

'BADLY MISLED' BY ADVISERS, SAYS THEODORE

JFK Grieved Over 'Bay

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SORENSEN

of Pigs'

NEW YORK, July 21 (AP)—Theodore C. Sorensen, a top aide to President John F. Kennedy, says that after the 1961 Bay of Pigs fiasco he heard Kennedy ask himself "How could I have been so stupid to let them go ahead?"

Sorensen gives his account of Kennedy's role in the abortive Cuban invasion in a national magazine. The article is the first of a series of excerpts from a forthcoming book.

Sorensen says the whole Bay of Pigs disaster "seemed to move mysteriously and inexorably toward execution without the President's being able to obtain a firm grip on it or reverse it."

VERSIONS AGREE

Sorensen's account agrees in substance with the version of Kennedy aide Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., published in another magazine this week. While Schlesinger was in on the invasion plan and advised Kennedy against it, Sorensen learned of it afterward in long talks with Kennedy.

Both the Kennedy aides differ with Richard M. Bissell Jr., a former Central Intelligence Agency official, who said in an interview that the invasion might have succeeded if Kennedy hadn't canceled a second air strike at Fidel Castro's air fields.

in fact approved a plan bearing little resemblance to what he thought he had approved."

Sorensen said there had been objections from such men as Schlesinger, whose story appeared in Life, and Sen. J. William Fulbright, D-Ark., and there even were doubts among some of the CIA and military planners.

But those doubts were not pressed, Sorensen wrote, because "both the CIA and the Joint Chiefs were moved more by the necessity of acting swiftly against Castro than by the necessity for caution and success."

OBJECTIONS MADE

"He should have paid more attention to his own politically sound instincts and to the politically knowledgeable men who did voice objections directly," Sorensen wrote, "instead of following only the advice of Latin American experts Adolf Berle Jr. and Thomas Mann."

After the disaster, Sorensen said Kennedy was "aghast at the enormity of his error, angry at having been badly advised by some and let down by others."

Despite frequent briefing, the President was completely misled about the operation, Sorensen said. Kennedy thought it was to be a "quiet infiltration" with two possible outcomes—"national revolt or a flight to the hills," Sorensen wrote.

Instead, the affair was "trumpeted" in advance as

an invasion, and neither a Cuban uprising nor escape of the invaders into the hills was remotely possible, Sorensen said.

In addition, Sorensen said, Kennedy thought that Cuban exile leaders understood the

United States could not overtly help, when in fact they were counting on it.

"The President, having approved the plan with assurances that it would be both clandestine and successful, thus found in fact that it was too large to be

clandestine and too small to be successful," Sorensen wrote.

"Ten thousand exiles might have done it—or 20,000—but not 1400, as bravely and brilliantly as they fought."

Bissell, who was in charge of planning the invasion for

the CIA, said in a Washington Star interview that Kennedy's cancellation of a second air

strike against Castro's air fields might have made a critical difference.

"If we had been able to dump five times the tonnage of bombs on Castro's air fields, we would have had a damned good chance," Bissell said.

The first strike was made early Saturday, April 15, two days before the landing. The second strike was scheduled for dawn Monday after the landing party was ashore.

PROJECT WAS DOOMED

Sorensen said the cancellation of the air strike was unimportant because the project was doomed long before that. He said Kennedy told him later he should have canceled the entire operation, not merely the air strike.

"For it was clear to him by then," Sorensen wrote in Look Magazine, "that he had

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