elicited favorable comments from Secretary McNamara. Indeed, defeatism seemed to infiltrate McNamara's bureaucratic defenses. When his Deputy Secretary Roswell L. Gilpatric, who had been a member of the panel that recommended in December, 1960 to President-elect Kennedy the unification of the armed services, held a farewell news conference on January 17, 1964.

He no longer believes, he said, that the Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force can function as Assistant Secretaries of the Defense Department.

Nor does he believe, as he once did, he added, that a single Chief of Staff for all the services would be an improvement over the present system.

More than any new conviction, Gilpatric seemed to express his pessimism as to the Administration's prospects to curtail the virtual sovereignty of the junta.

In this atmosphere, Congress could hardly be expected not to succumb to the junta's wishes. In March, 1964 it passed a military authorization bill, which included \$50 million more for a new manned bomber for the Air Force than the Administration had requested. A new improved manned interceptor (IMI) project, for which the House in its bill had already appropriated \$40 million, was dropped by Senate-House conferees only after President Johnson disclosed, on February 29, 1964, that the Air Force already had developed an IMI, the A-11 2,000 mile an hour aircraft.

Perhaps the predicament of the Administration is best shown in its continued inability to shake loose of the dreaded General LeMay. When his unusual, only one-year reappointment by President Kennedy expired in June, 1964, President Johnson again postponed the General's retirement until February 1, 1965. *The New York Times* in a display of an unbelievable degree of naivete stated that "it appeared that the extension was calculated to permit the general to complete a full 35 years of service for sentimental reasons." (April 9, 1964.) Had, in fact, the Johnson Administration been guided in its treatment of General LeMay by nothing but its sentiments, the Air Force chief would be in an unenviable situation. And if Washington were indeed ready to postpone his retirement in order to enable him to complete 35 years of service, this could have been arranged easily enough if only President Kennedy did not go out of his way in 1963 to renew his appointment for only a fraction of the usual tour of duty.

The *Times*, however, added that "at the same time it was privately suggested by opponents of the Administration's policies on air power that the extension would have the effect of keeping General LeMay in uniform until after the national election this fall." (*Ibid.*) The only thing that this explanation does not explain is why in such a case the politically-minded and belligerent general would acquiesce in being cunningly put into political deep freeze. The President could not compel him to remain in office,

hence LeMay must have decided to stay on for reasons of his own. Hence the probability that as a year before, this time too LeMay was retained upon his own insistence, backed by the full power of the feared junta.

The recently published but already widely acknowledged book by David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, "*The Invisible Government*" (Random House), begins with the following description:

There are two governments in the United States today. One is visible. The other is invisible.

The first is the government that citizens read about in their newspapers and children study about in their civics books. The second is the interlocking, hidden machinery that carries out the policies of the United States in the Cold War.

This second, invisible government gathers intelligence, conducts espionage, and plans and executes secret operations all over the globe.

The Invisible Government is not a formal body. It is a loose, amorphous grouping of individuals and agencies drawn from many parts of the visible government. It is not limited to the Central Intelligence Agency, although the CIA is at its heart. Nor is it confined to the nine other agencies which comprise what is known as the intelligence community: The National Security Council, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, Army Intelligence, Navy Intelligence, Air Force Intelligence, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The Invisible Government includes, also, many other units and agencies, as well as individuals, that appear outwardly to be a normal part of the conventional government. It even encompasses business firms and institutions that are seemingly private.

To an extent that is only beginning to be perceived, this shadow government is shaping the lives of 190,000,000 Americans. Major decisions involving peace or war are taking place out of public view. An informed citizen might come to suspect that the foreign policy of the United States often works publicly in one direction and secretly through the Invisible Government in just the opposite direction.

This description is accurate as far as it goes. Perhaps at the time it was perceived, it was still too early also to discern the hegemony-aspiring junta which constitutes that part of the Invisible Government over which the Constitutional Government has long since lost effective control.

That the junta backs Barry Goldwater for President is obvious. Less obvious are the ways by which Goldwater rose from a fringe-leader within the Republican Party only a few months ago, to the virtually unanimously elected Republican candidate for the Presidency. Unless one is so politically unsophisticated as to believe that the Republican Party's Convention is a truly democratic institution, one is compelled to wonder whether behind Goldwater's nomination there was not that kind of prompting and pressure by the junta as has repeatedly caused Congress and its committees to pass bills explicitly opposed by the Administration.

And if it was that easy for the junta to impose Goldwater upon the Republican Party, what surprises may be in store for us in order actually to deliver the U.S. Presi-

dency to the junta's confidant? Will they involve behind-the-scenes electoral maneuvering? Will they involve such domestic or international provocations as might cause the electorate to succumb to the blandishments of a super-patriotic demagogue? Or, is the junta not quite ready for a power take-over and is merely consolidating its political and economic supporters with the view of capturing the Presidency in 1968?

Even if this year the junta is treating the election campaign as a mere rehearsal for 1968, it is of utmost historic importance that its representative, Goldwater, be refuted, at the polls by the largest possible majority and that Johnson's hand in Congress be significantly strengthened as well. For unless his new Administration will have a great deal of self-confidence and tangible popular support, it may hesitate to move decisively against the junta. In such a case, the insurrectionists would retain sufficient power not only to sabotage the Administration's legislative program, especially as it applies to military procurement, but also to involve the United States in international conflicts. Thus, even without an electoral mandate, the junta could succeed in having the United States follow its policies, leading the country and the world towards nuclear disaster.

One of the biggest mistakes the American people could make would be to judge Barry Goldwater by the presence or lack of typical symptoms of European fascism. Even Hitler's and Mussolini's fascism, had it survived World War II, would no longer have each of the characteristics of its earlier period. By the same token, one needs to be acutely aware of the fact that the principal forces which make up the junta are not an adult contingent of boy-scouts; it is not particular symbols and games which they are after, but the fulfillment of concrete socioeconomic aspirations. They are after billions of dollars in government contracts; they are after that kind of governmental regulation which proves most profitable to them; they are after both domestic and foreign privilege and therefore ever ready to defeat, conquer and exploit anyone in foreign lands. All this is serious business, leaving no room for romantic naivete. If, therefore, their purposes can best be served by forfeiting the outward symbolism of their European social predecessors, their appearance, style and words will differ from those of the Nazis and the fascists. They will continue to talk of the sacred rights of the individual, they will not parade around in all too many uniforms and they will not greet each other with fascist salutes. None of which renders them one iota less dangerous than were their more formal European counterparts.

To a great extent the U.S. Government, which is now being electorally challenged by the Goldwater forces, is already a captive of these forces. There is a desperate need for the American people to extricate their Constitutional Government from the grip of a well-organized junta which commands at least one complete military service and a huge industrial complex. The loss of a President to that junta was a national heart-break; we must not lose world peace to it.